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ABSTRACT 
 
The post-apartheid government of South Africa has committed itself to achieving 
fundamental transformation of the education system. The government has adopted 
policies and measures that aimed to bring about the goals of equity and redress, and to 
enhance democracy and participation of all groups in development and decision making 
processes at all levels. It is acknowledged that the democratic government has 
accomplished a lot in education within this short period and has made numerous strides in 
enhancing equity, redress and social justice; providing high quality education for all the 
people of South Africa; bringing about democratisation and development; and enhancing 
effectiveness and efficiency. However, despite these apparent achievements, this study 
shows that there have been a number of setbacks and contradictions in the policies which 
have affected the process of bringing about fundamental changes and transformation in 
the education sector. The setbacks and contradictions resulted from factors which have 
affected the type of policies developed to transform the education sector. They also 
affected the formulation and implementation of the policies, thereby limiting the 
achievements of the goals of transformation agenda in education.  
  
Hence, this study examined the politics of transformation and change in the education 
sector by examining the type of policies that have been put in place; their formulation, 
implementation and outcome. The main research questions are:  
• What kind or type of policies have been put in place to transform the education 
sector? 
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• How and by whom were the policies formulated? 
• How are these policies being implemented and what have been the outcomes of 
the process? 
 
Transformation and in particular the policy process is beset with continuous debate, 
contestation and struggle for the success of ideas and interests which are pursued by 
individual actors, groups and policy networks through the institutions. During these 
different stages policies are modified, constituted and reconstituted. As a result, they give 
rise to intended and unintended outcomes which are likely to support or contradict the 
objectives of those policies.  Hence, the process cannot be explained using only one 
approach or theory. Therefore, this study has been situated in ideas, group and network 
and institutional approaches or theories to examine the factors that have affected 
education policies, their formulation and implementation and the overall transformation 
of education in South Africa. It contends that policy change and variation result from 
interaction of ideas and interests within patterns of group and policy networks and preset 
institutions. The study adopts qualitative interpretive methodology in order to question, 
understand and explain institutions; interests groups and ideas; socio economic and 
power relations involved in the process. It also appraises the framework for action.  
  
In addition to conducting literature review, unstructured interviews were held with 
officials from provincial and national Departments of Education, members of national 
and provincial legislatures, principals, teachers, members of school governing bodies, 
learners, Non-governmental organisations, Community based organisations, Faith based 
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organisations, teachers’ and workers’ unions. Observations were made during meetings 
of school governing bodies. The study draws reference from the Eastern Cape Province 
between 1994 and 2002 and looks at the school level (Basic and Further Education 
levels). Reference is also made to selective policy instruments namely, the South African 
Schools Act (SASA) (1996), Curriculum 2005 and Norms and Standards for School 
Funding (1999).  
 
Overall, the findings of the study have shown that various factors have led to setbacks  
and contradictions in the policies that were adopted in education. They have also affected  
the formulation and implementation of the policies, hence exerting certain limitations on  
the achievements of the goals of transformation in education. The factors identified in the  
findings are the outcome of the negotiated settlement and subsequent changes made by  
the apartheid government in education before the 1994 elections; constraints and unequal   
participation of different groups in education policy development in various established  
structures and avenues; drawbacks in the implementation of education policies by  
decentralised structures and agents at various levels. This was exacerbated by lack of  
capacity, lack of adequate resources, lack of commitment and will among some of the  
civil servants coupled with corruption and mismanagement. The legacy of apartheid and 
the homeland governments, together with existing backlogs added another layer. 
Consequently, there were challenges in the economic policy which led to inadequate  
funding for education.  
 
The findings of this study show that competing ideas and interests advanced by groups 
 iii
and networks have impact on decision making, policy content and implementation. 
Therefore, some policies will reflect and maintain the interests of those individual actors, 
groups and policy networks that exerted most influence. The findings also reveal that 
institutional norms and rules, inadequate resources, lack of capacity and skilled human 
resources and economic environment, constrain decision making, policy content and 
implementation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The change from apartheid to democratic government in South Africa was a fundamental 
process that entailed thoroughgoing transformation in the economic, political and social 
spheres. With the advent of democratic rule in South Africa, the government had to 
redress past inequalities and remove discriminatory policies created by the apartheid 
regime (Samuel 1991).  This included reaching out to the majority with adequate 
provision for and access to services, as well as re-directing the way services are resourced 
and delivered (Department of Education 1996). The process entailed establishing 
structures at different levels; and formulating new policies and regulations that would 
enhance equity, democracy and participation, and ensure redress in different areas. One 
of the targets of the above process of transformation has been the education sector which 
was highly contested and beset with a lot of challenges. This study looks at the politics of 
transformation and change in the education sector in South Africa. It examines the type 
of policies that have been put in place; their formulation, implementation and outcome.  
 
0.1 South African Discrimination Policies and Racial Problems  
For centuries the black population in South Africa were discriminated against and denied 
their political and socio economic rights. They were given inferior status and their human 
rights violated. South African racial problems had deep historical roots that began with 
the arrival of the Dutch in the Cape in 1652, and the Great Trek which took place 
between 1835 and 1841 (Elphick and Giliomee 1978; Magubane 1993; Landsberg 2004). 
The above developments led to deprivation, dispossession of land and other property, 
exploitation and violation of human rights of the black population groups in South Africa. 
It also led to the exclusion of blacks from participation in political and economic 
activities. The discovery of minerals, that is, diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886 led to 
the introduction of an array of discriminatory laws and practices intended to keep black 
workers, particularly Africans as a reservoir of cheap and flexible labour (Magubane 
1993). Many of the discriminatory features of the twentieth century South Africa, among 
them, pass laws, urban squatter settlements, impoverished rural homelands and the 
 1
African migrant labour system were first established in the course of South Africa’s 
industrial development (De Kiewiet 1975).  
 
With the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, laws were enacted to 
further marginalise and exclude the black population groups (Oliver and Atmore 1974). 
Through legislation, political and property rights were overwhelmingly restricted to the 
whites while the majority black population was dispossessed and disenfranchised. The 
Mines and Works Act of 1911 stipulated that only whites were allowed to hold skilled 
jobs in the mining industry. The Native Land Act (1913) prohibited Africans from 
owning land in any part of South Africa outside a small area set aside for their use. 
Without the right to vote they could do little to change the laws that excluded them from 
the political process and participation in the economy (Bundy 1987).  
 
Discrimination and exclusion of the black people was intensified when the National Party 
won elections on its apartheid platform in 1948 and took over the running of the 
government. Apartheid was institutionalised and legalised; henceforth racial 
discrimination became the apartheid government’s policy and ideology that dominated 
South Africa’s political, social and economic sphere. According to Magubane: 
    
The policies of apartheid were based on several major pillars: the Population Registration Act; the 
Group Areas Act; the Land Act; the Separate Amenities Act; and the Bantu Education Act. These 
pillars of apartheid controlled and dictated virtually all aspects of people’s lives including their 
places of residence; ownership of property; movement; access to social and recreational amenities; 
access to educational facilities; rights of association; and franchise rights. This social engineering 
of apartheid – separateness – secured a virtual monopoly of power – political, economic etc. for 
whites.  (Magubane 1993:52). 
 
South Africa was proclaimed to be a white man’s country in which members of other 
racial groups were denied political rights. Under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 (and 
later, the Bantu Self Government Act of 1959), Africans were moved to homelands or 
‘bantustans’ and grouped as different ‘nations’ where they would be able to preserve their 
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own cultural identity (Behr 1988). Consequently, coloureds and Indians were also 
excluded from South African politics.  
 
Education is one of the most important pillars in building any society and in ensuring a 
decent life for its people. However, during the apartheid era education was provided 
according to the roles that people were supposed to play in society. In line with its 
policies of discrimination, the apartheid state enacted the Bantu Education Act in 1953 
which ensured that the majority of African children received education that relegated 
them to unskilled manual labour and low status jobs. On the other hand, education 
provided to white children prepared them for an almost complete monopoly of dominant 
positions in society (Lemmer 1991). Like in other sectors, racial discrimination strategies 
were used to allocate funding for education where schools that catered for white people 
received more funds than those allocated to other racial groups. The outcome was 
overcrowded schools, and inadequate classrooms with very high teacher: learner ratios in 
the schools that catered for black people. Consequently, many schools were forced to 
have double sessions. There was inadequate and poor quality teaching due to under-
qualified and un-qualified teachers, poor salaries and working conditions (Lemon 1994).  
 
In addition to the skewed allocation of state funding, the school curricula was saturated 
with racism and dogmatism and based upon outdated theories of learning and teaching 
practices. It perpetuated race, class, gender and ethnic divisions and denied common 
citizenship and national identity. There was no involvement of essential stakeholders in 
the educational sector and curriculum development process (Nasson 1990). There was 
unequal provision of resources for implementing the curriculum. For example, there were 
differences in the preparation and qualifications of teachers; and provision of essential 
resources such as libraries, textbooks, laboratories and other teaching and learning 
materials (Samuels 1990; Behr 1988). The curriculum failed to offer equal access to 
knowledge which resulted in black students’ low and unequal access to both higher 
education opportunities and to the labour market. There was a racially and ethnically 
divided system of governance, with 19 operating departments under 14 different cabinets 
each implementing its own regulations under 12 Education Acts (ANC Policy 
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Framework on Education and Training 1995). The authoritarian system of educational 
governance and management produced a bureaucracy that was inefficient, ineffective and 
of low quality at all levels (Buckland and Hofmeyr 1993). The non consultative and top 
down style of bureaucracy restricted wider participation in policy formulation and 
ensured political control by its top echelons. Teachers, parents, workers, learners and 
community members were also excluded from taking part in education decision making 
(Centre for Education Policy Development 2000).  
 
Resistance to the education system (which was also linked to the overall political 
struggle) was transformed in 1976 with the Soweto students’ uprising where African 
learners boycotted the use of Afrikaans as a medium of learning. Student protests and 
school boycotts intensified throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Lemmer 1991). 
Although such moves were geared towards challenging the state’s education system, they 
were linked to the broader political struggle of black communities against the evils 
perpetrated by the apartheid system. Resistance to the apartheid system emerged from 
different angles despite incremental reforms introduced within the established 
framework. Civic and residents’ associations emerged and organised rent and consumer 
boycotts. Similarly, the trade union movement organised strikes and stay aways 
(Landsberg 2004). Members of the ANC and PAC liberation army infiltrated South 
Africa’s borders and destroyed important apartheid government targets. With the country 
on the verge of civil war, the apartheid government imposed a series of states of 
emergency, used the police and the army against opponents of apartheid and dispatched 
military forces on armed raids into neighbouring states (Kitchen 1994).   
 
The same period also saw the intensification of international resistance against apartheid 
(Kitchen 1994). In the wake of increasing economic and cultural sanctions by the 
international community against the apartheid government, foreign investors withdrew, 
economic output declined and inflation became chronic. Consequently, changes on the 
international and regional levels contributed to a shift of stand by the ANC. The 
Agreement on Namibian independence by Cuba, South Africa and Angola led to the 
ANC’s closure of its military camps in Angola in 1988. The Frontline States (Zambia, 
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Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Angola and Namibia) which had provided different 
kinds of support to the ANC exerted pressure on the latter to opt for a negotiated 
settlement. It was becoming economically difficult for the Frontline States to continue 
supporting the organisation (Friedman 1994; Landsberg 2004). It also became clear to the 
ANC that the Soviet Union which provided a lot of support preferred a negotiated 
settlement rather than a military option to end apartheid. The above developments forced 
both the apartheid government and the ANC to opt for a negotiated settlement 
(Landsberg 2004).  
 
0.2 The Negotiation Process and Outcome 
Different groups and parties participated in the negotiation process. This took place 
initially in a forum known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
and later, the Multi-party Negotiating Forum. The ANC and the National Party (NP) 
government were the major role players in these negotiations. Each of the participating 
groups and parties intended to reach a settlement that was most favourable to its 
constituency and one that would serve its interests and values (Friedman et. al. 1994). 
The negotiations resulted in gains, losses and compromises by different parties and 
groups. Agreements were reached on a number of important aspects some of which have 
affected the transformation of education. Among the agreements reached involved the 
establishment of a democratically elected five year interim Government of National 
Unity led by a political coalition; the constitutional principles and the interim constitution 
as well as legislation required for holding democratic elections; national and provincial 
structures and the allocation of powers between the central government and nine new 
provinces. The interim constitution provided a framework for governing the country for 
five years, while a new constitution was being drafted by the Constituent Assembly. The 
ANC committed itself to sunset clauses where civil servants who served in the apartheid 
government structures were to be retained and their jobs guaranteed for five years 
(Atkinson 1994; Simpson 1996).  
    
In the area of education different groups and constituencies advanced views on how to 
transform the educational system in South Africa in order to address the problems of the 
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apartheid system. Such groups and constituencies included the ANC and the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM), the NP, the business community, the labour movements 
(among them the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), teacher organisations (among them the South 
African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU), the National Professional Teachers’ 
Organisation of South Africa (NAPTOSA) etc. and the international community. 
Different views were also advanced through the National Education and Training Forum 
(NETF) which was one of the fora established as a sectoral negotiating body in the area 
of education. Groups and constituencies presented contesting views on policy proposals 
that were likely to suit their interests and values. Negotiations led to compromises and 
concessions by different groups and constituencies, and agreements were reached that led 
to the adoption of some of the policy proposals. 
 
The African National Congress (ANC) including its allies in the Mass Democratic 
Movement (MDM) and the White minority National Party (NP) advanced two main 
contesting views on the policy proposals. The key policy proposals advanced by ANC 
and MDM were (Ota 1997): 
• the creation of a single national system of education with four levels of governance (national, 
provincial, local and institutional); 
• the provision of ten years of free and compulsory, high quality general education for all the 
nation’s youth; 
• the provision of significantly expanded, high quality early childhood development education 
(ECD) and adult basic education and training (ABET) as well as increased access to and mobility 
within the post-secondary sector for all students, with cost recovery based upon the ability to pay; 
• the establishment of statutory bodies at national and provincial levels so that a wider range of 
stakeholders can participate in the development of educational policy; 
• the establishment of a single national qualification and certification structure; 
• the development of a national core curriculum that integrates academic and vocational 
competencies; 
• support for efforts to develop an adequate supply of competent teachers supported by lifelong 
professional development programmes and collective bargaining; 
• support for students’ freedom of choice regarding their language of instruction and rights of access 
to education.  
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The National Party’s key proposals were (Ota 1997): 
• the creation of a single but highly decentralised national system of education; 
• the provision of increased parental choice through an emphasis on privatisation of schools; 
• the creation of a national core curriculum; 
• a redistribution of educational resources to equalise the expenditures for schools serving whites 
and non-whites; 
• the subsidisation of teacher salaries and of other school expenses at the nation’s predominantly 
white schools. 
 
0.3 The Establishment of a Democratic Government and Transformation of 
Education 
The democratic government established after the 1994 elections outlined the 
transformational vision for South African education as one that was comprehensive and 
which would bring fundamental changes in all major aspects of the educational system. 
Many of the policy proposals advanced by the ANC and the MDM, the NP and different 
groups and constituencies were adopted after the 1994 elections. The principles that 
guided the new government’s transformation process and education policy formulation 
efforts were outlined by the Department of Education (1995) as: 
• equity and redress: ensuring that all forms of unjust differentiation are removed and equal 
opportunities are provided to the majority of South Africans; 
• democratisation: ensuring that democratic, representative and participatory governance prevails; 
• quality: setting educational standards and ensuring that they are maintained in conformity with 
transformative norms, standards and ideals of excellence;   
• development: making certain that the educational system is transformed to enable it to contribute 
to the common good of society; 
• effectiveness and efficiency: ensuring that desired outcomes or objectives are achieved without 
unnecessary duplication and waste; 
• institutional autonomy: ensuring that organisational choice and self regulation are embraced and 
facilitated. 
 
The post 1994 election period witnessed the formulation and implementation of different 
policies. These policies were geared towards bringing fundamental transformation of 
South African education from a racially segregated and differently resourced system into 
a desegregated and more equalised one. Policies were formulated and implemented in 
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different areas. Among these included: democratic governance and democratising 
relations within and outside of the state; establishing of sound management systems at 
national and provincial levels to drive reforms; reviewing and strengthening resource 
allocation on the basis of redress and equity at all levels; taking the discourse of 
education policy and reform into the public arena for debate and discussion; and 
transforming learning by offering a curriculum that would shape future possibilities for 
education and training (Department of Education 1995).  
 
The potential of the above policies and measures to achieve significant transformation 
and change is evident as they are based on the principle of moving the education system 
from its deep rooted inequality and inequity into that of equality and equity, access and 
redress. Evidently, the achievements accomplished so far by the democratic government 
in redressing imbalances, discrimination policies and racial problems outlined in earlier 
sections within this short period need to be commended. However, despite these apparent 
achievements, a number of studies have identified various setbacks and contradictions in 
the policies which have affected the process of bringing about fundamental changes and 
transformation in the education sector (Ota 1997; Jansen 1999; Jansen 2001; Sayed 2001; 
Soudien, Jacklin & Hoadley 2001; Vally & Tleane 2001; Oldfield 2001). Among the 
setbacks identified in the above studies are: that the current education policies have 
maintained inequities along class lines; in some of the policies education is seen and 
treated as a consumer good as opposed to a public right; there is lack of articulation 
within policies; economic strategies and policies pursued have failed to address existing 
inequities in education and so forth (Ota 1997; Sayed 2001; Soudien, Jacklin & Hoadley 
2001; Vally & Tleane 2001; Oldfield 2001).    
 
While acknowledging the above findings, this study shows that the setbacks and 
contradictions resulted from factors which have affected the type of policies developed to 
transform the education sector. They also affected the formulation and implementation of 
the policies, thereby limiting the achievements of the goals of transformation agenda in 
education, namely, enhancing equity, redress and social justice; providing high quality 
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education for all the people of South Africa; bringing about democratisation and 
development; and enhancing effectiveness and efficiency. The factors include: 
 
   0.3.1 Outcome of the Negotiated Settlement 
Some of the compromises, counter-pressures and agreements reached in the negotiated 
settlement have affected and constrained education policies adopted to transform the 
education sector including their formulation and implementation. The establishment of 
the Government of National Unity during the transition period meant that decisions were 
made on the basis of compromise, negotiation and consensus. The outcomes were that the 
pace and extent of transformation in the education sector was limited as the post 
apartheid government was constrained from implementing key aspects of policies. It also 
led to protection of established interests since some communities were able to retain 
privileges and influence policies in their favour. Another aspect in the negotiated 
settlement was the establishment of national and nine provincial governments and the 
allocation of concurrent powers. The arrangement and functioning of systems and 
structures at national, provincial and local levels and corresponding allocation of powers 
and responsibilities led to misinterpretation of policies during implementation. It has also 
created incoherencies and, at times, confusion, constraining the process of policy 
formulation, implementation and delivery of services in education. 
 
Through the sunset clause all civil servants who served in the apartheid government were 
guaranteed positions in the public service during the transition period, 1994 to 1999. 
Although they had skills and experience in generic administrative procedures they lacked 
the new transformation orientation and management styles. While others were willing to 
learn and change, some felt threatened by the new approach and continued with old 
practices that undermined the very changes that were being introduced.  
 
0.3.2 Constraints and Unequal Participation of different Groups in Formulation of 
Education Policies 
Education policy is generated by national and provincial executive representatives and 
then discussed by Heads of Department Committee (HEDCOM) after which it is passed 
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to the Council of Education Ministers (CEM) for approval. It is then presented to Cabinet 
for approval as an executive policy programme and thereafter it is either implemented or 
taken through legislative route to be adopted by parliament. The post apartheid 
government has ensured that education policy development is consultative by 
establishing different structures and avenues to enable participation of different 
stakeholders in the process. Among the structures and avenues are temporary 
commissions established by the Departments of Education, statutory bodies, hearings 
called by the Portfolio Committee on Education, and participation of people and groups 
in the provinces through the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). However, the 
structures and avenues have brought about unequal participation where organised 
privileged groupings, some with different values, aspirations and perceptions had more 
opportunities and pedigree in influencing or inputting into the policy process. Some of 
the structures were heavily weighted toward ministerial appointments. Many stakeholders 
who are responsible for implementation and those who were the target beneficiaries of 
the new education policies were left out of the process. Unequal participation has watered 
down some of the goals of the policies.  
 
0.3.3 Setbacks in the Implementation of Education Policies and Delivery of Services by 
the Decentralised Structures and Agents in different Levels 
The arrangement and functioning of systems and structures at national, provincial and 
local levels and allocation of powers and responsibilities has adversely affected policy 
implementation and delivery of services. The responsibilities of strategic control over 
educational norms and standards has been centralised in the national Department while 
the provinces are charged with policy implementation. Problems of allocation of powers 
and the functioning of structures at the national and provincial levels have resulted in 
misinterpretation of policies by the provincial Departments of Education. It has also led 
to same Departments setting their own priorities and implementing policies selectively. 
The fact that funding was allocated by provincial legislatures exacerbated the problem 
because the national Department had no control of financial resources. In addition, 
coordination between different levels has been wanting, as much as coherence around a 
clear set of outcomes. Challenges to policy implementation still persist although the 
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national Department of Education has attempted to address the problems by restructuring, 
including the establishment of new organisational structures and management strategies, 
and the introduction of other measures and regulations to ensure control, monitoring and 
support. 
 
Another setback in policy implementation has been lack of capacity, motivation and 
commitment among civil servants. Those who served in the apartheid government had 
skills in generic administrative processes and experience. However, some of them lacked 
the orientation, will and commitment to adapt to the new approach and continued to 
function along the old practices, which undermined the implementation of some of the 
new changes that were being introduced. Their senior managers and other new employees 
most of whom were political activists and party cadres had awareness and better 
knowledge of the new orientation and the type of management style that was required. 
However, they lacked the necessary skills and experience to implement them despite the 
fact that they enjoyed political legitimacy and had commitment to transformation. 
Setbacks in education policy implementation can also be attributed to corruption, 
mismanagement and maladministration on the part of some of the civil servants. This is 
more endemic in provinces like the Eastern Cape which incorporated two former 
homelands. 
 
0.3.4 Lack of adequate Public Funding for Education   
Financial constraints have presented a major challenge for the implementation of policies 
and the government’s transformative education programmes. With the establishment of 
the new government, it was realised that the country was already spending a large share 
of its gross domestic product (GDP) on education which is higher than the international 
average for developing countries. Hence, increase in education expenditure would only 
be financed by economic growth. In the initial two years, the post apartheid government 
put forward its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was 
developed prior to the 1994 elections. It entailed massive human resource development as 
one of the key components driving the nation’s economic reconstruction. Under the RDP 
budgeting for education would be based on needs. However, given the scale of injustices 
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and inequities that existed, it was realised that there was a need for more investment than 
the state could afford. Therefore, the government committed itself to a macroeconomic 
policy framework, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy to 
provide stability in the economy and resources for attaining greater distributive justice. 
GEAR is based on an export led strategy with reduced tariff barriers to attract foreign 
investment and stimulate growth. It also emphasizes privatisation of essential state assets 
and removal of exchange controls. It is aimed at reducing the government’s fiscal deficit 
and is focused on a projected economic growth of 6% per annum. However, the fact that 
GEAR failed to attract the amount of required foreign investment as expected and the 
economic growth per annum was at times negligible or very low meant that there was no 
additional funding for educational expenditure. Hence, additional funding to enable 
redress could only be raised by allowing schools to charge fees; redistribution of 
resources through the Equitable Shares Formula and resource targeting of poor schools 
(intra- provincial equity).     
 
Justifications for charging fees were advanced by a number of stakeholders and experts. 
It was argued that since the government might not be able to fund the former Model C 
schools at the same level as before and if no other sources of funding were available it 
might affect the quality of education adversely. Therefore, there was likelihood that 
majority of parents in the middle class might opt to take their children to private schools, 
on the ground that the quality of education in public schools was low. This would deny 
the public schooling system the most influential people like business people, politicians, 
professionals, senior public servants etc. Moreover, allowing the former Model C schools 
to charge fees would free up additional public funds that would be used in addressing 
backlogs in the schools that served the former disadvantaged communities. The outcome 
of charging school fees has been that children from middle class families have stayed in 
public schools because they were able to hire additional teachers and acquire other 
essentials that enhanced provision of quality education. Although it has also enabled 
children of all races from middle class families to access quality education in the former 
Model C schools it has led to continued socio economic imbalances.  
 
 12
The post-apartheid government has attempted to direct greater levels of resources to 
provinces that were historically disadvantaged through the Equitable Shares Formula in 
order to address the issue of jurisdictional inequality and poverty. The Equitable Shares 
Formula was phased in over a period of four years so as to ensure that those provinces 
which were projected to receive real cuts in their budgetary allocations were given 
sufficient time to make the necessary adjustments, either to their expenditures or to their 
own revenues. However, despite these measures which have seen significant allocation to 
poor provinces, inequitable distribution of resources across provinces still remains. The 
poorer provinces, the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu Natal spend the least per 
capita on education while the wealthier provinces like the Western Cape and Gauteng 
spend relatively more per learner. This is despite the fact that the poorer provinces spend 
a proportionately high percentage of their provincial budget on education. 
  
To achieve intra-provincial equity the government has adopted policy measures to direct 
more funding to poorer schools. In 1999 the Department established Norms and 
Standards of School Funding which stipulate funding procedures to promote equity and 
redress within the context of inadequate government spending and more reliance of 
parental financial contribution for education. The Norms and Standards provide the 
poorest public schools and those in bad physical condition a larger resource allocation 
than relatively advantaged schools. The major challenge is that the Norms and Standards 
of School Funding do not redress personnel costs in favour of poor schools, the way it 
does for non-personnel costs. Therefore, the proportion of the budget transferred from 
least poor to most poor is small; limited to non-personnel funds and is most likely to have 
very little impact on reducing inequalities. Wealthier schools remain to benefit as 
personnel costs favour schools that qualify for additional staff based on broader subject 
choices. Consequently, more weight is given to mathematics, science and technical 
subjects. Schools offering these subjects, most of which are former Model C schools, are 
allocated more teachers. Similarly, there have been challenges with the exemption clause 
because some schools exclude learners whose parents are not able to pay or those that are 
likely to apply for exemption.  
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The above factors, namely, the outcome of the negotiated settlement; constraints in 
participation of different groups in the formulation of education policies; setbacks in 
the implementation of education policies and delivery of services by the decentralised 
structures and agents in different levels; and lack of adequate public funding for 
education have impacted adversely on the policies that have been put in place to  
transform the education sector including their formulation and implementation. 
 
0.4 Aims and objectives of the study 
The aim of the study is to examine the transformation process in the education sector 
within the context and setbacks outlined above. This entails looking at the following 
aspects:  
• Analysis of the policies that have been put in place in the education sector by 
assessing the conceptual coherence and content of such policies, including their 
goals, purpose, nature, scope, and context. Examining whether such policies 
contain coherent or contradictory goals and how the tensions between the two 
have been addressed.  
• Examination of policy formulation in the sector will be pursued by looking at how 
the process takes place at different levels. It will also look at existing strategies 
and avenues for participation and how they are functioning. It will examine what 
groups or individuals are included or excluded in the process and how it has 
affected the type of policies that have been formulated to transform the education 
sector.  
• Implementation of policies in the sector will be examined by assessing the 
structures in different levels, agents/groups and institutions involved in the 
process including their powers and functions. It will also look at the level of 
human, financial and other resources provided for implementation. It will 
examine implementation of one policy at the school level to assess which groups  
benefit from the process. 
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0.5 Research questions 
 The main research questions of the study are: 
• What kind or types of policies have been put in place to transform the education 
sector? 
• How and by whom were the policies formulated? 
• How are these policies being implemented and what have been the outcomes of 
the process? 
 
The study is premised on the fact that transformation including policy and the policy 
process involves an examination of a multiplicity of formal and informal negotiations, 
contestations and struggle between competing groups with different perceptions, 
expectations and interests. Transformation is a thorough going process of bringing about 
fundamental change that is designed to unseat the status quo and replace it with a 
qualitatively higher order. Seen in this light, transformation is progressive and beneficial, 
and addresses long term societal interests compared to ad hoc reforms. Transformation 
entails not only policies, institutions and processes but values and attitudes that resonate 
with and support the transformed environment. Contestations and struggle between 
competing groups in the transformation and the policy process as highlighted in the study 
takes place throughout the process, that is, when policy texts are being produced; when 
they are being discussed and scrutinised in public discussions and hearings; when they 
are being adopted in the legislature or other bodies; and when they are being 
implemented, monitored and evaluated. Such actors and groups use a variety of strategies 
and methods to influence decision making, policy content and implementation to their 
own advantage. As a result, in all its stages, the policy process is beset with continuous 
debate, contestations and struggle for the success of ideas and interests which are pursued 
by individual actors, groups and policy networks through the institutions. During these 
different stages policies are modified, constituted and reconstituted. As a result, they give 
rise to intended and unintended outcomes which are likely to support or contradict the 
objectives of those policies.  
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Hence, the examination and analysis of the process has to take above factors into 
consideration. It is also evident that the process cannot be explained using only one 
approach or theory. Therefore, this study has been situated in ideas, group and network 
and institutional approaches or theories to examine the factors that have affected 
education policies, their formulation and implementation and the overall transformation 
of education in South Africa. It contends that policy change and variation result from 
interaction of ideas and interests within patterns of group and policy networks and preset 
institutions.  
 
The study adopts an interpretive qualitative methodology to examine transformation in 
the education sector, namely; the type of policies formulated, the policy development and 
implementation processes and their outcomes. Interpretive qualitative methodology 
entails getting close to research subjects in their natural setting in order to describe and 
understand the world through their eyes. It focuses on the process rather than outcome; 
the actor’s perspective is emphasized; and its primary aim is in-depth description and 
understanding of actions and events (Babbie and Mouton 2004; Valadez and Bamberger 
1994). By using interpretive qualitative methodology the study seeks to expose the 
different views and perceptions of the transformation process in the education sector of 
all the people and groups that have been included in the research, namely policy makers 
and implementers (members of national and provincial legislatures, officials from the 
national and provincial Departments of Education, representatives from political parties, 
teachers, representatives from NGOs, CBOs, FBOs and so forth); those from formerly 
disadvantaged communities who are the intended beneficiaries of the transformation 
process in education; and those from formerly advantaged communities most of whom 
were beneficiaries of the policies of the former regime.  
  
Respondents would be able to look back at the effects that the oppressive and 
discriminatory education policies of the apartheid era have had on them and on the 
education system. They would then make a comparison in terms of the strides taken since 
1994 by the new government in the long journey to redress the effects of past oppressive 
and discriminatory education policies and programmes. The use of interpretive 
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qualitative methodology in this study enables the researcher to: examine and expose the 
effects of education policies on the ground; examine how and where policies increase 
inequality and impact unfairly on particular groups; and provide opportunity to explore 
how injustices and inequalities are produced, reproduced and sustained; and be in a 
position to understand how such processes may be challenged or addressed. 
Although the study looks at the process of transformation and policies in the education 
sector in South Africa, it pays particular attention to the Eastern Cape Province. 
Reference will also be made to selective policy instruments, namely, the South African 
Schools Act (SASA) (1996), Curriculum 2005 and Norms and Standards for School 
Funding (1999). The study will be confined to looking at school level (Basic and Further 
Education levels) and within the period between 1994 and 2002. 
    
This study is divided into six chapters. The first Chapter gives the background 
information on the transformation process and the establishment of the democratic 
government in South Africa. It also discusses the establishment of the Eastern Cape 
province. The second Chapter is divided into two parts. Part I provides a conceptual and 
theoretical perspective on policies and the policy process. Part II outlines different 
research paradigms and methodologies to identify the research path and methodology of 
the study. The third Chapter is divided into two parts. Part I discusses the changes made 
by the apartheid government in the education sector and the schooling system in late 
1980s and early 1990s. Part II outlines the initiatives and different groups involved in 
developing policy options in the education sector before the 1994 elections.   
 
The fourth Chapter is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the structures and 
institutions established and powers granted to those institutions. Part II examines the 
policy development processes after the 1994 elections. Part III looks at education policies 
that emerged after 1994. The fifth Chapter examines policy implementation and its 
outcomes at the provincial level and is presented in two parts. Part I looks at the 
establishment and functioning of the Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Education. 
Part II examines the implementation of school governance in the Eastern Cape. The sixth 
Chapter provides conclusion to the study.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 
 
PART I 
The Negotiated Settlement 
 
This part discusses the negotiation process with the aim of showing that the settlement 
reached on the constitution, the system of government, the staffing of government 
apparatus and the policies of government were a product of negotiation and compromise. 
The negotiations entailed contestation and bargaining by a variety of actors and groups 
with different values, perceptions and preferences. The contestations and negotiations 
particularly by the NP led to compromises which watered down significantly many of the 
ANC’s political goals. Because of this, the South African government system, including 
the education system that was established after 1994, was not a pure product of the 
ANC’s initial political goals. Hence, this part examines the negotiation process in order 
to have a clear understanding of the compromises made in the negotiated settlement, 
some of which have partly affected or contributed to the challenges that impact on 
education policies and the transformation of the education sector. 
  
1.1 Factors which Prompted the Negotiation Process 
 The years from 1976 to 1989 saw profound developments in South Africa which brought 
about the end of the apartheid era (Kitchen 1994).  After the 1976 Soweto Uprising, 
domestic and international resistance to apartheid intensified and reached new heights. In 
order to defuse black anger and to minimize resistance, the apartheid government 
introduced incremental reforms, among them, the enhancement of powers of township 
authorities; an increase of the budget for education; the opening of opportunities for the 
urban black informal economic sector; the granting of bargaining rights to trade unions; 
and the scrapping of pass laws which restricted freedom of movement for black people 
(Pottinger 1994).  In this regard, the move in 1984 to establish a tricameral parliament 
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with segregated chambers that included the so-called Coloureds and Indians was intended 
to fulfil the same purpose for the two population groups (Lawrence 1994). 
  
However, discontent persisted as school and consumer boycotts, strikes and stay aways 
challenged the government’s strategy of co-option. These moves led to the rise of civic 
associations, student and youth movements. The latter mobilized dissent after realising 
that reforms and other measures by the government were intended to entrench apartheid 
and exclude them permanently from participation in governance (Pottinger 1994; Cobbet 
1990). The state reacted by using measures of repression and punishment as a coping 
mechanism.  The security organs were controlled and concentrated in the executive in 
order to enable the President to make use of repression to quell violence and resistance.  
In 1986 a state of emergency was declared giving the security services an upper hand to 
combat resistance without much scrutiny by the courts and the press (Kitchen 1994). The 
cost of sustaining repression was very heavy on the state and measures taken to avert it 
were unsuccessful. Attacks by the African National Congress (ANC) which was 
operating underground increased during that time (Orkin 1995). Moreover, diplomatic 
and cultural isolation and economic sanctions imposed by the international community 
adversely affected the economy (Landsberg 1994). As the above events unfolded, 
attempts to refine and retain apartheid as planned by the state had failed.  The apartheid 
government was forced to think about negotiations. 
 
Changes on the international and regional levels contributed to a shift of stand by the 
ANC. On the international level, the 1986 Reykjavik summit between the Heads of State 
of the US and the Soviet Union paved the way for cooperation rather than confrontation 
among the two superpowers. It also set the stage for cooperation among the superpowers 
in resolving regional conflicts. The agreement led in 1988 to a US brokered accord 
involving Cuba, South Africa and Angola on Namibian independence. According to 
Landsberg: 
 
The parties agreed that the ANC should close its military camps in Angola and leave the country – 
thus radically limiting its remaining military options. This was just the most overt sign of a shift in 
Soviet foreign policy towards seeking negotiated settlements to regional conflicts in which it had 
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previously armed one of the belligerents. While the Soviet Union continued to pledge its support 
to the ANC, it became increasingly clear to the latter that its superpower ally wanted a negotiated 
rather than a military end to apartheid (Landsberg 1994:278-279). 
 
Moreover, the Frontline States exerted pressure on the ANC to negotiate because it was 
difficult for them to maintain the required support due to economic problems. These 
states were therefore obliged to concentrate more on their own national interests. 
Landsberg stated: 
 
The Namibia agreement also confirmed another trend which strengthened the international 
impetus towards a negotiated settlement: it confirmed that the ANC’s allies in neighbouring 
African states found support for its guerrilla war increasingly burdensome, and were prepared to 
withdraw practical support for it where – as it increasingly did – this conflicted with their own 
national interests.  The changing regional and national climate contributed significantly to a shift 
in emphasis by the exiled ANC which from January 1987, began stressing its support for a 
negotiated settlement rather than a military victory (Landsberg 1994:279). 
 
In addition to domestic factors, the apartheid government was also forced to enter into 
negotiations because of changes in the international scene. Cooperation between the 
superpowers led to a US/Soviet Union/European policy alliance on South and Southern 
Africa. The above countries held informal meetings and talks as a team with the apartheid 
government. They pushed the government to opt for negotiations and threatened to 
impose joint sanctions. The success achieved in the negotiations, which led to the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the Namibian settlement in 1989, 
motivated the apartheid government to re-examine the heavy costs of its military option 
and to rethink about negotiation. Informal discussions and secret meetings were held 
between NP officials and the ANC imprisoned leaders. Contacts were also held with the 
leadership of the exiled ANC in Lusaka.  
In February 1990, President F.W. de Klerk legalised more than thirty anti-apartheid 
organisations; released eight long-term political prisoners including Nelson Mandela and 
Walter Sisulu; and removed many emergency regulations concerning the media and 
political detainees. He also announced his intention to negotiate a new democratic 
constitution with his political opponents. In October 1990, the parliament took a symbolic 
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step towards reform by repealing the Separate Amenities Act, which was an important 
legislation that propped the apartheid regime.  Joe Slovo of the ANC made the following 
statement: 
 
We are negotiating because towards the end of the 1980s we concluded that, as a result of its 
escalating crisis, the apartheid power bloc was no longer able to continue ruling in the old way and 
was genuinely seeking some break with the past.  At the same time, we were clearly not dealing 
with a defeated enemy and an early revolutionary seizure of power by the liberation movement 
could not be realistically posed.  This conjecture of the balance of forces (which continues to 
reflect current reality) provided a classic scenario, which placed the possibility of negotiations on 
the agenda.  And we correctly initiated the whole process in which the ANC was accepted as the 
major negotiating adversary (Slovo 1992:36-37).  
 
In discussing the process of democratisation, Sorensen outlines some of the underlying 
reasons for a transition to democracy which confirm the position discussed above: 
 
 Transitions to democracy are only very rarely based on the complete defeat of the elites who stood 
behind the previous authoritarian rule. In the vast majority of cases the transition to democracy is 
based on negotiations with the forces backing the authoritarian regime. The question then 
becomes: Why should the forces behind authoritarian rule enter such negotiations? There can be 
several reasons. Democratic openings are often preceded by a split in the coalition behind 
authoritarian rule, a split behind hardliners and soft liners. The latter may seek more democratic 
forms of rule perhaps in order to get the upper hand in a conflict with hard liners in the face of 
internal and external pressures and perhaps also due to normative commitments to democracy 
(Sorensen 1998:28).    
 
A negotiated settlement on the country’s transition to democracy meant that the process 
of transformation would be less abrupt and would be limited to reforming the existing 
status quo and its institutions.  It also meant that both sides had to engage in discussions 
about the reforms to be introduced because each of the main parties had its own vision of 
the transition to a new order. Negotiations began in December 1991 with the 
establishment of a negotiation forum Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) where nineteen parties participated. However, the negotiations were 
abandoned after achieving little progress due to lack of trust between the NP government 
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and the ANC. There were also deep differences over federalism and power sharing 
(O’Malley 1994; Schneidman 1994). Due to international pressure, negotiations resumed 
in a Multiparty Negotiating Forum in April 1993 following the signing of the Record of 
Understanding between the ANC and the NP. Twenty six political groups participated in 
the negotiating forum. The Record of Understanding committed the NP to accepting an 
interim government that would prepare for the election of a transitional Parliament 
charged with drafting a new constitution. The ANC accepted to share state power with 
the NP during the transitional period (Rantete 1998).     
 
1.2 Agreements Reached on Different Aspects 
Although there were gains and losses through compromises by different parties and 
groups in the negotiations, agreements were reached on a number of important aspects, 
namely: 
 
1.2.1 Power Sharing during Transition Period 
It was agreed that there would be a democratically elected five-year interim Government 
of National Unity (GNU) led by a political coalition. It was also agreed that the centre of 
government would remain in Pretoria and that the new state President would be chosen 
from the party that won the largest majority of votes in nationwide non-racial elections. 
Any party that won at least 5 percent of the seats in parliament would be entitled to a 
place in the cabinet. The transitional parliament was to be charged with drafting and 
adopting a new constitution. The ANC accepted the idea of sharing power with the NP 
during the transition. The agreements on the transitional government represented 
important compromises by both the NP government and the ANC, and helped to set 
precedents for future negotiations. The NP won agreement on its refusal to give the new 
state President broad and extensive powers during the transition period (under the 
previous system the President could override the views of minority parties). However, the 
NP government compromised on the demand for a permanent consensus style 
arrangement to be enshrined in any new constitution by agreeing to a five-year 
transitional government. The arrangement satisfied the NP demand for legally binding 
checks and balances to protect the country’s white minority.  
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On the other hand, the ANC compromised on its earlier insistence on full and immediate 
majority rule, by agreeing to participate in a power sharing arrangement for at least five 
years. A number of writers have expressed their sentiments concerning the motive behind 
the NP insistence on power sharing. According to Jung and Shapiro: 
 
 Government reformers in the NP held most of the trump cards in the negotiations with their 
opponents, the ANC moderates. Although the NP leaders could not impose all of their wishes on 
their opposition, the ANC was not in a position to force the NP into major concessions because the 
ANC was not, militarily or otherwise, well positioned to take over the country without collusion 
from the apartheid regime. South Africa was, as a result, provided with a constitution that gives a 
great deal of power and leverage to its “old establishment” (Jung and Shapiro 1995:296). 
 
Giliomee made a similar assertion: 
 
 The negotiated transition of 1990 to 1994, far from indicating the collapse of the old regime or 
power structure, actually reflects the persistence of an established distribution of social and 
economic power. Power sharing is a product of the strength of the former political and economic 
elite (Giliomee 1995:93).   
 
Hence, the above agreement posed certain limitations to the functioning of the 
democratic government after April 1994. An attitude of give and take in search for 
common ground had come to characterise inter-party relations particularly between the 
ANC and NP in the Government of National Unity. This affected the pace and the extent 
of transformation and the policies formulated in education and their implementation as 
decisions were to be made on the basis of compromise, negotiation and consensus. It also 
ensured that there was no major threat to NP constituencies’ opportunities and privileges. 
Hence, established interests were protected (Chisholm 1994).  
 
1.2.2 Constitutional Principles and the Interim Constitution including Federalism  
The negotiating Forum agreed on a set of binding constitutional principles referred to as 
‘sacred principles’ (O’Malley 1994). These principles had to be reflected in the final 
constitution. According to O’Malley: 
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The device of ‘binding constitutional principles’ was used as a key to unlock the impasse thrown 
up by the necessity of meeting both the conditions of legitimacy and inclusivity. Minorities would 
know that the final constitution, fleshed out and developed by a democratic body, would at least 
respect the core principles negotiated in advance. Such principles would codify the essential 
protections and goals of a democratic society respecting individual rights and those of culture, 
language and religion (O’Malley 1994:45).   
 
The Forum also agreed further on the interim constitution as well as the legislation 
required for holding democratic elections. The Interim Constitution was ratified on 
December 22, 1993 and implemented on April 27, 1994. It provided a framework for 
governing for five years, while a new constitution was being drafted by the Constituent 
Assembly. The final constitution had to comply with the principles embodied in the 
Interim Constitution, including a commitment to a multiparty democracy based on 
universal suffrage; individual rights based on equality and non-discrimination; and 
separation of the powers of government.   
  
The Interim Constitution also contained other key provisions, namely, proportional party 
representation in the legislature with representatives selected from lists of party 
delegates; a bicameral parliament comprising of a 400 seat National Assembly and a 
Senate made up of ten members chosen by each of the nine provinces; and a Constituent 
Assembly made up of both houses of parliament. The Constitution also defined the 
national executive (a President, two Deputy Presidents and the Cabinet), the judicial 
system (a Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and lower level courts), the Office of 
the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Commission on Gender 
Equality, the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and the Public Service 
Commission. Other provisions related to the police and security establishments, the 
continuation or repeal of existing laws, and international agreements and arrangements 
for legislative, executive, public service, legal, financial and other administrative bodies. 
  
Among the schedules attached to the Interim Constitution were those which described the 
country’s nine new provinces including areas that were still under contention, and the 
authority of provincial legislatures. The distribution of central and regional powers were 
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among the issues that were highly contested. In previous years the NP resisted federalism 
and endorsed centralisation. However during the negotiations it joined hands with the 
Democratic Party and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to fight for a favourable settlement in 
the allocation of powers between the central government and the nine new provinces. The 
NP foresaw that it did not stand the prospect of achieving political power at the national 
level. Therefore, dividing executive authority between the central and provincial 
government would guarantee minorities their rights and a stake in the system. At that 
time, both NP and the IFP were able to protect their regional power base through 
promoting decentralised state power. While the NP was the majority party in the Western 
Cape, the IFP dominated in KwaZulu Natal, with each party holding the Premier’s post in 
its respective province. 
 
The ANC which had not favoured federalism on the ground that it was not an effective 
tool for redressing inequalities, accepted it “along with concession of a constitutional 
court, a set of constitutional principles and various other attributes associated with the 
federal model” (Southall 1998:6). Federalism was also retained in the drafting of the final 
constitution. However, Pottie (2000) observes that the 1996 Constitution was designed to 
promote cooperative federalism rather than competitive federalism. He noted: 
 
The emerging politics of federalism in South Africa has not necessarily led to strong and effective 
provincial government. In fact, financial instability, political turmoil and calls from some quarters 
to re-think the role and purpose of provincial government have marked the experience of 
provincial government since 1994 (Pottie 2000:38). 
 
The agreements reached on the establishment and arrangement of a central government 
and nine new provinces, including their functioning and allocation of powers, posed 
major challenges in the formulation and implementation of education policies and the 
overall transformation of the education sector.  
    
1.2.3 Retention of Civil Servants that served in the Apartheid Government  
In the negotiation process the ANC commited itself to a ‘sunset clause’ that is, a 
temporary rule that guaranteed minority participation (Atkinson 1994; Simpson 1996; 
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Sayed 2001). Among the compromises made under this agreement was guaranteeing jobs 
and the retention of civil servants that served within the line departments of apartheid 
government structures for five years. This presented a challenge to the transformation of 
the process of governance in education and other sectors in South Africa in the years that 
followed. Some of the apartheid bureaucracy lacked the required orientation and will to 
adopt the new approach and continued with the old practices, a factor which adversely 
affected the implementation of the transformation agenda. 
 
Due to pressures to meet deadlines, parties in the Negotiating Forum left open areas 
where they were not able to reach agreement. Similarly there were cases where they 
agreed on important rules, but not always on the resultant outcomes. These cases were 
also left open. Among such examples were loopholes in the agreement on the civil 
service. Although it was evident that there would be mutual suspicion between officials 
and elected representatives, and between old and new officials, the negotiations left room 
for differing interpretations of what was allowed and what was not. Such differing 
interpretations provided an opportunity to some people to advance their preferences and 
interests and this affected the process of transformation in education and other sectors. 
  
 1.2.4 Outcomes influenced by the International Community 
The role of the international community in influencing the outcome of the negotiations is 
noteworthy. It has been observed that the international community provided advice and 
exerted significant influence on the negotiation process. Regional government was 
among the issues that were highly contested by the IFP, NP, DP and other smaller parties. 
The influence of western governments, among them Germany, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Austria and Australia was evident. Most of them provided 
suggestions and advice on different types of federal systems with the aim of influencing 
the Negotiating Forum to opt for regional government. Members of different parties in 
the Negotiating Forum were invited for study tours to those countries to see how their 
systems functioned. Local business initiatives collaborated with foreign organisations in 
providing information that would enlighten the negotiating parties on federalism. The 
Consultative Business Movement hosted a workshop on regional government for 
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participants of the Multiparty Negotiating Forum, which was facilitated by a 
representative from the Harvard Law School. According to Landsberg (1994:288), 
“almost full consensus emerged on the importance of regions, how they would be 
constructed, and what the general division of roles would be”. It is suggested that the 
workshop influenced greatly the thinking of the ANC on federalism and regional 
government (Landsberg 1994; Davenport 1998). The regional government model adopted 
by South Africa bears some similarities with the German model. 
 
Evidently many of the above agreements have affected the transformation of the 
education system particularly the policies that have been put in place, their formulation, 
implementation and outcome. This is will be discussed in more detail in other chapters. 
 
1.3 Establishment of Democratic Government in South Africa 
This section discusses the establishment of the democratic government of South Africa. It 
identifies the political and executive powers of the democratic government including the 
new institutions and structures that were put in place to ensure that the transformation of 
education and other sectors take place as stipulated in the Constitution. The ANC took 
office after 1994 elections as the leading party of the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) alongside the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Historically, the ANC and 
the NP have represented very different approaches to economic and social policy. As the 
ANC established some dominance in the policy terrain, significant areas of convergence 
emerged. In the economic realm, both the NP and the ANC accepted that South Africa 
should have a mixed economy. In the social arena, they agreed that the provision of 
education, health and housing for the black majority needed to expand dramatically. As 
far as the civil service was concerned, the ANC conceded the necessity of retaining 
bureaucrats from the old order. However, differences continued to exist and were 
responsible for shaping the outcome of attempts to meet the expectations and policy 
commitments in all sectors. 
 
The new government established after 1994 consists of national, provincial and local 
spheres that are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated (Constitution of the Republic 
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of South Africa 1996 Chapter 3 Section 40(1)). The three levels operate under the 
principle of cooperative government. Notwithstanding this arrangement, some of the 
spheres, particularly the provinces, enjoy limited autonomy while a number of 
responsibilities and powers remain under the national government. This aspect will be 
explored further below.  
 
With the establishment of a democratic government, the new democratically elected 
Parliament sitting as a Constituent Assembly (CA) drafted the final Constitution. 
Members of Parliament held public meetings throughout the country to solicit 
submissions from ordinary people and civil society organisations. Written submissions 
were also made. The 1996 Constitution closely followed the broad outline of 1993 
Interim Constitution but emphasised cooperative federalism. The Constitutional Court 
rejected the first draft of the new constitution because it failed to comply with all the 
binding constitutional principles. However, it was approved in December 1996 after the 
necessary revisions were effected.    
 
1.3.1 The Parliament 
The new Parliament that was established after the democratic elections consisted of the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The National 
Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure that government is governed by 
the people as provided under the Constitution. The National Council of Provinces 
represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the 
national sphere of government. It does this mainly by participating in the national 
legislative process and by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues 
affecting the provinces (Constitution of South Africa, S.42(3)-(4). The National 
Assembly consists of not less than 350 and not more than 400 women and men elected 
through a proportional representation system. In contrast, the NCOP is composed of ten 
delegates from each province (one of whom is the Premier who heads the delegation), 
three special delegates and six permanent delegates (Constitution of South Africa, S.60 
(1)-(2). The purpose of having special and permanent delegates is to ensure that members 
of the provincial legislature are involved in the national legislature.  
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The Constitution outlines the legislative authority of the different spheres of government. 
According to Section 43, the legislative authority at the national sphere is vested in  
Parliament, while that of the provinces is vested in the provincial legislature. The local  
sphere of government is vested in the Municipal Councils (Constitution of the Republic   
of South Africa 1996, Section 43(c)).  
 
1.3.2 Parliamentary Committees 
In many countries, parliaments delegate part of their work to committees because it is not 
possible to conduct all parliamentary affairs together as a body. There are jurisdictions 
that give committees great autonomy but others delegate responsibilities to committees 
and retain decision making power in the plenary. South Africa falls in the second 
category where the Constitution provides for the establishment of committees. However,  
the final decision making power remains with the plenary in order to ensure 
representation of diversity of interests (Murray and Nijzink 2002). Committees are 
charged with the responsibility of developing expertise, undertaking detailed work by 
gathering adequate relevant information that would enable proper decision making on 
public policy. In performing their functions, committees provide a forum for public 
participation during public hearings. According to Murray and Nijzink: 
 
Public hearings are an important method of gathering information and committees provide the best 
forum for this as they act as a vital contact public. Hence they provide a forum for public 
participation, a source of expertise outside the executive and less partisan, more problem oriented 
discussion (Murray and Nijzink 2002:60). 
 
Other avenues for public participation in the policy process in South Africa are provided 
through the establishment of commissions and statutory bodies at national, provincial and 
local levels (Department of Education 1995). This will be discussed in later Chapters. 
 
 1.3.3 The National Executive  
The executive authority of the Government of South Africa is vested in the President. He 
or she is elected by the National Assembly at its first sitting after election and whenever 
necessary to fill a vacancy (Constitution, Section 86 (1). The President appoints the 
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Deputy President and Cabinet Ministers, assigns them powers and responsibilities and he 
or she can also dismiss them. Under the GNU, there were two Deputy Presidents, one 
drawn from the ANC and the other from the NP, the latter being the party with the second 
largest majority. This arrangement changed when the NP pulled out of the GNU (there 
was no provision to that effect in the Constitution).  
 
The NP pulled out of the government in 1996 with the establishment of a permanent 
Constitution, although it could have stayed on till 1999. The reasons provided by NP for 
opting out of the Government of National Unity was that it could not concentrate 
effectively on its role as a major opposition. However, it is suspected that the NP felt that 
the Democratic Party (DP) was making huge inroads into the white vote at the NP’s 
expense. It is also speculated that the NP having secured its position through guarantees 
in the Constitution, saw there was no purpose of staying in the Government of National 
Unity where it could not exert any further significant influence. 
 
1.3.4 Provincial Government 
1.3.4.1  Representation 
The democratic government established nine provincial governments and legislatures in 
1994. This task posed numerous administrative and financial challenges (Southall 1998; 
Pottie 2000; Pampallis 2002). First, the nine provinces had to be demarcated for 
administrative and electoral purposes. Second, the former homelands had to be integrated 
with previous regional structures of the apartheid era. Third, the new provincial 
legislatures had to be established from scratch. 
 
The Constitution provided for provincial legislatures consisting of between 30 and 80 
members (Southall 1998; Pottie 2000). The number of members differs in each province 
and is determined according to the size of the population of the province (Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, Section 105(2)). The Electoral Act provides one seat for 
every 100 000 people whose ordinary place of residence is in the province (Pottie 2000).  
Members of provincial legislatures are elected in terms of proportional representation 
(PR) with an executive consisting of a Premier and Members of Executive Council 
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(MECs). They have limited powers, highly dependent financially on the central 
government and implement government policy. The executive authority of a province is 
vested in the Premier of that province. The Premier appoints members of the Executive 
Council from among members of the provincial legislature. They are charged with 
responsibilities of developing and implementing provincial policies as well as all national 
legislation within the areas where provinces and national government have concurrent 
responsibilities. They also coordinate the functions of the provincial administration and 
its departments.  
 
During the transition period (1994 – 1999), the national and provincial governments were 
structured within the framework of a GNU.  According to GNU rules, consensual politics 
and proportional representation played a role in the composition of the executive and 
distribution of cabinet positions. A party is required to have obtained at least 10% of the 
seats in the provincial legislature to be represented by a member in the Executive 
Council. Provinces with traditional leaders had to establish Houses of Traditional Leaders 
to advise on matters concerning traditional law and customs (Southall 1998).   
 
In the 1994 elections, the ANC gained provincial power by winning the majority of the 
votes in seven out of the nine provinces. Only two other parties, the IFP (with 50.3% of 
the vote in KwaZulu Natal) and the NP (with 53.2% in the Western Cape) gained power 
and premiership in those provinces (Reynolds 2000; Southall 1998). In 1999, the ANC 
gained majority votes in seven provinces. However, in KwaZulu Natal and the Western 
Cape, the ANC formed coalitions with the IFP and the NP although both IFP and NP 
retained the premiership. 
  
As stated in earlier sections, the National Assembly together with the NCOP constitutes 
Parliament. The NCOP may pass legislations in areas falling under functional jurisdiction 
of provinces and all national bills from the National Assembly. However, it cannot 
initiate money bills.  The NCOP replaced the Senate when the 1996 Constitution was 
adopted and came into operation. Southall (1998) outlines the reasons for the adoption of 
the NCOP, which was established from a model borrowed from Germany: 
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This model was borrowed because of dissatisfaction with the Senate, which although composed of 
members elected by the provincial legislatures, was deemed not to have served its role of 
representing the provinces adequately. Indeed once elected, Senators tended to vote along national 
party lines, and there were no formal mechanisms linking them to their provinces’ legislatures or 
governments (Southall 1998:15). 
 
 The NCOP comprises of 90 delegates, that is, ten delegates from each province. Ten 
additional members who represent local government do not have voting rights but may 
address the NCOP and its committees on matters pertaining to local government. The 
provincial delegation is headed by the Premier of the province and consists of six 
permanent delegates and four special delegates. The permanent delegates serve for the 
entire period of five years and are based in Cape Town. The four special delegates are 
appointed from time to time to represent the province on specific matters. The 
composition of special and permanent delegates is required to comply with democratic 
principles including representation of minority parties. Each provincial delegation in the 
NCOP has a single vote that will be cast by the head of the delegation. Agreement is 
reached in the NCOP when at least five provinces vote in favour of a bill. 
 
1.3.4.2  Powers and Functions 
The establishment of nine provinces in terms of the Interim Constitution brought a new 
system of government in South Africa. However, in drafting the 1996 Constitution, “the 
place of the provinces in the overall form of the government/state remained contentious” 
(Pottie 2000:41). The extent of the powers and functions of provinces was part of the 
debate which centred on whether the new government should be federal or centralised. 
With a majority vote in the 1994 elections, the ANC avoided having serious and 
meaningful discussions on the issue of federalism in the Constituent Assembly when the 
1996 Constitution was being drafted. With IFP out of the Constituent Assembly because 
of the ANC negation on the issue of international mediation, the model of cooperative 
government was adopted (Southall 1998). Cooperative government was supposed to 
promote coordinated governance instead of allowing the provinces to compete among 
themselves, and with the national government, for power and resources (Southall 1998; 
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Lodge 1999; Pottie 2000). The 1996 Constitution outlines that in cooperative government 
each level is charged with cooperating with one another in mutual trust and good faith by 
(Constitution Section 41(1)(h): 
(i) Fostering friendly relations; 
(ii) assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common interest; 
(iv) coordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
 
Structures and institutions have been established to promote, facilitate and enhance 
cooperation among the three spheres of government and to provide for mechanisms and 
procedures to settle emerging disputes. 
  
Provincial and national governments have concurrent powers over a number of spheres. 
These include education, health, social welfare, environment, tourism, agriculture and so 
forth. The Constitution provides very few areas of exclusive legislative competence for 
provincial government. The areas are set out in Schedule 5 Part A of the Constitution as: 
abattoirs; ambulance services; archives other than national archives; libraries (other than 
national libraries); liquor licences; museums (other than national museums); provincial 
planning; provincial cultural matters; provincial recreation and amenities; provincial 
sport; provincial roads and traffic; and veterinary services excluding regulation of the 
profession. Provinces have executive authority as long as they possess the necessary 
administrative capacity. Under section 100 of the Constitution, the national government 
may take over functions that a provincial government has failed to perform properly. 
However, the national government is obliged to ensure that provinces build their own 
capacity.  
 
1.3.4.3  Financial Responsibilities   
Provinces are entitled to an equitable share of the revenue collected nationally. Close to 
95% of provincial budgets comes in the form of transfers from the national government 
(Ajam 2001). The transfers take two main forms: 
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 First, provinces’ equitable share of nationally collected revenues. This is calculated on 
the basis of a formula constructed by the National Treasury. The formula reflects several 
provincial variables that include the size of the school age population and the number of 
learners enrolled in public ordinary schools; the distribution of capital needs in education 
and hospital facilities; the size of the rural population in each province; and the size of the 
target population for social security grants weighted by a poverty index (Department of 
Education 2001). The details of the formula are negotiated in the Budget Council 
(comprising of the Minister of Finance and the nine provincial MECs for Finance) and 
approved by the national Cabinet (Ajam 2001).  
  
The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), an advisory body established by the 
Constitution, makes recommendations on what would constitute an equitable division of 
nationally collected revenue among the different spheres of government. The Treasury, 
the Budget Council and the Cabinet must consider the recommendations of the FFC but 
are not bound to follow them (Pampallis 2002). Once received, the equitable share grants 
or block grants may be allocated by the provinces as they wish. Although the formula 
includes specific components that take into account the demand for education, health and 
welfare services, the Department of Finance emphasises that these components are 
neither indicative budgets nor conditional (Ajam 2001).  
 
A second source of provincial revenue (a little over 10%) comes in the form of 
conditional grants transferred from national government. The grants are allocated to 
provinces for specific purposes and may only be used for those purposes (for example 
academic hospital services, school infrastructure and so forth). Conditional grants are 
usually made to compensate for cross border services (for example when a significant 
number of the residents of one province regularly make use of the health or educational 
services of another province) or to ensure that national priorities are reflected in 
provincial budgets (Department of Education 2001). Since these grants are usually made 
on the recommendation of national Ministers and administered through national 
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Departments, national Ministries and Departments are in a position to influence 
expenditure on different activities. 
 
The major problem with provincial financing has been overspending, particularly in the 
period between 1994 and 1999. According to the South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR) (1998) project overruns for the 1997–1998 financial year were 8 
billion, close to 10% of the budgeted provincial allocation of 80.8 billion. Overspending 
was attributed to a number of factors (Financial and Fiscal Commission Report 1998): 
• High wage bill for provincial public servants. Labour unions demanded salary 
increase ranging from 9.5% to 15%. Increase spending on salaries meant that the 
provinces had to abandon new projects and cut capital expenditure.      
• Payment of debts incurred by former homelands before 1994.  
• Lack of budget skills and bad expenditure practices including mismanagement by 
provincial public service staff.  
 
Pottie (2000:45) identified a number of challenges which provinces face regarding 
financing: 
• Provinces do not control salary levels as they are negotiated at the national level. 
• Provinces have limited retrenchment powers. 
• National policy decisions like the extension of free health care to pregnant women and children 
under the age of six eat into provincial revenue by reducing hospital fees while increasing service 
costs. 
• Treasury transferred money to the provinces on a weekly not monthly basis. As a result provinces 
can no longer earn the interest on unspent money through the residual weeks of the month. 
• Costs in education, health and welfare are difficult to drive downwards without provincial 
government bearing the political costs of an unhappy electorate. 
 
Provinces have restricted revenue raising powers. According to Ajam (2001) provinces 
raise only 5% of their total budget, which is collected mainly from user charges such as 
motor vehicle licensing and hospital fees. The remainder of the revenue comes from the 
central government. The Central government has rejected proposals to give provinces 
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power to collect taxes, mostly because of lack of administrative capacity in the provinces 
(Lodge 1999).  
 
1.3.4.4  Governance 
The establishment of different provinces involved creating a unified representative 
system of public service across diverse racial and economic conditions and large 
geographical areas. According to Southall (1998:9), this process of transformation 
entailed: 
• The amalgamation of previously racially based administrations into a single public service split 
between nine provinces and the national ministries. 
• The relocation of staff and resources by the provinces into the departments identified by the 
constitution. 
• The creation (in some cases) of new district level services. 
• The rationalisation of provincial departments in line with the allocation of resources. 
 
Provincial governments were required to come up with new strategies on how to improve 
government administration and delivery of services while at the same time keeping an 
eye on financial sustainability (Lodge 1999). Southall (1998:9) identifies the strategies 
as: 
• reprioritising services in accordance with the policies of the new government; 
• developing management skills to promote better service delivery; 
• bringing services closer to the people, especially in rural areas; 
• re-orienting services to focus on the disadvantaged groups in society. 
 
There are 800 000 public service personnel employed in the provinces out of the 
country’s 1.15 million employees. This includes those who work in labour intensive 
functions such as health and non-tertiary education. Close to 400 000 were inherited from 
former homeland administrations (Pottie 2000). Through the sunset clause all civil 
servants who served in the apartheid government were guaranteed positions in the public 
service during the transition period, 1994 to 1999. This also applied to those who served 
in the former homeland governments. New civil servants and those who were part of the 
old order had to come together to build a public service with a new working culture 
(Department of Education 2001).  Most of the new civil servants lacked the necessary 
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skills and experience to run the public service. On the other hand, although those who 
served in the old apartheid government had required skills in generic administrative 
procedures they lacked skills in the new participatory management and transformation 
orientation. Most of them participated in training that was offered to all civil servants 
working in the new government to equip them with skills and orientation to the new 
management. However, some of them lacked the will to change and used their positions 
to undermine the changes that were being introduced (Pottie 2000; Fataar 2000).  
  
1.4 Discussions Emanating from the Findings 
The above findings reveal that by 1990 there was an accumulation of factors that exerted 
pressure on both the apartheid government and democratic liberation movements to come 
up with a negotiated political settlement to the South African conflict which was 
threatening to engulf the country in violence, bitterness and division. The Negotiating 
Forum, initially CODESA, and then Multiparty Negotiating Forum, included a variety of 
parties and entities which represented different interests, groups and constituencies, the 
NP and the ANC being the main role players. The negotiations entailed contestations and 
bargains by a variety of groups, parties, entities and actors with different values, 
perceptions and preferences. Bargains and contestations particularly by the NP led to 
compromises on many of the political goals and proposals advanced by the ANC.  
 
Hence, the South African government system, including the education system that was 
put in place after the 1994, elections was a product of compromise. Among the 
agreements reached in the negotiation settlement included power sharing during the 
transition period; the adoption of constitutional principles and the interim constitution; 
the establishment of national and provincial governments; the retention of civil servants 
who served in the apartheid government for five years; as well as the adoption of 
legislation for holding democratic elections. Although there are other factors that have 
affected and contributed to the current challenges in the transformation and the 
performance of the government in the education sector, some of the compromises made 
in the negotiated settlement have also played a part. They include: 
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• the establishment of a Government of National Unity and power sharing during 
the transition period. 
• the establishment of national and provincial governments and concurrent powers 
allocated to them. 
• the retention of civil servants who served in the apartheid government for five 
years. 
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PART II 
 
The Eastern Cape Province 
 
This section outlines the background to the establishment of the Eastern Cape Province 
from the old Eastern Cape and the two homelands; the prevalence of poverty and  
underdevelopment particularly in the homeland areas; its political make up before and  
after the 1994 elections; and the overall problems associated with the construction of the  
new provincial administration. 
  
The Eastern Cape Province was established from the amalgamation of the former  
 homelands of Transkei and Ciskei with part of the former Cape Province. Like all the  
other provinces, the boundaries of the Eastern Cape province were confirmed in the Final  
Constitution of 1996. The selection of the provincial capital posed a challenge to the new  
government as five cities contested to be the capital of the new province. Pottie (2000)  
suggests that the interest of so many cities to house the provincial headquarters shows  
that the Eastern Cape administration was being forged out of diverse and competing  
territorial administrations. This was also evident from the fact that many of the top civil  
servants from the Transkei fought hard, hoping that if Mthatha would be the provincial   
capital of the new province they would be able to continue with the privileges and  
opportunities they had. Others had hoped that with the incorporation into South Africa,  
Transkei would have been a tenth province. At the same time many of the old Cape civil  
servants were not willing or keen to integrate and work with their counterparts from 
the former homelands. They preferred to have other towns besides Bhisho and Mthatha as  
the provincial capital (Southall 1998).  
   
 The legacy that the old Transkei and Ciskei brought to the Eastern Cape government was  
close to chaos as their administrations were riddled with corruption, fraud, theft,  
maladministration and inefficiency (Southall 1998; Pottie 2000). There were no reliable  
accounts kept since 1987 and most of the records had either been destroyed or lost. This  
made it difficult to construct asset registers for inherited offices or hold anybody  
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accountable for the chaos that ensued (ECSECC 2001). The problems of the two  
homelands, which now form part of the Eastern Cape Province, can be understood by  
looking at the origins and history of the homeland system.  
  
 1.5 The Establishment of Reserves and the Homeland System 
 The homeland system with its fragmentation, location, size, social and economic 
 deprivation was a product of the process of the South African frontier wars during the  
19th century and legislative confirmation in the 20th century (Bundy 1987). Following the 
discovery of diamonds in the 1860s the British imperial government expanded into 
Southern Africa and engaged in wars with different chiefdoms. In South Africa these 
Wars of Dispossession ended in the 1890s with the British stripping chiefs of their  
powers and replacing them with appointed magistrates and headmen (Bundy 1987;  
Southall and De Sas Kropiwnicki 2003).   
 
Africans were pushed into native reserves, which were barren, infertile and too small to 
provide sufficient means of subsistence for the growing black population. The Native  
Land Act of 1913 confined Africans to the reserves and ensured that they were not  
allowed to obtain land outside this area, denying them of the right to own property. The  
passage of the Act was intended to provide continued access for the supply of low wage  
labour force to white farmers who were, at the time, the dominant group in South African   
politics as well as the magnates of the mines and other industries.  Within a month of the  
passing of the Act, Africans were dispossessed of their land, lost their livestock and                                         
and thrown off white farms. The area set aside for Africans constituted only 7.3 per cent  
of the country’s total land area which was inadequate for the expanding population. In  
1936 the Native Land and Trust Act allocated an additional 15.2 million acres for the 
African population. Most of it was never released and it still proved to be too small for  
expanding population (Butler et. al. 1977). Politically, the Africans were denied the right 
to vote and this made them voiceless and powerless in providing any challenge to the 
system. The Africans in the Cape were granted franchise during the second half of 
the nineteenth century. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, a series of 
Acts and legislations were passed to exclude them from the franchise (Bundy 1987; 
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Mbeki 1992). With the establishment of the Union Government in 1910, the Africans in 
the Cape, like those in the rest of the country, were segregated and excluded from 
participation in the political and economic life of the country, and driven into servitude. 
From 1911, a chain of laws designed to reinforce this segregation and dispossession 
were passed (Oliver and Atmore 1974). 
 
In 1948 the NP took over the administration of the country and moved immediately to 
enact the apartheid policy, which further institutionalised political and racial segregation. 
Among the laws passed were the Bantu Authorities Act, the Bantu Education Act, the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, the pass laws and influx control regulations, and the 
Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act (Landsberg 2004). Under the Bantu 
Authorities Act of 1951 and later the Bantu Self Government Act of 1959, the reserves 
were converted into ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ where Africans were grouped as 
different nations under the pretext that this measure would enable them to preserve their 
own cultural identity.  According to Cross (1994:142) the homeland policy or 
bantustanisation emerged out of a number of concerns: 
• the need for a counter – revolutionary culture that would eventually frustrate the growing national 
consciousness and political consciousness promoted by labour and liberation movements; 
• the need to restructure, rationalise and consolidate the existing mechanisms of control of labour; 
• the need to minimise social, economic and political problems determined by the process of 
secondary industrialisation, which brought about increasing social and economic integration with 
profound political and ideological implications. Bantustanisation was supposed to feed white 
controlled industry with cheap labour in an orderly manner, while consolidating the foundations of 
white supremacy in South Africa. 
    
The Bantu Self Government Act of 1959 designated eight national units or ethnic states 
(later increased to ten) based on linguistic and cultural grounds. In the period between 
1963 and 1981, the ten homeland territories became ‘self governing national states’. Of 
these, only four opted for independent status (Behr 1988). The territory of the homelands 
represented approximately 13 per cent of the total land surface of South Africa, much of 
it being poor agriculture land severely affected by erosion. The homelands remained 
overwhelmingly subservient to South Africa economically depending on income from 
migrant labour. Over 70 per cent of the economically active population was involved in 
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migrant labour system, almost all being male workers. Access to employment in the 
white areas was strictly controlled by the pass laws, and other restrictive legislations.  
 
Under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the apartheid government restructured 
chieftainship, whose powers were curtailed during the British rule. It established a 
hierarchy of Native Authorities (tribal, regional and territorial) with limited executive, 
legislative and judicial powers each guided and controlled by whites. The Promotion of 
Bantu Self Government Act of 1959 gave the ‘self governing states’ a number of 
executive and legislative prerogatives including control of land in the homelands, albeit 
under the utmost supervision of the local native commissioner (Mbeki 1992).  
 
With the introduction of the influx control and the labour bureau system, chiefs were 
given the power by the native commissioner to select workers for contract labour. This 
opened the doors for bribery and corruption. Mbeki noted: 
 
In situations where there was an inexhaustible supply of labour, the chief’s hands could be 
greased. He took money from those whom he recommended for a job under contract, as well as 
from those whom he promised to place at the head of the queue for the next call up for contract 
labour. Even though the chiefs were by and large illiterate they were placed at the head of school 
committees and took instructions from the Native Commissioners on how the schools should be 
run. The teachers had to carry out the chiefs’ instructions or lose their jobs (Mbeki 1992:25).    
 
This demonstrates that the roots of corruption, abuse of power and authoritarianism in the 
homelands originated during the apartheid era and permeated all structures and levels of 
administration. 
 
1.6 Transkei and Ciskei Homelands 
The following two sections look at political developments and class structure in the 
Transkei and Ciskei, the two homelands that were amalgamated into the Eastern Cape 
province. An examination of political developments including class structure shows the 
type of officials that formed the homeland bureaucracy and corruption and 
mismanagement which permeated all sections and structures of civil service since the 
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establishment of the two homeland governments. 
      
1.6.1 Political Developments 
Transkei was granted self-government by Pretoria in 1963 and gained ‘independence’ in 
1976 under the leadership of Chief Kaiser Matanzima, the Paramount Chief of Emigrant 
Thembuland. His authoritarian domination and dictatorial rule lasted until 1986. He 
returned to power four times between the period 1963 and 1986 by the Transkei National 
Independence Party (TNIP) through ‘carefully controlled elections which provided a 
veneer of democracy’ (Southall 1992). The dominance of TNIP was closely associated 
with traditional authority and heavily dependent on the Transkei Defence Force (TDF), 
an instrument and creation of apartheid. Due to involvement in extensive corruption, 
Chief Kaiser Matanzima was forced by the apartheid government to step down in 1986 
although he remained a member of parliament. He was succeeded by his brother Chief 
George Matanzima. The apartheid government took this measure in order to ensure that 
political control was retained by the Matanzimas, thus enabling the government to control 
the homeland and enforce its policies of racial discrimination and segregation (Southall 
1992).  
 
However, allegations of corruption and misappropriation of state funds led to George 
Matanzima and his six ministers being toppled in a bloodless military coup. Stella 
Sicgau, a daughter of the Paramount Chief of Eastern Pondoland was elected by the TNIP 
to take over from George Matanzima. However, she too was ousted from power by the 
army on 30 December 1987 on the grounds that she was involved in corruption or failed 
to act against corrupt managers and other civil servants within the government (Southall 
1992). The homeland was placed under the Transkei Military Council (TMC) headed by 
Bantu Holomisa. The TMC attempted to root out corruption from the government by 
establishing commissions of enquiry to investigate different aspects of corruption, and 
ensuring that George Matanzima, his Minister of Finance and a number of civil servants 
stood trial for massive fraud, theft and malpractice. Such a move earned General 
Holomisa popularity with the Pretoria Government and the people of the homeland.  
However, other people suspected to have been involved in corruption, fraud, malpractice 
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and financial mismanagement and also implicated in the commissions of inquiry (like 
Kaiser Matanzima, Stella Sicgau and Sol Kerzner) did not stand trial. 
  
Holomisa also attempted to distance himself from the Matanzimas’ rule and actions and 
tried to show the people that he was different from the previous dictatorial regimes. He 
maintained close relationship with the liberation movements particularly (the ANC and 
the PAC) while at the same time showing loyalty to the Pretoria government. Three 
weeks before President de Klerk unbanned the liberation movements in 1990, the TMC 
lifted the ban on the ANC, PAC and “national and local opposition groups” (Southall 
1992: 6). In the same year, trade unions in the homeland were allowed to operate and the 
Labour Relations Decree was passed to provide for the registration of trade unions, the 
introduction of structures of collective bargaining and the appointment of a National 
Manpower Commission (Southall 1992). Holomisa and his team (which consisted of 
different grouping from the homeland) participated in the negotiation process. 
 
Transkei’s neighbour, the Ciskei homeland accepted ‘self government’ in 1972. It gained 
‘independence’ in 1981 under Lennox Sebe with his Ciskei National Independence Party 
as the ruling party. Ciskei had a little over half a million people and was divided into 
nineteen separate areas. Many of the areas were new resettlements designated particularly 
for migrant labourers who were forcibly removed from the urban and those areas 
earmarked for white people. The tribal authority system was revived and chiefs and 
headmen were appointed in the new settlements which had been absorbed in the Ciskei 
and had no tribal rulers before. As in the Transkei, the magnitude and level of corruption, 
abuse of power and authoritarianism by the traditional authorities and those who worked 
in the government was immeasurable.  The move to independence in Ciskei brought a lot 
of opposition and resistance from various organised groups on the ground. Residents’ 
associations had formed in most rural areas to resist forced removals and imposition of 
tribal authorities. Consequently, the South African Allied Workers’ Union (SAAWU) 
organised around Mdantsane, a homeland city which was established as a reservoir of 
cheap labour from the rural areas of the homeland to the border area and East London 
industries (Dauda 1996). Although SAAWU was banned, residents associations put up 
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resistance by driving chiefs away, killing their livestock, and burning their houses. 
According to Southall and De Sas Kropiwnicki: 
 
Resistance to Sebe’s regime became more widespread, peaking in early 1990, when it was 
estimated that some two thirds of the homeland’s rural population had either burnt or returned 
their membership cards of the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party. Sebe responded by 
declaring a State of Emergency, ironically on the same day (2 February) as President Willem De 
Klerk made his historic speech unbanning the ANC (Southall and De Sas Kropiwnicki 2003:8).        
 
The Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) overthrew Sebe on 4 March 1990 under the leadership 
of Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. Initially, the new military ruler was very close to the then 
recently unbanned ANC, freeing political prisoners and speaking at a mass rally under the 
ANC banner (Southall and De Sas Kropiwncki 2003; Daily Dispatch April 15, 2004). He 
promised to dismantle the tribal authority system and introduce democratic 
representation. At the same time he encouraged the formation of residents’ associations 
whose number increased dramatically throughout the homeland.  
 
However, things changed and he turned against the ANC. Fearing the power of residents’ 
associations which were pro-ANC, Brigadier Gqozo banned the movement and re-
established the tribal authority in 1991, a measure which brought back violence and 
further protests. Some of the reinstated headmen lost their lives and property while others 
resigned to save themselves. Brigadier Gqozo established the Ciskei Traditional Leaders 
Association (CTLA) to provide material and moral support to the chiefs and headmen. 
Due to persistent protests and violence another State of Emergency was imposed in 
October 1991. In September 1992, the ANC led a mass action campaign in Bhisho to 
bring down the Ciskei homeland government. The campaign ended tragically when 
Ciskei police and troops opened fire killing 29 people and wounding 200. By 1993 the 
support for the homeland government had waned and efforts to resist being 
reincorporated into South Africa proved fruitless.  
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1.6.2 Class Structure  
The political situation in the homelands gave rise to different class structures with varied 
interests and perceptions. These structures have played different roles that have affected 
the process of integration of the homelands as well as the functioning of the new 
province.  
 
As indicated above, chiefs had become salaried government officials as they formed part 
of the state machinery. This changed the role of chiefs who were initially regarded as a 
traditional ruling class. They now assumed the role of political managers having had to 
manage expanded budgets and large homeland bureaucracies. This was necessary in 
order to maintain control over the homeland states and to entrench the segregated system 
of apartheid. However, not all traditional leaders assumed that role or became agents of 
the apartheid government. Some of them resisted the homeland system and refused to be 
co-opted in the new leadership role extended by the apartheid government. They opted to 
join hands with trade unions and the democratic movement which was closely allied to 
the ANC. Many progressive chiefs joined the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South 
Africa (CONTRALESA), which was formed specifically to resist independence being 
forced by Pretoria on KwaNdebele homeland. CONTRALESA brought together 
traditional leaders who were in favour of unitary democratic South Africa and was 
aligned to the ANC.            
 
Traditional leaders who accepted to become agents of the apartheid government 
dominated homeland political power and formed the majority in the homeland 
Legislative Assembly. The effect of this was to marginalize middle class aspirations. 
Southall and De Sas Kropiwnicki noted: 
 
…. the first Bantustan election in Transkei saw forty five elected members of a new Legislative 
Assembly (which replaced the Territorial Authority) outnumbered by sixty four ex officio chiefs. 
Similarly in Ciskei’s first election in 1973, chiefs outnumbered elected members by twenty-nine to 
twenty. Implementation of this model elsewhere ensured that the chiefs were never outnumbered 
in Bantustan legislatures (Southall and De Sas Kropiwnicki 2003:6).       
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By controlling the government machinery, the homeland political leaders provided 
favours and employment to the homeland middle class in return for political loyalty and 
support. The homeland middle class supported the homeland government in order to 
maintain their interests. Therefore they were able to switch their loyalty even when 
changes of leadership occurred. In the case of both Transkei and Ciskei they were able to 
shift their loyalty to Holomisa and Gqozo respectively following the coup in 1987 in the 
former homeland and in 1990 in the latter.              
 
The above two groups, that is the political homeland leaders including chiefs and senior 
administrators and the middle class among the ordinary rank and file homeland civil 
servants, made up the bourgeoisie of the homelands. Despite the fact that they performed 
different functions, they all depended on the state financially and they also had “common 
life style and investments (from bank accounts to liquor stores)” (Southall 1992:11). 
Nzimande (1992) went further and distinguished between different factions of the 
bourgeoisie in South Africa, which were also apparent in the homelands. He outlined 
them as bureaucratic, civil service, corporate and trading factions of the African petty 
bourgeoisie. According to Southall: 
 
The bureaucratic/state manager stratum (whether chiefly or senior administrative) consists of that 
faction of the petty bourgeoisie directly in control of the Bantustan state apparatus and which 
benefits directly from the Bantustan programme. In contrast, the civil service centred fraction is 
only temporarily tied to apartheid structures, and it shares many of the conditions of the working 
class in its relationship with the state and Bantustan authorities (such as poor salaries, tight 
political and administrative control over working lives, late payments and delayed salary 
increases). It is this civil petty bourgeoisie, which Nzimande views as potentially the most reliable 
ally of the working class and of progressive forces within the country (Southall 1992:11).  
 
If Transkei is taken as an example, the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie exerted its 
dominance between 1976 and 1978. This is the time when the Matanzimas, who were 
drawn from chiefly elites, headed the homeland. Their main concern was to secure 
autonomy for the homeland by maintaining independence from Pretoria: this would 
enable Transkei to become self sufficient and gain recognition as an ‘independent state’. 
At the same time the economy remained highly dependent and politically determined by 
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the apartheid government. There was a heavy reliance on funding and seconded officials 
from Pretoria (Peires 1992; Southall 1992; Tapscott 1992). From 1978 there was more 
thinking on rural and regional development. There was another shift towards using 
experts, consultants, academics, NGOs and parastatal organisations than seconded 
officials from Pretoria (Tapscott 1992). Many of the consultants and experts, including 
academics, came from outside South Africa. Their ideas were more acceptable by the 
young middle class civil servants who occupied dominant positions in the homelands. 
This is the time when many of the political homeland leaders and other chiefs had been 
ousted from power and, in the case of Transkei, the TMC under Holomisa had taken over 
the reins of the homeland.  
 
As a measure to impose greater financial control on the homelands, Pretoria established 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) as the major financial source for the 
homelands. The DBSA came up with new apolitical and technocratic strategies as a guide 
for regional development. The strategies were embraced by the young middle class civil 
servants many of whom had been promoted to senior positions within the civil service 
and were eager to manifest their dominancy and control (Tapscott 1992). However, Bank 
(1992) and Spiegel (1992) suggest that the control effected by middle class was only 
apparent in Mthatha as the picture was different in the small towns and in the rural areas.        
 
During the Matanzimas’ reign, which was the time of domination by traditional leaders, 
the small towns in the Transkei were under the control of local property owners and 
traders (Bank 1992). Mismanagement, corruption and inadequate funding led to neglect 
and deterioration of essential services. Movement of people from rural to urban areas due 
to prolonged drought and lack of land led to land invasion and the establishment of 
squatter settlements in the small towns. This provided opportunities and led to the 
formation of radical youth and civic organisations aligned to the ANC, PAC and other 
liberation movements. In the late 1980s and early 1990s these movements were able to 
exert pressure on town councils and local government to allocate land and provide 
services in the squatter settlements. There was greater involvement of such groups in the 
affairs of town councils where many of the old members were forced to resign.     
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Consequently, the rural areas of Transkei were the most affected and haunted by the 
dictatorial control of the Matanzimas (Spiegel 1992; Southall 1992). The homeland 
leadership established structures consisting of chiefs and headmen, police and informers, 
and local officials of the central administration. People in the rural areas were oppressed, 
harassed, intimidated and threatened by chiefs and headmen, police and informers, local 
officials of the homeland administration and a network of intelligence (Spiegel 1992). 
Bureaucratic red tape and corruption by all structures led to many ordinary rural people 
being denied essential services. People in the rural Ciskei were able to form residents’ 
associations and put up resistance against coercive and corrupt traditional authorities. 
However, their counterparts in the Transkei were harassed and instilled with fear and 
threat by Matanzimas’ homeland structures and intelligence networks (Spiegel 1992). 
When the TMC took over, traditional authorities in the rural areas were not disrupted 
neither did Holomisa (himself a chief) take immediate measures to dismantle them. 
 
The magnitude of corruption and mismanagement that existed in the civil service in both 
homelands was destined to contribute to the difficulties of establishing the Eastern Cape 
province. 
  
1.6.3 Economic Developments 
This section presents the economic developments that took place in the homelands of 
Transkei and Ciskei, with the aim of showing the chronic poverty and economic 
difficulties experienced by the people. Pervasive poverty and economic conditions posed 
hardships to many households, many of who were unable to meet their obligations such 
as paying school fees. It also shows the difficulties experienced in maintaining 
partnership  between communities and the Department in funding schools, where 
communities are required to raise additional funds as stipulated in the South African 
Schools Act (SASA) to enable schools supplement the limited funding provided by the 
Department of Education. As a result of poor economic development, enormous backlogs 
existed in the homelands. The above factors affected the amalgamation and the 
functioning of the provincial Department of Education given the fact that more resources 
were needed in the former homelands in order to achieve equity and redress.     
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In the 1960s the apartheid government devised a policy of industrial decentralisation in 
an attempt to create employment for the impoverished and overpopulated Bantustans by 
encouraging the establishment of industries on the borders of these territories. It offered 
incentives and assistance to firms that were prepared to settle at designated towns with 
perceived growth potential. Under this arrangement, industries were established in King 
William’s Town and East London in 1964; Berlin 1972; and Queenstown 1975. The main 
emphasis in this first phase was stimulation of industrial activity on the borders of the 
homelands. In the second phase industries were established in the homelands in the towns 
of Butterworth, Mthatha (1969) and Dimbaza (1975). The third phase entailed the 
introduction of the Regional Industrial Development programme in the Border Ciskei and 
Transkei (BCT) region in 1981. Because the above industrial centres inherited different 
infrastructural facilities, the incentive packages, which were given until 1991, were not 
the same.  
 
An examination of manufacturing industries showed a high degree of dependence on 
decentralisation incentives. Nel and Temple (1992) observed that 65% of the firms would 
not have been located in these regions without incentives. This applied to 81% of Ciskei 
firms and 78% of those in the Transkei. Khanya (2000) found that the single most 
important concession to 58% of the firms were labour incentives, followed by a transport 
subsidy (17%) and an interest subsidy (15%). Workers were subjected to the worst forms 
of exploitation in those industries, many of which were owned by Chinese industrialists 
from Taiwan. The government did not recognise their trade unions and prohibited the 
Wage Board, which was originally set up to protect the interests of unskilled and 
unorganised workers from determining wages for African workers employed in the 
border industries (Mbeki 1992).  
 
The workers fell in two categories, namely, those who commuted daily to work on the 
‘white’ side of the border and those that worked in industries in the homeland side. It was 
assumed that the wage earned from the industries would supplement earnings from 
subsistence farming. However, in reality the wages earned from the industries and from 
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migrant labour were the only real source of income for many households in the 
homelands (Mbeki 1992; Khanya 2000). Efforts to attract industry to the industrial 
development points of the BCT had limitations. O’Neill (1988:15) noted that the 
industrial centres “lacked local linkages and the forces of agglomeration necessary to 
promote sustained and meaningful development”. He concluded that backward and 
forward linkages in the region were very weak.  
    
The presence of the majority of industrialists was highly artificial because they relied 
mainly on state assistance for their survival and would not have settled in the area if there 
were no incentive packages (O’Neill 1988). This was evident towards the end of 1980s 
and early 1990s, the time that the incentives and subsidies were removed. Most industries 
in the homelands relocated to South Africa increasing the already soaring numbers of 
unemployed people. According to Nel and Tempe:  
 
Despite having 13.5 per cent of the country’s population, the Gross Geographic Product (GGP) of 
the BCT region was only 6.6 per cent of the national total. In Transkei the unemployment rate 
averaged an estimated 32 per cent with a peak of 83 per cent in the Cofimvaba district. 
Unemployment in the Ciskei ranged from 26 – 35 per cent in urban areas, to 60 – 76 per cent in 
rural areas. Concomitant with the restricted employment opportunities was a very high 
dependency rate in the area. On average each working person in the Border region supported 1.6 
others, compared to four others in the Ciskei and between 10 – 14 people in the Transkei (Nel and 
Tempe 1992:165).   
 
As stated above, land shortage coupled with growing population in the homelands are 
among the factors that prevented most people from earning a living from agriculture. 
Many of those who were able to farm engaged mainly in subsistence agriculture for home 
consumption with very negligible production for sale (Bembridge 1984). Moreover, since 
the 1980s, recession and drought significantly affected agricultural production in the 
homelands (Perret 2002). As a result a very large proportion of food requirements (70 per 
cent) was bought from outside the homelands of Ciskei and Transkei (Beinart 1992). 
There has also been very heavy dependence on migrant labour earnings since the end of 
19th century in both homelands (Bembridge 1984).   
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Within the same period there was a decline in the number of people employed in the 
mines, and those employed in the manufacturing sector, in the homelands, and in the 
border region (Bembridge 1984; Nel and Temple 1992; Beinart 1992). Southall states: 
 
In Transkei, for instance, whereas the number of Transkeian migrants employed by the Chamber 
of Mines declined from 125 900 in 1980 to 104 328 in 1990, the number of jobs in manufacturing 
within the homeland similarly decreased from 19 600 in 1985 to 14 621 in 1989. By the mid 
1980s, in any case, minimum wage rates in Transkei had fallen to less than a third of their 
equivalent in South Africa and to far below the official Household Subsistence Level (Southall 
1992:17).   
 
Although the NP government provided funding for social services and other activities in 
the homelands, the provision of basic services was hampered by inadequate funding, 
weak incentives at the lower levels and poor management and administration. Lack of 
legitimacy of the homeland states created suspicion and exacerbated the lack of 
cooperation that existed between the government, service delivery agencies and the 
communities that were to be served, thus further weakened the effectiveness of 
development efforts (Donaldson 1992). On many occasions, priorities were given to 
programmes and projects which promoted and favoured elites’ interests. Political 
influence and patronage was a determining criteria in both homelands in the provision 
and delivery of services, particularly in the provision of schools, clinics, water supply, 
irrigation schemes, road construction projects, housing and allocation of commercial 
farmland (Southall, Segar and Donaldson 1992). 
 
1.6.4  Establishment of the Eastern Cape Province 
1.6.4.1  Socio-economic Conditions Pertaining in the Province 
The homelands of Ciskei and Transkei with their historical legacies and problems were 
amalgamated to the new Eastern Cape province. It was one of the seven ANC led 
provinces with Mr. Raymond Mhlaba (an ANC veteran) as the Premier until 1997 when 
he stepped down. In addition to managing the new province, the magnitude of the 
problems and chaos that ensued from the amalgamation process and integration of 
different departments, were too overwhelming for the aging Premier to handle. He was 
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succeeded by Reverend Makhenkhesi Stofile who was a national Member of Parliament. 
Given the historical, economical and political situation of the homelands, the Eastern 
Cape province became, and still remains, one the poorest provinces in South Africa, with 
70% of its 6.2 million inhabitants classified as poor. Sixty four per cent of the people (4 
million+) live in the rural areas under harsh conditions of deprivation (May 1998).  
 
Female-headed households constitute a large proportion of households and male 
absenteeism (a result of migration) stands at 31% compared to the national average of 
5%. Poverty in the province is deeply entrenched with 41% of households earning a 
monthly income of less than R 400 and a further 41% earning less than R 1 400. The 
average annual income per person is R 3 985 compared to R 8 148 nationally (Brooks 
2000). The province is among those with most children of school going age living below 
the poverty line. This is illustrated in Table I below.  
 
Table I: Number of Children Living Below the Poverty Line, 1995 
 
 
Eastern Cape 
Northern Cape 
Western Cape 
Free State 
KwaZulu Natal 
Gauteng 
Mpumalanga 
Northern Province 
North West 
 
Total 
 
 
2 182 949 
   130 048 
   276 138 
   635 735 
2 159 992 
   555 426 
   636 157 
1 923 925 
   585 890 
 
9 086 260 
    
% of all children in province 
70 
52 
22 
57 
56 
25 
52 
74 
49 
 
54 
 
 
 
Source: EduSource Data News 1997 
 
Rural unemployment stands at 49%, the former Transkei being the area with least 
employment opportunities. As a result, over 40% of the households rely on pensions and 
close to 20% on remittances from migrant labour (Khanya 2000). According to May 
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(1998), more than 75% of the people in this region live in informal structures; 85% do 
not have access to adequate sanitation and water. Most of them do not have access to 
electricity. Abject poverty is also prevalent in the rapidly growing informal settlements 
around major urban and peri-urban areas.  
 
Per capita income of South Africa’s provinces ranges from US$ 1072 in the Limpopo 
Province to US$ 6290 in Gauteng. This means that Limpopo and the Eastern Cape 
Province are among the poorest, while Gauteng and the Western Cape are the richest.  
The Human Development Index (HDI) also reflects disparities in human development 
with the Limpopo and the Eastern Cape Provinces having the lowest and Western Cape 
and Gauteng the highest (see Table II). 
 
Table II: Provincial GGP Per Capita and HDI 
 
Province
Western Cape 
Eastern Cape 
Northern Cape 
KwaZulu Natal 
Free State 
North West 
Gauteng 
Mpumalanga 
Northern Province 
South Africa 
GGP Per Capita
4096 
1550 
3368 
2323 
3003 
2202 
6290 
3662 
1072 
3160 
 
 
HDI
0.826 
0.507 
0.698 
0.602 
0.657 
0.543 
0.818 
0.694 
0.470 
0.677 
 
Source: Financial and Fiscal Commission 1998 
 
The province has one of the largest education systems in South Africa with over 6400 
schools, 2.3 million learners and more than 75 000 teachers and officials (Education 
Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand Quarterly Review of Education and Training in 
South Africa 2000; Eastern Cape Department of Education (2000a)). ECSECC (2001) 
observed that in the 1996 School Register of Needs Survey, nationally the province had 
the greatest shortage of classrooms (15 538) relative to the number of learners and the 
highest learner classroom ratio (50:9) and teacher learner ratio (43:1 in primary and 33:1 
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in secondary schools). A total of 61674 educators (30% males and 70% females) were 
employed in schools in the province. It is estimated that 42% of the educators were 
under-qualified (ECSECC 2001; Eastern Cape Department of Education (2000a)).  
 
Substantial inequalities also existed between regions within the province. The western 
part of the province is better resourced compared to the former Bantustan homelands of 
Ciskei and Transkei. Former homeland schools lacked administrators or managers. 
Educators performed the functions of teachers as well as administrators whilst in the 
former white schools, teachers taught and administrators managed. This division of 
labour existed in the more privileged schools between educators and administrators and 
this ensured that there was no confusion between the different functional areas of 
education management and teaching. 
 
Most infrastructure backlogs were inherited from the former Transkei and Ciskei 
homelands, where learner: educator ratio is in excess of 80:1 and grossly inadequate 
classrooms and poorly constructed school buildings are still common. According to the 
provincial Department of Education there is a shortage of 40% of classrooms at the 
primary level and 34% at the secondary level. Other infra-structural shortages include 
limited teaching and learning materials, the need to provide running water and toilets to 
more than 34% of the schools, electricity to 77% of the schools, and telecommunication 
services to 81% of the schools (Eastern Cape Department of Education (2000a). 
 
 By 1997 education levels among adults living in the province continued to reflect the 
rapid nature of apartheid education.  According to a study by the Education Policy Unit, 
University of Witwatersrand (2000), most Africans over the age of 20 years had none or 
only some primary education and only 3% had any higher education. This is a great 
contrast compared to education levels among the white population. There is a direct 
correlation between education and unemployment, and poverty levels in the province (see 
Table III). 
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Table III: Racial Inequalities in Education and Employment in the Eastern Cape 
 
 Education Levels of People over 20 years of age in 1997 Unemployment 
Rate in 1997 in 
% 
 None Some 
Primary 
Some 
Secondary 
Grade 12 Higher 
Education 
 
Africans 
Coloureds 
Indians 
Whites 
Total 
24.3 
10.2 
6.5 
1.2 
19.3 
27.8 
30.7 
13.1 
1.2 
24.2 
32.8 
42.5 
40.0 
32.8 
33.9 
12.1 
12.3 
30.4 
40.7 
16.4 
3.0 
4.3 
10.0 
24.1 
6.5 
46.8 
23.0 
13.5 
6.7 
37.5 
 
Source: Education Policy Unit University of Witwatersrand: Quarterly Review of 
Education and Training in South Africa 2000. 
 
1.6.4.2 Amalgamation of the Civil Service 
Following the amalgamation process, the Eastern Cape Province inherited 140 000 civil 
servants from the three areas, that is, 55 000 from the Transkei, 20 000 from Ciskei and 
65 000 from the Cape Provincial Administration. The Constitution provided for the 
Province to have 10 departments and these were to be formed out of 20 from the 
Transkei, 19 from Ciskei and the former Cape Province (Southall 1998; Pottie 2000).  
 
With such a high increase in the number of civil servants, the budget for salaries rose 
from 41 per cent in 1994 to 45 per cent in 1995 as opposed to the 35 percent 
recommended by the national government (Southall 1998). The establishment of the 
province entailed rationalisation of the civil service, which included reduction of its size 
as well as the introduction of uniform public service conditions. It was discovered that 
the province had an excess of 18 000 staff and they were to be retrenched. The South 
African Public Servants’ Association (formed from a merger between civil servants’ 
organisations from the Transkei and Ciskei) objected to the measure which was 
abandoned. It was decided that the excess staff would be reduced through attrition, that 
is, replacement would not be made against positions of those who retired.  
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 Moreover, there were plans to replace the old civil servants with new ones in top 
positions. This was supposed to be done through a voluntary retrenchment scheme. 
Unfortunately, most of the people who opted for voluntary retrenchment were those with 
most skills and experience, leaving the province with a bureaucracy that lacked skills and 
capacity. Many of the top civil servants holding positions of Director-Generals and 
Deputy Director-Generals (mainly from the Transkei and Ciskei) and who could not be 
absorbed were reluctant to take junior positions in the new province. They were also not 
willing to take up voluntary retrenchment packages. As a result, they occupied 
supernumerary positions and were paid by the province without performing any official 
duties (Southall 1998).  
 
Rationalisation of the civil service entailed also removing ghost workers in the province 
estimated to be close to 10 000, at a cost of R 400 million per annum. The exercise of 
removing ghost workers involved working together with special police/security teams 
and Home Affairs Department to reissue new identity documents to all civil servants; 
conduct head count including putting physical security measures at the workplaces; and 
investigate fraud in all departments (Southall 1998; Khanya 2000; Pottie 2000). There 
were unauthorised appointments, salary increments and promotions made particularly in 
the Transkei and Ciskei before the end of the negotiations. The problem was more serious 
in the Transkei where, according to Southall (1998:10) “most of some 4 300 people 
subsequently declared to have been promoted irregularly throughout the country as a 
whole had been promoted in Transkei”.  
 
The provincial government established a number of commissions of inquiry to investigate 
corruption, illegal promotions, maladministration and misappropriation, fraud, theft and 
ghost pensions. The findings from the inquiries were implemented and some of the 
problems were addressed. However, the Departments of Health, Education and Social 
Development, where most thefts, misappropriations and fraud were initially reported, 
failed to prosecute most of the culprits (ECSECC 2001). The new province inherited 9.9 
billion in debts incurred by the two homeland governments. It was written off by the 
 57 
 
national government (Southall 1998). A lot of people who were entitled to pension funds 
were not able to receive them and facilities, supplies and support to schools were not 
provided. Health services particularly to the rural areas were poor and inadequate. 
  
1.6.4.3 Political Developments  
The ANC had been the dominant party in the province where it enjoyed the support of the 
majority of the people. Many of its top leaders were either born in the province or 
educated in its historical institutions and colleges. Therefore, it is not by coincidence that 
the ANC won 84% of the votes in 1994, taking 48 seats in the provincial legislature. The 
NP (later New National Party) won 9.8% of the votes and took 6 seats; the DP 2.1% and 
had 1 seat; and the PAC won 2.0% with 1 seat.  The emergence of a new party, the 
United Democratic Movement (UDM), changed the picture in the 1999 provincial 
elections.  
 
The UDM was formed in 1997 from a merger of Bantu Holomisa’s National Consultative 
Forum (NCF) and Roelf Meyer’s New Movement Process (NMP) (Ndletyana 1999; 
Southall 1999). As stated above, Holomisa had gained popularity from the people, chiefs, 
and civil servants for the bold measures he took to address corruption and 
maladministration, during Matanzimas’ reign. He had also welcomed and provided a 
home for the liberation movements and individuals at a time when they were banned in 
South Africa. With the establishment of the democratic government, Holomisa was 
elected a Member of Parliament under the ANC ticket and became a Deputy Minister of 
Environmental Affairs. He was dismissed from the ANC in 1996 following his revelation 
to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Stella Sicgau’s involvement in bribery 
and corruption (Ndletyana 1999). On the other hand, Roelf Meyer left the NP following 
the refusal of the latter to form a new party or merge with another one in order to rid 
itself of its shoddy past history. With the formation of the UDM, Holomisa was elected 
its leader and Roelf Meyer deputy.  
 
The membership of UDM was drawn from different groups and areas of South Africa, 
but the largest membership was from the Eastern Cape province, mostly the former 
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Transkei. The UDM claimed that it would score enough votes to be the official 
opposition in the province. It campaigned and capitalised on a number of issues that 
would swing voters to its advantage during the elections. Failures and weaknesses in the 
ANC led provincial government were exposed. Among them was the amalgamation and 
rationalisation of the civil service with associated retrenchments, which threatened the 
job security of most civil servants, particularly those in the former homelands that  had 
been declared supernumeraries. Government delays in effecting new salaries for civil 
servants who had received rank promotions was also brought up as an issue by the UDM.  
 
The UDM also levelled criticisms against the ANC led government on delivery of 
services. Many people especially those from the rural areas of the former homelands were 
dissatisfied with services they received on such areas as education, health and social 
welfare. Some of them did not receive their pensions and disability grants because of 
problems of re-registration and delays in processing the grants. With inadequate funding 
and tight financial control, many Departments failed to implement their programmes as 
planned. This was aggravated by inefficiency, corruption, mismanagement and 
maladministration on the side of provincial civil servants.  
 
Both the ANC and UDM competed to win the support of traditional leaders. Although the 
latter purported to be above politics by allowing all parties to campaign in their areas, it 
was evident that CONTRALESA was aligned to the ANC as two of their members were 
on its national candidate list. On the other hand, the relationship between traditional 
leaders and the Eastern Cape provincial government was not good. Traditional leaders 
were dissatisfied with the fact that provincial House of Traditional Leaders performed 
only an advisory role, and their powers were being taken by elected local councils. They 
were also unhappy with the provincial government’s refusal to provide remuneration to 
headmen in the Ciskei (Southall and De Sas Kropiwnicki 2003). However, the ANC 
realised they needed the support of traditional leaders in order to overtake UDM by 
gaining more votes.   
In March 1999 the provincial government provided salary increase to 227 traditional 
leaders enticing them with material benefits. According to Southall and De Sas 
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Kropiwnicki (2003:17), paramount chiefs were paid R 322 800 and chiefs 77 472 per 
annum. A five million rand package was extended to the Transkei’s 997 headmen. 
However, the UDM gained significant votes in the Eastern Cape in 1999 elections. It won 
13.6% of the votes and took 9 seats thereby becoming the official opposition. The results 
are presented in Table IV.          
 
Table 1V: 1994 and 1999 Eastern Cape Provincial Election Results 
 
 % of Votes in 
1994 
Number of Seats  % of Votes in 
1999 
Number of Seats 
ANC 84.4 48 73.80 47 
NNP   9.8   6   3.22   2 
DP   2.1   1   6.29   4 
PAC   2.0   1   1.14   1 
UDM Did not Exist Did not Exist 13.60   9 
Others  1.7 -   1.95 - 
Total 100.0 56 100.0 63 
 
Source: Adopted from Southall R (1999:165) ANC Versus the UDM in the Eastern Cape     
 
In the 2004 elections, the ANC gained majority of the votes in the provincial elections in 
the Eastern Cape. However, inefficiencies, corruption, mismanagement and poor service 
delivery by the provincial administration is still prevalent. The powers of traditional 
leaders have not been clarified and tension between them and local government 
councillors continue to be felt.  However, despite the above limitations, the UDM has not 
been able to provide a credible challenge to the ANC. Most votes for the UDM from the 
Eastern Cape came from Mthatha. Although it still remained official opposition, it did not 
gain more votes because it was confronted with divisions and defections at both national 
and provincial levels. Consequently, its performance and challenge as an official 
opposition in the Eastern Cape province has not been impressive (Ndletyana 1999; 
Southall 1999).   
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1.7 Concluding Remarks 
The above discussions show that the Wars of Dispossession during colonial times and the 
apartheid policy marginalized the Africans by confining them into reserves and later 
segregated homelands. The condition of the people was exacerbated by poverty and 
unemployment and also by a corrupt, inhuman and inefficient system managed by self 
interest seeking elites. These factors have been carried over to the new Eastern Cape 
Province which has been beset by unending and unsolvable problems. The province 
remains one of the poorest and most populated provinces with a very unsatisfactory 
record of policy implementation and service delivery in almost all sectors.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
PART I 
 
 Theoretical Perspective on Policies and the Policy Process 
 
Education reform in developing countries is driven by a number of pressures. Population 
growth and persistent fiscal crises require governments to search for educational policies 
that are cost effective while maintaining quality standards and providing access to as 
many citizens as possible. At the same time provision of education is one of the basic 
tasks required of governments. According to Nkinyangi (1991) “failure to provide access 
to education to all who desire it on terms that they regard as acceptable may call into 
question the government’s legitimacy and threaten its political survival” (p. 159).  
 
The aim of educational reform is intended to fulfil two compelling purposes, namely, to 
promote economic efficiency and enhance legitimacy of the government (Kelly 1990; 
Plank and Adams 1989; Jacobson and Berne 1993). However, the two imperatives 
require quite different policies. Policies intended to increase efficiency of the education 
system may undermine the legitimacy of the government. For example, measures to 
increase school fees or reduce labour costs may be met with strong opposition from 
learners, parents and teachers. According to Nkinyangi (1991) “opposition from 
educated, cohesive, articulate interests threatens government survival” (p.157). On the 
other hand, the implementation of policies intended to enhance government legitimacy 
may be beyond the means available to public officials. For example, the right of all 
citizens to basic education is enshrined in most national constitutions, and the goal of 
providing primary education for all children is reaffirmed by governments and 
international agencies every decade (Cheru 1995).  Despite these declarations, however, 
millions of children remain out of school; and enrolment rates are falling in many 
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countries (Jacobson and Berne 1993). 
 
As third world countries attempt to achieve the two competing objectives (Plank and 
Adams 1989). However, they are confronted with a number of problems in executing this 
pursuit. According to Plank (1990), “any significant change in the structure and operation 
of the educational system or in the distribution of educational resources is almost certain 
to damage the interests of one or more powerful constituencies. Educational reforms are 
therefore undertaken only at the peril of the government’s survival” (p. 540). However, in 
the eyes of both domestic and international audiences failure to address educational 
reforms reveals lack of commitment to address a looming crisis. Inaction on such crisis 
threatens both domestic political support and the government’s claim on international aid 
(Jacobson and Berne 1993).  Therefore, often policy initiatives are announced but they 
remain symbolic as they are likely not to be implemented as planned. Plank (1990) 
argues: 
 
The consequence of this dilemma is a style of politics familiar in countries around the world, in 
which governments have much to gain from the announcement of policy initiatives and much to 
lose from their implementation. Under these circumstances reform rhetoric stands in for reform; 
the declaration of good intentions takes the place of action that might lead to its realisation. In 
adopting such strategies, politicians and public officials seek to gain the benefits that derive from 
active engagement with crises while avoiding the costs that inevitably accompany changes in the 
prevailing distribution of resources (Plank 1990:556).  
 
Therefore, in many developing countries, transformation, or a stated agenda of 
educational reform, very often fails to achieve its goals. 
 
Another major factor of education reform in developing countries is that the reform 
agenda is defined to a large extent by policy prescriptions from the international aid 
agencies especially the World Bank (Cheru 1995; World Bank 1992). Jacobson and 
Berne (1993:165) outline two main reasons: 
• In many countries, the revenues that public officials can generate locally are no longer sufficient 
for the responsibilities assumed by the government in education as in other sectors. Local revenues 
are fully committed to the payment of salaries and the maintenance of existing programmes, and 
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resources needed to fund new initiatives must be sought abroad.  The power to provide or 
withhold resources from governments gives the donors tremendous leverage over educational 
policies, such as deciding which reforms will be funded or withdrawal of support from 
governments that adopt policies disapproved.  
 
• Most educational research in developing countries is conducted by or under the auspices of the 
principal aid agencies, primarily because they provide the necessary human and financial 
resources. Unconstrained by local political considerations, the policy preferences of the 
international aid agencies are guided largely by research-based assessments of “what works.”  As 
a result, the linkage between educational research and educational policy is much tighter than in 
developed countries. 
 
Due to the pervasive influence of the international aid agencies, the educational reforms 
adopted in developing countries tend to look much the same (Samoff 1992). Kelly (1990) 
provided as examples those countries that are engaged in macroeconomic policy changes 
under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 
changes which are often referred to as ‘structural adjustment programmes’ include 
substantial reductions in public employment and public expenditure. Mkandawire (2002) 
observed that because the education system often accounts for the largest share of both, 
governments have been advised to adopt educational reforms that reduce costs and 
increase efficiency. 
 
As a result, governments have reduced public expenditure on education and shifted costs 
of schooling from public agencies to parents and communities. Governments have also 
imposed or increased school fees and delegated the responsibility for the management 
and governance, including construction and maintenance of schools, to local authorities 
or local governing bodies (Bray 1988; Jimenez 1987; Sayed 2001). A second strategy 
adopted in many countries involves attempts to reduce the real value of teachers’ salaries, 
which usually constitute the largest share of educational expenditures. Measures 
undertaken in this regard include the encouragement of multiple-shift schools or 
multigrade classrooms as an effort to increase pupil or teacher ratios without 
commensurate increase in teachers’ pay (Jacobson and Berne 1993). The above shows 
some of the political dilemma of education reform. The political survival of many 
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governments is increasingly dependent on striking a balance between the policy changes 
necessary to ensure the flow of foreign assistance and investment and education policies 
and programmes that advance the interests of key domestic constituencies (Nkinyangi 
1991). In most cases this has resulted in an increase of poverty and the undermining of 
equity agenda and programmes. Therefore in examining the transformation of education 
in South Africa and the policies developed there is need to take the above dilemma into 
consideration. 
 
 2.1 Definitions and Dimension of Policies 
There have been numerous competing definitions of public policy, some complex and 
others very simple (Jenkins 1978; Dye 1982; Anderson 1990; Howlett & Ramesh 1995; 
Parsons 1995). Heclo (1972:85) defined policy as “course of action or inaction rather 
than specific decisions or inactions”. It affects a large number of people and if chosen by 
government it becomes public policy.  Policy is not an administrative rule applicable to a 
large single case but a settled course of action that is to be followed in numerous cases. 
According to Easton (1965:130), “policy consists of a web of decisions and actions that 
allocate values”. Jenkins (1978:15) defined policy as a “set of interrelated decisions taken 
by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of 
achieving them within a specified situation where those decisions should, in principle, be 
within the power of those actors to achieve”. Parsons wrote:  
   
To have a policy is to have rational reasons or arguments, which contain both a claim to an 
understanding of a problem and a solution. It puts forward what is and what ought to be done. A 
policy offers a kind of theory upon which a claim for legitimacy is made. With the development of 
modern electoral and party systems in industrial societies policy discourse became the main mode 
through which electorates engaged with politics and rival political elites. The politician is expected 
to have policies as a shop is expected to have goods to sell (Parsons 1995:15). 
 
Despite these variations, most authors agree on certain key aspects, namely, that public 
policies result from decisions made by governments.  It can also be concluded from the 
above statements that policy is a matter of authoritative allocation of values and the 
operational statements of those values or statements of prescriptive intent (Odora 1994). 
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Authoritative allocation of values draws our minds to the centrality of power and control 
that is inherent in the concept of policy (Kogan 1975; Prunty 1985; Ham & Hill 1984; 
Ball 1990). But policy is also about discourse and power (Ball 1990; Parsons 1995). 
Discourse designates the relationship between power and knowledge, and as shown by 
Foucault (1981), knowledge and power are inseparable. Forms of power are infused 
within knowledge, and power relations permeate forms of knowledge. According to 
Foucault: 
 
Discourses are not just about what can be said, and thought; but also about who can speak, when, 
where, and what authority. It is both an instrument and an effect of power; but also a hindrance, a 
stumbling block, a point of resistance, and a starting point for an opposing strategy (Foucault 
1981:25). 
 
Discourse provides a particular and pertinent way of understanding policy formulation, 
because policies are pre-eminently statements about practice, the way things could or 
should be which rest upon and derive from statements about the world, or about the way 
things are. Consequently, policies embody claims to speak with authority. They 
legitimate and initiate practices in the world, and they privilege certain visions and 
interests. According to Ball (1990), they are intended to bring about idealised solutions to 
diagnosed problems. They are “in short, power/knowledge configurations par excellence” 
(Odora 1994). 
 
2.2 Types of Policies 
In order for policies to be effective vehicles for bringing about transformation or 
fundamental change, there should be among other things willingness to depart from the 
values and procedures of the existing order (Sabatier 1987). In other words, there should 
be an initiative and agreement to come up with the right type of policies, which, if 
implemented effectively, would likely bring about the expected changes. Policies can be 
classified as either substantive or procedural (Lowi 1972; Anderson 1990; Parsons 1995). 
Substantive policies spell out what the government is going to do and procedural policies 
deal with who is going to take action and through which mechanisms. Policies can also 
be differentiated on the basis of the nature of their impact on society and the relationships 
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among those involved in policy formulation. They can be classified as regulatory, 
distributive or redistributive (Anderson 1990; Parsons 1995). Regulatory policies impose 
restrictions or limitations on the behaviour of individuals or groups. For this reason, 
regulatory decisions involve conflict between two groups or coalitions of groups, with 
one side seeking to impose control on the other. Hence in regulatory policies some 
groups may emerge as clear winners or losers, although winners might get less than they 
initially sought due to bargaining and compromises.  
 
Re-distributive policies involve deliberate efforts by the government to shift the 
allocation of wealth, income, property or rights among broad classes or groups of the 
population in order to seek more fundamental change. Re-distributive policies are 
difficult to secure because they involve reallocation of money or power (including 
rights). Those who possess money or power rarely yield them willingly, and often they 
have the means for resistance (Ball 1990). Distributive policies involve the distribution of 
services or benefits to a particular or general segment of the population (communities, 
groups, individuals, corporations etc.). In most cases those who seek benefits do not 
compete directly with one another and their benefits do not represent a direct cost to any 
specific group. Hence distributive policies create only winners and no specific losers 
although taxpayers pay for their financial costs (Anderson 1990; parsons 1995). 
 
Public policies have also been distinguished as material or symbolic policies depending 
on the kind of benefits they allocate (Anderson 1990; Jansen 2001). Material policies 
provide either tangible resources or substantive power to their beneficiaries or impose 
disadvantages on those who are adversely affected. Symbolic policies have little or no 
material impact on the people. They do not deliver what they appear to deliver and no 
tangible advantages or disadvantages are allocated by them. Most policies are neither 
entirely material nor symbolic. Policies that are material on the basis of legislative 
language may be rendered symbolic by administrative action or by failure of the 
legislature to provide adequate funds for their implementation (Jansen 2001). At the same 
time, policies may also move from being symbolic to a more material status.  In South 
Africa, education policies have substantive, material, symbolic and re-distribution 
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aspects. Although policies emphasize goals of equity, redress and social justice, some 
have had limitations which have affected the attainment of those ends (Pampallis 2001; 
Sayed 2001).   
 
2.3 The Policy Process 
The policy process can be examined either by looking at the former as a series of 
activities or by understanding the influences on the process. An examination of the policy 
process as a series of activities does not emphasise “the content of public policy to be 
studied, but rather the process by which public policy is developed, implemented and 
changed” (Dye 1992:24). The term policy process in this case refers to specific phases of 
policy making arrayed through time, namely, agenda setting, policy formulation, policy 
adoption, policy implementation and policy assessment (Jones 1977; Anderson 1990; 
Parsons 1995; Lungu 2001). This is illustrated in Table V below. 
 
Table V: Phases of the Policy Making Process 
 
PHASE                                    CHARACTERISTICS 
AGENDA SETTING Elected and appointed officials place problems on the public agenda. Many 
problems are not acted on at all, while others are addressed only after long 
delays. 
POLICY 
FORMULATION 
Officials formulate alternative policies to deal with a problem. Alternative 
policies assume the form of executive orders, court decisions, and legislative 
acts. 
POLICY ADOPTION A policy alternative is adopted with the support of a legislative majority, 
consensus among agency directors, or a court decision. 
POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
An adopted policy is carried out by administrative units which mobilise financial 
and human resources to comply with the policy. 
POLICY 
ASSESSMENT 
Auditing and accounting units in government determine whether executive 
agencies, legislatures, and courts are in compliance with statutory requirements 
of a policy and achieving its objectives. 
 
Source: Dunn W. (1994:16) Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction 
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An examination of the policy process also entails looking at the forces that shape public 
policy in the country. Anderson (1990) groups these forces into official and unofficial 
actors; the former being governmental institutions such as the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary and the latter comprising of institutions of civil society, such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), policy networks and communities, other interest 
groups and ordinary citizens. Dye (1992) provides another perspective based on who 
makes policy and how policy is made. He identifies elites, the masses, interest groups and 
governmental institutions as actors who exert influence on public policy. He outlines 
methods of making policies as non-rational intuitive, rational comprehensive, incremental 
and game simulation methods. Warwick (1974) presents a model of the forces that shape 
public policy by adopting the environmental approach to policy analysis. He classifies the 
policy environment into external and internal sub-environments for an agency, with 
remote and proximate elements in both environments. Remote factors are those that exert 
direct impact on the policy process, while proximate elements exert indirect influences.   
  
The above show the complexity of the policy process and change. Sabatier (1999: 3-4) 
elaborated the following reasons for the complexity of the policy process:  
• There are normally hundreds of actors from interest groups and from 
governmental agencies and legislatures at different levels of government, 
researchers and journalists involved in one or more aspects of the process. Each of 
these actors (either individual or corporate) has potentially different values, 
interests, perceptions of the situation and policy preferences. 
• Policy debates among actors in the course of legislative hearings, litigation and 
proposed administrative regulations typically involve very technical disputes over 
the severity of a problem, its causes, and the probable impact of alternative policy 
solutions. Understanding the policy process requires attention to the role that such 
debates play in the overall process. 
• Most disputes involve deeply held values, interests, wealth, and at some point, 
authoritative coercion. Given these stakes, policy disputes seldom resemble polite 
academic debates. Instead, most actors face enormous temptations to present 
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evidence selectively, to misrepresent the position of their opponents or coerce and 
discredit them, or generally distort the situation to their advantage.  
 
Hence, the policy process including initiation, formulation, implementation and 
evaluation should be seen as a process that entail inquiry and scrutiny with multiplicity of 
negotiations, formal and informal, contestation and struggle between competing groups. 
According to Soudien (2001:79) these struggles and contestations are initiated “at the 
point where policies are originated, are present in the moment of their inscription, are 
active when policies are mediated to the public, are signally present when they are 
implemented, and continue to shape the meaning of particular policies when they are 
subjected to critique in the academy and elsewhere”. Hence policies are constituted and 
reconstituted within a continuum of activities and events from the textual to the practical. 
Within these processes of constitution and reconstitution, outcomes arise which may be 
both intended and unintended, and support or contradict the initial objectives of those 
policies. Given these circumstances and as researchers scrutinize the development and 
implementation of particular policies, there should be a tighter articulation of concerns in 
order to bring into the open issues about exclusionary, divisive and socially unjust 
intentions and consequences of such policies (Ozga 2000; Power 1994). 
 
2.4 Approaches/Theories of the Policy Process and Change 
While the above discussions show the complexity of the policy process, different studies 
articulate theories to examine the process. They include institutional, socio-economic, 
group and network and rational choice approaches and ideas. This study has been situated 
in ideas, group and networks and institutional approaches to discuss education policies, 
their formulation and implementation and the overall transformation of the education 
sector in South Africa. The following discussion presents the approaches that have been 
adopted to examine the study and outlines how they have been used to explain the 
findings. 
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2.4.1 Institutional Approach 
Traditionally, the institutional approach concentrated on describing the formal and legal 
aspects of governmental institutions, mainly by discussing their formal organisation, rules 
and procedures, legal powers, activities and functions. However, the approach did not pay 
much attention to explain how institutions operate or analyse public policies produced by 
institutions. Moreover, it did not attempt to find out the relationships between 
institutional structures and public policies (Anderson 1990; Dye 1992). Subsequently, the 
attention of this approach shifted from concentrating on formalism to analysing the 
political processes within governmental institutions focussing on the behaviour of 
participants in the process and on political realities. Despite its narrow focus, the 
approach, can be used in public policy analysis. Government institutions are a set of 
regularised patterns of human behaviour known as rules or structures that persist over 
time. It is their differing kinds of behaviour patterns that distinguish, for example, courts 
from legislatures, from administrative agencies and so forth (Anderson 1992).  
 
Rules and structures can affect decision making and the content of public policy. Rules 
and structural arrangements are not neutral and may give advantage to certain interests in 
society and withhold advantage from other interests. Some individuals and groups may 
enjoy greater access to government power under one set of structural characteristics than 
under another. Hence, the structure of governmental institutions may have important 
policy consequences. In some countries, power is allocated among different spheres or 
levels of government creating different arenas of action. In other cases certain groups 
may be able to exert more influence if policy is made at the national level whereas others 
may benefit more from policy making at state, regional or local level.  
 
The institutional approach has been adopted in the study to explain the effect of 
institutional rules or structures, arrangements and procedures on the adoption and content 
of policies in the education sector in South Africa including the outcome of their 
implementation. This has been done by examining the institutions (the provincial and 
National Departments of Education, the National Assembly, the NCOP, provincial 
legislatures and other bodies) and the existing rules or structures of the institutions that 
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are involved in the education policy process. It also entailed an analysis of the formal 
policy process in education, and the different roles performed by each institution in the 
process. The above measures were intended to find out and explain whether institutional 
rules or structures facilitate certain policy outcomes or obstruct others; and whether they 
provide advantage to certain interests in the society or exclude others. The institutional 
approach has also been adopted to examine the organisation or arrangements of the 
institutions at different levels (national, provincial, district and school levels) including 
allocation of powers, roles and responsibilities in the policy process (formulation and 
implementation of policies in education) as provided for in the South African 
Constitution.  
 
However, the institutional approach has limitations. For instance, it may not be adequate 
to analyse how different actors in the different institutional structures, for example, the 
executive (the national and provincial Departments of Education) relate to and interact 
informally with others (like groups from outside the government, politicians and other 
members of the executive and bureaucracy); and how such relationships and interactions 
affect the outcome of the policy process in education. Moreover, the Constitution of 
South Africa provides for consultations and participation of citizens in the policy process. 
However, the institutional approach on its own may not enable us to find out the informal 
relationships and interactions which take place in the different institutions and avenues 
between different groups during the policy, or on how they effect on the adoption and 
content of the policy.  
 
The institutional approach is also not adequate to analyse the types of individuals or 
groups that participate or are involved in consultations, including their values, aspirations 
and perceptions; and those that are excluded from the process. This would have enabled 
the study to explain how inclusion and exclusion of different groups and individuals 
affect the adoption and content of policies and their implementation. Limitations of the 
institutional approach have been identified in a number of studies. John (1999) observes 
that the institutional approach tend to neglect the political and social context that affect 
the way formal rules and norms operate. Actors and groups often circumvent institutions 
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in the pursuit of their interests. Moreover, any institution becomes weak if powerful 
groups gain access to public decision making. Groups have resources to ensure that 
politicians and bureaucrats respond to their interests no matter what legal and 
constitutional weapons are available (Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Brown 1995). 
 
Therefore, because of the above identified limitations, this study has complemented 
institutional approach with group and network approaches in order to analyse and explain 
the effects of the above factors on the adoption and content of education policies and 
their implementation. 
    
2.4.2 Group and Network Approaches 
Group and network approaches put emphasis on the importance of interactions between 
the participants in the policy process. This approach believes that policy emerges as a 
result of informal patterns of association. Groups formulate policy and set the agenda; 
they try to influence the legislative and executive decisions; they usually participate in 
the decisions about implementation; and they often implement policies themselves 
(Sabatier 1999).  
 
Group approaches contend that politics is about associational relationships because the 
formal office holders are part of interest-based politics as are groups themselves. This 
means the political parties are composed of groups; legislatures are constituted by group 
action; and different branches of public bureaucracies behave as groups in their own right 
(John 1999; Anderson 1992). Hence, the assumption is that the state is fragmented into 
different groups each with its own interests and preferences. Advocates of this approach 
contend also that patterns of alliances build up between outsider groups and the 
bureaucrats. Such groups have different interests, preferences and powers. The patterns of 
alliances are the ones which structure policy rather than the institutions of the state.  
 
 The group approach has been criticised for overstating the importance of groups while 
understating the independent and creative role played by public officials in the policy 
process. They have also portrayed a stable relationship between a few sets of actors 
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without taking into consideration the complexity of the policy process. It is contended 
that the emergence of a variety of issues besides economic interests, the prevalence of 
protest, the questioning of authority and the loss of certainty and optimism in solving 
policy problems, has led to a vast number of relationships between groups of all types 
and rendered the policy process more complex (John 1999). This has led to policy 
networks approach which explains relationships between decision makers as they operate 
in different policy sectors. The approach assumes that different kinds of relationships 
between group representatives, bureaucrats, politicians and other participants in decision-
making account for the different ways in which political systems process policy (Rhodes 
1994; Browne 1995; John 1999; Sabatier 1999).   
          
The policy networks approach is different from group politics because the relationships 
between decision makers matter rather than the effect of the presence of an organisation 
in the policy process. It is similar to the group account because it focuses on the informal 
and associative aspects of decision making rather than just on formal arrangements. 
Rhodes (1994) asserts that currently policy making involves a large number of 
institutions in each policy sector, especially when there are elected and non-elected 
bodies. Although decision making bodies have room to manoeuvre, they normally 
depend on each other particularly in exchange of resources and therefore   form close 
dependent relationships within a policy sector. Relationships within a network can be 
established by finding out the extent in which actors are linked to each other; the person 
who facilitates contact of members/actors; the closeness of actors to each other in terms 
of the structure of their relationship and the number of clusters of relationships. 
 
 Studies have distinguished between policy networks and policy communities (Rhodes 
1994; Wilks and Wright 1987). Policy networks have loose, open and reputable actors. 
They are interest based and participants are assumed to take part in the networks in order 
to further their own ends, which are seen as essentially material and are recognisable 
from outside the network. On the other hand, policy communities are characterised by 
stable and restricted membership, shared responsibilities for delivering services and a 
high level of integration. They consist of a small number of participants who know each 
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other well and who share the same values and policy goals. It is assumed that policy 
emerges through the roles and values of the participants rather than through debates in the 
wider democratic process (Wilks and Wright 1987; Rhodes 1994; John 1999). It is also 
contended that networks are a space within which trust and policy learning takes place. 
Through networks actors trust each other and exchange policy ideas, and this enhances 
the potential for policy learning (Rhodes 1994; Browne 1995; John 1999).      
  
Groups and policy networks approach has been adopted in the study to explain the effect 
of relationships and informal interactions that obtain in different groups and policy 
networks. These groups and networks consist of interest groups and lobbyists, experts, 
policy analysts, executive administrators, bureaucracies, politicians and other actors that 
formulate and implement policies in education. This study examines different groups and 
policy networks that were involved in the policy process in particular the South African 
Schools Act, their organisation and the relationships among them. It identifies how actors 
contacted each other and whether there were specific leaders in each group; it examines 
how close the actors were to each other in terms of the structure of their relationship; and 
it identifies the advantages and other means they had that enabled the groups and 
networks to remain cohesive. Furthermore, the study seeks to find out and explain how 
groups and networks involved in the policy process operate; why and how relationships 
in the networks are formed; how they are organised; how actors manage differences; and 
how all these factors affect decision making, the content of policies and the outcome of 
their implementation.  
  
Groups and policy networks approach has also been adopted to examine the strategies 
and methods used by different groups and networks to influence the policy process in 
each phase and in various institutional structures. The main focus is on the South African 
Schools Act although reference is also been made to other education policies. However, 
the group and network approach on its own is not adequate to explain decision making, 
policy variation and change. The issue of how networks operate, their values, aspirations, 
interests and goals, including the strategies and methods adopted to influence decision 
making in the policy process, entails the inclusion of the role of ideas in the analysis. It is 
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assumed that ideas as well as interests bind together groups and individuals in a policy 
sector, thus enabling them to exert more influence (Anderson 1992; Parsons 1995; John 
1999).  
 
2.4.3 Ideas 
The policy process is permeated by ideas about what the best course of action should be 
and beliefs about how goals could be achieved. However, in most cases there are 
disagreements on the goals to be achieved and the proper course of action to adopt. 
Therefore, participants or advocates of the policy process put forward contrary ideas and 
engage with others in order to emerge as winners. The advocates may be experts, agency 
bureaucrats, legislators, politicians, members of different interest groups and so forth. 
Hence, an ideas based approach emphasises that the reasons for policy change and 
stability are the ideas that the above actors bring to the public sphere. According to John: 
 
The reason why there are particular policies is because people believe and try to influence decision 
makers on the basis that there is a right course of action. Advocacy is a causal factor over and 
above the effects on policy of political institutions and interests (John 1999:145). 
  
Consequently, Majone (1989) argue that in addition to political institutions and interests, 
advocacy has effect on policy change. He asserts: “We miss a great deal if we try to 
understand policy making solely in terms of power, influence and bargaining to the 
exclusion of debate and argument” (Majone 1989:2). Policy analysts contend that 
different public decision making fora in the US and many other countries weigh different 
forms of evidence and attempts to find solutions to policy problems. John argues: 
 
The reasons for policy change are not about the relative power of interests, each with resources 
and strategies which would be able to influence outcomes in the policy process, but about the 
quality of arguments which the lobbyists and government agencies present to other public decision 
makers, to the media and to other experts. The ability of participants to argue, to use rhetoric and 
to marshal evidence is crucial. Even if these activities are not scientific and hide real interests, the 
conditions of public discourse demand objective and research based argument. Advocacy, 
however, elaborates and stylizes such arguments while not challenging their rationality (John 
1999:155).    
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Studies have shown the importance placed on the role of analysis and ideas on the policy 
process. Sabatier (1999) identified advocacy coalitions which form in a policy sector and 
whose members are distinguished from other coalitions through shared values and 
knowledge. Hence, a policy position is based on claims about knowledge and causation. 
Policy analysis and the growing need of arguments for evidence in the policy process has 
led to an increase in the number of participants, among them experts, analysts, 
technicians, journalists, television programmers, researchers and academics. 
 
Ideas have also been important in policy transfers (Majone 1989). Policy makers 
investigate the negative and positive experiences of others and seek to apply the policy to 
their own contexts. In such cases what is being transferred ideas. Most of the approaches 
to the policy change and variation show the importance of ideas in the process. 
Institutional analysis emphasises the importance of ideas. As Krasner (1988) has shown, 
institutions effect actions by shaping the interpretation of problems and possible solutions 
and by constraining the choice of solutions and the way and extent to which they can be 
implemented. Although ideas do not have an independent existence, they play a major 
role in group and network approaches; and debates and ideas are advanced by competing 
interests to influence policies to their favour (Lindblom 1980; Ham & Hill 1984; Sabatier 
1999; Kingdon 1984). This study examines ideas on policy options and debates advanced 
by different interests in education before and after the 1994 elections. It also analyses the 
strategies and methods used to advance those ideas by examining groups, networks and 
stakeholders with different interests and influences that participated and shaped the 
policy process in education as well as those that were excluded.  
 
The discussion above shows that one approach on its own is not adequate to explain the 
policy process. As a result, the study has been located in ideas, group and networks and 
institutional approaches to examine the factors that have influenced policies, their 
formulation and implementation and the overall transformation in education.  
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2.5 Agenda Setting and the Policy Formulation Process 
Of the many demands made on the government by the public, only a small portion will 
receive serious consideration by policy makers. The demands that policy makers feel 
compelled to respond to by taking action at a given time constitute the policy agenda. In 
order to achieve agenda status, a problem must become an issue or a “matter requiring 
public attention” (Anderson 1990:82). Agenda building is therefore a competitive process 
and a number of factors determine whether an issue gets on an agenda. Cobb and Elder 
(1983) distinguish between a systemic or public agenda and an institutional or formal 
agenda. The two Authors consider a systemic agenda as consisting of all issues that are 
commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention 
and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing government 
authority. This is normally a society’s agenda for the discussion of public problems. 
However, due to a number of reasons, - lack of time, resources, interest, information and 
lack of will among officials, - only small portions of the problems on the systemic agenda 
are considered by government to warrant serious attention. 
    
Agenda setting is followed by formulation of policy proposals, which involves the 
development of a pertinent and acceptable proposed course of action (Anderson 1990; 
Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Parsons 1995). Although policy makers agree on existence of 
a problem, they may not share the same understanding of its causes and repercussions. 
Therefore, searching for a proposed course of action or solution to a problem will 
encounter a variety of pressures and contestation. The whole process from agenda setting 
to policy formulation and the choice of policy options is not orderly but a complex and 
messy exercise where issues and proposed policy options are included or excluded (Jones 
1984; Majone 1989).  
 
2.5.1 Inclusion and exclusion of Issues in Agenda Setting and the Policy Formulation 
Process 
Studies view both agenda setting and policy formulation as activities in which issues are 
included and excluded and bias is mobilised to ensure that conflict is managed and 
contained (Cobb & Elder 1983; Ham & Hill 1984; Howlett and Ramesh 1995). Cobb & 
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Elder (1983) show how the interests of those who have a dominant position and power in 
a policy field are motivated to ensure that the issue is confined within few groups/areas, 
and also how an issue may be expanded if it is to impact on a decision making process. 
Schattschneider wrote: 
 
All forms of political organisations have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of 
conflict and the suppression of others because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues 
are organised into politics while others are organised out. There is no more certain way to destroy 
the meaning of politics than to treat all issues as if they were free and equal. The inequality of 
issues simplifies the interpretation of politics. Politics becomes meaningful when we establish our 
priorities  (Schattschneider 1960:71). 
 
Consequently Parsons confirmed: 
 
Policy holders operate on the strategy that issues need to be privatised and confined within tight 
parameters while those who are challenging dominant policies will engage in socialising and 
politicising the issue, from expert to public and from a private arena to a public arena. Winners 
seek conflict reduction, losers conflict expansion. Agenda setting in this sense is therefore to do 
with the management of conflict, and institutions and organisations have a central role (Parsons 
1995:130).  
 
2.5.2 Power, Decision Making and Participation in the Policy Formulation Process 
Dahl showed how power dominates where there is a difference in preference of issues 
between actors/elites. He indicated that actors whose preferences prevail in conflicts over 
key political issues are those who exercise power in a political system (Ham & Hill 
1984:62). However, Bachrach and Baratz showed that Dahl presented only one face of 
power as the other side of it operates through the process of non-decision making to 
suppress conflicts and to prevent them from entering the political process (Bachrach & 
Baratz 1970:4). Non-decision making is a means by which “demands for change in the 
existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before 
they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed to gain access to the relevant decision 
making arena; or failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision 
implementing stage of the policy process” (Bachrach & Baratz 1970:7). 
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 Non-decision making can take different forms (Ham & Hill 1984; Saggar 1991; Parsons 
1995; Bachrach & Baratz 1970): first, force can be used to block demands from entering 
the political process; second, some groups can be co-opted into decision-making 
procedures to deter the emergence of certain issues; third, rules and procedures can be 
introduced to postpone unwelcome challenges. Some issues could be referred to 
commissions or committees for detailed study with the intention of delaying or finding 
reasons for keeping them out; and fourth, existing rules and procedures may be shaped as 
a way of blocking challenges.  
  
A study done by Bachrach and Baratz on examination of poverty, race and politics in 
Baltimore showed how “demands of black people in the city were excluded from the 
decision making processes by politicians and business leaders through various means 
including force, sanctions, co-option, manipulation of symbols such as labeling of certain 
views as emanating from ‘troublemakers’ and ‘communists’ and strengthening the 
‘mobilization bias’ by new barriers or symbols” (Bachrach & Baratz 1970:126).  
The above findings reveal how power can determine the capacity to command action or 
inaction. The existence of this power poses a major challenge to pluralist conviction that 
policy-making process is open for everyone (Parsons 1995; John 1999).  
 
There are number of issues to be considered when we examine power, decision making 
and participation in the policy in South Africa. Although the policy process in South 
Africa has entailed extensive consultation and participation, there have been some 
limitations.  Jansen (2001:208) observes: 
• Despite the fact that groups are invited to participate, their views do not prevail. 
• Where participation in initial debates has been broad, the policies adopted might 
not have been widely discussed and criticised. 
• Participating groups have unequal power and expertise leading to different 
emphasis and outcomes. 
• At times participation takes place after the policy framework has been decided.  
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The above limitations affect the type of policies developed; the type of groups, 
constituencies and stakeholders who are able to participate in the process, and whose 
views and ideas are taken. It also affects the implementation of the policies.  
 
Consequently, in South Africa, given the stakeholder representation in the policy making 
process, many people initially assumed that there were no conflicting interests in 
establishing policies once consensus has been reached. This is to a great extent true 
because, in their eagerness to overcome the legacy of apartheid, coupled with public 
enthusiasm to enhance transformation, people supported policies without putting up 
much challenge (Motala 1999; Nicolaou 2001; Vally 2001). However, now that the 
situation of different disadvantaged groups has not changed at the pace anticipated, it is 
evident that some of the policies have not met the goals of redress and equity. As a result, 
pressure groups and organisations have formed to press for change, gradually leading to 
policy learning where some of the policies are being reviewed (Motala 2003; Dielties and 
Motimele 2003).   
 
 2.5.3 Language and Public Policy 
Critical approaches direct attention to argumentation, language and discourse and how 
they shape the way we make sense of the world and understand policy (Foucault 1984; 
Bobrow & Dryzek 1987; Edelman 1988; Fisher & Forester 1993). According to the 
approaches, analysis of the policy process involves exploring the way in which policy 
discourse comes to frame the arguments that form the frameworks within which problems 
and agendas are constructed. The assumption here is that the language we use to talk 
about policy and policy problems is not neutral. Therefore, one is able to understand how 
a problem has been defined by analysing the way in which its discourse has been framed 
(Edelman1988; Hoppe 1993).  
 
On the same issue, Eldeman (1988) has analysed the use of language by politicians and 
bureaucrats as involving the manufacture and manipulations of symbols as a remedy for 
public concern. He examined the symbolic content of policy and politics and the way in 
which policy makers are involved in exploiting symbols and language. He stated: 
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Symbols may be either referential, that is they may refer to something that is tangible and be 
related to real rewards and resources. However, given that referential symbols are a limited 
commodity, policy makers are more likely to be engaged in the production of condensational or 
emotional symbols, which reassure and give an illusion of concern or a solution. This capacity to 
structure complex problems in ways and words that suit policy makers distorts the perceptions of 
citizens. Problems are constructed in order to justify solutions rather that solve problems (Edelman 
1988:20-21). 
 
Edelman who identifies the use of media and the relationship between leaders and their 
audience confirms the above statement. Problems are defined in a process whereby 
politicians and the media manipulate meaning and symbols in order to facilitate close 
control over what is discussed and how it is discussed and what significance is attached 
to an issue (Edelman 1977). Hence, an ordinary citizen does not face a world of facts but 
that of political fictions. How problems and issues are presented means more than what is 
actually stated. Parsons stated: 
 
The way in which a policy is expressed is central to understanding what is going on when issues, 
problems and policies are defined. Language is a key element in the making of a problem and the 
defining of solutions. How policy is framed is very important to the capacity of the policy to adapt 
circumstances, accommodate demands and promote the compliance of the public. Hence, although 
a policy succeeds as a political device, it may actually fail to address or ameliorate the problem 
except in the terms defined by policy makers (Parsons 1995:181). 
 
In South Africa the textual language of all education policies put emphasis on goals of 
equity, redress, participation, democracy etc. However, contradictions emerge because 
the market element in those policies impacts on redress, equity and participation (Sayed 
2001; Motala 2001; Greenstein 1997). Other, policies like Curriculum 2005 are packaged 
in radical language with elements of People’s Education while in fact they lean more 
towards neo liberal strategies (Sedunary 1996; Centre for Education and Policy 
Development 2000). 
  
2.5.4 The Role of Professionals and Think Tanks 
Post-structuralists/post-modernists and some critical theorists, among them Foucault and 
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Habermas, have examined politics of knowledge/ideas and the role of experts and 
professionals in the policy process (Parsons 1995). They have also examined the role of 
‘think tanks’ in the same process. Professional groups are seen as creators and proponents 
of bodies of knowledge that play important roles in shaping social policy and institutions 
of everyday life (Majone 1996). Hence professionals and their knowledge have power. 
“Knowledge becomes power and the professional stands as the human link between the 
two” (Friedson 1986:9).  In the construction of problems those who have knowledge on 
certain issues have the opportunity and play a major part in providing input in the 
definitional process. Therefore, professionals have a key role in the production and 
dissemination of knowledge and in the interpretation and implementation of policy at 
‘street level’ (Weimer &Vining 1992).  
 
‘Think tanks’ and research bodies have emerged to influence policy agenda through 
publication of research and policy advocacy (Weiss 1992). Howlett and Ramesh 
(1995:58) define think tanks as “independent organisations engaged in multi-disciplinary 
research intended to influence public policy”.  Think tanks vary from those that are small 
and highly political; to ones that are large and well funded; and those that are large, well 
funded and political. Their research is mostly directed at proposing practical solutions to 
public problems and coming up with findings or evidence that support the ideology 
driven positions they advocate. Weiss (1992:118) identifies four factors which led to 
think tanks/ policy analysis organisations as “political fragmentation and desegregation, 
the complexity of social problems and the declining influence of the civil service”. 
Although Weiss was referring to the United States of America, she stated that these 
factors apply in varying degrees to other political systems. According to her analysis, 
think tanks fill “a gap which growing knowledge; growing complexity and increased 
pluralism create” (Weiss 1992:120).  
  
Critics have highlighted the dangers of increased growth of think tanks/policy analysis 
organisations (Fisher 1991; Bobrow & Dryzek 1987). They argue that with the 
emergence of think tanks, knowledge can be effectively presented as policy argument, 
and in an open society, knowledge clashes constitute a democratic way of proceeding. 
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However, this assumption poses a problem since those without power and resources may 
not have access to analysis. This brings back some arguments advanced in our previous 
discussions, namely that analysis can distort or manipulate debate. In order for 
participation in the policy process to be effective, it has to focus on the way policy 
analysis “can level up rather than increase inequality of influence” (Fisher 1991:104).  
According to Bobrow & Dryzek: 
 
Large corporations, government bureaucracies, national interest groups, and professional 
associations are highly organised and have the resources to hire skilled and persuasive advocates. 
Community organisations, small businesses, and the poor typically come off worse even in a 
forum of formal equality of access (such as a legislative hearing, court case, project review, public 
hearing, or special commission) (Bobrow & Dryzek 1987:177). 
 
Lack of policy analysis outside interest groups and organisations that can afford it 
reduces severely the capacity of citizens to participate in formulating agendas and 
constructing problems. Think tanks/policy analysis organisations are not neutral and their 
analytical arguments may advance/advocate particular class and business interests or 
certain values and beliefs. 
 
Think tanks established by different groups, political parties, and professionals from 
different affiliations and establishments, played a very influential role in identifying the 
transformation agenda and policies in the education sector in South Africa before the 
1994 elections. After 1994 a different picture emerged with the government playing a 
major role with selected groups and networks participating (de Clercq 1998; Soudien 
1999; Jansen 2001; Lungu 2001). 
 
2.6 Policy Implementation 
The policy making process does not come to an end after its adoption stage or when 
policy has been approved. Implementation is another very important means where 
policies are formulated as they are implemented (Parsons 1995). According to Anderson 
(1990), it is difficult to differentiate neatly the adoption of policy from its implementation 
just as it is also difficult to demarcate policy formulation and adoption. Yet, in many 
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cases, the political system has been examined by treating policy and administration 
separately. This fails to recognize that the content of policy and its impact on those 
affected may be substantially modified, elaborated or even negated during the 
implementation stage. In some instances, legislation does not do much more than 
authorise an agency, or the executive, to make policy on some matter (Howlett and 
Ramesh 1995). In many cases administrative agencies operate under broad and 
ambiguous statutory mandates which give them a lot of discretion to decide what should 
or should not be done. In effect such statutory mandates direct agencies involved to make 
policy (Anderson 1990; Rockman 1997). In many cases those who participate in 
legislative process are not able to agree or reach settlement on some of the issues. They 
are left to administrative agencies that make decisions on how to interpret and implement 
them.  
 
A number of actors/institutions also exert influence on the process. Legislatures use 
different strategies to influence the implementation process (Parsons 1995; Roberts 
1994). Among them is specificity of legislation. The more detailed the legislation passed 
by legislature, the less the discretion the administrative agencies will be able to exercise. 
Roberts (1994) provides some pertinent examples. Among them is placing limitations on 
the use of funds by including it in the statutes; specified deadlines for taking action on 
some of the acts; setting specific standards as in minimum wage legislation etc. At times 
the legislature has to endorse appointments of top executives. This can sometimes be 
used by the legislature as a means of influencing implementation by ensuring that their 
preferred candidate is appointed. Members of the legislature also exert influence on 
policy implementation as they perform oversight duties and handle problems that 
constituency and party members encounter with administrative agencies. 
 
Courts exert influence on policy implementation through interpretation of legislation, 
statutes and regulations and review of administrative decisions in cases brought before 
them. Courts can facilitate, hinder or nullify the implementation of policies through their 
decisions (Anderson 1990; Weimer and Vinning 1992). Some of the decisions can either 
favour selected interests or reverse decisions of government for the benefit of 
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disadvantaged groups. In South Africa, the courts have reversed decisions on 
implementation of a number of public policies. Among such policies are teacher 
redeployment and rationalisation and provision of anti-retroviral therapy for people living 
with HIV and AIDS. 
 
Groups and policy networks also exert influence on policy implementation (Rhodes and 
Marsh 1992; Marin and Mayntz 1992; Peters and Wright 1996). Given that 
administrative agencies can use discretion in the implementation of policies, groups and 
networks are able to influence agency action which may have substantial effect on the 
course and impact of public policies. Other actors that exert influence on the 
implementation process include political party officials; media who may report, publicise 
or criticise agency actions; and executive staff agencies (Anderson 1990). It is evident 
that a variety of participants or institutions with varied interests, power and values may 
become involved in the administration and implementation of a given policy.  
 
2.6.1 Models of Policy Implementation 
 
2.6.1.1  Top Down Rational Model 
Different models on policy implementation have emerged to explain the policy 
implementation process. Among the initial ones, is the rational “top-down” model, which 
puts more emphasis on control and compliance (Hood 1976; Gunn 1978; Sabatier & 
Mazmanian 1979). According to the model, successful implementation of a policy 
depends on: 
• Clearly defined and understood goals; 
• Readily available resources; 
• A chain of command which is capable of assembling and controlling resources; 
• A system that is able to communicate effectively and control the individuals and 
organisations involved in the performance of tasks. 
 
Ham and Hill (1984) showed how Wildavsky and Pressman used the top-down model to 
examine ways in which policy transmission occurs or fails to occur through multi-
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government systems. The two authors argued that “if action depends upon a number of 
links in an implementation chain, then the degree of cooperation between agencies 
required to make those links has to be very close to a hundred per cent if a situation is not 
to occur in which a number of small deficits cumulatively create a large shortfall” (Ham 
& Hill 1984:97). The cumulative deficit in implementation occurs if cooperation in 
implementation is non-existence. Other advocates of the top-down model have shown 
how policies have succeeded in implementation because of clarity of their mandates and 
availability of resources (Sabatier & Mazmanian 1979). They have also identified clarity 
and consistency in the communication of policy as another important factor for successful 
implementation (Hood 1976; Nixon 1980). The above advocates show that clear 
communication and clarity of the mandate mean that there is no ambiguity and 
compromise at the policy making stage and this results in smooth implementation.  
 
A number of criticisms have been levelled against the top-down model. Since the policy 
process and policies are such a complex phenomena, implementation is equally complex 
and it cannot be taken as merely a technical aspect and a straightforward process as 
advocated by adherents of this top down model. As mentioned above, it is difficult to 
determine where policy-making stops and implementation begins since the policy-
making process continues even during the implementation phase (Anderson 1990; 
Majone 1996). Hence policy making in this case may involve “continuing flexibility; it 
may also involve the concretisation of policy in action or into a process of movement 
back and forth between policy and action” (Ham & Hill 1984:106). Hence, because of 
these factors, implementation is seen as a policy/action continuum in which interactive 
and negotiation process takes place between those seeking to put policy into effect and 
those upon whom action depends (Linder and Peters 1987). This shows that the top-down 
model is not adequate to explain policy implementation. Hence, the development of a 
bottom-up (‘backward mapping’) model to study/explain policy implementation. 
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2.6.1.2 Bottom-up or Backward Mapping 
Elmore defines ‘backward mapping’ as: 
 
‘backward reasoning’ from the individual and organizational choices that are the hub of the 
problem to which policy is addressed, to the rules, procedures and structures that have the closest 
proximity to those choices, to the policy instruments available to affect those things, and hence to 
feasible policy objectives (Elmore 1985:3). 
 
The bottom-up model sees the relationship of policy makers to policy deliverers as being 
very crucial. According to Parsons: 
 
The bottom-up model is one which sees the process as involving negotiation and consensus 
building. These involve two contexts or environments: the management skills and cultures of the 
organizations involved in implementing public policy (schools, hospitals, police forces, welfare 
agencies, armed forces, government departments), and the political environment in which they 
have to work (Parsons 1995:469). 
 
In this model professionals or ‘street level’ implementers use their own discretion on how 
they would apply a policy since they have opportunities and responsibilities of 
controlling and delivering services (Lipsky 1976). Implementers are likely to make varied 
interpretations because policies, regulations and laws have interpretive aspects. Therefore 
policies may not always yield the expected outcomes (Davis 1991). Younis (1990) gives 
an example of a study done by Webb and Wistow who looked at personal social services 
policy. The study found that there was an implementation deficit because local authorities 
chose to disregard central guidelines of cutting expenditure on services and preserved 
social services expenditure, while effecting a cut on other services. O’Brien & Li (1999) 
cited cases where policies were selectively implemented in rural China despite the fact 
that the centre exerted a lot of pressure on grass-roots officials. Although they 
acknowledged the fact that implementation tended to be poor “when policy directives 
were vague; when there was serious division over policy among the central elite; and 
when the programme ran counter to bureaucratic interests”; they discovered other reasons 
(p.173). Firstly they realised that with decentralisation officials at each level gained full 
authority to appoint their subordinates and this has affected adversely the implementation 
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of some policies.  They stated: 
 
Rural cadres may obey a directive from their bosses one rung up, even if they know it conflicts 
with a measure promoted by higher levels. For instance when confronting a villager who cited a 
central policy on rejecting illegal fees, a village cadre asked if he listened to his grandfather (the 
central leadership) or his father (local officials). When the man replied that he paid attention to 
both, the cadre insisted on collecting the fee. “Very good! Now grandfather has given his orders 
(that is, the centre has banned the fee), but father has not made his position known (that is, local 
officials have not revoked it). We depend on father for a living, so we must carry out his order 
(and collect the fee)” (O’Brien & Li 1999:171).  
 
It was also found out that policies whose implementation targets and output were 
quantifiable were implemented better than those whose output could not be measured or 
quantified. This was attributed to incentives and rewards being provided when targets 
were met and could be seen. Hence more emphasis was put on implementing selective 
policies whose output could be measured, while others whose output could not easily be 
quantified were neglected (O’Brien & Li 1999).  
 
Due to the factors the policy formulation process may be skewed by policy 
implementation that is dominated by professionals (Dunleavy 1982). For example, 
district agricultural officers might adopt their own way of implementing a policy on new 
methods of farming and soil conservation that might lead to different outcomes from 
those set out in the policy. In this way, ‘street level’ implementers also shape policy and 
its implementation can be enhanced by their experience and knowledge (Lipsky 1976).  
Majone and Wildavsky (1978) have argued that policy does not happen at the front part 
of the policy process but evolves and unfolds over time. The front part produces 
potentialities and principles that change and adapt in practice. They contend that 
“implementation is evolutionary as it will inevitably reformulate as well as carry out 
policy” (Majone and Wildavsky 1978:116).  
 
Exercising discretion brings about problems associated with differences in interpretation 
and application of policy to specific circumstances. From and Stava (1993) give the 
example of the European Union where there are considerable variations in the 
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implementation of European Union directives and regulations by member countries. 
Although the South African Development Community (SADC) has not achieved the 
same degree of integration compared to the European Union some of the policies such as 
those concerning environment, transport, trade, agriculture and others are formulated by 
the group of countries in the community. Implementation of those policies has always 
varied because of a number of reasons, among them resources, facilities, political 
environment and different interpretations by implementers (Institute for African 
Alternatives 1993). In South Africa there are variations in policy implementation among 
the nine provinces and even within a province (for example between different public 
schools). 
 
O’Brien and Li (1999) observe that both approaches, that is, the top down rational model 
and bottom up or backward mapping explain much about how bureaucracy functions in 
policy implementation. However, there is a feeling that neither approach alone is well 
suited to explain why an implementer who is responsible for a range of policies executes 
some well and others poorly. Studies have advocated the need to combine the top down 
emphasis on central control with the bottom up emphasis on street level discretion 
(Sabatier 1986; Hull and Hjern 1982; Matland 1995; O’Brien and Li 1999). O’Brien and 
Li note: 
 
This mixed strategy encourages us to consider all the incentives grass roots official faces, both 
those that emerge from the day to day environment and those structured into the situation from on 
high. Drawing on both approaches, we can see why street level bureaucrats are sometimes 
“principled agents” and sometimes wily defiers of the wishes of their superiors (O’Brien and Li 
1999:168).   
 
Another factor is that policies are an outcome of negotiation and compromise. As 
outlined by Barret and Hill (1981:89) it means: 
• Many policies represent compromises between conflicting values. 
• Many policies involve compromises with key interests within the implementation structure. 
• Many policies involve compromises with key interests upon whom implementation will have an 
impact. 
• Many policies are framed without attention being given to the way in which underlying forces 
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(particularly economic ones) will undermine them. 
 
Evidently, this would have implications in their implementation. Those policies, which 
have the support of implementers, would receive more attention, while those that are not 
favourable to them are likely to remain symbolic. Inaction could also occur in places 
where there is a division between levels of government where policies may require 
parliamentary enactment and thereafter implemented by provincial or local government.  
Although laws may be passed by parliament, resources for implementation may not be 
available and therefore the required policies may not be implemented and may remain 
symbolic. This has happened in some of the provinces in South Africa where provinces 
failed to implement education policies because of lack of adequate funding. These 
aspects are discussed in Chapter IV and V. 
 
It is evident that no individual model on its own can be adopted to explain policy 
implementation. Therefore, this study has adopted elements from all the above models to 
explain policy implementation processes in education. This has been done by: 
• Analysing arrangements of structures and institutions that have been charged with 
education policy implementation that have been put in place at the national, 
provincial and local (school) levels. It also entailed assessing their powers, 
functions and responsibilities. 
• Analysing the performance and functioning of structures and institutions at 
different levels. 
• Examining implementing agents, among them senior management, both new and 
old members of the bureaucracy who were absorbed in the new government. It 
also entailed assessing the functioning and performance of different programmes 
and activities. This included examining various sources of funding and their 
allocation. 
• Analysing coordination of activities among different levels and monitoring 
processes.            
The above aspects were examined and assessed within the framework of new 
managerialism and policy delivery systems which has been adopted by most developing 
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countries. They have also been adopted by the new South African government as it 
restructured the bureaucracy and reorganised its structures in the education sector after 
1994 elections. The following sections present different types of policy delivery systems 
and outline major aspects of the new managerialism that were adopted.    
 
2.6.2 Policy Delivery Systems 
Policy delivery systems have become very complex and fragmented. Public goods and 
services are now being delivered through a network of diverse types of institutions and 
instruments. This means that the functions are allocated to special purpose authorities and 
institutions. Rhodes (1994) has outlined the implications of fragmentation as creation of 
conflict between different agencies competing for ‘turf’ and between central and local 
governments which resent to be bypassed and overlooked. “Such fragmentation does not 
only thwart proper control and encourage policy slippage or deviancy from central 
expectations but it also increases governmental complexity” (Rhodes 1995:330).  
 
The most common types of delivery systems are governmental and sectoral mixes (Batley 
and Stoker 1991; Massey 1993; Butcher et. al. 1993; Burns et. al. 1994; Parsons 1995; 
Peters and Wright 1996; Rockman 1997). 
 
2.6.2.1 The Governmental Mix 
Responsibility of delivery of public goods and services in governmental mix is taken by 
different levels of government. Parsons (1995) identifies the levels as national, 
regional/state, local and neighbourhood. The main emphasis in such cases has been 
decentralisation of functions. Decentralisation may be viewed as an attempt to download 
control to more build-in, self-regulatory delivery systems (Kickert 1993; Farazmand 
1997). Peters and Wright (1996) observe that as a move towards decentralisation, central 
governments have permitted sub-national governments to make allocative decisions 
about who will get what from the public sector. The move also includes empowerment of 
employees of government in lower echelons to acquire more power and control over their 
own jobs in order to increase the satisfaction of clients. They have been given greater 
latitude to make decisions and then become accountable for those decisions (Kernaghan 
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1992). The division of responsibility of policy delivery to different levels means 
administrative and financial arrangements, including powers granted to different levels, 
are determined by political and constitutional traditions.  
 
In their study conducted in OECD in 1991, Batley and Stoker observed that an important 
trend in governmental mix was neighbourhood and community decentralisation which 
started in the 1980s and continued in the 1990s (Batley and Stoker 1991). Some local 
authorities developed multi-service neighbourhood offices to manage services and 
forums or committees which provided for local participation, access and accountability. 
Such practices have led to a move from centralised bureaucratic structures towards local 
management networks which are closer to citizens. The emphasis or shift of delivery to 
lower levels has to be viewed in the context of post-Fordism where Weberian/Taylorist 
hierarchy is giving way to less bureaucratic, flatter, more fragmented structures where 
public sector organisations are run the same way as business organisations (Burns et. al. 
1994). Emphasis has also been put on accountability where government bureaucrats are 
not only accountable to their political heads (who assume in principle responsibility for 
policies carried out in their departments); but also downward to the customers of public 
services. For example “the naming of public officials under the introduction of publicised 
quality and performance indicators have emphasised dominancy of political 
accountability” (Day and Klein 1989:121).  
 
Moreover there have also been changes in established procedures. Departments set 
indicators and civil servants are remunerated according to performance. The performance 
of individual public servants is now being assessed and differential pay (whether in the 
form of bonuses or increase in base pay) is being granted to better performers (Ingraham 
1993). Internal organisation reforms inspired by the private sector have been combined 
with attempts to transform the recruitment patterns by employing people from the private 
sector on short term contracts. Senior managers are employed on contract and assessment 
of their positions is based on performance (Linder and Peters 1989). In South Africa, 
governmental mix is among the strategies of policy delivery in education. Delivery of 
education policy is shared among three levels, namely, national, provincial and district 
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levels. Provinces have decentralised power to districts and schools to enable them to 
make decisions and exercise more control of their work. The results of policy delivery by 
governmental mix have encountered a number of difficulties which are discussed in 
Chapters IV and V.  
  
 2.6.2.2 The Sectoral Mix
In the sectoral mix services may comprise a mix between public and private 
responsibility and also between the voluntary sector and community agencies that may 
have a role in service delivery. It provides a mode of delivery which overcomes the 
problem of which a particular level of government should be responsible. In the sectoral 
mix we have public-private partnerships, the voluntary sector and the community.  
 
2.6.2.3 Public-Private Partnerships
Kouwenhoven (1993) identify a number of policy areas where public-private partnerships 
have been established; namely, infrastructure developments, urban renewal, regional 
development, education and training and environment issues. One of the advantages that 
governments obtain from public-private partnerships is securing private sector finance 
and management expertise. On the other hand, the private sector benefits from finance, 
infrastructure, good environment and other amenities which enable it to function 
smoothly and increase their profits. According to Parsons (1995:490) “public-private 
partnerships have been viewed by many people ways of avoiding problems of top-down 
implementation in public policy”.  
 
However, public-private partnerships have not always met the anticipated expectations 
(Massey 1993; Parsons 1995). Despite the above limitations there are areas in which the 
extension and development of partnerships will continue to grow. Massey (1993) 
identifies big projects for which partnerships are the only means in which problems such 
as urban regeneration can be addressed and opportunities such as hosting of soccer world 
cup, Olympic Games and other big social events may be secured. In case of small scale 
projects “the use of partnerships in local government offer possibilities of securing 
additional funds and expertise from the private sector which stand to gain in profits as 
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well as the public relations that results from the acceptance of social responsibilities and 
an ethical approach to business” (Parsons 1995:499).  
 
 2.6.2.4 The Voluntary Sector
Historically, the voluntary sector has been involved in welfare provision and other 
activities intended to uplift and empower the poor and needy (Butler and Wilson 1990; 
Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Parsons 1995). In most cases religious organisations have 
established charitable institutions which have been among the major providers of social 
services as well as education. With the emergence of the welfare state and mass 
education, the voluntary sector was rendered less necessary. But in recent years, there 
have been a decrease in the role of the state providing directly a range of social and 
welfare services. Hence, the role of the voluntary sector in service delivery is 
increasingly becoming crucial (Peters and Wright 1996; Rockman 1997). Voluntary 
organisations employ people on a permanent basis. They also have to make money and 
run on a sound financial basis (Osborne and Gaebler 1992:44).  
 
In many cases the voluntary sector enters into partnerships with public and private sectors 
in delivering services. Private sector finance may support activities of voluntary groups in 
association with the government. Alternatively, the government may choose to deliver 
via the voluntary sector and fund through grants or there may be a network of funding 
and support which facilitates an exchange of finance, expertise and commitment (Butler 
and Wilson 1990). Public agencies have become dependent on the voluntary sector to 
deliver services which they find either difficult to provide or lack resources to provide 
those services that have been traditionally provided by the voluntary sector.  Contracting 
out or outsourcing to NGOs and individual consultants often through tendering process 
has been among the common strategies of partnerships in policy delivery. Contracting out 
is said to enhance cost efficiency and the agents are appraised on this basis (Pampallis 
2004; Rockman 1997; Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993). Outsourcing has been a common 
practice in education in South Africa particularly in the provinces and districts where 
there is lack of capacity. While this has been a very useful practice in policy delivery, 
there have been a number of challenges which are identified in Chapters IV and V.   
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2.6.2.5 The Community  
The community is another component of sectoral delivery mix. Since 1980s community 
based public policy strategies have been prominent in approaches to local policy making 
and implementation. Glen (1993:217) defines community as “groups who share a 
location or physical space or who have common interests, traits or characteristics”. He 
sees community policy as being “territorial or non-territorial and may be directed at a 
neighbourhood or a part of a town, or it may be directed at a group of people who share a 
problem or an interest” (p.220). He identifies forms of community policy as: community 
development which is intended to empower community to help itself with the aim of 
promoting bottom–up approach where people are involved in defining their needs and 
goals; community service that is geared at improving the relationship between the outputs 
of service providers and clients. This is intended to make services more responsive to 
community’s needs and increase their involvement in the way in which services are 
delivered. Community action is directed at problems of power and mobilisation of 
interests. It is intended to campaign for policies and interests of those that are 
marginalised and excluded from the political agenda.   
 
The community aspect of policy delivery adds to the network and inter-organisational 
nature of a mix which may be found in a policy sector. It also challenges the power, 
autonomy or dominancy of professionals in their relationship with the service 
users/clients as more active partners. Establishment of governing bodies in schools in 
South Africa is one example of involving community in policy delivery. Governing 
bodies are responsible for governance, formulation of school policies and the overall 
implementation in public schools. This aspect is discussed further in Chapters IV and V.  
 
 From the above discussion, it is evident that approaches to the policy process have 
become very complex with emerging demands, new issues and problems of various 
dimensions. These are advanced by actors, groups and networks and other webs of 
influence with different goals, values, aspirations, interests, powers and resources. They 
use a variety of strategies, tactics, and methods to influence decision making, policy 
content and implementation. Therefore, in all its stages, the policy process is beset with 
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continuous debate, contestation and struggle for the success of ideas and interests which 
are pursued by individual actors, groups and policy networks through the institutions. 
Therefore, an examination and analysis of the process has to take the above factors into 
consideration.  
 
It is evident from the above analysis that the process cannot be explained by using only 
one approach. This study has been situated in ideas, group and networks and institutional 
approaches to examine the factors that have affected education policies, their formulation 
and implementation and the overall transformation of education in South Africa. It 
contends that policy change and variation result from interaction of ideas and interests 
within patterns of group and policy networks and preset institutions.  
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PART II 
 
Methodology  
 
  
2.7 Objectives of Policy Research 
Dale (1986) identifies three purposes of policy research, namely, the social 
administration project; the policy analysis project; and the social science project. The 
social administration project was dominant from the 1940s to 1970s. Its purpose was to 
use research to improve administrative practices of the welfare state. It focused mainly on 
the national system as provided by the welfare state rather than international comparative 
approaches (Taylor-Gooby et. al.1981). Such concentration made the field “become 
rather parochial, together with a preference for ‘top down’ interventions in policy and an 
emphasis on the collection of empirical data: put crudely, facts rather than theories” 
(Ozga 2000:39). In the social administration project, research is carried out in order to 
improve the client’s welfare and therefore researchers define a client’s need.  In this 
regard accumulation and testing of core knowledge and the development of fundamental 
theory take a second place to the above concern (Mishra 1997). 
 
The policy analysis project became prominent between the 1970s and 1990s (Ozga 
2000).  The main concern of researchers working in this area is to find ways of ensuring 
effective and efficient delivery of social policies irrespective of their content. Such a 
focus shows the technicist character of policy analysis and its preoccupation with 
outcomes (Dale 1986).  Policy analysts see policy as the function and preserve of 
government. The emphasis is to find out what governments do, why they do it and what 
difference it makes (Ham and Hill 1984). Hence policy analyst seeks to meet clients’ 
needs, to define and clarify their problem, to identify options and assess their 
effectiveness, the likely obstacle to their implementation and their fitness for purpose. 
The policy analyst works within the same framework of action as the policy maker and is 
concerned with strategic issues (Dale 1986). 
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For the social science project, the problem is defined by the nature of existing theory and 
the orientation is towards improving it, namely, having a better understanding of how 
things work. According to Ozga:  
 
The orientation of the social science project is towards the academic discipline, rather than 
towards the need of a client or customer, and the rules of the discipline, and its principles of 
enquiry, guide research practice, rather than a framework of strategic planning requirements and 
possibilities. Accountability is to the research community, rather than to the customer or sponsor 
(Ozga 2000:41).   
 
 However, the fact that the focus of the social science project is inclined more towards 
academic discipline does not mean that researchers have disengaged from practice. 
Researchers working within the area may also focus on improving practitioners’ 
understanding of the nature of the problems they encounter in their daily activities by 
making them understand better the social world. Others may seek to influence policy 
makers as a secondary feature of their work, by adding to the availability of knowledge 
within the community.   
 
The above projects are distinguished from one another by their purposes. The latter also 
reflect different values. This study looks at transformation in the education sector by 
examining the type of policies that have been put in place, the processes for their 
formulation and implementation. Given that policy development and implementation 
involve negotiation, contestation and a struggle between competing groups, the processes 
will be examined to find out who are the beneficiaries and who have been marginalized 
or excluded in the process. This would present a broader picture/world that would explain 
how things come to happen as they do and how they ought to be. In this case, the study 
will use the social science project to examine and explain the situation.      
 
2.8 Methods of Study and Research Design 
The study adopts an interpretive qualitative methodology to examine transformation in 
the education sector, namely; the type of policies formulated, the policy development and 
implementation processes and their outcomes. Interpretive qualitative methodology 
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entails getting close to research subjects in their natural setting in order to describe and 
understand the world through their eyes. It focuses on the process rather than outcome; 
the actor’s perspective is emphasised; and its primary aim is in-depth description and 
understanding of actions and events (Babbie and Mouton 2004; Valadez and Bamberger 
1994; Guba 1990; Miles and Huberman 1984). According to Valadez and Bamberger: 
  
Qualitative methods can also be justified on ethical grounds. Because many programmes produce 
major changes in the lives of the population (not all of which are positive), planners have a moral 
obligation to understand how people feel about these programmes and how they affect them. Not 
to try to understand the point of view of a community resident (who will perhaps suffer if the 
project does not go as expected) is tantamount to ignoring democratic principles of social 
participation. Although quantitative methods can describe some of the behavioural changes that 
occur, they usually cannot reveal how people feel about these changes. Direct face to face contact 
with the affected population may often be the best way to find out (Valadez and Bamberger 
1994:331). 
 
By using interpretive qualitative methodology the study seeks to expose the different 
views and perceptions of the transformation process in the education sector of all the 
people and groups that have been included in the research, namely policy makers and 
implementers (members of national and provincial legislatures, officials from the national 
and provincial Departments of Education, representatives from political parties, teachers, 
representatives from NGOs, CBOs, FBOs and so forth); those from formerly 
disadvantaged communities who are the intended beneficiaries of the transformation 
process in education; and those from formerly advantaged communities most of whom 
were beneficiaries of the policies of the former regime.  
 
Respondents would be able to look back at the effects that the oppressive and 
discriminatory education policies of the apartheid era have had on them and on the 
education system. They would then make a comparison in terms of the strides taken since 
1994 by the new government in the long journey to redress the effects of past oppressive 
and discriminatory education policies and programmes. The use of interpretive 
qualitative methodology in this study enables the researcher to: examine and expose the 
effects of education policies on the ground; examine how and where policies increase 
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inequality and impact unfairly on particular groups; and provide opportunity to explore 
how injustices and inequalities are produced, reproduced and sustained; and be in a 
position to understand how such processes may be challenged or addressed. 
 
 2.8.1 Data Collection 
The adoption of interpretive qualitative methodology in this study entailed using different 
kinds of data collection methods to gather information; namely, through analysis of 
documents and reports, unstructured interviews, focus group discussions, and 
observations.  
 
Observation enables a researcher to probe deeply and to analyse intensively a specific 
case. With observation a researcher is able to discern ongoing behaviour as it occurs and 
is able to make appropriate notes about its important features. There are two types of 
observation, namely, participant and non-participant observation. In the former, the 
observer engages in the very activities he/she sets out to observe. Often the observer 
cover up is so complete that as far as the other participants are concerned, the researcher 
is simply one of the group members. A non-participant observer stays out of the group 
activity under investigation and does not become a member of the group. In observation, 
it is important to know precisely what should be observed. What should be looked for in 
observation can be formulated, that is, the content can be specified. This is structured 
observation. However, what should be observed or aspects of the content may not be 
specified beforehand. This is unstructured observation. 
 
Interviewing is a mode of communication between two individuals or an individual and a 
group. Interview may be helpful where information about people’s knowledge, values, 
preferences and beliefs are being sought. Some interviews can be semi-structured in that 
the interviewer will either have a written or mental note of questions to be raised during 
the interview but the order and the precise wording of the questions will not be 
predetermined. A semi-structured interview schedule allows participants to express 
themselves at some length but within a structure that prevents them from going off track. 
Other interviews can be in-depth or non-directive. In this type of interview, minimal 
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direction or control is exhibited and the interviewees are given freedom to express their 
feelings as fully and as spontaneously as they choose or are able to do. 
 
Information obtained from documentary sources enables researchers to structure research 
problems and pose relevant questions for their studies. It is also used to complement and 
strengthen data obtained through other methods, namely observation and interviews. 
Documents fall into several sets of categories. The first set depends on how official or 
public the documents are. Official or public documents are those produced by 
governments for their own purposes. Such documents are also produced by non-
governmental institutions like churches, voluntary associations, international 
organisations, academic institutions etc. There are also private or unofficial documents 
produced by individuals, independent research workers, journalists etc. The second set of 
categories depends on whether the documents are primary or secondary. Primary 
documents are those which are produced in the course of the routine activities of a social 
organisation or in the daily lives of individuals, for example, notes, diaries, agendas etc. 
Secondary sources include documents such as books, articles, census reports, 
development plans and so forth.   
 
 The use of several methods of data collection or triangulation enables the researcher to 
explain more fully the richness and complexity of the policy process by examining it 
from more than one standpoint and, in so doing, achieve a measure of validity and 
reliability. Cohen and Manion outline advantages of the multi method approach or 
triangulation: 
 
It has been observed that as research methods act as filters through which the environment is 
selectively experienced, they are never a theoretical or neutral in representing the world of 
experience. Exclusive reliance on one method, therefore, may bias or distort the researcher’s 
picture of the particular slice of reality he/she is investigating. He/she needs to be confident that 
the data generated are not simply artifacts of one specific method of collection.  And this 
confidence can only be achieved as far as normative research is concerned when different methods 
of data collection yield substantially the same results. Further, the more the methods contrast with 
each other, the greater the researcher’s confidence. If, for example, the outcomes of a 
questionnaire survey correspond to those of an observational study of the same phenomena, the 
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more the researcher will be confident about the findings (Cohen & Manion 1980:208). 
 
2.8.2 Sample for the Study 
Respondents for the study were drawn from the following bodies, institutions and 
directorates: Parliament (National Assembly and NCOP); the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Legislature; National Department of Education; Eastern Cape Provincial Department of 
Education (Directorates of Human Resources Development, Finance, General Education 
and Training, Further Education and Training, Physical Resources and Planning, 
Curriculum Development, District Development; Education Labour Relations Council, 
the Office of the Superintendent General and districts). A directorate is the highest level 
in the organisational structure of the Eastern Cape Department of Education and is 
headed by a Chief Director. Since the time of data collection, the organisational structure 
and the names and numbers of directorates have changed slightly due to the restructuring 
of the Department. The number of people interviewed in each institution is shown in 
Table VI. 
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Table VI: Number of People interviewed in each Institution/Organisation 
 
           Institution/Organisation        Number of Respondents 
National Assembly 
NCOP 
 
Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature 
 
National Department of Education 
 
Eastern Cape Provincial Department of 
Education 
 
- Directorate of Human Resources 
- Curriculum Directorate 
- Finance 
- General Education and Training 
- Further Education and Training 
- Physical Resources and Planning 
- Education Labour Relations Council 
- District Development Directorate 
- Senior Managers from Superintendent 
General’s Office 
- District Officials 
- National Education Health and Allied 
Workers Union (NEHAWU) 
 
3 
3 (1 permanent delegate; 2 special delegates) 
 
4 (Drawn from the ANC, UDM, PAC and DA) 
 
2 (officials from the office of the Deputy Director 
    General Policy Development) 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
 
3 
15  
 
2         
 
Ten public schools from King William’s Town and East London districts were included 
in the study. Among those schools, four were former model C schools; three township 
and three rural schools. Seven people were interviewed from each school. Stratified 
sampling technique was used to select the schools. This was done by listing the names of 
all former Model C schools in the district and township and rural schools separately. 
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They were put in three hats and four names were picked from those of former Model C 
schools and three each from township and rural schools. King William’s Town and East 
London districts were chosen because they had all types of schools. They also had a large 
population in urban and rural areas. Ten representatives from NGOs, Community based 
organisations (CBOs), faith based organisations and teachers’ organisations (SADTU, 
NAPTOSA and SAOU) were also included in the sample.  
 
The evaluation of education policies entailed an in-depth analysis of documents and 
reports. Both official/public (primary and secondary) and private (primary and 
secondary) documents were consulted. Because the analysis of policies was based mostly 
on documentary sources, it was necessary to review a variety of documents from different 
sources. This was intended to enhance reliability of information obtained from different 
documents, as it enabled information from different sources to be compared and 
contrasted.  
 
Among the official/public documents reviewed were those produced by the government 
for its own purposes, which include government gazettes; white and green papers and 
other government working papers produced by the Department of Education; 
commissioned research reports by the Department of Education; reports on Parliamentary 
proceedings; Department of Education annual reports; research reports and documents 
produced by “think tanks” affiliated to different political parties; and reports of political 
parties. Private documents consulted include journal articles, books, research reports by 
individuals and institutions/organisations, policy reviews and commentaries from 
newspapers and other independent sources. 
 
Interviews were held with the following people: 
• Selected governmental officials from the national Department of Education; 
members of the National Assembly; NCOP and Eastern Cape Provincial 
Legislature.  
• Chief directors and one or two directors (in directorates where more than one 
person was interviewed) from directorates of Human Resource Development, 
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Curriculum Development, Physical Resources and Planning, Finance, General 
Education and Training, Further Education and Training, Education Labour 
Relations Council, District Development Council, Senior Managers from 
Superintendent General’s Office and representatives from NEHAWU.  
• Interviews were also held with civil servants who served in the apartheid 
government and were retained by the new government under the Sunset Clause. 
 
An unstructured interview was used to allow respondents to express themselves freely 
since the intention was to obtain people’s perceptions, beliefs and opinions about 
transformation in the education sector and the major challenges the process encountered. 
Participants were also able to give their views and opinions on new the policies that have 
been developed to transform the sector. They discussed the formulation process and 
provided views on groups and people who have been included or excluded in the process. 
They shared their experiences on the implementation of policies including the major 
achievements and challenges that were encountered in the process. The discussions were 
held once with each respondent and lasted for 60 to 90 minutes. 
 
Unstructured interviews were also held with representatives from NGOs, faith based 
organisations, civil servants who served in the apartheid government and were taken by 
the new government under the Sunset Clause, community based organisations and 
teachers’ unions. The aim was to find out the part they played in the process of setting 
policy agenda in the new dispensation and in the development of education policies. They 
also gave their views on the type of policies developed to transform the education sector. 
Since most of the above groups are also involved in policy implementation, they also 
shared their views on the process of implementation, including identifying the strengths, 
weaknesses and the overall progress achieved. Interview with each respondent was held 
once and took 60 minutes. 
 
Focus group discussions were held with district officials, namely, district managers, 
education development officers and subject advisors from East London, King William’s 
Town, Alice and Peddie districts. The discussions took place separately for each group 
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(district managers, subject advisors and education development officers). They identified 
factors which affected their work performance and discussed possible solutions to the 
problems. Respondents were also able to discuss and share their views and experiences 
on policies developed to transform the education sector, their formulation, 
implementation, achievements and the challenges encountered. Each of the three focus 
group discussion was held once and took 60 minutes. 
    
Focus group discussions were also held with different groups of respondents from the ten 
schools; namely, twenty teachers, twenty learners and 30 members of school governing 
bodies including principles. Respondents gave their perceptions, views and opinions on 
the type of policies developed by the new government to transform the education sector 
and their understanding of those policies. The discussions concentrated mainly on the 
South African Schools Act and Curriculum 2005. The participants also shared their 
experiences on the formulation and implementation of the policies, the achievements 
made and major challenges encountered. Each focus group discussion took 50 minutes. 
They were held three times for each group because the respondents were many and had 
very limited time in each session.    
 
A non-participant observation method (structured) was used to observe school governing 
body meetings in five of the schools (two former Model C, one rural and two township 
schools). The intention was to observe attendance in the meetings and how the school 
governing bodies perform; issues and decisions that are made; and members’ 
participation in the sessions. The aim was to find out whether there is a clear 
understanding of roles and responsibilities of the respective members. Each school was 
observed once. 
 
In the interviews and observations, hand written notes were taken and a tape recorder was 
used to record the interviews and discussions. The hand written notes from the interviews 
and observations were reviewed and written properly at the end of each day of field work. 
Recorded tapes were transcribed on completion of the field work. Gaps and questions 
which arose out of the notes were clarified, answered or filled by going back to the 
 107
 
respondents for further elaboration. 
 
2.8.3 Ethical Issues 
Efforts were made to maintain confidentiality since the researcher had to earn trust from 
different stakeholders who had to divulge information that was not supposed to be shared 
with people outside their organisations and institutions. Some schools required forms to 
be signed to assure them that what was observed would not be used against their 
institutions. Some of the respondents were given a draft of the findings to find out 
whether some of the issues presented reflected what was discussed. This is very 
important because as a researcher, I have my own values and convictions which are likely 
to affect the way I look at the transformation in the education sector and the policies that 
have been put in place, including their formulation and implementation. Therefore, it 
might also affect the way the data from different respondents is interpreted. Being able to 
discuss the draft of the findings with the respondents is also one of the ways of 
addressing the above limitation. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
TRENDS IN EDUCATION AND POLICY INITIATIVES BEFORE THE 1994 
ELECTIONS 
 
 
PART I 
 
Trends in Education in the pre 1994 Election Period 
  
 
The aim of this section is to outline policies and the provision of education during the 
apartheid era, highlighting the magnitude of the problem in the sector that had to be 
addressed by the post apartheid government. It also shows strategies used by the 
apartheid government to effect changes in the education system so as to ensure that the 
status quo and the basic interests of its constituencies will not be threatened.  
 
3.1 Education during the Apartheid era 
 
3.1.1 Inferior Education and Inadequate Funding 
The introduction of the policy of Bantu Education in 1953 by the apartheid state ensured 
that the vast majority of black people received inferior education. Hendrik F. Verwoerd, 
the architect of apartheid and Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 until his 
assassination in 1966, stated that Africans were not going to “live an adult life under a 
policy of equal rights” and that there was no place for Africans “in the European 
community (South Africa) above the level of certain forms of labour” (Behr 1988:12). He 
emphasized that education for black groups had to be different from that of the white 
minority. Hence the introduction of Bantu Education was intended to relegate Africans to 
manual and low status jobs in the country. Verwoerd rejected the schooling structure 
established by missionaries on the ground that it produced the ‘wrong type’ of black 
people. Hence, education for the black people was taken away from missionaries and 
placed under the control of the state (Samuel 1990). Consequently, all educational 
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appointments, syllabi, examinations and school buildings were controlled by the state. 
The state education policy ensured that the majority of black children had some contact 
with Bantu Education. 
 
This measure resulted in a massive increase in the number of black pupils in the lower 
primary and higher primary levels where most of them ended their schooling (Pillay 
1990). The deliberate lack of state funding for secondary schools, as well as abject 
poverty within the black communities, led to massive dropouts in black schools. 
According to Samuel: 
 
Out of 200 000 black pupils in Sub A in 1950, 894 reached matriculation in 1962. Of these 532 
(59.8 per cent) failed. By 1970 the position had not changed substantially. Some 68.8 per cent of 
black pupils were in the lower primary classes (41 per cent were in Sub A or Sub B); 26.6 per cent 
were in the higher primary classes; only 4.1 per cent were in junior secondary classes (Form I to 
III) and 0.36 per cent were in Form IV or V. Some 2 938 black pupils, or 0.11 per cent of the total 
black school enrolment, were in the final year of secondary school, Form V (matriculation). By 
1975 the position had not greatly improved. Although the number of black pupils in junior and 
secondary standards had improved numerically from 122 000 to 317 000, as a proportion black 
secondary school pupils had dropped from 4.48 per cent to 2.73 per cent (Samuel 1990:19). 
 
The above figures by Samuel show that the apartheid state was determined to ensure that 
in line with its policies of discrimination, the majority of black children received 
education that equipped them with only unskilled manual labour. At the same time 
education provided to white children prepared them for an almost complete monopoly of 
dominant positions in society. According to Lemmer (1991), in 1975, over 36.44 per cent 
of white pupils were in secondary school. This number was 13 times higher than that of 
black pupils in secondary school in 1975. There were 44 white students for every black 
one at matriculation level. The differences between white and black attrition/retention 
rate in schools was due to two factors. First, most white parents were in a privileged 
economic position and were able to raise more funds for their children’s schooling. 
Second, the state applied racial discrimination strategies in allocation of funding for 
education and other sectors. Pillay (1990) provide examples where in 1975/76 the state 
allocated R 744 million to white education and R 166 million to black education. This is 
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an average of R644 for every white and R 41.80 for every black pupil. Despite 
incremental change in the method of funding education introduced in 1980 and early 
1990 that aimed at improving the amount allocated to black education, huge inequities 
remained (Hyslop 1990).             
 
As indicated above, there were shortages of secondary schools for black children. Despite 
the fact that there was a shift in state policy in the 1970s onwards and more schools were 
built very few black children were accommodated. The problem was exacerbated by the 
state’s policy of locating high schools for black children in the homeland labour reserves 
(Hyslop 1990). This was another strategy of denying secondary education to the majority 
of black children in the urban areas. This strategy also reinforced the state’s policy of 
relocating people to the homelands (Butler et. al. 1977). The limited number of secondary 
schools ensured that thousands of children were forced into labour market prematurely 
particularly in urban areas where most of them were engaged in unskilled manual labour.    
 
3.1.2 Inadequate Teaching 
There was inadequate teaching due to under-qualified and un-qualified teachers, poor 
working conditions and salaries. Samuel noted: 
 
In 1976 only 1.7 per cent of teachers had a university degree. Another 10.4 per cent had a 
matriculation certificate, 49.3 per cent had two years of secondary school and 21 per cent had 
completed primary school. Besides being under-qualified, most teachers were very poorly paid. In 
1975 black teachers with similar qualifications to whites earned 55 – 63 per cent of white teachers’ 
salaries. An African woman with a degree and a teacher’s certificate started on R 185 per month. 
A white man with a similar qualification started at R 342 a month (Samuel 1990).    
 
Inadequate teaching was aggravated by extremely overcrowded conditions. McKenney 
(1994) observed that in 1975 the average teacher: pupil ratio in black school was 1:54.1 
against 1:20.1 in white schools. In most cases the numbers in a class would be close to 
100. It was reported in January 1976 that some primary school classes had up to 113 
pupils because principals were reluctant to turn them away (Lemon 1994). In 1975 the 
shortage of teachers and classrooms forced schools to have double sessions in 43 per cent 
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of all black schools (Lemon 1994). The situation remained the same in the 1980s and 
early 1990s (Nasson 1990).   
 
Due to lack of state funds schooling became very expensive for black people. Until 1976 
parents were responsible for purchasing uniforms, all stationery and a number of 
textbooks for their children. In some places black parents paid additional money besides 
their monthly rents for school buildings to ensure that more schools are built (Chisholm 
et. al. 1993). On the other hand, white pupils in state schools received all their textbooks 
and stationery at no cost (Behr 1988).  
 
The above factors contributed to high drop out and failure rates. Evidently the high 
failure rate discouraged many black pupils from continuing with their education (Lemmer 
1991).  
 
3.1.3  Inequalities in Curriculum 
In addition to the skewed allocation of state funding, there were big limitations in the 
curricula. It was saturated with racism and dogmatism and based on outdated theories of 
learning and teaching practices. It perpetuated race, class, gender and ethnic divisions and 
denied common citizenship and national identity (ANC Policy Framework on Education 
and Training 1995). The curriculum was also examination driven with emphasis on 
memorisation and rote learning as opposed to the development of critical thinking, 
reasoning, reflection and understanding. It was unresponsive to changing labour market 
needs and failed to prepare learners for the world of work and participation in social and 
economic development of the country (Pillay 1990). The lack of relevance of the 
curriculum was exacerbated by the narrow base of participation in the curriculum 
development process. There was lack of involvement of essential stakeholders like 
parents, learners, workers, teachers and the private sector in the development process 
(Nasson 1990).  
 
Inequalities in the provision of education to black and white groups were also reflected in 
the unequal allocation of resources for the implementation of the curriculum. Even where 
 
112 
 
 
 
the syllabus was almost the same, there were differences in the preparation and 
qualifications of teachers; and the provision of essential resources such as libraries, 
textbooks, laboratories and other teaching and learning materials (Behr 1988; ANC 
Framework on Education and Training 1995). This meant that the curriculum that was 
experienced by different racial groups was not equal. It failed to offer equal access to 
knowledge. “Unequal access to knowledge placed limits on subject choices in black 
schools, especially in mathematics and the sciences; and marginalized some forms of 
knowledge such as cultural and life experiences of the majority of the people” (ANC 
Policy Framework on Education and Training 1995:72). 
 
Moreover, there was no integration between general education and vocational/technical 
training and this limited the vertical and horizontal mobility of the majority of South 
African students, most of who were forced to pursue the latter educational option. This 
resulted in black students’ low and unequal access to both higher education opportunities 
and the labour market. Education for Whites and Asians was compulsory until 16 years, 
and Coloureds until 14 years. There was no compulsory schooling for blacks (NEPI 
Framework Report 1993).  
  
3.1.4 Governance and Management 
In terms of education, governance and management, the education system was 
fragmented and comprised of different segregated subsystems each of which provided for 
the education of specific population groups. Although there was a Department of 
National Education that determined national education policy, there were eighteen 
executive education departments that functioned as separate entities (Lemmer 1991). The 
Department of Education and Training administered education of black people who lived 
outside the self-governing states (homelands). Moreover, each of the homelands had its 
own ministry of education.  There was an authoritarian system of educational governance 
and management which produced a bureaucracy that was inefficient, ineffective and of 
low quality (Buckland and Hofmeyr 1993). The non consultative and top down style of 
the bureaucracy restricted wider participation in policy formulation and ensured political 
control by its top echelons (Centre for Education Policy Development 2000). It lacked 
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democratic control, as it excluded the majority of the nation’s learners, teachers, parents, 
workers and community members from education decision making (Lemmer 1991). The 
education system had also been characterized by gender and class inequalities (Nasson 
1990). 
 
3.2 Resistance and Changes in the Education System by the Apartheid 
Government 
In 1976, the apartheid state introduced Afrikaans as a medium of instruction for half of 
the subjects in high schools which catered for the African learners. Before the move, all 
subjects were taught in English (Alexander 1990). This was rejected by learners, teachers 
and parents. Moreover, a high failure rate among Standard 5 learners was attributed to the 
fact that examinations of some of the subjects were written in Afrikaans (Pillay 1990). 
Negotiations failed and this led to the Soweto student uprising of 1976 (Nasson 1990; 
Lemmer 1991). This revealed the failure of Bantu Education and led to more challenges 
to the apartheid education system by black learners. Although the uprising was geared 
towards challenging the state’s education system, it was linked to the broader political 
struggle of black communities against the evils of the apartheid system. The same period 
witnessed the emergence of the independent black trade union movement; the spread of 
Black Consciousness ideology; significant downturn in the country’s economy; high 
unemployment rate; and political independence of Mozambique and Angola (Samuel 
1990:22). All these developments had a spill over effect on schools.       
 
The use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools was dropped by the 
state after the 1976 Soweto uprising. There were moves by the state to increase funding 
of black schools in 1979. More funds were allocated for maintenance of school buildings 
and building new classrooms in urban areas. However, vast inequalities continued to exist 
between funding for schooling and education of white and black learners. According to 
Samuel (1990:22), “In 1979 it was estimated that the state spent R 7 000 on each white 
child for the full period of his/her schooling, as compared to R 350 for a black child”. In 
1980, the apartheid state implemented the Education and Training Act to replace the 
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Bantu Education Act of 1953 and Bantu Special Education Act of 1964 (Behr 1988). 
According to Behr (1988:33): 
• The Act dropped the designation of Bantu and replaced it with “black”; 
• It declared free and compulsory education as its central aim; 
• It pledged itself to the active involvement of the parents and communities in the education system; 
• Appointment and dismissal of teachers became the domain of the Department; 
• Home language would be used as medium of instruction up to Standard 2 (Grade 4); 
• Building and maintenance of black schools became the responsibility of the Department of 
Education and Training (DET). 
 
People involved in black schooling felt that the Act did not address the real problems of 
education as it took place within the framework of political reformism and separate 
development (Lemmer 1991; McKenney 1994). DET announcement that compulsory 
education would be introduced in certain selected areas in 1981 was rejected because 
people felt that it was imposed by the state without consultation (Pillay 1990). At the 
same time a new regulation to restrict admission on the grounds of age was introduced. 
Students over the age of 20 years were barred from registering for Standard 9 and 10 
(Grade 11 and 12) while those over the age of 18 were not admitted to Standards 6, 7 and 
8. Those over the age of 16 were not admitted in primary schools. Although the 
regulation was not strictly adhered to, it became a major source of contention as it was 
implemented selectively to keep out learners who were student leaders and those who led 
the school boycotts and resistance (Nasson 1990). 
 
In 1983 the apartheid state released the White Paper on the Provision of Education in the 
Republic of South Africa. The White Paper was the result of recommendations made by a 
Working Group based on investigation made by the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) on education in South Africa (Behr 1988). Behr outlines the content of the White 
Paper as: 
 
All educational matters that relate solely to a specific population group were deemed “own affairs” 
of the group concerned, but aspects of education which affect all groups, such as financial 
standards, salaries and conditions of employment of staff, would be handled as “general affairs” 
by a new Ministry of Education. As for syllabi, the government once more reiterated the 
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desirability of different curricula, declaring that each education department had the right to 
develop syllabi in accordance with the world view and within the cultural framework of the 
population group it serves (Behr 1988:36). 
 
As in the previous policies the response to the White Paper was negative (Lemmer 1991). 
School boycotts and learner protests intensified in the 1980s and during this period actual 
teaching and learning did not take place in most black schools. The move also saw the 
suspension and arrest of many student leaders and the banning of Congress of South 
African Students (COSAS), an association of learners in primary and high schools that is  
affiliated to the ANC. Learner protests and school boycotts revealed that solution to the 
inadequacies of the education system was only a short term demand. The education 
struggle was interlinked to the wider struggle for liberation and the demise of apartheid. 
Therefore, students linked their educational grievances to wider community and political 
issues such as the withdrawal of police and military from the townships; the resignation 
of town councillors, a reduction in rents and the reinstatement of dismissed workers. 
Samuel observes: 
 
The rapid intensification of student protest against the educational system and the clear 
identification of this protest with the wider struggle against the apartheid state were the 
consequences of a number of developments. The political crisis of the state, the growth and 
strengthening of black political initiatives (through the organisation of the United Democratic 
Front and the National Forum), the weakening economy, the increasing strength of the organised 
labour movement, the lack of confidence expressed by the private sector, a growing number of 
attacks of targets inside South Africa by the liberation movements, and growing internal 
resistance, all created a political climate of resistance. It is in this context that the intensification of 
student protest must be seen (Samuel 1990:27).  
  
The crisis precipitated reactions by different communities and organisations, among them 
the National Education Crisis Committee (later the National Education Coordinating 
Committee, NECC).  The NECC was launched in 1985 as the education component of 
the anti apartheid mass Democratic Movement and comprised of community and political 
leaders, parents, teachers and learners. It became a strong negotiating force with 
government. The incremental educational reforms in 1980s could be attributed partly to 
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the pressure exerted on the state by the NECC and other movements (Lemmer 1991). The 
NECC developed principles for a post apartheid education system under the banner of 
people’s education.  According to Wolpe (1990:26), the principles put forward were: 
 
• the establishment of a free compulsory, unitary non racial and democratic system of education 
administered by a single department; 
• the need for education to be rooted in the community allowing for the active participation of 
learners, parents and teachers in the process of education; 
• formal recognition of the role played by learners in the education process; 
• development of curricula and textbooks relevant to local needs; 
 
The NECC became a strong pressure group advocating for democratisation of the 
education system. Most of the cosmetic and incremental reforms in education made by 
the apartheid government in the 1980s for the black population groups are attributed to 
pressure exerted by NECC on the government (Lemon 1994). However, the 
intensification of the resistance against the apartheid system from within the country; and 
the imposition of different sanctions by the international community; and increased 
pressure on both the ANC and the apartheid government by allies forced the two parties 
to opt for a negotiated settlement. Education was among the aspects discussed in the 
negotiation forums. As the negotiations were about to begin, the apartheid government 
took a different approach towards admissions, financing and management of white 
schools (Lemon 1994).  
 
3.2.1 Changes in the Status of White Schools and Admission Policies 
In the 1980s, school segregation laws led to an increasing surplus of places for whites, 
and this led to the closure of many schools. The schools that closed down in 1992 had the 
capacity to enrol 25 822 learners, but had enrolled only 11 226 (Chisholm et. al. 1993). 
Enrolment ratios had decreased because of a decline in the birth rate among the white 
population group. Although with the Free Settlement Areas Act of 1988 people of 
different races lived in same areas, they still had to take their children to schools of their 
own racial groups. Parents in areas which were most affected with the closure put 
 
117 
 
 
 
pressure on the government to allow white schools to admit learners from the other racial 
groups (McKenney 1994).  
 
While the government reacted by using repressive measures on blacks when they 
demanded change to the education system, the white population received a positive 
response. Three new school models were introduced in 1990. According to Lemon: 
 
 Parents could opt to go private, with a 45 percent subsidy (model A), state-aided, with the state 
paying staff salaries (model C), or to manage their own admissions policy, subject to conditions 
intended to preserve their cultural character, but remain fully state financed (model B). Schools 
wishing to change status were required to hold an official poll of parents; an 80 per cent turnout 
was required, and 72 per cent of those entitled to vote had to support the change. The ministry 
would then give its consent (Lemon 1994:94). 
 
The response to the policy was overwhelming and by the end of 1991, ninety five per 
cent of schools in the Cape Province had voted for change; 79 per cent in Natal; and 38 
per cent in the Transvaal (Lemon 1994). Although the process took some time to be 
accepted and adopted in Afrikaans medium schools, they eventually voted for change to 
the new school models because schools with lower enrolment were threatened with 
closure. They also risked losing their subsidy allocation from government. Therefore, 
they endorsed change not because they were genuinely keen to do so, but because they 
could not afford to lose their privileges (Lemon 1994).  A new model D was also 
introduced to allow white schools with seriously decreasing enrolments to be transferred 
to black education departments, or to be transformed into open schools under the control 
of the Department of Education and Culture. Although this was seen as a step towards 
addressing the backlogs in black education, the shifting of a school from one racially 
defined department to another was criticized as a continuation of an ‘own affairs’ policy 
that reinforced continued segregation (McKenney 1994).  
 
The majority of white schools opted for model B as they wanted to control their own 
admission policies. McKenney attributed the response to change in the school system by 
the white population group as being driven by conservative reasons: 
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 Schools believed that control over their own admission policies could enable more measured 
change than might ultimately be forced on other state schools. Certainly the admission policies 
adopted suggest that schools were anxious to protect their academic standards as well as their 
culture ecology as indicated by staff members of Bryanston High School, Johannesburg 
(McKenney 1994: 35).   
 
By the beginning of 1992, black learners were estimated to comprise only 0.88 per cent 
of the total enrolment of 904 403 in Model B schools that admitted learners from other 
races. Of this 0.88 per cent, African learners comprised 40 per cent, coloured learners 43 
per cent, and Indian learners 16 per cent of black enrolment at these schools (Chisholm 
et.al. 1993). This was a very small number compared to learners from the black 
population group who needed admission. Due to budgetary constraints caused by 
economic recession, school financing policy changed in 1992. School budgets were cut 
and teachers were retrenched. In order to minimize retrenchments, all schools were 
advised by the government to adopt model C whereby they would retain the status quo, 
but with fewer teachers and reduced funding. Fee payment would become compulsory. 
Both poorer white and black children felt the effects of Model C.  
 
Although the government made available R70 million to assist needy parents and schools 
converting to Model C, the press publicised the results of several surveys that showed 
how fees had risen and remained unpaid. One survey which was completed by 94 per 
cent of Model C schools, showed that more than a quarter of parents of children (74 per 
cent) had not paid fees in full, while 18.8 per cent had partially paid and the rest had 
defaulted (EduSource 1993). This means that no fees were paid in full at these schools. If 
the schools were unable to extract fees, it raised questions about the number of black 
learners who could be accommodated, as most parents would not have sufficient income 
to pay. The parents in each Model C school elected a school governing body. Ownership 
of buildings and grounds, furniture and equipment was transferred free of charge to 
Model C schools.  
  
 
119 
 
 
 
School governing bodies would be responsible for maintenance, which accounted for 17 
per cent of total costs. Schools became juridical bodies with the right to enter into 
contracts and to sue and be sued. They gained a high degree of autonomy, including the 
right to charge compulsory fees and to determine the admission policy of the school. 
Although the transfer of assets was due to financial constraints, it was also undoubtedly 
geared towards making it difficult for the new government to reverse changes in the 
schools and to enable the NP to maintain support from its constituency (Sayed 2002). 
According to Lemon (1994), the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) 
stated that the budget constraint was used as a smokescreen to restructure white education 
before a democratic solution to the entire education crisis could be found through the 
process of negotiation.  
 
Schools introduced admission tests to assess proficiency in language and numeracy in 
order to determine the entrance level. However, some studies alluded to the fact that 
some schools administered entrance tests in order to control enrolment of learners from 
different racial groups (McKenney 1994). Differentiation among the black people 
became an issue because it was the few privileged middle class group who might be able 
to send their children to schools with better facilities and more qualified teachers. People 
have reacted to cases where teachers in state schools took their children to model B 
schools, and became less committed employees in their own schools, as they knew that 
their own children’s education was qualitatively higher and secure (Chisholm et. al. 
1993).   
 
3.2.2 Proposal on Regional Integration 
Another measure taken by the apartheid government to restructure white education was a 
proposal to integrate all departments of education (excluding homelands) on a regional 
basis. This did not mean abolishing of the four governance models of education, which 
operated on racial basis. But Piet Marais, then Minister of Education and one in charge of 
restructuring, said that the 64 Acts which regulated education at that time were to be 
reduced to six or seven as the government began to integrate the existing four education 
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ministries into one central ministry and create several non-racial regional education 
systems. Marais stated: 
 
 It would be impossible to run such large organisations on a centralised basis, and one of the 
realities was that education would have to be organised and administered regionally. An education 
department consisting of a departmental head and a management team should be established in 
each region. In this way, the available education management manpower, from within and outside 
of the existing management departments can be divided among all regional departments. The three 
education departments (White, Coloured, and Indian) of Parliament and the DET should be 
brought together in a co-operative venture. Self-governing states would come into the system 
voluntarily, while the addition of independent homelands would depend on constitutional 
negotiations.  Education regions would have to coincide with the regions as determined in the 
negotiation process (Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand Quarterly Review of 
Education and Training in South Africa 1993:4). 
 
The above statement suggests that the intention of the government was to maintain the 
system of segregation in education despite the idea of establishing a single central 
ministry and regional departments. Many groups opposed the initiative as they felt that 
efforts to restructure education had to involve all stakeholders through a negotiated 
process. Teacher organisations, particularly SADTU and other stakeholders called for the 
establishment of a National Education and Training Forum (NETF) to negotiate on 
transformation and restructuring of the education system (Chetty 1993). 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that as the negotiations advanced, the apartheid 
government used institutions which were instruments of the state to make changes in the 
system in order to maintain its interests and those of its constituencies; and to strike a 
good bargain position in the negotiation process. According to Sayed: 
 
The National Party was both negotiating group and the government of the day. It thus not only 
engaged in formulating possibilities and options for education but was also able to effect unilateral 
changes as it controlled the apparatuses of the state. An important aspect of its strategy was 
unilateral deregulation of state assets. In education, it formulated the Clase Bills which ceded 
control of formerly white only schools to school governing bodies. In the interregnum from 
negotiation to elections, the National Party government effectively created a market driven school 
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system, with white schools charging high school fees and gaining control of their physical assets 
as required by the Constitution. The new government was thus committed to entering into bona 
fide negotiations over any alteration to the formerly white only schools. As a result the National 
Party stripped the state of considerable assets even before the new government came into being 
(Sayed et. al. 2001:252). 
 
The different changes made by the apartheid government in white only schools and the 
proposal to reorganise education administration can be explained by referring back to 
ideas, group and institutional approaches or theories. The fact that the NP was in power 
meant that it had the advantage of using the rules and structures of the government to 
advance ideas that enabled it to effect changes and to ensure that its interests were 
maintained and secure. At the same time, the apartheid government made it difficult for 
the new government to implement its transformation agenda in education. As indicated in 
Chapter II, actors and groups use ideas to circumvent institutions to effect changes in 
pursuit of their interests. Public officials have their own interests and ambitions that they 
seek through control of state machinery. Since institutions comprise of norms, rules and 
structures of government, people from within are able to use those norms and rules to 
effect changes that would enhance and further their interests ( Howlett & Ramesh 1995). 
The above findings also reveal that institutions constrain or restrain change.    
 
3.3 The Situation in State Schools  
While changes were taking place in white schools, the situation in most state schools that 
served black communities rapidly deteriorated. The enrolment at black schools 
throughout the country exceeded its potential capacity by more than 250 000 during the 
first quarter of 1993 (see Table VII). Double shifts operating at 367 schools had involved 
266 947 primary and 85 820 secondary school learners, at the same time as some white 
schools and colleges were closing down (Edusource 1993). 
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Table VII: Capacity of and Actual Enrolment in Schools, 1993 (Excluding Homelands) 
 
Population Group 
 
 
African 
Coloured 
Indian 
White 
Total 
Capacity 
 
 
2 385 021 
828 370 
294 354 
1 493 086 
5 000 831 
Enrolment 
 
 
2 635 653 
893 074 
271 319 
906 302 
4 706 348 
Places  
Shortage (-) or 
Excess (+) 
-250 632 
-64 704 
+23 035 
+586 784 
+294 483 
 
 
Source: EduSource Data News 1993 
 
While it was evident that the government was protecting privileges of its constituencies 
in education through changes that were made in white schools; it sought to alleviate some 
of the pressures on township and rural schooling through increased expenditure. 
Government spending on black schools increased by 25 per cent during the 1993/94 
financial year to R4.1 billion (Hofmeyr and Simkins 1993). However, despite the above 
increases, expenditure was eroded by sharp increases in unit costs as well as student 
numbers. Therefore, real spending per learner declined by more than 10 per cent and the 
differences in average spending per learner remained large (see Table VIII). 
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Table VIII: Per Capita Expenditure, 1993/94 (Excluding former homelands) 
 
African                                R2 184 
Coloured                             R3 691 
Indian                                  R4 687 
White                                  R5 403 
 
 
 
 
 Note: 
• Per capita expenditure in the former homelands varied from R1 053 (Transkei) to 
R2 241 (Qwaqwa). 
• Equal per capita expenditure on all children in the country averaged out at  
R2 222. 
Source: EduSource Data News 1995 
 
Therefore increases and changes of trends in financing did not significantly affect 
inequality, quality, or conflict in the education system. The African population group 
particularly those in the homelands remained the most disadvantaged. In 1992/93, South 
Africa experienced its worst crisis in education since 1984/85 (EduSource Data News 
1992). As discussed in Chapter I and earlier sections of this Chapter, the crisis in 
education was integrally linked to the political crisis in the country and the ups and 
downs of the political negotiations that were taking place during that period. The 
Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand Journal of Quarterly Review of 
Education and Training in South Africa (1993) show that more than 16 000 instances of 
disruptions took place throughout the country and 11 million pupil days were lost. An 
analysis of the disruptions showed that 23 per cent of cases occurred in Gauteng and 
almost 17 per cent in townships on the East Rand. These were places where the lowest 
pass rates in matriculation examinations were recorded (EduSource 1993). In order to 
understand the underlying causes of the crisis, we need to look closely at the struggles 
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that were taking place on the ground during this particular time. The government imposed 
R72 matriculation examination fee, which was rejected by students from black 
communities. It was later reduced to R48.  According to Tikly: 
 
 Examination fees for matriculation students represent only about 0.17% of the total estimated R23 
billion budget for per-tertiary education in 1993/94. While an examination fee of R48 represents 
roughly 6% of the average monthly income of an African family (estimated at R779), it constitutes 
only 1% of the average monthly income of a white family (estimated at R4 679). The 
intransigence of the state on the issue thus needs to be explained. It must be seen against the 
background of attempts by the state to set policy precedents which would be difficult to reverse in 
the future and as a regressive tax which, like VAT, presses hardest on the poorest (Tikly 1993:6). 
 
Another issue was overcrowding and lack of space in schools that were meant for black 
population groups. The Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and other student 
organisations embarked on a campaign to have examination fees scrapped and for the 
government to allow students to make use of underutilised white schools. The student 
organisations together with NECC had also demanded cessation of the unilateral 
restructuring of the education system, the establishment of a national negotiation forum 
for education, more textbooks, laboratories, libraries and teachers at black schools 
(Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1993).  
 
Similarly, teachers aired their grievances, demanding an increase in salaries and an end to 
rationalization and retrenchments. The government responded with an increase of 5 per 
cent salary to all civil servants, but SADTU rejected the offer and embarked on a two-
week strike leaving learners without teachers. Although the initiative was not wholly 
successful, its negotiating team won key concessions on salary increases for lower paid 
teachers. According to the Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand:  
 
 This was SADTU’s first attempt at organising a national strike of South African teachers. 
Mistakes have been made. At the same time, important victories have been scored, leading to the 
empowerment of a sector that has long been subjected to intensely authoritarian and bureaucratic 
forms of control. The unquestioning subservience of teachers to education authorities has finally 
been broken (Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1993:4). 
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 The strike had mixed results. While on the one hand large sections of the community, 
namely, learners, were alienated and disadvantaged by the strike, some gains were made 
in salary increases, and increased confidence of SADTU and teachers as an organised 
group to exert pressure for change. The pressure exerted on the government led to the 
establishment of the much awaited National Education and Training Forum (NETF) for 
negotiating transformation in the education sector. The idea of a forum as a means to 
engage the state had first been mooted in 1992, at the National Education Conference 
(Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1993). However, differences 
emerged on the role that such forum would play. 
 
3.4 National Education and Training Forum (NETF) 
According to Jansen (2001:22), the NETF was “one of several fora established as sectoral 
negotiating bodies ahead of the inauguration of the first post apartheid state”. It began to 
function late partly due to disruption of schooling in townships and in major city centres 
and also failure of government and organs of civil society to address the education crisis. 
The initial attempt to address the education crisis was the establishment of the Joint 
Working Group consisting of government officials and members from the ANC. The 
functioning of the Working Group failed due to lack of will by the apartheid government 
and also lack of legal status of the group to intervene and initiate changes in the 
prevailing situation in education. The failure of the Joint Working Group brought 
together of political, teacher, student and education service organisations in a National 
Education Conference in 1992. The aims of the conference were (Jansen et. al. 2001:23): 
 
• To develop broad principles, norms and values that should underpin a future education system; 
• To establish joint strategies and campaigns to address the education crisis; 
• To develop mechanisms for constructing a new education system and for dealing with education 
in the transition period. 
 
The conference called for establishment of a negotiating forum that would bring together 
the government and participants in the National Education Conference with the aim of 
putting an end to the unilateral restructuring of education by the apartheid government 
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and enhance a negotiated restructuring of education during the transition period (Jansen 
et. al. 2001). Hence the above developments in the National Education Conference 
together with persistent strikes and protests by teachers for salary increases and demands 
for an end to retrenchments led to the establishment of the NETF in August 1993.  
 
The government saw NETF as an advisory forum to the education co-ordination service 
made up of experts.  Other individuals saw it as a forum to ‘clip the wings’of youth and 
call schools to order (Chetty 1993). In other words, both the government and individuals 
wanted the forum to be diverted from its functions by enforcing discipline and curtailing 
calls for transformation of the education system. The National Education Conference 
demanded a representative body of all stakeholders, including students, whose work 
would be conducted on the basis of consensus. The government wanted to see the NETF 
as a body that would exist indefinitely, while the National Education Conference 
representatives saw it as a transitional structure that would to facilitate negotiations in 
restructuring the education system (Lawrence 1995). 
 
According to the founding agreement (1993:1), the mission of NETF was to initiate, 
develop and participate in a process involving educational and training stakeholders in 
order to arrive at, and establish agreements, on: 
• the resolution of crises in education; 
• the restructuring of the education system for a democratic South Africa; 
• the formulation of policy frameworks for the long term restructuring of the 
education and training systems, which are linked to the human, social and 
economic development needs of South Africa. 
 
Participation in the NETF was open to national stakeholders in education and training. 
The structure consisted of a plenary which was the highest decision making body; an 
executive committee responsible for planning, coordinating and driving the work of the 
forum; working groups which would investigate matters referred to them by the plenary 
or executive committee; a chairperson elected on a rotating basis and a secretariat 
(EduSource 1994). 
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 According to the founding agreement, the NETF would operate on the basis of inclusivity 
and consensus seeking. It would aim to acquire its authority through developing widely 
accepted, implementable and effective policies and function in a transparent and publicly 
accountable manner. The Forum accepted that responsibility for managing education 
remained with the government of the day (NETF 1993). The success of NETF was 
mixed. It managed to deal with some short-term issues (for example suspension of 
examination fees) but did not make much headway on restructuring. A major problem 
was the reluctance of the government to co-operate in providing information and 
planning for change (Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1994). 
 
This section has outlined how education for black groups, particularly Africans, 
deteriorated and led to a crisis that was characterised by strikes, protests, boycotts and 
campaigns by teachers (SADTU), students (COSAS) and other ANC affiliated 
organisations. The actors called for the establishment of the NETF and an end to 
restructuring of education by the apartheid government. Pressure from the different 
groups involved led to the establishment of the NETF for negotiating transformation in 
the education sector and salary increase for teachers. It also increased confidence of 
different groups in demanding for their issues to be included in the policy agenda.  The 
above discussions can be explained by referring back to ideas and group approach. 
Different interest groups consisting of teachers, students, NECC and other service 
organisations aligned to the ANC organised under the umbrella of the National Education 
Conference put forward certain demands, among others, bringing apartheid to an end; 
bringing to a halt the unilateral restructuring of education by the apartheid government; 
enhancing a negotiated restructuring of education; improving of teachers’ salaries and 
ending retrenchments and rationalisation; abolishing examination fees and alleviating the 
problems of overcrowding in schools.  
 
The major point regarding these demands is that groups had interests which were in 
conflict with those of the government. Moreover, they had no informal relationships and 
interactions with network alliances in the government and neither did they always share 
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similar ideas and interests. Due to the above reasons, it would not be possible for the 
groups to advance their ideas and interests in order to effect the necessary changes. 
Hence the groups exerted pressure on the apartheid government by means of protests, 
strikes, boycotts and other mass campaigns to ensure that negotiations and restructuring 
of the education system is addressed. Anderson (1990) identifies protest activity, 
including violence, as a means of bringing problems to the attention of policy makers or 
as a way of putting pressure on policy makers to address problems by putting them on the 
policy agenda. Despite the fact that the apartheid government acceded to some of the 
demands, like an increase of teachers’ salaries, removal of examination fees and the 
establishment of the NETF, as the government of the day it ensured that it constrained the 
NETF from pursuing a negotiated restructuring of education. 
 
Group interests also became dominant before the 1994 elections where different policy 
networks and coalitions joined a race in competing to advance ideas on possible policy 
proposals and options in the education sector in the future democratic government. 
Groups that advanced policy proposals and options had different interests and 
orientations with varying goals, values and aspirations. This resulted in watering down 
some of the Principles of People’s Education as advanced in the Freedom Charter and put 
forward by the NECC and other organisations in the Mass Democratic Movement. The 
following section discusses the policy proposals and groups that advanced them 
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     PART II 
 
Policy Initiatives in Education before the 1994 Elections 
 
Before 1994 elections, different groups, constituencies and organisations came up with 
options, ideas and beliefs that shaped the education policy agenda and proposals of the 
democratic government (Muller 1987; Badat 1995). This part examines constituencies 
and the content of the agenda in mid and late 1980s and in the period starting from 1990 
to 1994. It will show the agenda narrowed and changed with the participation of different 
groups and actors. 
 
Democratic movements, among them the NECC, shaped the education agenda and 
options during this period. The agenda consisted of the liberal and radical ideals 
embodied in people’s education pioneered by the NECC in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The groups and constituencies involved included students, teachers, parents and workers. 
The Freedom Charter, drawn up in 1955, became the foundation for all specific demands 
around education. Although most of the actions undertaken by the above groups were 
intended to maximize resistance to the apartheid system, they played a great role in 
shaping the direction of education policies and transformation in the country (Chisholm 
and Fuller 1996).  
 
The principle of equality of provision was extended in daily contests by teacher and 
student organizations to issues around free and compulsory schooling, provision of 
facilities and textbooks, and teachers’ working conditions and salaries. There were 
struggles against racially based schools, compulsory school fees and exclusions from 
school on the basis of age, among others (Perry 1992). Unequal spending on white and 
black education was at the root of inequality and of the racist school finance system. 
Democratic governance at both national and local levels was another issue contested and 
was central to the 1980s agenda which combined elements of the Freedom Charter and 
the NECC agenda. There was a demand for a unitary and desegregated system of 
schooling. The call for a strong central state was seen as necessary for redistribution and 
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attainment of equity. The NECC advocated democratisation of social relations inside 
schools. According to Chisholm and Fuller: 
 
The demand for popular control over and democratization of schools found clearest expression in 
the struggles around the establishment of democratically constituted Student Representative 
Councils (SRCs) and Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs). This was one of a number of 
demands designed to alter social relations in schools; also included were demands for an end to 
sexual harassment of schoolgirls by male teachers, of corporal punishment and the requirement to 
pay school fees (Chisholm & Fuller 1996:700). 
 
The NECC and the whole democratic movement’s understanding of democracy was 
rooted in conceptions of mass participatory democracy and a radical egalitarianism 
concerned with democratisation of control over schooling at local, regional and national 
levels with the following elements: stronger participation of girls and women in the 
education sector; greater involvement of parents, teachers and students in school affairs; 
the recognition of the association by teachers inside the school; and more lateral 
participatory teaching practices inside classrooms (Mashamba 1990). They advocated 
public and objected to private schooling (Lewin 1991; Badat 1995). Hence, from this 
notion of democracy, there was a strong conviction in equality in education and rejection 
of elitism, which benefited a selected few people.  
 
Another aspect of people’s education that was contested by the NECC and other 
democratic movement groups was the culture of teaching and learning. In this area 
groups advocated a progressive curriculum that would: 
• encourage collective input and active participation by all, as well as stimulating 
critical thinking and analysis; 
• equip and train all sectors of people to participate actively and creatively in the 
struggle to attain people’s power in order to establish a non-racial democratic 
South Africa; 
• allow students, parents, teachers and workers to be mobilized into appropriate 
organisational structures which would enable them to participate actively in the 
initiation and management of people’s education in all its forms. 
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 Teacher education was considered crucial in assisting students to formulate appropriate 
programmes that would liberate and empower them with skills and prepare them to 
become responsible and good citizens (Nkomo 1990; Unterhalter 1992).  
 
Democratic governance at national and local levels; equity; redress; and the culture of 
learning had specific meaning as defined in the above section. For instance, the positive 
and creative side of people’s education insisted that the equality of education between 
races was not enough and that a radical transformation of basic economic and 
institutional structures was required to address the ills of apartheid (Essop 1992). The 
radical and idealist policy agenda of mass democratic movement and the NECC’s 
people’s education became diluted and narrowed drastically as events unfolded in the 
early 1990’s. 
 
3.5 Organisations, Institutions, Groups and Policy Position in the early 1990s 
The unbanning of political organisations and the process of negotiation led to pronounced 
changes in the transformation agenda. The ANC with a more moderate approach to 
educational reform, assumed political leadership over the more radical NECC (Badat 
1995). This also divided the NECC as “leading members became divided in loyalties 
between building the ANC internally or keeping the momentum of the NECC going as a 
separate organisation” (Chisholm and Fuller 1996:702). Furthermore, as the politics of 
negotiation (which had began at the national level) included high level players, the 
initiative for change was removed from school based actors and weaker interest groups 
that had engineered mass action and envisioned radical change of social relations at the 
local level.  Chisholm and Fuller wrote: 
 
COSAS and other student bodies such as Pan African Students Organisation (PASO) generally 
delinked local organizing from national policy issues. The tertiary students’ organization, the 
South African Students’ Congress (SASCO), became focused on internal reorganization and its 
role in the new era. SADTU, now recognized as a legitimate agent of teachers, concentrated on 
building its own organization and advancing salaries and working conditions. The strength of 
NECC was itself dwindling. It was no longer effectively coordinating the struggles of its diverse 
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constituencies, previously united by their common opposition to apartheid. These constituencies 
now appeared to be retreating and fragmenting along traditional lines of self-interest, moving 
away from earlier core issues central to people’s education (Chisholm and Fuller 1996:704). 
 
Organisations, groups, interests and institutions with different beliefs and ideologies 
came up with ideas about “best policy options” which would enhance change in the 
education sector after 1994. According to John: 
 
Ideas based approaches in public policy contend that it is the ideas that actors bring to the public 
sphere that are the reasons for policy change and stability. The reason why there are particular 
policies is because people believe and try to influence decision makers on the basis that there is a 
right course of action. Advocacy is a causal factor over and above the effects on policy of political 
institutions and interests (John 1999:145).  
 
While the above statement show the importance of ideas in policy process, it is assumed 
that ideas together with interests bind together the groups and individuals in a policy 
sector thus enabling them to exert influence. This was the case with different groups in 
the early 1990s. Those in the mass democratic movement, the ANC and labour were 
interested in transforming the education system to enhance equity, participation and 
redress. Those in business were interested in enhancing equity and redress in education in 
the country. They were also interested in transforming the education system to enable it 
to offer education that would generate skills geared towards improving the economy and 
meeting competitive market conditions. The apartheid government was interested in 
doing away with using race as the basis for provision of education but it also ensured that 
changes in policies would not disadvantage it and its constituency.  The different actors 
and policy options put forward before 1994 are examined below. 
 
3.5.1 The ANC    
The ANC established an Education Desk in Johannesburg, which coexisted with the 
NECC. As indicated in Section I of this Chapter, the NECC was an alliance of student, 
teacher, and labour organisations (COSAS, SADTU, COSATU) and became the initial 
vehicle through which the ANC directed the development of its education policy. The 
NECC commissioned the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) to develop 
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policy options for the broader democratic movement (Sayed & Jansen 2001). The 
unbanning of political movements and the beginning of negotiations brought new 
challenges for the democratic movement in South Africa. For bodies such as the NECC, 
this meant that their opposition and demands-based strategy would have to be replaced by 
one which enabled them to engage the state and other powerful groups such as the 
business sector in debate around specific possible alternatives to the future education 
system (NEPI 1993). It was acknowledged that the strategic shift would not have been 
accomplished easily.  According to Wolpe: 
 
 Decades of repressive political conditions have left South Africa with a seriously impoverished 
public discourse about education possibilities and alternatives. With a history of restricted access 
to information and analysis, and a political climate hostile to free debate and open discussion, it is 
no wonder that much of the discussion is couched in terms of opposition and general demands for 
redress rather than in terms of positive and attainable alternative policies. Progressive 
educationists have tended to respond to the hostile and polarised political environment in similar 
terms, with critical analysis of government policies rather than by providing the research and 
analysis necessary for formulating specific policy alternatives (Wolpe 1995:3). 
 
In addressing the new challenge, the NEPI had to orient people to the new position. The 
initial purpose was to provide NECC with information and analysis as a basis for 
discussion and debate. It was hoped that this would in turn enable communities, groups 
and individuals to sharpen their views about their education interests and how these could 
best be served, thereby enabling them to participate more effectively in the policy debate. 
The Framework Report states: 
 
 A consequence of NEPI has been the creation of a context where South African progressive 
educationists could together go through a process of policy option analysis, thereby expanding, 
consolidating, and partly re-orienting a broad base of expertise regarding policy issues. Through 
the exercise NEPI researchers have come to see that notions of policy analysis and vigorous 
democracy are closely allied to each other. By broadening the terms of discussion, by extending 
the issue of policy beyond a narrow circle of education expertise, and by seeing the policy process 
as a dialogue where it is legitimate to differ, it is hoped that the NEPI reports will make a 
contribution to the way in which educational policy is understood and pursued in a future non-
racial, non-sexist democracy (NEPI 1993:4).  
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 Hence, the main contributions of NEPI were: 
• Establishing a values framework within which a post apartheid education policy 
could be conceived, that is, around the pillars of non-racialism, non-sexism, 
equity, democracy and redress. 
• Engaging academics from universities in policy development, thereby effectively 
displacing the earlier tradition of policy criticism, which characterized progressive 
academic work in education. 
• Signalling the parameters within which a more refined education policy could be 
developed in the future, for example, the establishment of early childhood 
development and care, and adult basic education and training as crucial areas 
within which to shape future policies. 
• Creating a frame of reference within which rival policies would develop their own 
policy positions. 
NEPI produced 12 main reports in 1993 outlining policy options for early childhood 
development and care, adult education and training, curriculum, post-secondary 
education and governance. 
 
However, NEPI had its own weaknesses and could not claim to develop what became 
ANC policy since 1994. An examination of the new government education policy shows 
less continuity with NEPI options. Sayed and Jansen (2001:18) outline the weaknesses 
and criticisms of the NEPI options: 
• The NEPI could not anticipate the ambitious and idealistic statements of what should be rather 
than concrete analyses of what would actually happen given CODESA and the politics of 
reconciliation. 
• NEPI researchers had limited access to the inner workings of the education bureaucracy and the 
kinds of legislation and practice governing policy formulation on a day-to-day basis. 
• The NEPI worked in relative isolation from the main engine of education and training policy 
formation, namely, the National Training Board (NTB). The influence and authority of the NTB, 
in its second wave of policy generation could not have been anticipated by NEPI at the time. 
Evidently, ideas on policy options put forward by NEPI revealed the inexperienced side 
of the ANC and other mass democratic movements. The expertise and skills gained in 
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NEPI was used by the ANC in the development of a major process of education policy 
research and writing. The exercise was orchestrated through its ‘think tank’, the Centre of 
Education Policy Development (CEPD) that was established in 1992 and funded by the 
Canadian government (Wolpe 1995). The role of think tanks in the policy process was 
discussed in Chapter II. The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of a number of 
important think tanks mainly because policy makers and others were in need of new ideas 
and policies (Weiss 1992). Non-governmental think tanks like the CEPD in the early 
1990s saw their role as shaping the context within which debates on issues takes place, 
and aimed at influencing the process wherein issues are formulated into problems 
(Parsons 1995).  
  
The CEPD saw itself as a professionally autonomous institution, providing independent, 
rigorous and well-researched policy support to the democratic movement in the education 
and training sector during the transition period (CEPD Prospectus 1993).  The CEPD 
functioned under the auspices of a Board of Trustees that included the ANC and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
 
The CEPD worked through non-governmental research units and engaged individuals, 
academics, activists in the education sphere, as well as practitioners to conduct research 
on all aspects of the education system and to propose policies for education 
transformation. A series of workshops were hosted to prepare a draft ANC education 
policy. The workshops suggested the following priority areas: structure and system of 
schooling; integration of education and training; rural education; language policy; teacher 
development; finance and the bureaucracy; science and technology education and post 
secondary education (Chisholm & Kgobe 1993). While NEPI provided the foundation for 
much of the work conducted in these workshops, new material and more refined policy 
positions were developed (Chetty 1993). Unlike NEPI, a policy framework of the ANC 
rather than policy options was produced.  
 
The policy framework was produced to enable the ANC to present an overall vision and 
outline broad principles for a new education and training policy for South Africa. It was 
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aimed at providing cohesion in an education system that was deeply fragmented along 
racial and ethnic lines. It did not offer very detailed policy proposals but sought to build 
the foundation on which concrete suggestions for changes in policy could be developed 
and implemented (the Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1994).  
Moreover, the ANC charged the CEPD with the task of interpreting the Policy 
Framework in programmatic terms by developing an Implementation Plan for Education 
and Training (IPET). The purpose of the process was: 
 
To prepare a plan to be used by the central and provincial governments that will take office 
immediately after the elections. It is intended to form the basis for action by ministers in the new 
governments and enable the new executive and administrative authorities to act quickly in putting 
new policies to work. IPET will not stand on its own but form a part of the overall Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (The Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1994:12). 
 
However, there was dissatisfaction expressed about people’s exclusion from participation 
in the process. Civil society organisations, among them SASCO and COSAS felt that the 
formulation of education policy did not go through sufficient consultation and that many 
important structures were excluded from the process (the Education Policy Unit, 
University of Witwatersrand 1994). They also expressed their fear that the process was 
overtaken and dominated by academics and experts who did not represent any 
constituency other than themselves. Some of the educators, parents, members of civic 
organisations and NGOs from the Eastern Cape province who were interviewed by this 
author echoed similar sentiments. The respondents were asked to comment on the process 
of developing policy options before 1994 and inputs provided by them in the process. 
The majority of them felt that academics, experts and ANC elite (mostly from exile who 
did not know the realities on the ground) dominated the process. “The process excluded 
most of the people who are crucial and real stakeholders of education who were not 
highly educated but knew what they wanted in the new South Africa since they were 
advocates of People’s Education” (Response from member of community based 
organisation). 
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3.5.2 Labour 
3.5.2.1 National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA)
The origin of post apartheid policy on education and training dates back from the mid 
1980s.  This was the time when NUMSA’s Research and Development Group offered 
block training for workers over a three-month period. In the workshops, consultations 
took place and workers were able to provide inputs on their experiences and limitations 
of the training that they received and their future development aspirations. According to 
Sayed & Jansen: 
 
These experiences were strong formative influences on Bird’s (The person responsible for 
NUMSA’s RGD for Training) thinking and orientation towards education and training. Workers 
wanted training, but could not progress unless they passed through the formal schooling route. 
And schooling was geared towards youth, with a rigid set of steps for achieving school 
qualifications. For Bird and her colleagues, a crude model of a future vision for resolving this 
problem started to emerge: it consisted of the two legs of a ladder, the one representing education 
and the other training. The rungs would connect education and training to enable workers to enjoy 
upward mobility without having to re-enter the school system (Sayed & Jansen 2001:14). 
 
The Australian Metalworkers’ Union had developed a sophisticated model of the 
emerging ladder, which impressed NUMSA, and trainers of labour movements. Bird and 
other labour movement trainers and officials visited Australia and had meetings and 
discussions with academics, educators and representatives from the Australian 
Metalworkers’ Union. The model was presented at the NUMSA Congress in 1991.  To 
NUMSA, the Australian model offered broad banding and multi-skilling as a method of 
increasing productivity which was part of the broader economic agenda. Increased 
productivity was linked to improved training. However, the Australian debate was driven 
by labour and schooling did not appear as strongly reflected in the conceptualisation of 
this model of education and training. 
 
3.5.2.2 COSATU
Between 1990 and 1993, COSATU developed a pro-active human resources policy, 
which included a policy for literacy and adult basic education. To COSATU, adult basic 
education referred to the provision of an empowering general education for adults to 
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ensure literacy, numeracy and information gathering skills (Chisholm & Kgobe 1993). 
Like NUMSA, COSATU implemented block training for workers through Participatory 
Research Projects. Training workshops served as policy deliberation forums for 
education and training. The main purpose, like that of NUMSA, was to find ways of 
integrating education and training.  
 
Subsequently, COSATU put forward a policy proposal on human resources development 
whose goals included commitment to a single, non-racial and non-sexist education 
system geared towards meeting the needs and aspirations of society (COSATU Human 
Resources Committee 1992). The Federation felt that for the policy goals to be achieved, 
it would entail a number of strategies and measures to be taken, namely, destroying 
apartheid education; implementing free and compulsory education for all children; 
developing literacy, numeracy and critical thinking; and building a formal education 
system geared towards providing scientific and technological skills (Innes Labour Briefs 
1993).  
 
In order to achieve the above measures, COSATU emphasized that the restructuring of 
education and training would not be effected without its input; the state rather than 
market forces would play a key role in planning education and training policy; and that 
the existing gap between formal education and vocational education had to be narrowed 
(Chisholm & Kgobe 1993). The Federation developed a three pronged approach to its 
human resources policy based on the areas of education and training; adult basic 
education; and development of female workers (COSATU Human Resources Committee 
1992). 
 
COSATU argued that education and training would have to be linked to economic 
planning. Trade unions should play a central role in the planning, implementing and 
monitoring of training. They also emphasised the importance of affirmative action in 
order to address the problem of discrimination in training on the basis of class, race and 
gender. They advocated paid leave to enable workers to receive education and training. 
They emphasised the importance of lifelong learning for all workers. “Formal schooling 
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should be linked to adult education and industrial training, which must in turn provide 
career paths for workers. Training must lead to national or industrial certificates, while 
skills, which workers have, should be recognized as a form of formal training” (Chisholm 
& Kgobe 1993:16). COSATU emphasised the need for one national system of adult basic 
education with national certification. They outlined a strategy of training for female 
workers that would enable them participate fully and more effectively in education and 
training programmes.   
 
As discussions on the above matters progressed, COSATU’s Participatory Project 
worked on the themes of integration, articulation and accreditation. With integration, 
adult basic education, technical and formal education would be interlinked in such a way 
that there was equality and maximum mobility between them. Articulation was supposed 
to be interlinked to integration and would ensure that what was taught in adult basic 
education was relevant and corresponded to what was taught in formal education. A set 
of competencies from which all sectors would draw would be set up. Accreditation 
referred to certification, which would attempt to establish equivalence across sectors 
(Innes Labour Briefs 1993).  
 
COSATU’s policy proposals on integrating education and training were discussed in the 
National Training Board (NTB). The NTB became the most important policy and 
political vehicle for charting the future direction of education and training systems during 
the CODESA negotiations. “Among the competing policy initiatives under way in 
expectation of a change of government, it was the NTB’s National Training Strategy 
Initiative which contained the nucleus of the idea of an integrated system of education 
and training. The idea of the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) was born” 
(Jansen 2001:15). By 1993, discussions and meetings between COSATU and NTB had 
become the mainstream of policy deliberation and political negotiation for the new 
education and training system that was to emerge in official education policy after 1994. 
 
However, it became difficult to fit schooling in the COSATU model on education and 
training and since the ANC came into the picture after COSATU had outlined the model, 
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there were suggestions of using pilot projects to test the way the new education and 
training system would work. The suggestions were discussed in the NETF by the 
National Education Conference (NEC) which was a broad based constituency of 
education stakeholders aligned to the ANC, to take education issues into negotiation 
forums. The ANC did not have strong representation in the NETF and their 
recommendations were not taken.  Another vehicle that was established to provide 
educational representation and to bring education and labour into closer cooperation was 
the Inter-Ministerial Working Group (Innes Labour Briefs 1994). This group became the 
drafting committee of the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) which was 
designed to create through the NQF, a single coordinated system of education and 
training (Jansen 2001). 
 
However, integration of education and training was not achieved, and the new democratic 
government established two ministries in 1994 - one for education and another for labour 
- as opposed to a single ministry as some of the major proponents had expected. 
 
3.5.2.3 SADTU
Although SADTU was not such a powerful player in the policy game at that time, it had 
by 1993 developed positions on the main policy issues in education. Unlike many of the 
other policy statements that emerged during the transition period, SADTU’s vision was 
strongly rooted in the values and principles of People’s Education, and emphasised 
changes in curriculum, methodology, language policy, system and structure of schooling, 
resources and evaluation of both learners and educators. The Union advocated 13 years of 
free and compulsory schooling, including a year of pre-school. SADTU felt that the state 
had to bear the primary responsibility of financing and providing education. The same 
stand was taken by COSATU. 
 
In contrast to NEPI and the ANC, SADTU proposed a major increase in the overall 
education budget. It shared with NEPI and the ANC a commitment to redress and 
redistribute resources to areas of greatest need, but also carried a more radical view of 
what should be done with private schools (SADTU 1993). Neither NEPI nor the ANC 
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saw the abolition of private schools as a reality. SADTU proposed that state subsidies to 
private schools should be drastically reduced and that former ‘Model C’ schools should 
revert to being state schools.  
 
There was more militancy and radicalism in most of SADTU’s proposals, which called 
for drastic changes in the education system. This trend continued after the establishment 
of the new democratic government where, in some instances, SADTU felt that the pace of 
transformation in the education sector was too slow and that the poor people who 
sacrificed most to fight for the freedom and democracy in the country had been let down 
by the government. 
 
3.5.3 The Apartheid State 
In 1991, the government released the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS), which 
presented the National Party’s own agenda and negotiating platform (Lemmer 1991; 
Bennell 1992). ERS presented short and medium term managerial solutions to some of 
the existing educational problems (Lemmer 1991). It also made long-term proposals that 
were debated by different groups as methods of redressing the sector (Bennell 1992). It 
recommended non-racial regional authorities; equal education opportunities for all; free 
and compulsory education for all South Africans up to Standard Five (current Grade 
Seven); and a single new education department for all races that would make satisfactory 
allowances for the accommodation of diversity; restructuring and upgrading of standards 
in tertiary education and the use of distance education in teacher training (ERS 1991; 
Lemmer 1991). 
 
The proposals of ERS departed to some extent from the prevailing system of apartheid 
education (Wolpe 1995; Lemmer 1991). Race was not going to feature within the new 
educational dispensation; recommendation of a single ministry of education was in 
accordance with the demands of a wide spectrum of political and community 
organisations. The difference between its proposals and those developed by NEPI showed 
the main constitutional difference between the National Party and the ANC. The latter 
advocated the concentration of state power for redistribution, while the former preferred 
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to decentralise control to public services serving primarily whites (Murray 1995). This 
strategy allowed it to devolve power to governing bodies in white schools, which were 
able to introduce admission policies and raise fees above what many of those seeking 
access could afford. 
 
However, the National party policy treated education as an essentially technical problem, 
paying little attention to political demands or redress of historical imbalances. It was not 
specific in terms of financial provision or means of implementation. The fact that it 
recommended free and compulsory education up to Standard Five (Grade Seven) meant 
that many black people would be unable to continue beyond that level as they would not 
be able to pay for their own schooling (the Education Policy Unit, University of 
Witwatersrand 1993).  
 
Another proposal, “A Curriculum Model for South Africa (CUMSA)” emerged after the 
release of ERS. The CUMSA proposal resulted from fact-finding missions and trips 
overseas by two senior officials in the apartheid government to investigate education 
reform. According to Jansen: 
  
One of the most important findings of these officials was the utility of ‘competencies’ as 
constituting the framework for reforming apartheid education. The trend in much of Europe during 
the early 1990s was to reconstitute vocationalism within a progressive understanding of education 
and the labour market. Vocational training linked to employment in a changing labour market was 
couched in a discourse of relevance, progression and opportunity. The new vocationalism 
advanced high skill, high employment rather than the menial tasks associated with its earlier form 
(Jansen 2001:19). 
 
Following their findings, the two government officials conducted a review of more than 
100 different school syllabi used in South Africa at that time with the aim of addressing 
the issue of putting too much emphasis on content while neglecting other aspects. The 
outcome of the review was the proposal for a streamlined curriculum built around 
competencies. It was a sophisticated proposal that was highly criticised by National Party 
leadership because it allocated lesser time for religious education while consolidating 
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syllabi under one authority. 
 
The aim of the state during this period was to retain as much as possible the privileges of 
its constituencies. Hence ideas advanced by the state and its constituencies in the 
initiatives to formulate education policies reflected those values and ideology that the 
apartheid state wanted to maintain. The state was able to use its own instruments and 
other forums to exert most influence and modify ideas advanced by its adversaries. This 
is confirmed by institutional and group approaches which postulate how individuals, 
groups, classes and states pursue their specific interests in the context of existing formal 
organisational rules and norms (Howlett & Ramesh 1995; John 1999). The apartheid state 
used its power and state machinery to introduce changes and restructure education in line 
with its own ideas advanced in ERS. This is evident in the changes introduced at the 
school level that were discussed in detail in the first section of this Chapter. Effecting 
changes and restructuring on the eve of the establishment of new democratic government 
would enable the apartheid state to bargain and retain some of the changes that it had 
initiated and implemented.   
 
3.5.4 Business Community 
In the early 1990s, business influenced education through the Urban Foundation. The 
Urban Foundation and the Anglo American Chairman’s Fund provided funding which 
supported the development of entrepreneurship in education, vocational training and 
infrastructure for school buildings (Jansen 2001). Business continued to exert greater 
influence when the Urban Foundation established the Education Policy and Systems 
Change Unit in 1992.  Through its key leading education experts, the Education Policy 
and Systems Change Unit developed a media strategy for its policy positions. Its experts 
wrote and commissioned key policy papers around which public debate and discussion 
were organized. Consequently, the Education Policy and Systems Change Unit experts 
participated in ANC commissioned work, among them NEPI where they were able to 
exert greater influence on education policy thinking within the ANC. Reorganisation of 
the Urban Foundation led to the establishment of the National Business Initiative which 
is currently providing funding for Further Education and Training colleges and other 
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skills training institutions.  
 
In addition to providing funding to the Urban Foundation, the corporate sector 
established the Private Sector Education Council that regularly produced position papers 
as part of its attempt to influence national education policy thinking before 1994. The 
Council emphasised technical and vocational education; expressed concern about the lack 
of competition in the education system; and called for realignment of education with the 
needs of a modern economy. The influence of the business sector in education change 
before 1994 was further affirmed through its representation in the National Training 
Board. A member of GENCOR representing employers and business in the Board played 
a major role in the development of the National Qualifications Framework that mostly 
addressed the training needs of labour. The representative from GENCOR was well 
placed and knowledgeable because he had studied in New Zealand and had encountered 
the concept of the NQF during that time. 
  
Business was also represented in the Joint Education Trust (JET) which, through its 
alliance with unions and political parties, determined funding priorities for education. 
JET was established in 1992 by a consortium of businesses and other organisations. Its 
formation was spearheaded by the Private Sector Initiative (PSI), a collaboration of 20 
leading South African companies. The PSI joined forces with community organisations, 
including leading political parties, labour unions, business and other education 
organisations to improve the quality of education and to transform the system into one 
more equitable for all South African citizens. An amount of 500 million Rand was 
allocated for education development by the corporate partners and was administered by 
JET when it was founded in 1992 (the Education Policy Unit, University of 
Witwatersrand 1994). Among JET founding organisations were AECI Amplats Limited, 
Anglo American Limited, Barloworld Limited, Billiton, C. G. Smith Limited, COSATU, 
FABCOS, First National Bank, Johnnic Limited, the National African Federated 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NAFCOC), Reunert Limited, South African 
Breweries, Sanlam, Sasol, Southern Life Association Limited, Standard Bank of South 
Africa, the IFP, the ANC, AZAPO, PAC, SADTU and the National Council of Trade 
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Unions (NACTU). Among the major objectives of JET were to improve mathematics and 
science education, vocational education and training and teacher effectiveness, and 
enhance educational efficiency.  
 
3.5.5 The National Education and Training Forum (NETF) 
The NETF, as was discussed earlier, exerted influence on the education policy agenda 
and policy options and proposals. NETF consisted of representatives of stakeholders in 
education who were defined as central government, the national education conference, 
business, representatives from homelands, the training sector, universities, parents, 
church organizations and NGOs. It was almost exclusively concerned with macro-
systems issues and most of its members engaged in liberal modern forms of policy 
analysis (NETF Documentation 1993, 1994, and 1995). Evidently, this weakened the 
radical content of the NECC, National Education Conference and other mass democratic 
movements. Due to its composition, NETF was dominated by government and business 
who had active role in the proceedings. However, students, teachers, workers, parents and 
other employed or unemployed persons did not have equal role as compared to that of the 
government and the business sector (Chisholm & Fuller 1996). 
  
As stated above, the NETF only managed to deal with short term issues (suspension of 
examination fees) but did not make much headway with restructuring due to a number of 
factors, namely; lack of legal status, the reluctance of the government to co-operate in 
providing information and planning of change, and lack of organisational capacity - 
office space, full time management and clear decision making process (the Education 
Policy Unit University of Witwatersrand 1994; Jansen et. al 2001). Regarding curriculum 
reform the NETF offered a temporary solution, that is, to cleanse the curriculum of 
offensive elements, such as racist and sexist language (Jansen 1996; NETF 
documentation 1993 and 1994). Time frames were short, thus limiting involvement and 
participation. As Jansen (1996) observes, the outcome was to “sanitise” the syllabus 
symbolically, often focusing on making pronouns gender neutral. 
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3.5.6 International Community 
The national players identified above were not the only actors in the theatre of 
educational transformation before 1994 elections. Donor agencies, some in collaboration 
with national organisations, institutions, and individuals, also played a significant role. 
One aspect that came out of initiatives by donor agencies was that the ANC was very 
much involved and behind those activities. It was also revealed that, like in all other 
sectors, there was much international influence on the transformation of education system 
in South Africa (Landsberg 1994).  
 
The World Bank organised and funded workshops on technical and vocational education; 
and finance and governance in education. It also had several technical teams assessing 
training and other needs of local researchers engaged in NEPI project (CEPD 1993). In 
1993, one of the scheduled workshops on transition was hosted jointly by CEPD and the 
Education Policy and Systems Change Unit. After the workshop a consultancy report was 
produced by representatives from the ANC and the Education Policy and Systems 
Change Unit on Education Planning and System Management. On the basis of this report, 
the Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand provided the following 
criticisms: 
 
The World Bank’s sector assessment of educational planning and management in South Africa has 
gone to great lengths to quantify the gaps in the existing system and the staffing and training needs 
of a new education bureaucracy. What that quantitative exercise cannot do is address the 
qualitative issues in the structure and functions of the supervisory services. The staffing ratios it 
has generated in relation to pupil enrolments and professional staff may be useful norms for a 
technical manpower planning exercise. Such an exercise has the effect of homogenizing variations 
for the purposes of taxonomy. However, the proposals for the numbers to be trained and the 
rationale for their distribution needs to be balanced by a much more thorough analysis of the 
quality of delivery across the system. The paucity of specific skills (especially in specialist 
subjects) and the skewed distribution of them across the system require another kind of policy 
approach (The Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1993). 
 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) exerted major 
influence and provided most funding in education policy initiatives. The early influence 
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was established through extensive funding of NGOs, a number of them with well-
established anti-apartheid credentials. Jansen (2001:20-21) outlines the influence of 
USAID on education policy as: 
• commissioning of the standard sector assessments associated with its operations in much of the 
world. The primary education sector assessment provided critical information on the status of 
primary education in South Africa. The tertiary education sector assessment fulfilled a similar 
function for higher education, providing information for policy and planning which was in short 
supply during the early part of the decade. In doing the studies on the education sector, USAID 
was able to bring American expertise alongside South African participants. 
• bringing in cutting edge technologies for recasting education policy thinking in the democratic 
movement. The Research Triangle Institute (RTI) was contracted to work with Education 
Foundation to generate and apply policy-modelling tools to project educational needs and finance 
in the future. The APEX model projected enrolment patterns in the future and different financing 
scenarios for different projections. These sophisticated computer technologies were presented to 
all key education and political stakeholders in education as a tool for planning provision after 
apartheid.  
• direct funding of ANC and other leaders, often through the United States Information Service, on 
study visits to the United States to examine education policy and practice in American schools and 
universities. Examples included the studies of American college system, the provision of 
education for disadvantaged young children and science and mathematics education in high 
schools. The USAID funded Tertiary Education Project facilitated such visits to the United States 
by South African education and political leaders in the first half of the decade.  
 
 The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada sponsored 
workshops on science and technology policy for a democratic South Africa in 1992 
(CEPD 1993). The exercise was undertaken at the request of the ANC through its 
Research Department. The report produced was highly critical of the existing system of 
science and technology research and development, and a Science and Technology Forum 
consisting of all statutory science and research development bodies and representatives of 
the mass democratic movement was established to examine the restructuring of science 
and technology research and development in the country (Chisholm & Kgobe 1993). 
 
A number of donor agencies provided funds to organisations, institutions and individuals 
to enable them to conduct policy analysis and education policy research for advocacy 
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purposes. Among them the INTERFUND Consortium provided funding for university 
based Education Policy Units which played a key role in staffing NEPI research groups. 
The Education Policy Units saw themselves as extensions of ANC education policy 
thinking. They were contracted by CEPD to conduct research for the ANC and mass 
democratic movement and also played a role in the ANC forums. The Units’ research in 
higher education played an important role in development of higher education policy 
after 1994. 
 
3.5.7 Other Initiatives 
In addition to the above players, groups, institutions and organisations in different areas 
of education held workshops, conferences and established forums to which they put 
forward policy options and agenda for transforming the education system: 
 
• In 1990, a wide spectrum of interested parties met in a conference to discuss and 
put forward proposals for change of the quality and structure of education. The 
conference was attended by commerce and industry, the alternative organisations, 
political groupings, independent agencies offering formal and informal 
education, educators and parent bodies. According to Lemmer (1991), two 
aspects emerged from the debate, namely, the establishment of a single ministry 
of education, and the equalisation of the amount of funds spent on each South 
African child. It was hoped that the implementation of such proposals would 
address inequalities in the education system.  
 
The outcome of the conference opened doors for more people, groupings and 
organisations to debate and pursue those issues; and in this regard, pressurised on 
the government to re-examine the education system in the country as a whole 
(Turner 1990). However, as more varied groups and organizations got together 
many compromises on salient issues and proposals were made to accommodate 
ideas, concerns and needs of such groups.      
 
• In 1990, Mr. Nelson Mandela initiated direct negotiation with the apartheid 
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government over the ongoing education crisis. The Mandela delegation sought to 
address both the immediate crisis and the long term restructuring of the education 
system. Most of the needs identified included many demands put forward by the 
NECC. Emphasis was placed on timely delivery of textbooks, an emergency fund 
to address historical backlogs of classroom construction, access to resources in 
white schools and more efficient administration of supplementary examinations 
(Pillay 1992).  
 
At a broader level, the delegation sought to stop government from pressing ahead 
with its own agenda, including the semi privatisation of white schools, and to 
involve black communities meaningfully in decision-making (Essop 1992). 
However, a Joint Working Group established to monitor the situation failed to 
prevent unilateral restructuring of the education system by the government. As 
restructuring went ahead, some negotiations also took place, resulting in 
compromises on a number of issues that were crucial for transforming the 
education sector. 
 
• A Multi Faith Religious Education Forum held a meeting with members of the 
ANC on 17 February 1994 to discuss issues of religion in public education. The 
forum submitted proposals for a new national policy that would overcome the 
negative use of religion in education and provide for a positive approach in 
accordance with the Constitution (the Education Policy Unit, University of 
Witwatersrand 1994).  
 
The proposals sought to distinguish between two disciplines: Studies in Religion 
which is provided by all the major religions of South Africa; and Religious 
Education which allows pupils to examine their own religion in an educational 
way, enhancing awareness of religious beliefs and traditions of their fellow pupils 
and relevance of religious values to their life experiences. This was to be done in 
a way that accorded respect and equal consideration to all religions.     
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from policy initiatives in education by different 
groups before 1994 elections. First the ideas and options advanced by each group or 
constituency reflected their interests in education in the new government. As a result the 
constituencies driving the education policy agenda including its content changed 
substantially as groups, institutions and organisations came in with different and often 
competing ideas. The NECC which advocated radical values and beliefs of People’s 
Education lost its support and its power dwindled as the politics of negotiation and the 
accompanied compromises took place with the participation of the ANC and other high 
level players in the mass democratic movement. This means actors like COSAS, SASCO, 
PASO and others, particularly those at the local and school levels and weaker interest 
groups that had advocated radical ideas and policy options were marginalised. 
Consequently, many of the ideals and beliefs of People’s Education as advanced by the 
NECC were either watered down or left out. According to Mokgalane & Vally: 
Earlier concepts of participatory democracy gave way to an emphasis on consultation among elite 
stakeholders, a process which invariably led to the dilution of policies and delays in forward 
movement. The emphasis on collective, organized effort among those with a common goal and 
vision was transmuted into a concern with reconciliation and cooperation among racial groups 
(Mokgalane & Vally 1996:4). 
Business was interested in policy options that would transform education and redress 
existing imbalances to enable it to produce the required human resources and skilled 
manpower suitable for the needs of a modern economy. While the measure would enable 
people to secure viable employment, it would also be beneficial for business’s 
competitive and changing markets. The NP produced policy options that advocated de-
racialising education, decentralisation and shifting of autonomy to the school level. This 
was intended to ensure that its privileges were secure and maintained as shown earlier. 
As part of the mass democratic movement, unions advocated policy options that would 
enhance fundamental transformation of the education system to ensure equity and 
redress. However, they also came up with policy options that were geared towards 
serving the interests of their members, namely, the provision of skills and training.               
 
Second, education policy proposals advanced by some of the groups in the early 1990’s 
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were a result of “policy copying” or policy transfers which entailed adoption of policy 
proposals from outside (Chisholm & Fuller 1996). John (1999) observes that policy 
makers adopt policies from other countries and apply them to their own contexts. In such 
cases it is ideas that are being transferred. It was shown earlier how different 
constituencies, namely, labour, government, business, and so forth sent representatives to 
fact-finding missions in the developed world to find out policy models that could be 
applicable to South Africa after 1994. The adoption of policy proposals and options 
through policy transfers illustrate that there were a number of factors influencing policy 
initiatives in education by different groups. Some groups realised that the best means to 
address the education crisis would be by searching for, and adopting, new ideas and best 
practices from international experiences (Lungu 2001). According to De Clercq (1998) 
policy transfer could have limitations if certain factors are not taken into consideration: 
 
The new policy proposals borrowed ideas from the international comparative experience and 
policy literature which they wove into the South African local concerns of redress and equity. 
They borrowed more from the advanced industrial countries, including Australia, and tended to 
ignore the instructive experiences from societies in transition with similar socio-political 
democratic agendas and aspirations. The problem with this import is that it was often done in a 
selective advocacy type way, without offering a critical assessment of these foreign policy models, 
even from within their own context. The political and socio-economic conditions of these 
countries and the problems the policy models sought to address were never explained (de Clercq 
1998:144).           
 
Another factor in policy transfer is the fact that policy makers and groups would seek to 
transfer ideas that are likely to favour their interests. This was discussed in above sections 
in the case of labour, the NP government and business. 
 
While the above discussion and developments show the importance of ideas in the policy 
process, it is assumed that ideas together with interests bind together groups and 
individuals in a policy sector thus enabling them to exert influence on the process. It is 
evident from the above discussion that ideas played an important role in the formulation 
of policy options and proposals advanced by different groups before the 1994 elections. 
However, it is also clear that each group that advanced policy options or proposals had 
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certain interests that were reflected in the options or proposals it advocated. It has also 
shown that changes in the political environment lead to loss of prominence of ideas 
advanced by certain groups and also dwindling influence, loss of status and importance 
among those groups, particularly if they had no power in the government.  
 
This was the case in the early 1990s with the different groups that were organised under 
the mass democratic movement and the NECC. The negotiation process entailed 
compromises that led to watering down or abandoning many of the radical ideas of the 
mass democratic movement and elements of popular education advanced by the NECC. It 
also removed initiative for change from school based actors and weaker interest groups, 
giving way to high level players and the top elite in the ANC. The following chapter 
looks at transformation initiatives in education after the 1994 elections by examining the 
following aspects: the structures established to develop and implement policies; the 
education policy formulation process; and the type of policies developed to transform the 
education sector.     
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CHAPTER IV 
 
STRUCTURES, POLICIES AND THEIR FORMULATION AFTER 1994 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the structures established 
in the education sector at different levels, including the functions and powers granted to 
the respective levels, their relationships and how they have affected the formulation and 
implementation of policies and the goals of transformation. The second part looks at 
education policy development processes at national and provincial levels. It examines 
how the process takes place and identifies the structures involved. It shows the different 
groups and constituencies involved with the intention of revealing those that play a 
dominant role and those that are excluded in the process. The third part analyses some of 
the policies that have emerged from the transformation process and identifies their 
limitations.  
 
 
PART I 
 
The Establishment of Structures, Functions and Powers 
 
With the establishment of the democratic government after 1994 elections, education 
became a right for all South African citizens as stipulated in the Constitution. The Bill of 
Rights (Chapter Two of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996) stipulates: 
 29. (1) everyone has the right - 
  (a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and 
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make 
progressively available and accessible.  
 
(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language 
or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that 
education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, 
and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable 
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educational alternatives, including single medium institutions taking into 
account - 
  (a) equity; 
  (b) practicability; and 
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices. 
 
There are also other aspects of the Bill of Rights which have a direct bearing on the right 
to education. The responsibility to protect: (i) the right to freedom of conscience, religion, 
religious observance, thought, belief and opinion (Section 15) (1) and (2); the right to 
freedom of expression, including freedom to receive or impart information or ideas, 
freedom of artistic creativity, and academic freedom and freedom of scientific research 
(Section 16(1)) and; the responsibility to ensure that the child’s best interests are of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child (Section 28(2)). 
 
 As a result, the new government assumed the central responsibility of ensuring the 
provision of education and training. The White Paper on Education and Training set out a 
new philosophy of education for South Africa based on principles of equity and 
democracy: 
 
The realisation of democracy, liberty, equality, justice and peace are necessary conditions for the 
full pursuit and enjoyment of lifelong learning. It should be a goal of education and training to 
enable a democratic, free, equal, just and peaceful society to take root and prosper in our land, on 
the basis that all South Africans without exception share the same inalienable rights, equal 
citizenship and common destiny, and that all forms of bias (especially racial, ethnic and gender) 
are dehumanizing (Department of Education 1995:22).   
 
Consequently, the new philosophy would necessitate “changing all aspects of the 
education system” (Harber 2001:5). This is also outlined in the White Paper on Education 
and Training: 
 
The letter and spirit of these rights and freedoms should inform the intellectual culture in all 
schools and educational institutions, and professional services in departments of education. This 
has unavoidable implications for curricula, textbooks, other educational materials and media 
programmes, teaching methods, teacher education, professional supervision and management 
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culture (Department of Education 1995:43).   
 
Therefore, the crucial task was to put in place structures, measures and policies aimed at 
achieving what has been stated above (Department of Education 1995:10). The National 
Minister of Education indicated how the process of transformation was to be approached: 
 
 Firstly, we had to transform an education and training system which had been fragmented along 
racial and ethnic lines, and a system that had been saturated with the racial ideology and 
educational doctrines of apartheid. Secondly, we had to transform a system characterised by lack 
of access or unequal access. Vast disparities exist between black and white provisions. Large 
numbers, in particular, adults, out of school youth and children of pre-school age, had little or no 
access to education and training. Thirdly, we had to transform a system that lacked democratic 
control. Parents, teachers, workers were excluded from school level decision-making process 
(Department of Education 1998:21). 
 
The most crucial task was to establish properly functioning structures to facilitate 
the formulation and implementation of policies that would enhance effective  
transformation of the education sector.  
 
4.1 Functions and Powers Granted to National and Provincial Departments of 
Education 
The principle of cooperative governance underpins the provision of education. As 
discussed in Chapter I, cooperative governance is a South African phenomenon arising 
from the unique political settlement translated into the Constitution (Department of 
Education 2001). According to the Constitution, education is categorised as a ‘Schedule 
Four’ function, which means that it becomes a functional area of concurrent National and 
Provincial Legislative competence.  
 
Provincial governments are empowered with executive responsibility for education (other 
than universities and technikons) within their provinces subject to the national 
government’s responsibility to protect essential national interests (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Section 125). Provinces have full responsibility for the 
administration of General and Further Education (GET). In this case, provincial 
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legislatures may make laws on any aspect of education except those that affect 
universities and technikons.  
 
The national government is responsible for higher education, namely, universities, 
technikons, and teachers’ colleges; development of norms and standards; and the 
conditions of employment and service of teachers in schools and colleges. The national 
government has precedence over the provinces where the latter cannot perform its 
functions effectively or where national uniformity is required (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996). The national Minister of Education determines national 
policy for planning, provisioning, financing, staffing, coordination, management, 
governance, programmes, monitoring, evaluation and the well being of the education 
system. Provincial governments make provincial policy within the parameters of national 
policies, frameworks, norms and standards.  
 
The provincial Departments of Education have the responsibility for establishing, 
managing and supporting schools and other pre-tertiary educational institutions in their 
provinces. They are financed through the provincial budgets voted for by the provincial 
legislatures based on monies “largely (but not entirely) received in the form of block 
grants from the national government” (Pampallis 2002:6).   
 
Although the national Minister of Education determines the parameters of the education 
system, the Minister’s powers are circumscribed by both the Bill of Rights and 
constitutional provisions governing cooperative governance as stipulated in the National 
Education Policy Act (Department of Education 1996). The Act establishes two high 
level committees, namely, the Council of Education Ministers (CEM) and the Heads of 
Education Departments Committee (HEDCOM). CEM consist of the Minister, national 
Deputy Minister of Education and the nine Members of the Executive Committees 
(MECs) for Education in each province. HEDCOM consists of the Director General in 
the national Department of Education, his/her deputies, and the nine heads of the 
provincial Departments of Education. While CEM is responsible for policy issues, 
HEDCOM is responsible for matters of administration and management.  
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 All legislation and national policies are discussed and normally agreed upon in the CEM. 
While the Minister is obliged to consult with the CEM on all new policy and legislation, 
he/she is not obliged to secure its support. In practice, however, the Minister is unlikely 
to make policy or propose legislation without the agreement of the CEM. The Act also 
obliges the Minister to consult with other stakeholders including the organised teaching 
profession before he/she determines national education policy (Department of Education 
1996). 
  
In addition to constitutional allocation of powers to the provinces, powers and authority 
has been decentralised to the school level through the South African Schools Act (SASA) 
of 1996. Among its provisions is the establishment of governing bodies with considerable 
powers in all public schools. The responsibilities and the functioning of school governing 
bodies has maintained and enhanced inequities and inequalities between wealthier 
schools and public schools that served previously disadvantaged communities. These 
aspects are discussed in Part III of this Chapter and in Chapter V.   
 
4.1.1 Problems Emerging from Powers Granted to National and Provincial 
Departments of Education 
A number of problems have emerged as a result of the functions and powers granted to 
provincial and national Departments of Education. Some of them were identified in 
Chapter I in the discussions on the powers and functions decentralised or granted to the 
provinces by the Constitution. While provincial governments have full executive 
responsibility for running provincial education systems, the National Ministry and 
Department of Education does not have such powers and cannot intervene except in 
emergencies. The White Paper on Education and Training (Notice196 of 1995) provides 
a distinction between the National Ministry and Department of Education as follows: 
 
The Ministry of Education includes the Minister of Education, the Deputy Minister of Education, 
advisors and administrative staff. In terms of the Constitution, a Minister is accountable personally 
to the President and Cabinet for the administration of his or her portfolio, and is required to 
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administer the portfolio in accordance with the policy determined by Cabinet (Department of 
Education 1995:7).  
 
The White Paper defines the Department of Education as: 
 
Part of the organisational structure of the public service, which is constitutionally required to 
execute policies of the government of the day in the performance of its administrative functions. 
The Department of Education is headed by the Director–General, who is responsible for the 
efficient management and administration of the Department, and is accountable to parliament for 
the funds voted to the Department in the budget. The Director-General is accountable to the 
Minister for the execution of policy, and in practice also makes available the professional 
resources of the Department for the development of policy as directed by the Minister 
(Department of Education 1995:7).   
 
The National Minister and Department can only exert leadership and influence, consult 
and give advice, and by agreement (in CEM or HEDCOM), collaborate or provide 
technical services to assist provincial departments (Department of Education 1998). The 
National Department of Education has no power under the Constitution to determine 
provincial education budgets. As stated in Chapter I, this power is vested in provincial 
governments and legislatures subject to the allocations of the provincial share of revenue 
by the national government. Although the National Minister of Education is empowered 
to establish policy for planning, financing and staffing, he/she is not empowered to make 
budgetary allocations in order to give effect to such policy frameworks, norms and 
standards. In the same vein, provincial Departments are obliged to undertake certain 
expenditures that have not been budgeted for in order to implement the new norms and 
standards established by the national Department. This implies that provincial 
Departments may have to abandon priority programmes in order to fund and implement 
new norms and standards. They could also use their own discretion to implement only 
certain but not all aspects of those new norms and standards, rendering some of the 
policies symbolic. According to EduSource: 
 
The national ANC has been unable to cope with the political independence and sometimes 
‘waywardness’ of the provinces. Due to inadequacy of resources to implement transformation 
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programmes in education and confusion on the arrangements, powers and functioning of 
structures, some provinces have not necessarily stuck to directives from the national level and 
have implemented policies selectively. This has also been evident in the provinces that are not 
controlled by ANC (EduSource 1997).   
  
The effects of lack of proper allocation of power and devolution of functions between 
national and provincial Departments of Education were identified by a senior 
management member from the national Department of Education at a National Policy 
Review Conference on Education and Training:  
 
 It needs to be pointed out that the current arrangement caused tensions and unevenness in the 
implementation of our transformation education policies, and in particular the preparedness of our 
provinces to implement Curriculum 2005. This arrangement also constrained the intervention of 
the National Ministry in ensuring that resources allocated to provinces for education are used for 
their intended purposes. The competency of provincial governments in determining their 
budgetary priorities have had negative effects on education and therefore education policies in 
some instances became unfunded mandates (Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 
1998:25). 
 
The Minister of Education, acting under government mandates, has approved national 
guideline agreements reached in the Education Labour Relations Council with respect to 
the provision of educators in provincial systems. However, funding to cover such 
agreements is dependent on provincial budget decisions. Initially, such decisions had 
adverse effects on the implementation of programmes by provincial Departments of 
Education. This is especially in respect to situations where additional funds had not been 
budgeted to cover salary increment agreements that had been reached at the national 
level. As stated above, the national Department has attempted to address the problem by 
inviting representatives of provincial Departments of Education in the salary negotiation 
forums (Pampallis 2002).  
 
According to the national Department of Education, the “establishment of decentralised 
governance at the provincial level has been one of the most complex areas of education 
transformation. Of particular concern has been the constrained ability of provinces to 
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apply national norms based on principles of equity and redress because of organisational, 
financial and service delivery limitations” (Department of Education 2001:14). Harber 
observed: 
 
 It became clear during the first parliament (1994–1999) that in practice there is considerable 
ambiguity and lack of clarity about the roles of the two levels of government. There are therefore 
regular disagreements and also regular criticisms of some provinces’ inability to deliver national 
education policy. The issue of right sizing and the redeployment of teachers is a case in point. The 
Minister of Education’s quarterly report to parliament at the end of 1999, for example, focused 
strongly on the provinces and signalled a new intention to intervene more strongly in the future in 
order to make the provinces function more effectively (Harber 2001:12). 
 
The realisation that national education policies were not being adequately implemented in 
the provinces led the national Department of Education shift its focus from policy 
formulation to planning for implementation. A number of regulations were issued and 
mechanisms developed to establish procedural uniformity across provinces. Despite these 
measures, setbacks in the implementation of education policy persisted revealing the 
complexity of the system and inadequate capacity. The national government ‘tightened 
the screws’ in order to ensure proper implementation of policies. It allowed less scope for 
provincial departments to determine and advance their own priorities. The Eastern Cape 
Socio-Economic Consultative Council (2001) provides an example of the system of 
conditional grant funding, which locked the non-personnel expenditure of the Eastern 
Cape Department of Education into nationally determined policy priorities. Conditional 
grants are usually made on the recommendation of the national Minister and administered 
through the national Departments. In this way, the Department of Education is in a 
position to influence at least some of the provincial education expenditure. However, a 
large proportion of the conditional grants provide for improvements in public service 
salaries and conditions which are negotiated after the beginning of the financial year and 
therefore cannot be used at the discretion of the national Department of Education (Ajam 
2001). 
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Other measures taken to ensure proper implementation of policies by provincial 
Departments of Education were implemented from mid 1998 by the national Department 
of Education. These include the provision of support for systemic reform through: 
• the provision of technical support; 
• collaboration regarding provincial budgeting; 
• deployment of national officials for the purpose of monitoring; 
• support for provinces (particularly to review the implementation of national 
policies and legislation); and,  
• greater accountability through regular reporting. 
There have also been calls to review mechanisms to strengthen intergovernmental 
relations. This is currently taking place. 
 
The above findings can be explained in a number of ways.  First, the arrangement of 
structures and allocation of powers hindered effective communication, coordination, 
control and monitoring of individual actors and organisations that were involved in policy 
implementation. Consequently, there was no proper link and cooperation among different 
national and provincial structures that dealt with implementation. Capacity was lacking 
and financial resources inadequate; equally there was no commitment and will among 
some of the civil servants.  
 
Second, the findings can also be explained by examining the role of street level 
bureaucrats and the effect of using discretion in policy implementation. This is one aspect 
which top down rational implementation model does not take into consideration and for 
which the model has been criticised. While we could attribute selective implementation 
of policies by the provincial Departments of Education to some of the above factors, it is 
also evident that the situation availed opportunities to street level bureaucrats to use their 
discretion to select the policies they preferred to implement. This worked against the 
goals of transformation as other interests took precedence.  
 
Therefore, the above findings show that institutional norms and rules, and arrangements 
of structures constrained education policy implementation and as such, it created room 
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for actors to implement policies selectively. This was also exacerbated by lack of 
capacity, inadequate financial resources, lack of commitment and will among some of the 
civil servants involved.         
 
4.2 Provincial Restructuring and Bureaucratic Reorganisation in Education 
The establishment of provincial Departments of Education necessitated the creation of 
new structures by amalgamating the old separate apartheid structures and reorganising 
the bureaucracy. A task team was appointed by the national Minister of Education to 
facilitate the provincialisation of education. The overall goal of the team was to ensure 
that new provincial Departments of Education would assume functions that were 
previously held by a number of authorities. This was intended to conserve resources, to 
facilitate equity and enhance effective delivery of services and participation in the 
provision of education by different communities.  
 
However, the uneven state of development between various authorities within a province 
and between provinces, as well as racial disparities, exerted a great impact on the process 
(Gordon 1997). For example, in the Free State, the task was simpler and less complicated 
as only three departmental structures (House of Assembly, Department of Education and 
Training and Qwaqwa) had to be amalgamated. In the Limpopo, the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu Natal provinces, the process was particularly difficult as overstaffed, inefficient 
departments of the former homelands also had to be amalgamated with the Departments 
of House of Assembly, Education and Training, and House of Delegates. This exercise 
took longer to complete compared to the other provinces which did not have similar 
structures. The three provinces, which are also among the poorest in the country, faced 
more problems of delivery and implementation of education programmes.  
The 1st of April 1995 marked the formal end of the 19 racially based education 
departments and the establishment of a single national Department and nine provincial 
Departments of Education. By the end of 1995, all provinces had established 
administrative structures, namely, regions and districts, and delegated them with 
responsibilities. The provincial head office was charged with the responsibilities of policy 
implementation, allocation of posts, finances and personnel while districts were to 
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provide support and provisioning to schools. In many of the provinces reorganisation of 
the bureaucracy took two phases. The first phase was carried out in 1994 –1998, and the 
second from 1999.  
 
4.2.1 Restructuring and Reorganisation of Bureaucracy 1994 - 1998 
Reorganisation during this period entailed changing the way the bureaucracy conducted 
their responsibilities and the adoption of a flatter organisational structure to promote 
efficient and responsive service delivery (de Clercq 2002; Wooldridge and Cranko 1995). 
The task of changing the way bureaucracies conducted their business entailed the 
promotion of values and ethos that were in line with the new democratic social order. 
This was done by challenging existing hierarchical, traditional and bureaucratic 
arrangements that existed by introducing more participatory, transparent and consultative 
departmental, managerial and policy practices which included provision of support and 
capacity building. As agreed in the negotiation process (through the sunset clause), most 
members of the old bureaucracy were retained. Interviews with government officials 
showed that members who served in the apartheid government were better equipped in 
terms of generic administrative processes and procedures but not so much in 
transformative participatory management styles. This was also admitted by an official 
who served in the old apartheid government and was later absorbed by the new 
government after the 1994 elections. He stated: 
  
Some of us had better experience than many of the new officials in the democratic government but 
only in relation to the procedures like procurement, budget planning, tendering procedures etc. 
We were also familiar with management styles practised by the departments we came from. We 
did not have experience with the new management styles and the new legislations put forward by 
the new government since they were not similar to what was advocated and practised in our 
former departments. So we were also struggling to cope since we had to learn some of the things 
(Respondent: official who served in the apartheid government). 
 
Therefore, restructuring of the bureaucracy entailed training all civil servants, that is, 
both the new and old including those that served in the apartheid government. Interviews 
with senior government officials at the national and provincial levels showed that all old 
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and new civil servants were trained and oriented in the new participatory management 
and consultative styles and new policies. However, it was acknowledged that some of the 
officials who served in the apartheid government were not willing, or could not easily, 
adapt to the new approach and orientation, a factor which affected the process of 
transformation. However, some of the officials who served in the apartheid government 
contended that many of them continued using old statutes and legislation because of 
delays in issuing new ones. They admitted that this practice led to problems in putting 
into effect the new management systems including the formulation and implementation 
of policies and programmes. However, the old statutes and legislation were withdrawn as 
soon as new ones were adopted. 
   
New civil servants, many of them from the former liberation movements, were appointed 
to some of the senior positions and were charged with the responsibility of training and 
orienting all civil servants in effecting the new changes. Interviews with officials frorn 
the national and provincial Departments of Education revealed that the actions of senior 
management were challenged and sabotaged by forces and interests from within and 
outside the bureaucracy, in particular, from among those that had served in the apartheid 
government. This was also confirmed by McLennan (2000) and de Clercq (2002) who 
observed that sabotage and challenges resulted in some of the new senior management 
(most of whom had no capacity and experience) losing direction and control or not being 
able to exert their power and authority. 
   
Writing about curriculum transformation, Jansen described the characteristic and 
behaviour of some of the members of the bureaucracy in the Departments of Education as 
follows: 
 
 In this bureaucracy, apartheid order bureaucrats worked side by side with new appointments from 
the liberation movement and its allies, the latter lacking administrative expertise to maintain 
operational systems, with the former lacking political commitment to the new demands for 
transforming education and curriculum. What emerged therefore, was a strong political rhetoric 
about curriculum transformation (by the new bureaucrats) significantly moderated by the 
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application of a legalistic and procedural framework (by the old bureaucrats) within which all civil 
servants were to behave (Jansen 1999:3).  
 
Similarly, a senior official from the national Department of Education observed: 
 
 Lack of true unity and commitment to non-racialism, non-ethnic administration and the problem 
of apartheid legacy in the bureaucracies persisted despite full amalgamation of different apartheid 
departments. Some of the members could not adjust to the new changes and work towards the 
transformation of the education system. In the eyes of many in the new government and the 
Ministry of Education, old networks and loyalties ran very deep and as a result they hindered real 
integration of work units, with stable management, and true unity of vision, mission and 
commitment (Department of Education 1998:34). 
 
It is evident that there were setbacks in the transformation of education which affected 
the pace of its implementation. This was partly due to lack of experience and proper skills 
among the newly appointed senior members of the bureaucracy as well as lack of 
commitment by some of the officials who served in the apartheid government. 
  
Inefficiencies within the bureaucracy could also be attributed to other factors. Many of 
the newly chosen members of the bureaucracy, especially those at the top echelons, have 
had very little or no training in managing the new organisations. They also had limited 
experience in running large public service systems. During that time, there were attempts 
to discard dead wood and those who did not support change by providing voluntary 
severance packages. This measure was also taken in order to rationalise and streamline 
the bureaucracy at both national and provincial Departments of Education (Gordon 1997; 
Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council 2001). The outcome backfired, as 
many of those who opted for severance packages were the most qualified personnel who 
left and joined the private sector. This had negative effects on the national and provincial 
Departments of Education. Provincial Departments of Education were left with many 
inexperienced and inadequately qualified civil servants in many sections and divisions. It 
also opened the doors for maladministration, corruption and financial embezzlement 
(EduSource 1998; Eastern Cape Socio- Economic Consultative Council 2001).  
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A provincial review was conducted in 1997 by a 15 member audit team under Paseka 
Ncholo the then Director General of Department of Public Service and Administration 
(EduSource 1998). The team found that many new policies were set at national level 
without due consideration for the organisational, financial and service implications to the 
provinces. For instance, the new Schools Act required members of school governing 
bodies to receive training. However, this was not budgeted for and provinces had 
difficulties in finding resources for this activity. Similarly, although technology education 
is part of Curriculum 2005, some provinces had no resources for schools, no training 
programmes for teachers, and no strategies were in place for its implementation. There 
was also lack of communication, financial controls and monitoring which resulted in 
over-expenditure in eight of the nine provinces. Most provinces had no qualified financial 
managers and this left personnel without proper financial management training and skills 
to administer budgets worth billions of rand. The team also found that in some of the 
provinces there was no clear differentiation between roles and responsibilities of political 
leadership and those of the administration. This caused a lot of tension between director 
generals/permanent secretaries and MECs in four of the provinces.  
 
Other commissioned reports and public audit reviews expressed concern about poor 
management systems and human resources systems, lack of strategic provincial 
managerial decision making, mismanagement and corruption by senior officials (de 
Clercq 2001). The reviews also raised concern that most provincial departments operated 
on a crisis management mode without proper strategic direction (Education Policy Unit, 
University of Witwatersrand 1998).    
 
The above findings on the first restructuring of the bureaucracy and the provincial 
reviews reveal similar trends as those discussed earlier in Section 4.1.1. There was lack 
of coordination, communication, control and monitoring of different structures involved 
in the implementation of policies particularly within national and provincial structures. 
There was also lack of strategic planning and policy direction among the provinces. The 
new policies were formulated at the national level without taking into consideration 
provision of financial and other resources that are critical for their implementation. There 
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was a shortage of skilled human resources and many of those in the senior management 
lacked the necessary experience. At the same time, there was no commitment among 
some of the civil servants. All these factors affected adversely the implementation of 
transformation agenda in education.  
 
We can conclude from the above findings that the arrangements and functioning of 
institutional structures, inadequate financial and human resources, lack of capacity, 
commitment and will among implementers, are some of the factors that constrain or 
affect policy implementation. The second bureaucratic restructuring entailed the adoption 
of elements of new managerialism, different policy delivery mixes, and bottom up model 
of policy implementation. These aspects were discussed in detail in Chapter II.  
 
4.2.2 Restructuring and Reorganisation of Bureaucracy 1999 - 2002 
As a result of the findings from the different reviews, provincial Departments of 
Education adopted a strategic management approach following recommendations from 
the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (METF). According to de Clercq:  
 
The METF recommended the use of organisational tools to link departmental budget and 
allocation of resources and expenditures to strategic objectives, programme targets, planning and 
performance measurements which were to be monitored and used for organisational learning. The 
Public Finance Management Act of 1999 made heads of Department and senior officials 
accountable for performing their service objectives (de Clercq 2002:9). 
 
Therefore, the second reorganisation adopted elements of the new public managerialist 
organisational approach, that is, managerial techniques from the private sector to 
streamline operations and improve performance by putting more emphasis on outcomes. 
The adoption of new managerialism could also be viewed as a means of increasing the   
capacity of the national government to enhance its control and monitoring of provincial 
departments. This would ensure that provinces maintain economic efficiency and  
effectiveness in performing their functions including transformation of the education  
sector. (Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1998; Department of 
Education 2001; Oldfield 2001). 
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 According to the new managerialism, a shift towards decentralisation to districts and  
lower levels enhances differentiation among public organisations, enabling them become  
more focused on single policies or issues (Peters and Wright 1996).  It is contended that 
the shift of delivery to lower levels has to be viewed in the context of a wider process of 
post-Fordism in modern society where Weberian/Taylorist hierarchy is giving way to less  
bureaucratic, flatter, more fragmented structures, and where public sector organisations  
are run the same way as business organisations (Burns et. al. 1994; Peters and Wright  
1996). Burns et. al. observes: 
 
 Our vision of a reformed public service seeks to replace complex bureaucracies with far more 
internally devolved structures. Within the context of a local authority, internal devolution gives 
service managers and staff the power to deliver and simultaneously frees the centre from 
absorption in administrative detail. In place of departmental hierarchies a new kind of organisation 
emerges in which there is a strong but lean centre with an outer ring devolved service delivery 
units (Burns. et. al. 1994: 272). 
 
The granting of more powers to districts is in line with ‘empowerment’ in the new 
managerialism where employees of government in the lower echelons are supposed to  
acquire more power and control over their own jobs. Empowerment also means greater 
latitude for them to make decisions and then become accountable for them (Peters and 
Wright 1996).       
 
Hence, in the second bureaucratic restructuring, more administrative powers and  
responsibilities were decentralised to districts to enable the head office focus on 
coordination, monitoring, determining policy, providing leadership, support and direction 
to district structures in policy implementation. The head office became responsible for  
the formulation of strategic priorities and districts were given the role of policy 
implementation and provision of school support. They were required to frame their 
activities within the strategic priorities set by the head office. Head office collaborates 
with districts to budget for the programmes and activities. The funds are then allocated to 
the head office and districts which are required to implement the programmes and  
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activities to meet specified performance targets.  
 
District officials became bureaucratically accountable to their immediate superiors in the 
district. However, their units’ work which falls under the management structures of the  
head office unit has to be planned, aligned and monitored by the head office unit or   
directorate in charge of the programme. For example, subject advisors in the districts  
working on teacher in-service programme are required by their counterpart in the head   
office to work through their senior district management to implement some of the head  
office initiated programmes. At the same time, they are accountable to their district  
managers for their operational plans and work performance.  
 
The above arrangement created challenges in many of the provinces. Districts 
complained of the head office changing agreed priority plans because of unexpected new 
priorities from the national Department of Education or having to attend to problems and 
concerns raised by politicians. Agreement on the plans means that programmes and 
activities have to be devised, effected, managed and monitored. However, some of the 
provincial Departments of Education head offices have been accused of exerting pressure 
on districts to push for the execution of their own programmes in order for them to meet 
their own plan and budgetary deadlines which are not aligned with district plans (Eastern 
Cape Socio- Economic Consultative Council 2001; de Clercq 2002).  Hence districts are 
not able to meet their set goals and targets. Another issue is the role of districts in 
ensuring policy implementation and provision of support in schools.  
 
The majority of educators that were interviewed felt that although districts have been 
given more autonomy and greater latitude in decision making, they are not performing 
the roles of policy implementation and provision of support to schools as required.  They 
expressed concern that often districts transmit a large number of policies to schools for 
implementation without providing the necessary support like adequate training and 
mentoring, the required follow up and sufficient resources, materials and facilities. 
Among the examples identified by educators in the interviews was that they were 
required to implement Curriculum 2005 although there was no adequate training and the 
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required follow up support. There were no sufficient teaching and learning materials and 
other crucial resources that would be necessary to enhance effective teaching and 
learning. As a result, only schools with better trained teachers and adequate financial 
resources, sufficient teaching and learning materials and facilities were able to implement 
the policy as stipulated. Educators also identified the Developmental Appraisal System 
(DAS) which was supposed to be implemented by schools to enhance teacher 
development. Some of the schools that implemented the policy did it haphazardly 
because of lack of guidance and support. Most districts failed to provide support to the 
schools partly due to inadequate financial resources, lack of capacity among district 
officials and lack of clarity and understanding of some of the policies by district officials.         
  
The bureaucratic and management structures oblige districts to account to provincial 
Departments of Education head office their compliance with procedures and also their 
organisational performance in terms of their plans and goals (Eastern Cape Socio- 
Economic Consultative Council 2001; de Clercq 2002). The performance based 
accountability is supposed to supplement the process based bureaucratic accountability 
practices. Writing about restructuring of bureaucracy in the Gauteng Department of 
Education (GDE) de Clercq observed: 
 
Balanced scorecard, strategic planning targets, activities and performance indicators are now part 
of the lexicon of all GDE directorates and units to indicate and reflect the importance of a culture 
of performance monitoring. Senior managers are appointed on a contract basis with an 
appraisal/performance management system in place to monitor the declared targets and 
performance indicators of senior managers’ unit plans (de Clercq 2002:12).             
 
While the emphasis in most provinces is on performance management and performance 
based accountability, the main challenge remains lack of capacity in terms of skills and 
the required number of human resources in most of the departmental units and districts. 
Given the existing weaknesses and fragility of some of the structures, there is a need to 
provide adequate support at all levels in order to enable the institutions improve their 
performance (Walker and Scott 2000; Elmore 2001).  
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This period of restructuring and reorganisation saw the Provincial Departments of 
Education contracting out to the private sector, international organisations and NGOs 
from within and without the country to implement some of its planned activities and 
programmes in education. Outsourcing has been attributed to lack of required skills 
among civil servants and also the need for speedy delivery of public services (Pampallis 
2004). However, there was also a belief among some of the respondents from the 
Department of Education, NGOs and schools that the private sector delivers better 
services. Therefore provision of better quality services by the private sector should not be 
discounted among the reasons for outsourcing, despite the fact that it has not been 
declared openly by the government. While delivery of crucial services in education has 
been accomplished through outsourcing, there have been a number of challenges. 
Interviews with some of the officials from the national and provincial Departments of 
Education revealed that due to lack of capacity there is no proper monitoring of some of 
the programmes and activities implemented through outsourcing. At times outsourcing 
has also been seen as “a waste of public resources” and a practice that “inhibits the 
growth of capacity and efficiency within the public service” (Pampallis 2003:424). 
However, this poses some dilemma given the lack of capacity and corruption that persist 
in the public service, the urgency for quick delivery of services, and the need to enhance 
the transformation agenda in education. 
 
The above discussion shows that there was improved performance in the second 
restructuring and reorganisation of the bureaucracy. Decentralisation and ‘empowerment’ 
gave more latitude and power to districts to make decisions and to be accountable for 
them. A number of measures were taken to ensure control as the head office was given 
responsibilities of setting priorities. However, the provincial Departments of Education 
were confronted with major challenges. This was confirmed through interviews with 
officials from the district, provincial and national Departments of Education. 
Respondents from NGOs and schools contended that although there were improvements 
in the second reorganisation of the bureaucracy, there were also a series of limitations. 
The problem of coordination and how different structures relate with each other remained 
a continuing challenge. Another challenge concerns districts fulfilling the role of 
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enforcing policy implementation at the school level while neglecting the function of 
providing support. This has limited the effectiveness of implementing the new policies 
and programmes designed to enhance equity and redress in some of the schools 
particularly those that served the former disadvantaged areas.  
 
As discussed in earlier sections, the National Department of Education has ‘tightened the 
screws’ by adopting measures intended to ensure more control and effective monitoring 
of the activities and programmes that are being implemented by the provinces to ensure 
that the goals of transformation are being pursued. These measures reveal contradictions 
and tension that exist as the central state attempts to balance centralisation and control 
while at the same time enhancing decentralisation to enable the provinces and other lower 
structures implement policies to attain transformation. Metcalfe and Richards observe:  
  
The mix of governmental levels of responsibility is therefore an issue which prompts the need for 
both centralisation on the one hand, to secure control of national finances in particular whilst, on 
the other requiring decentralisation in order to secure managerial benefits. Centralisation in order 
to decentralise, and decentralisation as mode of centralisation thus constitutes a key paradox in the 
allocation of responsibilities in the modern state (Metcalfe and Richards 1992). 
 
This aspect has been explored further in Chapter V which examines education policy 
implementation.  
 
4.3 Discussions Emanating from the Findings 
The above challenges and setbacks show the dilemma and contradictions that emerged in 
the organisation and functioning of different levels and structures, as the post apartheid 
government attempted to restructure the education sector. As stated in Section 4.1 above, 
the national Ministry of Education is responsible for norms, standards and policy 
frameworks in education. The Ministry liaises with the Department of Finance for the 
education budget and has access to the Cabinet and the major teacher unions and 
associations. The provinces are responsible for policy implementation, service delivery 
and monitoring of districts. Districts are required to monitor and provide support to 
schools. This arrangement of systems, structures and responsibilities has created 
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horizontal and vertical incoherence and, at times confusion, because the centre is 
separated from the policy implementation sites (namely, provincial, district and school 
levels). The national Department intervenes and rationalises its control because of its 
obligation to ensure redress and equity; and also because it perceives provincial 
Departments of Education as lacking capacity to coordinate and deliver policy (Oldfield 
2001). Similar problems of control and ineffective mechanisms of coordination also 
plague province-district and district school relationships.  
 
In order to maintain control the central state has created an institutional web of incentives 
and disincentives partly because of the need to maintain power and authority and to make 
the provincial, district and school levels act in line with central state agendas for 
redistribution and development, and its broader macroeconomic goals. It has ‘tightened 
the screws’ over Departments by issuing a stream of regulations to ensure intervention 
and control. Oldfield observes: 
 
Resource allocations give the government, particularly the Ministry of Finance and the treasury, a 
tool to use as an incentive carrot to be ‘developmental’ or as a coercive stick to exert pressure on 
provinces and local districts or schools that step out of the national line. In many senses it is in the 
realm of finance and its administration where the dynamics and the nature of embedded autonomy 
in the articulation of the South African local, provincial and national states comes to the fore. This 
may be referred to as the ‘iron fist’ of the national government, sometimes cosmetically dressed as 
the ‘kid glove’ of embedded autonomy (Oldfield 2001:46).  
 
Provinces have expressed concerns that their responsibilities and powers are being eroded 
and taken over by the national level. This is also supported by an article in the City Press 
of 7 November 2004 which reported on a sitting of the NCOP where Premiers expressed 
dissatisfaction about the diminishing role and powers of the provinces. The latter “were 
being reduced to agencies for poverty alleviation and ‘purveyors’ of social grants and 
health services, as opposed to being catalysts for economic growth” (City Press, p.4). 
While the above measures are currently being addressed, lack of coordination and proper 
control among different structures remain a problem. In addition, there is lack of capacity 
at provincial, district and school levels. The magnitude of the problem differs between 
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and within provinces and this factor affects the attainment of the goal of attaining equity 
and redress and the general transformation of education. It is evident from the above 
discussions that the arrangements and powers allocated to institutional structures at 
different levels and their functioning, including lack of skilled, committed human 
resources, and insufficient financial resources, have constrained the implementation of 
education policies. 
      
The following part examines the policy formulation process in the education sector and 
analyses how different structures and powers granted to them and various groups affect 
the process. It also analyses the type of policies that were formulated.   
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PART II 
 
Education Policy Formulation 
 
In Chapter III we outlined different groups and organisations from different backgrounds, 
interests, values and beliefs that contributed to education policy proposals before the 
1994 elections. Most of the pre 1994 proposals formed the basis for many of the 
education policies for transforming the education sector. Groups, organisations and 
institutions continued to exert influence on the policy process and the resultant policies 
which were formulated to transform the education sector. 
  
4.4 The Policy Formulation Process: What takes Place at the National Level 
Initiating legislation in South Africa is the primary task of the executive. On the other 
hand, the legislature has to ensure that legislation initiated by the executive is “fully 
debated in an open public forum, that all the issues raised by the legislation are 
adequately addressed, the needs of citizens are properly accommodated and that 
appropriate changes are made” (Murray & Nijzink 2002:5).  
 
The process of formulation of policies in education requires that national and provincial 
representatives from the Department of Education work as a team to generate a policy 
which is discussed in HEDCOM, and then passed on to CEM where it is debated and 
approved, rejected or amended. After approval by CEM it is presented to the Cabinet by 
the Minister of Education for approval as an executive policy programme. At this stage, 
policy implementation plans and regulations can be drawn or it can follow the legislative 
route to be adopted by Parliament. The entire process is outlined below. Discussions 
showed that it is in CEM that the most productive discussion of new legislation and 
policy affecting the provinces takes place. In CEM and HEDCOM and other fora where 
departmental officials discuss more technical matters, details of policies are tabled and 
provincial executives are given the opportunity to respond. It is in these fora where 
disagreements are also resolved. Although policy is formulated at the national level, 
representatives from the provincial executive are involved in the process. 
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 The following section discusses the process in detail. The institutions that are involved in 
the policy formulation, their powers and the existing rules or structures were discussed in 
Chapter I and Part I of this chapter. Lungu (2001) observes that the South African formal 
policy process can be divided into two parts, namely, the White Paper process and the 
Legislative process.  
  
4.4.1 The White Paper Process 
The South African policy making process can be described as a White Paper process due 
to the great emphasis placed on formulating national policies through this type of 
government document (Lungu 2001). The process begins with the government putting 
forward its proposals in a Green Paper which is a discussion document on policy options. 
The Green Paper originates in the Department of the Ministry concerned (in this case the 
Department of Education) and it is then published to solicit comments and ideas. The 
Department would also brief the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the Green Paper. 
A submission date is given for receiving input from civil society. The Green Paper is 
usually a product of a think tank appointed by the Minister in the name of a task team or 
commission. Initially, the task team or commission collects information by “conducting 
research which includes exploring various dimensions of the policy issue, visits by think 
tank to different national locations and other countries and institutions abroad, 
consultation with other government departments and relevant stakeholders” (Lungu 
2001:95). 
 
With the inclusion of input from civil society the Green Paper forms the basis for a White 
Paper, which is a broad statement of intended government policy. Comments are again 
invited from interested parties and stakeholders. Once the inputs have been taken into 
account, the Minister and officials within the government Department concerned may 
draft Legislative proposals. At this stage the Cabinet also considers the proposals. From 
this stage public policies can follow either the parliamentary process (beginning with a 
draft bill) or go the route of an executive policy programme announced by the Minister of 
the national department concerned. Curriculum 2005 is an example of a policy that went 
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the route of the White Paper process as it was pronounced as an executive policy in 1997 
(Department of Education 1997). The policy process, centres on “problem identification 
and definition and generating a broad consensus on policy proposals and strategies” 
(Lungu 2001:95). This is in line with the model proposed by Anderson (1990), Dunn 
(1994) and Parsons (1995) which is discussed in Section 2.3, Chapter II.  
  
4.4.2 The Legislative Process  
The Department of the Ministry concerned (in this case Department of Education) may 
require the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee to develop legislation to give effect to the 
new policy, particularly where the policy requires changes to existing or inherited laws. 
A White Paper may be gazetted as a Draft Bill for comment by a defined date, or given to 
certain organisations for comment. Once all comments have been considered the 
document is taken to the State Law Advisers who check the proposals for detail and 
consistency with existing legislation. Sometimes the Green and White Paper are bypassed 
and the process begins with legislative proposals originating in the Ministry or 
Department. These proposals are then tabled or introduced as a Bill in either the National 
Assembly or the National Council of Provinces for first reading and thereafter to the 
Portfolio Committee for consideration.  
 
The Portfolio Committees consist of members of different parties. They sometimes call 
expert witnesses or invite submissions to help refine the bill after which it may be 
amended. When the Committee has approved the Bill, it goes for debate in the House in 
which it was tabled. After its approval, it is transmitted to the other House and the same 
procedure is followed. When both Houses of Parliament have passed the Bill, it goes to 
the President for assent, and it is then published as law. The Constitutional Court can 
review the law for compliance with the constitution, and if it does not, it shall be returned 
to Parliament for the necessary amendments. “The legislative process is essentially a 
policy adoption stage, while implementation and evaluation stages are responsibilities of 
individual departments who sponsor a bill” (Lungu 2001:95). 
The Department of Education presented the outcome of the policy process as white 
papers; Acts of Parliament in which Portfolio Committee on Education play a decisive 
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role; major formal policy documents approved by the Minister of Education; and national 
investigations and technical developments initiated by the Department in collaboration 
with provincial Departments, NGOs, institutions and other state departments (Department 
of Education 2001). 
 
What is outlined above is the process in which public policy is developed and the 
institutions or structures that are involved. The formal policy process described above is 
seemingly straightforward, but in reality there is a lot of contestation by different groups 
and constituencies at different stages of the process. Compromises made during the 
negotiations, including consensus seeking, have sometimes aggravated contestation as 
different groups seek to protect established interests (Motala & Pampallis 2001; Karlsson, 
McPherson and Pampallis 2001; Nzimande 2001). Examples can be drawn from the 
formulation of the South African Schools Act (SASA) to show how different groups with 
various interests put their views and ideas in the process and how those views influenced 
the policy outcomes. 
 
4.4.3 Formulation of the South African Schools Act (SASA) 
The SASA which shaped the control of schools in South Africa was passed by Parliament 
in 1996, two years after the first democratic elections. Interviews showed that it was a 
highly contested piece of legislation. This is so because it affected groups which had 
different interests and views on how the school system that was hitherto organised and 
managed along racial lines should be restructured. The development of the SASA was 
preceded by a 17 member committee (known as the Hunter Committee), appointed by the 
Minister of Education to conduct research and review the organisation, governance and 
funding of schools. The Committee visited different parts of the provinces, held 
consultations with various groups, government departments and other stakeholders. The 
Hunter Committee provided three options for funding schools (Karlsson, McPherson and 
Pampallis 2001; Nzimande 2001). The report was given to two international consultants 
to advise on funding of schools. Following the report, a policy document was produced 
and public discussions were conducted, after which a Draft White Paper, White Paper, 
Draft Bill and Bill were produced (Department of Education 1995b; 1996d). The process 
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also involved negotiations between the Department of Education and different 
constituencies, among them teacher organisations, the Department of Finance, governing 
bodies of Model C schools (as required by Section 247 of the Interim Constitution) and 
other affected groups (the Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1996).  
 
The need to hold negotiations with Model C school governing bodies arose from the fact 
that during the negotiations the NP had taken advantage of its position (as the 
government in power) to change the status of state aided Model C schools. This was a 
strategic move to ensure that the new government would be forced to enter into 
negotiations with governing bodies of those schools before introducing any new changes. 
Therefore, the formulation of the SASA obliged the Department of Education to enter 
into negotiations with governing bodies of Model C schools before any changes 
concerning their powers were made as required by Section 247 of the Interim 
Constitution (Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis 2001; Mathieson 2001). Interviews 
with officials from the Department of Education and respondents from NGOs showed 
that negotiations with the governing bodies of Model C schools advantaged the latter as 
they were able to have many aspects and functions of their school governing bodies 
included in the new Bill. This is confirmed by Mathieson: 
 
Strong school governing bodies had also been a central demand of the ANC aligned and 
progressive organisations, but there was a feeling that the way in which these bodies were 
articulated in the South African Schools Bill that came before the Portfolio Committee was more 
attuned to the demands of the Model C constituency than to the ANC education policy arising out 
of parent, teacher, student associations. This shift in the emphasis of the South African Schools 
Bill, and the sense of alienation felt by the ANC aligned education organisations and intellectuals 
came about as the Department of Education fulfilled its obligations to Section 247 of the 
Constitution which required the Department to enter negotiations with Model C school governing 
bodies before any changes were made to their powers (Mathieson 2001:54).     
 
 Consequently, Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis observe: 
 
Government continued to have discussions with and take account of the concerns of the Model C 
constituency throughout the policy process, through to the final drafting of the Bill for tabling in 
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Parliament (Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis 2001:151).  
 
In addition to Model C schools other groups like the NP, the Freedom Front, the Model C 
based South African Federation of State Aided Schools and the Afrikaans Press, were 
also interested in maintaining their positions (Mathieson 2001; Karlsson, McPherson and 
Pampallis 2001; Harber 2001). They favoured more power to be given to school 
governing bodies at the school level, a measure that would retain the existing privileges 
and positions of Model C schools and also enable the above groups to maintain their 
interests. The reasons why the NP (which initially supported centralisation) opted for 
decentralisation were outlined in Chapter I. The NP foresaw that dividing executive 
authority between central and provincial government would guarantee minorities of their 
rights and a stake in the system. Initially, the NP was able to protect its regional power 
base through decentralised state power when it obtained majority vote and led the 
Western Cape province.  Chapter III showed how the NP changed the school system by 
ceding powers to Model C school governing bodies to maintain the interests of its 
constituency. 
 
The above groups interacted through workshops and meetings to put forward their views 
and these were submitted to the Department of Education. Interviews held with 
respondents from NGOs and educators from the former Model C schools revealed that 
those schools held meetings where they provided input on the Bill. They also 
acknowledged that schools sent representatives to meetings and workshops organised by 
the Model C based South African Federation of State Aided Schools to provide inputs 
and to adopt a negotiating position on some of the provisions in the Bill. They also 
confirmed that informal meetings were held with the NP, the Model C based South 
African Federation of State Aided Schools, the Freedom Front and other groupings which 
had interest in maintaining the status of Model C schools. The information was used in 
the negotiations between the school governing bodies and the Department of Education. 
The same respondents stated that inputs were also submitted by some of the above groups 
directly to the Department of Education.  
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Other groups like the Freedom Front and the Afrikaans media were also interested in 
preserving a single media Afrikaans schools in order to maintain their values and culture 
(Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis 2001; Harber 2001). Nzimande who was the 
Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Education showed how some Afrikaans 
speaking groups protested and petitioned to the President to address the issue of language 
and single medium schools. He stated: 
 
The matter was so contentious that it actually brought Mandela and de Klerk together for serious 
bilateral discussions. I recall being summoned by the President to meet a delegation of numerous 
Afrikaner groupings, some not even represented in Parliament, on issues related to the White 
Paper. We decided that the language of the White Paper could be changed and made more 
acceptable to these groups without giving too much ground on the actual goals we wanted to 
achieve. We insisted that learners retain the right to be taught in the language of their choice, 
making some allowance for single medium schools where it was practical (Nzimande 2001:41).  
 
This was also confirmed in discussions held with officials from the provincial and 
national Departments of Education who acknowledged that petitions were made by the 
above groups to the Department to consider the issue of single medium schools. Some of 
the respondents, particularly those from NGOs, provincial and national Departments of 
Education felt that the media - which was at that time  mostly white-owned and managed 
- assisted in the process by publicising and disseminating the views of the privileged 
groups in the debates and discussions. A respondent stated: 
• The media ensured that they avoided the main goal of the policy which was ending segregation 
and ensuring equity and redress in the school system; and instead focused on how the quality of 
education was going to be compromised as a result of dismantling the Model C schools 
(Respondent from NGO). 
 
  Another respondent noted: 
• There were disappointments with both electronic and print media during the public discussions on 
the South African Schools Bill as they failed to educate and inform the public on crucial education 
policy matters regarding the Bill. They only sought to publicise sensational matters that were 
supposed to garner support for the retention of Model C schools (Respondent: Government 
Official). 
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The role of media was also confirmed by Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis who 
observed: 
  
Until the debate shifted to parliament in the second half of 1996, the average television viewer or 
newspaper reader could be excused for thinking that the point at issue in the restructuring of the 
schooling system was whether Model C schools should be abolished or not (Karlsson, McPherson 
and Pampallis 2001:150). 
 
The above discussion on the role of the media confirms what has been discussed in 
Chapter II about critical theorists. The latter have shown how the media is able to use 
language and argumentation to present issues and distort meanings in order to enable 
powerful and preferred groups’ policy proposals secure preference from the public 
(Foucault 1984; Bobrow & Dryzek 1987; Edelman 1988; Fisher & Forester 1993). 
     
Interviews with respondents from the national Department of Education and NGOs 
showed that before the South African Schools Bill was submitted to the Portfolio 
Committee for public hearing and discussions, provisions in the Bill favoured Model C 
school governing bodies. This was attributed to compromises made by the Department of 
Education in the negotiations that were held with Model C school governing bodies. In 
the same vein, the Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand observed: 
 
Apart from changing the ownership of schools and rescinding powers to determine admission 
policies, the powers and functions of governing bodies of Model C schools will remain the same 
as before. Even the proposal that school assets should revert to the state will be largely nominal 
since Model C governing bodies could not sell or use these assets for purposes which were not 
approved by education authorities (the Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 
1996:11). 
 
When the Bill was submitted to the Portfolio Committee, the ANC aligned groups (which 
felt discontented and alienated from the process when it was being handled in the 
Department of Education), contested the Bill. The group felt that the Bill took more into 
consideration the demands of Model C school governing bodies, other associated groups 
and the NP constituencies (Mathieson 2001; Bush et. al. 2003).  The ANC aligned groups 
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were made up of the ANC Study Group, ANC aligned education organisations and 
intellectuals, Members of Parliament, COSAS and officials from the Department of 
Education who were members of the ANC. Members of the groups shared a common 
interest, namely, to see policy outcomes that would enhance democracy, equity and 
redress particularly among the disadvantaged groups and communities (Pampallis 2002; 
Mathieson 2001). Consequently, they also wanted to see reorganisation of the school 
system to ensure equity and redress. According to Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis:    
 
The largest of the constituencies represented by the ANC and its allies (often referred to as the 
democratic movement) were those sectors of society that would benefit from an equitable 
distribution of resources. This group tended to favour a greater centralisation of power, exercised 
mainly at the provincial level within a strong national framework (Karlsson, McPherson and 
Pampallis 2001:150). 
    
In addition to sharing common interests, each of the ANC aligned group had its own 
interest. For example, Mathieson (2001) observed that SADTU did not support the 
provision of having parents form a majority of members in school governing bodies; 
COSAS wanted to ensure that the Act included a provision for the establishment of 
learner representative councils and a code of conduct for schools.  
 
The ANC Study Group which was the caucus of the ANC on education matters 
participated in holding informal discussion in a number of other education policy 
initiatives. The Study Group became a forum for establishing, through debate, a preferred 
position to be taken into the Portfolio Committee for a decision. As Nzimande, the 
Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Education stated: “I would 
actually have preferred to take these debates into the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
itself, but this was not possible given the politics of the time” (Nzimande 2001:40). The 
Study Group was also a means of bringing the ANC constituencies into the policy 
making process. It met each week prior to the Portfolio Committee sessions and all the 
issues were discussed thoroughly and clear positions to be taken to the Portfolio 
Committee agreed upon. Mathieson (2001:44) stated: “There was a general rule that 
ANC MPs were not supposed to participate in Portfolio Committee discussions if they 
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had not attended the ANC Education Study Group discussions and understood what the 
ANC position was on the issue”.  
 
Nzimande further elaborated: 
 
The Study Group was used to bring our own constituency into the policymaking process, but this 
included organisations not necessarily allied to the ANC. The Study Group was a mechanism, then 
to resolve internal differences among elements from the broad democratic movement. It is 
important to note that in this context the Study Group, though formally composed of about 30 
members, would have different people attend its meetings at any one time depending on the issues 
on the table. In this way the Study group broadened participation in the policy process especially 
among Parliamentarians (Nzimande 2001:40). 
 
Discussions and meetings in the Study Group brought members and individuals close 
together and enhanced their working relationships. One example of such a close working 
relationship was that the Education Portfolio Committee would not propose amendment 
on policy without discussing it first with the Minister of Education. Nzimande (2001:40) 
explained: “We would convene hearings and my researcher would give us a detailed 
analysis of the hearings which we would then also share with the Minister so that he 
knew what some of the debates and issues were around a particular policy position”. 
Moreover, the Minister was represented in the Study Group by one of his advisers. 
According to Nzimande (2001:41), “This ensured that he was aware of all the issues 
being debated within his constituency. Hence the group worked together to ensure that 
they jointly influenced education policies”. 
 
Nzimande (2001:42) confirmed: “The ANC Study Group played a similar role when the 
South African Schools Bill was submitted to the Portfolio Committee on Education”. 
According to Mathieson (2001), the CEPD, which was a think tank of the ANC 
coordinated a workshop that brought together the ANC Study Group, progressive 
education organisations and intellectuals, ANC Members of Parliament, officials from the 
Ministry and Department of Education (who are members of the ANC), teacher unions 
and student organisations, to examine the legislation further and provide inputs.  
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 At the same time teachers organised marches in Johannesburg to express their 
dissatisfaction with the Bill and to put pressure on the Department of Education and 
Portfolio Committee to include some of the issues and concerns not included in SASA 
(the Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1996). The above measures 
confirm other issues raised in Chapter II on the confinement and expansion of issues in 
policy formulation. Policy makers are able to use the powers and rules of institutions to 
confine issues in policy formulation in order to protect and maintain the interests of 
preferred groups or constituencies. Similarly, those challenging policies or policy 
proposals expand issues from experts and bureaucrats to the public arena in order to exert 
pressure on the policy makers to make changes (Cobb and Elder 1983; Parsons 1995). 
Consequently, Anderson (1990) identifies protest activity, including violence, as a means 
of bringing problems to the attention of policy makers or as a way of putting pressure on 
policy makers to address problems by putting them on the policy agenda.   
 
Mathieson (2001:42) observed that following inputs from the workshop, including 
protests and challenges to SASA, suggestions and amendments were taken by ANC 
Study Group to be refined and presented to the Portfolio Committee hearings. These are 
outlined below. 
 
4.4.3.1 Representative Councils for Learners 
Following inputs from COSAS, which had been overlooked in the initial discussions, 
improvements were made on the sections on representative councils for learners; codes of 
conduct and school discipline.  
 
4.4.3.2 Parent Membership
SADTU lobbied hard to change the formulation of membership of school governing 
bodies to reduce the majority of parents from an absolute to a relative majority. However, 
despite these contestations the issue of parent majority on school governing bodies was 
not amended. Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis (2001:146) observe that this may have 
been “the result of pressure from the South African Federation of State Aided Schools 
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and parent representatives, and also because of opinion within the Education Ministry”. 
The White Paper and the Bill proposed that parent representatives form the majority in 
governing bodies (Mathieson 2001; Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis 2001). This was 
also supported by the Portfolio Committee on Education which believed that parents from 
disadvantaged communities who had been deprived from participation for a long time 
should be given the opportunity to do so (Nzimande 2001).  
 
4.4.3.3 School Admission Policy
There was controversy as to whether school admissions policy should be a function of 
governing bodies. Previously Model C governing bodies had the right to control 
admission and exclusion of learners at their schools. In most other schools, the power 
over admissions policy was vested in the Education Department, although its 
administration was vested in school principals (Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis 
2001). The democratic movement was opposed to school governing bodies being allowed 
to control admissions policy for fear that the affluent communities  (mainly white)  would 
use their power to exclude poorer learners (mainly black). The same had also been 
expressed by the Hunter Committee which recommended that provincial authorities 
should make regulations on admissions policy within the framework of national norms 
(Department of Education 1995c). Through pressure and submissions from ANC aligned 
organisations, the Bill was considerably amended. However, the Act still gave school 
governing bodies “the right to determine admissions policy, but prohibited them from 
unfairly discriminating against any learners. Furthermore, it prohibited schools from 
administering admission tests or refusing any learner admission because his/her parents 
were unable to pay the fees” (Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis 2001:156). 
 
4.4.3.4 Language Policy
Language policy created controversy because neither the Hunter Committee Report nor 
the government’s Draft White Paper mentioned who should have the power to determine 
the language policy of a school. However, in the Second White Paper and the Bill, the 
government gave such a right to school governing bodies. However, it was made clear 
that this power should be exercised within national and provincial policy frameworks and 
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it should not be used as means of discriminating learners (Education Policy Unit, 
University of Witwatersrand 1998; Gilmour 2001). According to Karlsson, McPherson 
and Pampallis (2001:156) “the inclusion of such a right for governing bodies was 
probably due to demands of Afrikaner parents and organisations as they considered this 
important”. The democratic movement feared that formerly privileged schools that 
wanted to maintain an exclusive admissions policy might be tempted to use the power to 
determine language policies assigned to school governing bodies as a way of restricting 
admissions on racial basis (Tikly and Mabogoane 1997). This had already happened in 
some Afrikaans schools in small towns of Potgietersrus and Groblersdal which tried to 
exclude black people on the basis of language or culture in defiance of provincial 
education departments’ directives (Gilmour 2001).  
 
4.4.3.5 Financing of Education
Financing of education was contested by different constituencies. The problem that faced 
the Department was that state resources were not sufficient to bring all schools up to the 
standard that had been enjoyed by whites before 1994 (Harber 2001). If it this was to be 
achieved, the government would have had to increase the size of education budget or find 
means of using non-state funds for education. This option was not possible because the 
government had put more emphasis on the reduction of fiscal deficit and government 
departments were under pressure to reduce spending. Although education expenditure 
was, and remains, the largest single item in the budget after debt repayment, educational 
spending fell in real terms and it was unlikely to rise over the following three years 
(Naidoo et.al. 1998; Greenstein 1997). Hence, the Department had to adopt another 
financing option. Model C lobby groups and some stakeholders within the mass 
democratic movement had argued that charging fees would bring private resources into 
the school system, enabling the government to channel state resources to those schools in 
greatest need (Nzimande 2001; Harber 2001). This was confirmed by Nzimande 
(2001:42) who acknowledged that many submissions made to the task team by different 
stakeholders contained similar proposals. The same recommendations were made by 
officials from the Department of Finance in their discussions with the task team 
(Mathieson 2001; Nzimande 2001; Department of Education 1995).  
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The Department sought advice on school financing from international consultants, and on 
the basis of their recommendations, it opted for a system that allowed school governing 
bodies, with the consent of the majority of parents, to determine fees which all parents at 
the schools would be compelled to pay. According to Harber: 
 
The argument presented by the consultants was that since the government might not be able to 
fund the middle class schools (mainly former white schools) at the same level as before and if no 
other sources of funding were available it might affect the quality of education adversely. 
Therefore, there is likelihood that majority of parents in the middle class might opt to take their 
children to private schools, claiming as a justification low quality education in public schools. 
This would deny the public schooling system the most influential people like business people, 
politicians, professionals, senior public servants etc (Harber 2001:16) 
 
Hence, the only option was to allow schools to charge fees in order to supplement state 
funding for their own schools. The parents would charge fees and determine its amount. 
Schools would not be allowed to expel learners or deny them access solely because their 
parents cannot afford to pay. However, schools could sue parents because of non-
payment of fees (Department of Education 1996). Nzimande (2001:41) commented, “By 
not placing a cap on school fees, we knew that we would be allowing privileged schools 
to hire more teachers and thereby perpetuate a two-tier system”. The Department 
established in 1998 Norms and Standards for School Funding, which deals with public 
funding of schools, exemption of parents who are unable to pay school fees and public 
subsidies to independent schools. This is discussed in Part III of this Chapter. 
 
 The above findings can be explained in various ways. While many other actors 
participated in the formulation of the SASA, the major contestation came from two policy 
networks. The first network consisted of the NP, the Freedom Front, the Model C based 
South African Federation of State Aided Schools, the Afrikaans Press and other 
constituencies. Their target was largely the white constituencies. The second one was 
made up of the ANC Study Group, ANC aligned education organisations and 
intellectuals, ANC Members of Parliament, COSAS and officials from the Department of 
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Education who were members of the ANC. Their target was mainly the black population.  
 
The two groups could be referred to as policy networks:  
• First, they were made up of groups with common interests, aspirations, values and 
goals and all pursued a common interest within the bigger groups.  
• Second, each individual group had its own interest that was also being pursued at 
the same time.  
• Third, both networks consisted of actors from representatives of interest groups, 
bureaucrats, politicians and other people in decision making positions. 
• Fourth, all the actors or groups in each of the two networks are linked to each 
other because they share similar interests, values and goals. For example, the first 
network had more preference for decentralisation to ensure that existing interests 
are maintained. This is evident from the fact that the NP, as a government, 
ensured that extensive powers were granted to Model C schools before the new 
government was established. The second network preferred redistribution and 
enhancement of equity in order to redress existing imbalances brought about by 
the legacy of apartheid policies. Members of the second network were to be the 
main beneficiaries in the process.  
• Fifth, there is no clear evidence as to which actor was steering the process and 
facilitating contact in the first policy network. In the second network, the main 
driver was the chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee of 
Education. It is evident that the type of contacts and relationships that existed, and 
the strategies that were developed in influencing policies, were spearheaded by 
the chairperson. The relationship that existed, particularly between actors in the 
ANC Study Group, was not only directed at SASA but also for other policies 
where major contestations were envisaged. 
 
From the findings it is evident that the relationship between different actors in both 
networks is not sufficient to explain the policy process. Each policy network held 
workshops and came up with ideas that were put forward either to the Department of 
Education or to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for Education to influence 
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decision making in the policy process. Consequently, the first network made use of the 
media to change public opinion and enlist public support. Both cases show the 
importance of ideas and interests in the policy process.  
 
The second network made use of public demonstrations to make policy makers accede to 
their demands of changing some of the provisions in the Bill.  The fact that the 
Department of Education had to negotiate with Model C school governing bodies as 
required by Section 247 of the Interim Constitution worked to the advantage of the first 
policy network. Often the negotiations led to compromises and as such, many ideas 
advanced by Model C school governing bodies were included in the Bill. The second 
network exerted influence when the policy moved to the political process. Although some 
amendments were made to the Bill following inputs from the second network, the 
economic situation restrained the incorporation of some of those changes, a factor which 
favoured the adoption of the options advanced by the first network.  
  
4.5 Public Participation in the Policy Process  
The formal policy process outlined in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 and also examples drawn 
from the development of the SASA showed that there are a lot of avenues for public 
participation in policy formulation. Almost at every stage in both the White Paper and 
Legislative processes, there are opportunities for the public to provide comments and 
inputs. Manganyi (2001) states: 
 
Anyone who is familiar with the situation in South Africa will know that a framework, and indeed 
a tradition of public participation in policy development are well established and have in the case 
of education, been alive for several years now. The policy accountability chain is established and 
maintained by these formal arrangements. The important point to make in this regard is that all the 
education laws and policies of the first democratic government were developed through structured 
public participation opportunities which involved members of the public, the Cabinet, education 
experts, teacher organisations, as well as the Education Portfolio Committee of the two chambers 
of our national Parliament (Manganyi 2001:29-30).  
 
 According to the Department of Education (1998), the education policy process has been 
intensely consultative and participatory, involving collaborative work between the 
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national and provincial political office bearers and departments, other state departments, 
the organised teaching profession and a wide array of stakeholder bodies. Furthermore 
the Department states: 
 
This work has been conducted in the public eye, through landmark investigations by expert 
commissions, committees and task teams, the publication of successive draft documents for 
comment by the public, and extensive face to face consultations (Department of Education 
1998:12). 
 
Lungu (2001:92) provides a number of reasons for stakeholder approach to policy 
making adopted by the democratic government of South Africa:  
 
• First, the long history of racial discrimination and later apartheid policies which systematically 
excluded some population groups from policy structures and processes, led to a strong desire in 
the democratic movement to create more inclusive and transparent policy processes.  
• Second, the fact that South Africa was among the last of the African states to achieve majority rule 
meant that it had the opportunity to observe and learn from the achievements, mistakes and 
omissions of other African states. Returning exiles and the presence of a sizeable group of experts 
and scholars from Africa and other countries, brought comparative insights into the processes of 
governance generally and policy making in particular.  
• Third, South Africa is relatively well resourced to finance and manage elaborate policy structures 
and processes.  
 
There are different consultative structures and avenues for participation in policy 
formulation in the education sector. In earlier sections, it was stated that the policy 
development process usually involves creation of commissions, whose membership 
include representatives of different sets of stakeholders, and experts involved in the area. 
However, such commissions are not permanent bodies and cannot be mobilized for 
support during the implementation process. Moreover they include only a selected group 
of people, mostly those who possess skills, expertise and knowledge about the policy 
area. Commissions collect information and data on the specific policy from very limited 
places and groups, mostly urban areas and affluent people.  
 
Other avenues of participation include political party structures and caucuses; established 
 192 
 
 
statutory bodies at different levels; public hearing convened by the legislature; and 
parliamentary constituency offices.  
 
4.5.1 Participation through established Statutory Structures 
The post-apartheid government has established structures to enable people to participate 
in policy formulation. The National Education Policy Act obliges the Minister to consult 
a range of stakeholders including the organised teaching profession before he/she 
determines national education policy. One example is the National Education Policy Act 
which requires the Minister to establish an advisory body known as the National 
Education and Training Council to enhance public participation in the policy process 
(Department of Education 1996). The Council which is composed of the main 
stakeholders in the national education system and education experts, is required to 
supposed to advise the Minister on broad policy and strategies for the development of the 
national education system and the advancement of an integrated approach to education 
and training (Pampallis 2002). However, at the time of concluding this research, the 
Council has not been functional. Provincial Departments of Education are also required 
to establish Provincial, District and Local Education and Training Councils to facilitate 
the participation of different stakeholders in the formulation of education policies 
(Heckroodt 2002; Pampallis 2002).  
 
Although all the provinces have not established the required structures, some of them, 
like Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal have active education and training 
councils at different levels (Heckroodt 2002). In most of these provinces the education 
and training councils are composed of representatives from: district education and 
training councils; parents of learners enrolled in schools; educators; learners; heads of 
institutions; principals; provincial department of education; governing bodies of public 
education institutions, NGOs dealing with education; business; labour; community based 
organisations whose core activities are education related; Education or Training Boards 
and Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAS); and district managers 
(Heckroodt 2002). There is no provincial education and training council in place in the 
Eastern Cape but there are plans to establish one by the end of 2005. Although districts 
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have already established district education and training councils, many of them are not 
fully functional. 
 
The establishment of statutory bodies for effecting participation in policy development is 
consistent with the ANC’s policy commitment in Education and Training Framework 
(1994) which stated that the creation of such structures was an important condition for 
establishing new relationships between the state and civil society in the post apartheid 
era. The credibility of such bodies will depend mostly on factors such as the 
responsibilities and independence granted to them as well as visible qualitative input 
resulting from their activities. However, Heckroodt (2002:7) cautioned: “Too close 
association with the state could place civil society in an awkward position of being co-
opted and used as mere conveyer belts for the approval and implementation of state 
policy”. 
 
Studies show that the composition of these bodies is heavily weighted towards ministerial 
appointments (Ota 1999). Their advisory role limits their influence on policy, as the 
Minister of Education is not duty bound to accept their advice. The process of 
establishing these bodies ignored differential capacities of organised civil society 
structures, as well as racial and gender inequities which constrain their full and effective 
participation. Findings have shown that many provincial education and training councils 
are dominated by males, whites, most affluent and highly educated representatives 
(Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis 2001; Jansen 2001; Sayed 2001; Heckroodt 2002). 
Sayed (2001) provide examples of differential capacity observed in the formulation of 
SASA where the majority of the 1700 submissions received came from previously white 
structures which possess ample resources for policy intervention.  
        
4.5.2 Participation through Public Hearings convened by the Legislature    
The Constitution provides extensive institutional mechanisms for public participation in 
the legislature. Chapter 4 (Section 59 and 72) of the Constitution requires Parliament to 
facilitate public access to participate in the legislative process. Moreover, several rules of 
Parliament give effect to this right. Rules 240, 241 and 249 instruct portfolio and standing 
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committees to call public hearings and provide an opportunity for the public to comment 
on draft bills. However, studies have shown that not all the public is able to participate 
and make submissions in committee hearings. According to February: 
 
The vast majority of groups participating in terms of making submissions and attending public 
hearings to committees are limited to better resourced NGOs and private sector/business interests. 
These groups are well placed to interact with the complex legislative language in bills, can afford 
to travel to Parliament, and have the capacity to conduct research. In terms of Rule 220, one 
language should be used in law making, and the translation of the bill into one other. In practice, 
Parliament uses only English and Afrikaans respectively with few exceptions. This further 
compounds the marginalisation of many citizens from meaningful participation in Parliament. 
Their lack of full and meaningful participation could mean that legislative outcomes fail to be 
reflective of and responsive to the interests of those who are poor and marginalised (February 
2004:19). 
 
Inclusiveness and participation of every South African citizen in public life is a 
constitutional right. Participation is one of the pillars of democracy. Democracy requires 
constant interaction between those who govern and the people. Participation is essential 
in enhancing development and one strategy of mobilising people to engage in the 
democratic project and contribute to the improvement of their lives. Participation enables 
people to understand their own situation and those of others and the environment around 
them and in this regard, enable them to commit themselves to programmes and activities 
adopted in various policies. All groups, whether they are officials at the lowest levels of 
the ladder in government departments or industries, teachers in schools, middle class 
parents and the poor and illiterate parents in urban or rural areas, are capable of 
participating in making decisions on the type of life they want to lead, the policies they 
want to see in place, and how they would like to see them implemented. Therefore the 
need to ensure participation of all groups of people becomes essential for attaining policy 
objectives and goals.  
 
Interviews held with Members of Parliament and officials from the National Department 
of Education confirmed the lack of participation by the poor and marginalised groups in 
policy formulation. The following section presents the results of focus group interviews 
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held with Members of Parliament and senior national Department of Education officials 
on public participation in the policy process in the education sector. Most respondents felt 
that although democracy has been achieved many of those who were marginalised or 
excluded by apartheid policies have not been able to participate fully in policy and 
decision making processes because of poverty and illiteracy. In the midst of such poverty 
and illiteracy, people have not been able to make their voices heard.  The following are 
some of the comments made in the group discussions: 
 
• Many people from poor communities have not been able to exercise their democratic right to voice 
their interest and participate fully in the social, economic cultural and political activities of the 
society as they lack certain levels of literacy and numeracy. I am afraid at this rate Portfolio 
Committees might turn into lobby arenas for the educated and well resourced to the exclusion of 
others (Comments from respondent from the National Department of Education).  
 
• I believe that many of our people who can participate in the policy process have been left out. 
While mechanisms for participation exist, the major problem has been availability of financial 
resources, to enable all people to take part. Those who are able to participate are the ones who 
are able to use their own means and resources (Comment from Respondent from National 
Department of Education).     
 
Manganyi (2001) raised the issue of some groups or communities being excluded from 
participation in the policy process because of lack of resources. He argued: 
 
When we look at participation, the government and the legislature are guided by what one can call 
‘accountability necessity’. This means that questions of sustainability, affordability impact on the 
viability of institutions as well as intergovernmental relations need to be considered. One of the most 
important questions, which needed to be asked, was: how much it will cost to enhance public 
participation in the policy process? We discovered as we went along that the policy development 
process needed to be placed within the context of the government’s expenditure frameworks and 
macroeconomic policies (Manganyi 2001:30). 
  
Many respondents felt that the limitations of wider democratic participation highlighted 
above resulted in having only a small group of people providing input in the policy 
process. A respondent made the following comments: 
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• Sitting in the Portfolio Committee in the first five years I noticed that it was mostly the organised 
sectors of the country that literally took over and made sure that they used all the opportunities 
and avenues provided for public participation in the policy process. They made sure that they 
prepared themselves well most of the times with well researched information and would present 
very sophisticated and technical papers for our consideration. I must say that this was not the 
same or true of the majority of people in South Africa. I mean those from the broad democratic 
movement and majority of those from disadvantaged poor communities (Comments from a 
National Member of Parliament). 
 
• Being a member of the portfolio committee on finance I am able to observe who participates fully 
in shaping our policies. In our hearing and public participation sessions, we could see some 
people coming in accompanied with their lawyers and accountants, with well-prepared inputs and 
arguments. These are not our common people but top executives and well off people. (Comments 
from a National Member of Parliament). 
 
The above responses confirm what Bobrow & Dryzek observed: 
 
Large corporations, government bureaucracies, national interest groups, and professional 
associations are highly organised and have the resources to hire skilled and persuasive advocates. 
Community organisations, small businesses, and the poor typically come off worse even in a 
forum of formal equality of access (such as a legislative hearing, court case, project review, public 
hearing, or special commission) (Bobrow & Dryzek 1987:177). 
  
Submissions to the Portfolio Committee have to be neat, legible and typed. Evidently this 
requirement excluded many ordinary people including teachers, parents and learners from 
disadvantaged communities and schools, who lack basic facilities. This concern was also 
raised by some of the respondents from Parliament and those from the National 
Department of Education.  
 
Participation in the policy development process through political party structures and 
caucuses has also not being inclusive of all members and constituencies except during 
elections. The example of the ANC provided in the previous sections showed that it is 
only Members of Parliament and few other constituencies that are able to provide input to 
the policy process through the normal party channels. The situation is similar with most 
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political parties in the country (February 2004; Mathieson 2001). Most respondents felt 
that the vibrancy and participation in policy development by most ANC aligned 
organisations in pre-1994 and immediately after the first democratic elections in 1994 
gave way to apathy and non-participation. Many of them attribute this to three basic 
factors:  
• first the role of some of the ANC aligned organisations has diminished because 
some of the key leaders took up positions within the government and private 
sector, thus diminishing the capacity of their organisations to participate 
effectively in the policy development process.  
• Second, while in government, leaders remain detached from the people and 
therefore it becomes difficult to mobilise their constituencies. Some respondents 
alluded to a drop in membership of the organisations due to availability of more 
avenues for political, social and economic advancement for some of the members. 
• Third, financial resources that were readily available before 1994 no longer 
existed because donors directed their funding to government. Hence has affected 
input in the policy process in terms of quantity and quality. As a result, this has 
provided an opportunity for other interests with resources to push their 
preferences without much competition. 
 
4.5.3 Participation through Parliamentary Constituency Offices  
As stated in Chapter I, the choice of the electoral system was an outcome of the 
negotiated settlement. A closed list proportional representation system was adopted to 
ensure that minority and smaller parties are represented in the legislature. Members of 
legislature from different parties elected through proportional representation system are 
allocated constituencies, including offices and financial resources. They are required to 
work with people in their respective constituencies and ensure that the people participate 
in policy and developmental matters. However, the closed list proportional representation 
system creates problems of accountability. Because the seat is owned by a party, a 
situation may arise in which the elected representatives see themselves as being 
accountable to their party and not to voters (February 2004). This adversely affects 
participation and involvement of people from different constituencies in policy 
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formulation and other developmental activities. 
 
4.6 Education Policy Development and Participation in the Eastern Cape Province 
 
4.6.1 Education Policy Development in the Eastern Cape Province 
The entire process of policy formulation was outlined in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. 
Although policy is formulated at the national level, representatives from provincial 
executive are involved in the process. New policies are tabled in forums of HEDCOM 
and CEM which consist of national and provincial Departments of Education officials, 
provincial MECs of Education and the national Minister of Education. Respondents from 
the Eastern Cape provincial Department of Education acknowledged that it is in these 
fora that most productive discussions and technical matters relating to new legislation and 
policy affecting education in the province take place. Provinces are given the opportunity 
to respond to concerns and most disagreements on policy issues and proposals are 
resolved. However, respondents from the Eastern Cape provincial Department of 
Education lamented that the above practice does not take place in the development of all 
education policies. They acknowledged at times the process is overshadowed and dictated 
to by the National Department of Education, including CEM and HEDCOM.  
Agreements reached in CEM and HEDCOM are subject to scrutiny in the NCOP. It is the 
NCOP that provides the opportunity for a public discussion of national policy with the 
provincial politicians and electorates. 
 
4.6.2 The Role of the NCOP in Provincial Policy Development 
The main function of the NCOP, as provided in the Constitution is to participate in 
national law making process and provide a national forum for public debate of provincial 
issues. In providing a forum to debate matters affecting the provinces, “the NCOP can 
ensure that provincial issues are aired and that provincial concerns are not marginalised 
or misrepresented in the national debate” (Murray and Nijzink 2002:42). Hence the 
NCOP passes bills that are applicable to all the provinces.  The latter are not required to 
deal with all bills passed by Parliament as some of them fall outside their jurisdiction. 
Such bills, known as ‘section 75 bills’, are those that are passed by procedures set out in 
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section 75 of the Constitution. They include constitutional amendments, money bills etc. 
The NCOP does not have much influence over them and although they are considered, 
the 10 provincial delegates vote as individual members of Parliament. ‘Section 76 bills’ 
are adopted under section 76 of the Constitution and also concern provinces, and include 
those relating to education. In order to become law, the approval of at least five delegates 
of the nine provinces is required (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).    
 
4.6.2.1 Provincial Delegates in the NCOP
The NCOP is made up of ten delegates from each province. An additional ten members 
representing local government do not have voting rights but may address the NCOP and 
its committees on matters pertaining to local government. The Provincial delegation is 
headed by the Premier of the province and consists of six permanent delegates and four 
special delegates. The permanent delegates are appointed by the provincial legislature 
within 30 days of the announcement of the results of provincial election. They serve for 
the entire period of five years and are based in Cape Town. The four special delegates are 
appointed from time to time to represent the province on specific matters. They consist of 
the Premier or his/her nominee and three other members of the provincial legislature. 
Respondents from the Eastern Cape provincial legislature and the Department of 
Education explained how agreements in education policies are reached in the NCOP and 
their participation in the process. Following discussions in HEDCOM and CEM and after 
approval by the Cabinet, a White Paper is gazetted as ‘section 76 bill’ and introduced in 
the National Assembly. When the bill leaves the National Assembly to be discussed in 
the NCOP, the province sends the chairperson of the Committee on Education and the 
MEC for education as special delegates. The special delegates ensure that provincial 
delegation include the expertise necessary to decide specific matters. 
After discussions in the NCOP, the bill is then taken to the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Legislature for public hearing and for further scrutiny by the Standing Committee in the 
Provincial Legislature and the provincial Department of Education. In this process the 
permanent delegates are supposed to return to the province, brief the relevant committees 
and assist in the preparation of the negotiating mandate (how provinces should cast their 
vote on the bill). This is also intended to provide an opportunity for the province to hold 
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public hearings on the bill. However, in practice this rarely happens as planned. Most 
often permanent delegates remain in Cape Town fully engaged in the NCOP committee 
work (in connection with section 75 bills) for which special delegates or direct provincial 
input is not necessary. When the permanent delegates are available, the time is too short 
to conduct effective debates and public hearings because during this time the Provincial 
Legislature will be holding caucus and constituency days. Provinces prepare negotiating 
mandates. The bill is taken back to the NCOP and provinces meet with the NCOP Select 
Committee where they negotiate in accordance with their mandate. This provides an 
opportunity for the provinces to make their own input on the bills. After this process the 
bill is voted on in the NCOP plenary. Provinces can either make use of the national 
framework without modifications, or adapt it to suit their specific provincial needs.  If a 
province has adapted a national framework to suit its needs and environment, the process 
goes through the same stages or procedures as is done at the national level.  
 
Provincial delegates cast their votes in the NCOP in accordance with the mandate of their 
provincial legislatures. This ensures that provinces engage with the NCOP matters and 
therefore strengthen the democratic process. Section 65(2) of the Constitution seeks to 
secure this process by requiring it to be regulated by an Act of the National Parliament. 
However, the Act anticipated in Section 65 has not been adopted and different provinces 
follow different procedures when they mandate their delegations to vote. According to 
Murray and Nijzink: 
 
It has been clearly wise to allow provinces to develop their own procedures, as their experience 
will ensure that the Act is attuned to the practicalities of the mandating process. But the Act must 
also take into account the fact that in some cases different procedures have been driven by the 
particular political circumstances in a province. Thus KwaZulu Natal has established a process 
under which a committee can confer a mandate provided that 75 per cent of the members agree. 
This encourages decisions that are based on provincial and not party interests and reflects 
sensitivity to the political needs of a province in which the party balance is very close (Murray and 
Nijzink 2002:50).    
   
Interviews with some of the members of the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature showed 
that even though delegates from a province may not agree with a bill they cannot vote 
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against it because of the mandate they receive from their provinces. In addition, they also 
receive a mandate from their political parties informally. A respondent cited a case where 
a bill was debated in the provincial legislature and a voting mandate was given to 
delegates. Although some of the delegates had reservations about some provisions of the 
bill and voiced their objection, the Provincial Legislature mandated them to vote for it. 
Similarly, the ANC instructed its members to vote for it. However, some months later the 
policy was amended to accommodate some of the provisions that were identified by the 
delegates. 
 
4.6.2.2 Factors which hinder effective functioning between the NCOP and Provincial 
 Legislatures 
The decisions taken by delegations to the NCOP are determined by their provincial 
legislatures. However, interviews with Members of the Provincial Legislature, Executive 
Members of the Department of Education and information from studies conducted earlier 
revealed that there are challenges to the achievement of this mandate, namely: 
• Many provincial members do not understand the NCOP, its benefits for the 
province and for the development of national policy, and its role in cooperative 
government. Most MPLs see themselves as provincial politicians, focused on 
provincial legislation and oversight of the provincial executive. In the interviews, 
very few provincial politicians raised issues relating to the NCOP although the 
NCOP work often dominates provincial programmes. 
•  In order to make decisions on national legislation, MPLs are supposed to follow 
debates, understand legislative proposals introduced in Parliament and assess 
their implications for the province. However, many of them lack the required 
skills and knowledge and essential support to engage with both national and 
provincial legislative matters. From the interviews it was clear that they rely on 
information from summaries of bills, inadequate and poor quality research and 
incomplete briefings in their committees.  
• Many MECs pay little attention to the passage of national legislation through the 
NCOP. This is attributed to the fact that they assume their work is done after they 
have participated in policy development in HEDCOM and CEM. Moreover, they 
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rarely discuss the appropriate mandate with their colleagues in the Provincial 
Legislature.   According to Murray and Nijzink: 
 
As it is the provincial executive that will bear responsibility for the implementation of 
much section seventy-six legislation, it is critical that the views of the MECs are 
considered by the provincial legislature when it confers mandates. Often political study 
groups and caucuses play the same role but when discussion is limited to these forums, 
democratic processes are weakened – decisions must also be discussed in public if 
legislatures are to fulfil their role as representative institutions (Murray and Nijzink 
2002:48).   
 
This was also confirmed in the interviews with some of the officials in the 
provincial Department of Education who felt that their role in the policy 
development process end after discussions in HEDCOM and agreement with 
CEM. They gave the impression that the next stage in the NCOP and Provincial 
Legislature does not concern them. One executive respondent stated: “I do not think 
we need to concentrate much with the process in the NCOP as we have already played our part. 
We only have to wait for things to be formalised so that we can implement those policies”.  
• Some respondents were concerned by the fact that misunderstanding about the 
role of provincial delegation to the NCOP at times increases the reluctance of 
MECs to participate in the NCOP decision making. There are perceptions among 
MECs and MPLs that their participation as a team in delegation to the NCOP 
undermines the separation of powers that exists between the legislature and the 
executive. However, the two provincial branches, that is, the executive and 
legislature, have to work jointly as a team in representing provincial interests in 
the NCOP.     
 
4.6.2.3 Problems of Participation by Permanent and Special Delegates
The issue of participation of permanent and special delegates has also affected 
participation in the development of policies. The purpose of having permanent and 
special delegates was to make certain that MPLs are involved in the national legislature. 
As well as representing the province in the Parliament, permanent delegates bring the 
broader national perspective to provinces. Consequently, by attending the NCOP as 
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delegates, the MPLs are exposed to national politics (Calland and Nijzink 2001). The role 
of permanent delegates was described by a NCOP Needs Assessment (1998) as follows: 
 
On the one hand a permanent delegate is the appointee of the provincial legislature and 
responsible to it. On the other, she or he is a member of the national Parliament, resident in Cape 
Town and involved on a daily basis in the processes of the national legislature. There is a danger 
that permanent delegates enter a political limbo – too remote from their provinces to have 
effective contact with them, too tied to the provincial legislature to act effectively and 
autonomously in the national Parliament. Links between provincial legislature and permanent 
delegate and between permanent delegate and the NCOP must be strong. Indeed our analysis 
suggests that effective permanent delegates are the key to effective functioning of the NCOP. 
They are a critical link between the provincial and national arenas (NCOP Needs Assessment 
Report 1998:28).   
 
However, the report also points to the fact that in practice the role of permanent delegates 
is not always clear and well understood. Provincial Portfolio committees have expressed 
concern regarding lack of briefing and reporting by permanent delegates. Many of the 
MPLs do not understand the role of permanent delegates and how to hold them 
accountable. Consequently, some permanent delegates, especially those from minority 
parties, feel isolated and in that regard, not being effectively used. Permanent delegates 
also face a dilemma because they have no political base in the province they represent 
and neither do they have status in Parliament. Respondents from the Provincial 
Legislature and officials from the Department of Education expressed concern about lack 
of adequate links between permanent delegates and the Provincial Legislature. Informal 
discussions with a permanent delegate revealed that inefficiencies and problems of proper 
planning and programming of activities hinder adequate links and effective relationship 
between the delegates and provincial legislature.  
All decision-making in the NCOP is supposed to be directed by provincial legislatures 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996). This requires provincial legislatures 
to deliberate and give their inputs on the national bills that their representatives will have 
to approve in the NCOP. In order for this to be achieved, it was agreed that the NCOP 
business should follow cycles to enable coordination of provincial involvement. 
However, cycles have been applied to section 76 legislation only while oversight 
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programmes and section 75 legislation are dealt with separately, a factor that inhibits the 
effective participation of provinces. Moreover, the implementation of the NCOP cycles 
has had limitations, among them, lack of proper coordination with provincial 
programmes; permanent delegates not being able to liaise properly with their provincial 
legislatures; cycles often being changed or abandoned; and cycles being too short to 
accommodate most legislation (Calland and Nijzink 2001). 
 
The findings above show how problems in the functioning of institutional structures and 
rules can affect participation of the public in policy development. It is evident that the 
relationship between the NCOP and provincial legislatures, the way both institutions 
implement their activities, the attitude of members of provincial legislatures and 
provincial executive coupled with ignorance or lack of knowledge on how the institutions 
function, has affected participation in policy development. It has denied many ordinary 
people who are not able to contest policies at the national level from doing so at the 
provincial level where it might be less expensive and logistically more accessible. This 
results in policy being developed and understood only by a small group of people. It also 
provides opportunities to such privileged group to contest and retain policies that would 
benefit this group to the disadvantage of the masses. As indicated in Chapter II, the above 
factors show that actors and groups use ideas to circumvent institutions to effect changes 
in the pursuit of their own interests.  
  
The Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature, like many of the other provincial legislatures, 
has passed little legislation since it was established. Table IX shows the number of bills 
that have been adopted by the provincial legislatures from 1994 to 2000. 
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Table IX: Law Making in the Provincial Legislatures 1994 - 2000 
 
Year E. 
Cape 
Free 
State 
Gauteng KZ-
Natal
Limpopo Mpumalanga N. 
West 
N.Cape W.Cape
1994 5 8 2 9 5 8 24 8 12 
1995 12 6 6 8 9 8 16 6 6 
1996 3 13 11 10 9 5 4 7 8 
1997 9 7 13 10 8 5 11 7 13 
1998 6 20 18 13 8 16 11 7 15 
1999 11 9 7 7 7 7 4 4 10 
2000 7 6 8 8 8 8 8 7 11 
Average 7.5 9.8 9.2 9.2 7.7 8.1 11.1 8.8 10 
 
Source: Murray and Nijzink 2002:75 
 
Evidently, the amount of bills passed by provinces over the period of 7 years is very low 
with Eastern Cape Province having the lowest number during the period. Many 
respondents attributed this to limited constitutional competencies of the provinces. 
Although the Constitution grants wide law making powers to the provinces, many of 
them have little understanding of their responsibilities and law making mandate. This can 
be attributed partly to the complexity of the system and also by the preoccupation of the 
provinces in establishing the required infrastructure to carry out the responsibilities 
imposed on them by national legislation (Murray and Nijzink 2002). Provinces that are 
aware of their powers wait for national frameworks and norms and standards to be 
established before adapting them to specific provincial needs. Provincial delegates 
revealed in the interviews that since they have negotiation mandates with Select 
Committees where their inputs are included, they do not see the need for repeating the 
process at the provincial level.  
 
Murray and Nijzink (2002:76) outline other factors as “lack of political will and vision in 
departments; lack of clear policy direction or assessment of provincial needs; lack of 
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understanding of the constitutional powers of provinces; and lack of competent drafters”. 
Respondents raised concern about the quality of bills introduced in the Eastern Cape 
Provincial Legislature. They acknowledged that in most cases drafting of legislation by 
departments is of low quality and on several occasions the Legal Unit raised concern 
about some of the bills that were been introduced as either being unconstitutional, invalid 
or legally unsound because of poor drafting. They also stated that the executive does not 
collect adequate information and data or conduct thorough research before a bill is 
produced and introduced to the Legislature. Similarly, there is lack of proper planning by 
the Legislature. Lack of capacity affects policy formulation by the Eastern Cape 
Provincial Legislature in general, and on education in particular.       
 
4.6.3 Participation in the Policy Development Process in the Eastern Cape 
Some of the MPLs interviewed expressed their dissatisfaction with the development of 
policies by most Departments in the Eastern Cape because they do not hold discussions 
or solicit feedback from stakeholders when they produce Green and White Papers. A 
respondent commented: 
 
• Departments have a habit of producing Green and White Papers and then immediately call in 
Drafters to draft a bill before they do proper consultations with stakeholders. At times they choose 
to consult only specific groups mainly those they feel are vocal and knowledgeable and are likely 
to cause problems or raise queries later thus further marginalising majority of people whom some 
of the policies will affect most (Respondent: Member of Provincial Legislature).   
 
Lack of adequate financial means affects the actual participation by stakeholders and 
other groups of the civil society in various policy processes. This was confirmed by some 
of the respondents from both the provincial Department of Education and the Provincial 
Legislature who said that although MPLs go to their constituencies to get feedback and 
views of the voters on draft policies and bills, they are not able to cover all groups due to 
financial constraints. In most cases people who are left out are those from the poor, rural 
and remote areas. Lack of literacy and numeracy skills was identified as an obstacle that 
limits participation of people in the policy process. Respondents said that due to the high 
illiteracy rate in the province, many people are unable to articulate or make their views 
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known. As a result there was a feeling among some of the respondents that the process is 
patronised by a small group of stakeholders from the more affluent communities, teacher 
organisations and NGOs. A respondent stated: 
 
• During hearings on a Bill by Standing Committee on Education there are a lot of informal 
interactions and lobbying between members of the Committee, the executive (MEC and top 
Departmental management), advocacy coalitions and interest groups and political parties. There 
are also behind the scenes interactions and mobilisation in party caucuses. You should know that 
ordinary people get no chance of real participation (Comments from respondent from the Eastern 
Cape Provincial Legislature). 
 
As stated in earlier sections participation of people in policy formulation is essential 
irrespective of whether they are affluent and educated or poor and illiterate. People are 
capable of participation if they are given the proper channels of communication and 
appropriate opportunities and avenues where they are also able to use the language they 
understand. 
 
The above findings show that institutional norms, rules and arrangements enhanced 
unequal participation in the policy process, opening more opportunity and chances to 
affluent groups, thus impacting on policy variation and change. The findings also show 
that lack of capacity among the provincial Department of Education officials and the 
Provincial Legislature affect the process of policy formulation. The findings confirm 
what was discussed in Chapter II above, namely, that actors and groups use ideas to 
circumvent institutions to effect changes in decision making and policy formulation in 
pursuit of their interests. It is also evident that institutional norms and rules constrain 
change in policy.    
 
 4.6.4 Findings on Participation from NGOs 
Focus group interviews were held with NGOs, Faith based Organisations and Community 
Associations working in the area of education to find out how they participated in the 
policy development process and their views on the type of policies formulated. 
Discussions concentrated on participation in the development of Curriculum 2005.   
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 Respondents made general comments on the process of education policy making in the 
country after 1994. They contended that the most noticeable change in the approach to 
education policy making is heavy reliance on technical committees, working groups, 
consultants and task teams with less involvement of different stakeholders and 
constituencies as compared to the pre 1994 period. The use of committees, task teams and 
working groups is not contested. However, concern was expressed that only selected 
groups and stakeholders are approached to provide input in policy making, leaving out 
many other important and relevant groups and constituencies. A respondent commented: 
 
• Different groups and civil society were able to participate in debates and suggestions on policy 
options and proposals in education in pre 1994 elections. Now the policy process has changed 
dramatically from consultation with different constituencies in the pre 1994 election period to a 
more technical and expert led approach in the post 1994 elections where only selected few are 
involved. This has opened opportunities for privileged groups to defend and maintain their 
interests (Respondent from NGO operating in the Province). 
 
Other respondents attributed non-participation and domination of the process by a small 
group on lack of enthusiasm, skills and knowledge. There is an assumption held by many 
people that because a democratic government is in place, therefore it is well acquainted 
with people’s needs and would eventually come up with the right policies. Viewed in this 
light, there is no need for participation in the process. A respondent stated: 
   
• Some groups who are already advantaged have been able to organise themselves and devised 
strategies which most times have worked to their advantage because other groups lack skills, 
enthusiasm, knowledge and will to do the same.  The main problem also is the fact that some 
people feel that since these leaders have brought us freedom and democracy, we trust that they 
will always make sure that they come up with policies that will uplift those who had been exploited 
in the past as they promised in election campaigns. I think trusting our leaders and not 
questioning them has availed opportunities for people to defend and retain their privileges 
(Respondent from NGO operating in the Province).     
 
Respondents commented on their participation in the development of Curriculum 2005. 
They viewed curriculum design as the lifeblood of education and the process should 
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entail extensive consultations with different constituencies. However, it was felt that the 
same has not been the case with Curriculum 2005; the process excluded many important 
constituencies and groups. A respondent commented: 
 
• At both national and provincial levels a small number of representatives from main trade unions 
and bureaucrats from the Department of Education shaped the development of the curriculum at 
various stages for example in Learning Area Committees. Despite the fact that our organisation 
had been involved in curriculum development issues and in-service training of teachers since late 
1980s and early 1990s and had been involved in same activities with the current provincial 
Department of Education, we had to literally push hard to be included. We were only able to do so 
in the last stages of the process (Respondent from NGO).   
 
Another respondent made the following comment: 
 
• Development of the new curriculum was not inclusive as Departmental officials and a group of 
few selected professionals dominated the process. It shut doors for us to provide input in the 
crucial stages of the process (Respondent from NGO).     
 
The above comments show how the Department of Education officials played a great role 
in conceptualising, managing and facilitating the curriculum development process while 
at the same time heavily influencing it. The Department ensured that it dominated the 
process its views reflected in most committees and structures established in each area and 
at every stage. A few examples are provided. Learning Area Committees (LACs) which 
reported to the National Curriculum Development Committee (NCDC) were tasked with, 
among others, writing specific outcomes for each of the 8 learning areas for General and 
Higher Education. Although LACs were composed of representatives from different 
stakeholders including teacher organisations, there were heavily dominated by 
Departmental officials who also led most of them. Bureaucracy from the Department of 
Education heavily dominated the NCDC, which developed draft policy and proposed 
structures for Learning Programme Development. The Technical Committee on 
Standards and Frameworks for learning programmes had 14 members of whom half were 
from the Department of Education. International consultants were also included. The 
Curriculum Management Committee which was charged with approving standards at 
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appropriate levels and learning programme guidelines was composed of representatives 
from the Department of Education, LACs and major teacher organisations. 
 
Govender et.al. (1997), Jansen (1998) and Soudien (1999) expressed concern that the 
process was characterised by the absence of members from previously disadvantaged 
communities and dominated by the bureaucracy. According to Soudien: 
 
The factor of non-availability of teachers and the availability of freelance ‘experts’ sets up a 
certain form of privileging that is often embodied within the longstanding, White-dominated ‘old-
boy’ or ‘old-girl’ networks of the apartheid era. The ownership of the reform process is thus 
perceived to lie with an elite group of experts funded by government authorities (Soudien 
1999:457). 
 
Respondents also expressed similar concerns. The following comment was made by one 
of them: 
 
• Our organisation had worked for a long time with rural schools and we knew the situation and 
what was needed. We wanted to provide input in the very initial stages of the process because we 
realised most of the proposals had been adopted from countries that are outside our country with 
different situations and conditions. The dominance of the bureaucracy was a major concern to us, 
as they really did not know the situation in our schools. Whatever input we gave after much 
struggle to get there was too late because it was evident that any input from us would not be 
included as work of  experts who were mainly White could not be challenged (Respondent from 
Community Based Organisation). 
 
Public participation constraint, lack of transparency and domination of the Department of 
Education has also been shown in an example provided by Soudien (1999) in his study on 
Transformation and Outcomes-Based Education in South Africa: 
 
A SADTU teacher delegate who served as a technical advisor to an LAC noted that when the issue 
of performance indicators arose within that committee, a subcommittee was organised to advise on 
the development of such indicators. The committee soon found out, however, that the indicators 
had already been developed by a separate specialist group under the auspices of the Department of 
Education (Soudien et. al 1999:449). 
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One major weakness of the process identified by respondents was the exclusion of 
teachers who are the main implementers of the curriculum. Harber (2001:53) quotes 
Professor Danie Schreuder of Stellenbosch who equated lack of teacher involvement to 
“the top management of a car manufacturing company designing a new model in the 
boardroom while on the factory floor workers are still manufacturing a 1954 model”. The 
following comments from different NGOs show the magnitude of the concern expressed 
on non-involvement of teachers: 
 
• Teachers and parents were not involved in the formulation process. It was a top heavy exercise 
dominated by government officials. Only few teachers from unions were involved, a process which 
left the bulk of teachers out (Respondent from Church Organisation).  
     
• The curriculum policy process was driven by selected group of stakeholders with little 
consultation with teachers. This action alienated teachers from the new curriculum. The policy 
making process was very technical and was divorced from the demands that had existed at the 
level of implementation (Respondent from Research based NGO). 
 
• The lack of concern with process that had been evident in the formulation and implementation of 
the curriculum has marginalised the overwhelming majority of teachers who had no access to 
information on OBE and literally no effort was made to involve them (Respondent from a Training 
based NGO). 
 
Throughout the period that the policy was being developed, that is, 1996 and 1997, 
concerns regarding lack of consultation and insufficient time to prepare for teaching and 
training of teachers were raised by different groups, particularly teachers and teachers’ 
unions. SADTU expressed reservations about the fact that the process was dominated by 
Department officials while teachers who are the main implementers of the policy were 
excluded. The concern was also expressed by Greenstein (1997) who stated: 
 
The vast majority of teachers who are supposed to carry out the policy at school level, and the 
provincial departments which are in charge of implementing and administering the policy, had 
been kept largely in the dark regarding the new policy until after it had been finalised. As a result 
of not taking their concerns with the speed and direction of the process sufficiently into 
consideration, the national department of education is forced at this late stage to scale down its 
 212 
 
 
plans and move at a slower pace. The original plan to implement the curriculum in three grades 
each year apparently has been reduced to only one grade in this coming year. Additional concerns 
have been expressed with the absence of appropriate materials, textbooks, poor preparation of 
teachers, unclear and untested assessment methods, lack of international compatibility and the 
undermining of content for the sake of vague and difficult to measure outcomes (Greenstein 
1997:7). 
 
Consequently, Govender et. al. wrote: 
 
The fact that the time frames have not been changed despite serious concern raised by 
organisations representing those who will actually be implementing the new curriculum in the 
classroom raises serious questions about the degree of participation in the curriculum development 
process. The state driven nature of the curriculum development process is also evidenced by the 
lack of dissemination of information regarding the progress of the changes in its structures. The 
most recent draft documents on aspect of the process have not been distributed for public 
comment. According to officials in the national department the Technical Committee report will 
be available upon request, but there will be no official call for submissions. Due to composition of 
the TC, that document itself will already be heavily influenced by officials at the various levels of 
the education bureaucracy. The lack of broad public involvement in the drafting and finalisation of 
learning area outcomes, which will provide the basis for the new curriculum, is a cause for 
concern (Govender e. al. 1997:13).   
 
A respondent from the Eastern Cape Department of Education gave the following 
remarks about the process of formulating the curriculum: 
 
• The Directorate of Curriculum Development had been involved in planning extensively but mostly 
at a national level. During this period there was huge pressure on the national Department to 
change, and provincial delegations were sent up to the national level to assist and participate in 
policy and planning. Provinces were conceived of as almost a department of the national 
government, and not as an independent sphere as is in the Constitution. This was reflected in the 
policy and planning process for curriculum which drew provincial directors up to national level 
for collective planning as if being called to head office (Respondent: Curriculum Directorate).  
 
4.6.5 Findings on Participation from Schools 
Focus group interviews were held with 7 representatives from each of 10 schools from 
King William’s Town and East London districts. Table X provides some of the 
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particulars of those schools.  
 
Table X: Characteristics of Schools included in the Study 
 
School No. of 
learners 
No. of state 
funded 
educators 
No. of 
educators 
funded by 
school 
governing 
body 
Ethnic 
composition of 
learners 
Ethnic 
composition 
of educators 
Number of 
members 
of school 
governing 
body 
Township A 982 30 0 100% Black 100% Black 8 
Township B 942 26 0  100% Black 98% Black 
3% Coloured 
6 
Township C 985 31 2 100%Black 100% Black 8 
Rural A 750 20 0 100% Black 100% Black 7 
Rural B 500 15 0 100% Black 100% Black 7 
Rural C 454 10 0 95% Black 
5% Coloured 
89% Black 
11% Coloured 
6 
F. Model C 
(English 
medium) 
722 25 6 50% Black 
43% White 
7% Coloured 
100% White 8 
F. Model C 
(Dual 
medium) 
965 36 8 49% Black 
34% White 
10% Coloured 
7% Indian 
98% White 
2% Coloured 
8 
F. Model C 
(English 
medium) 
683 22 5 53% Black 
49% White 
6% coloured 
2% Indian 
100% White 7 
F. Model C 
(Afrikaans 
medium) 
750 27 6 79% White 
18% Coloured 
3% Black 
100% White 8 
 
 
Table X shows the characteristics of the 10 schools included in the study. All the 
institutions were high schools with large numbers of learners. Despite the large numbers 
of learner population, the majority of the township and rural schools do not have 
additional teachers employed and paid by school governing bodies except one school. 
However, all the four former model C schools have additional teachers paid by the school 
governing bodies. This brings to light economic differences between, on the one hand, 
the former model C schools and on the other hand, township and rural schools. The 
majority of the township and rural schools have 100% black (African) learners. Almost 
all, except two of them, have black or African teachers. Despite the fact that all the 
former model C schools (except one) have a majority of black or African learners almost 
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all of them have 100% white teachers. This shows that full integration of teachers from 
different racial backgrounds in those schools has not been achieved. The number of 
school governing body members varies depending on the number of learner population in 
the institution. 
  
As stated in Chapter II Part II, the 7 representatives from each school who participated in 
the focus group and semi-structured interviews included two teachers, two learners and 
three members of school governing bodies, including the principals of the schools. The 
ten schools selected were 4 former Model C schools, 3 township schools and 3 rural 
schools. All these schools are currently categorised as public schools. The purpose of the 
focus group and semi-structured interviews was to find out how different people and 
groups at the lower level participated in the policy development process and their feelings 
about the type of policies that were developed to transform the education sector. The 
discussions concentrated on two policies, namely, SASA and Curriculum 2005. 
  
4.6.5.1 Comments on SASA and Curriculum 2005
Discussions in each group focused on whether the respondents were aware of both 
policies. The following interesting observations emerged: 
• All members of the school governing bodies, including principals and teachers 
from former Model C schools, were familiar with both policies. However, many 
learners from those schools were more familiar with Curriculum 2005 than 
SASA.  
• On the other hand, many of the teachers from the township and rural schools were 
more familiar with Curriculum 2005 than SASA.  
• All principals were more familiar with SASA while fewer members of the school 
governing bodies from township and rural schools shared such knowledge. Some 
principals admitted that they were not confident neither could they claim that they 
were very familiar with Curriculum 2005. 
•  Very few learners from township and rural schools were familiar with both 
SASA and Curriculum 2005.  
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Respondents gave their views on the two policies and discussed the aspects they felt were 
contradictory or likely to hamper the attainment of the goals of those policies. There was 
a general appreciation and feeling among most of the respondents that the goals of the 
two policies were sound, namely; to achieve equity and redress, to enhance democracy 
and participation, and to provide quality education including the overall improvement of 
efficiency and effectiveness in the education system. However, they doubted the 
achievement of these goals. 
 
4.6.5.2 The South African Schools Act
In discussing the SASA, many respondents, particularly those from township and rural 
schools, felt that the way the policy was presented favoured those who were privileged 
before the change from apartheid to the new democratic government took place. On the 
other hand, those from former Model C schools felt that some of the policies curtailed the 
exercise of powers at the school level while at the same time introducing measures that 
are likely to compromise the quality of education in those schools. They felt that most of 
what has been built over a long time was likely to erode away. The following are some of 
the responses on the issue of school fees and fund raising: 
 
• While there is appreciation that the new government is trying to bring change, there is a danger 
that people will remain disadvantaged while others push forward with previously existing 
privileges. You can see vividly the fact that parents are supposed to pay fees disadvantages many 
people who had been underprivileged before. People had high hopes because during the 
campaign in 1994 they were promised free education for nine years. Many people are too poor to 
pay and they feel betrayed by the government through their policies (Respondent: Learner from 
township school). 
 
• The policy has some good aspects but I have a problem with the point where it says that those 
parents who cannot pay are supposed to be exempted after considering their case. One ought to 
know that most of these people send their children to the poor schools which already charge very 
low fees. What we receive from the government is not adequate and you are not compensated for a 
parent who has been exempted. That is why most times we do not inform parents about this 
exemption rule (Respondent: Principal from a township school). 
 
• While the need to remove inequalities and provide access to education for all is appreciated, I feel 
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that the policies place more burden on some parents and also compromise the quality of 
education. The policy of exemption means that if you let too many parents off the hook in terms of 
payment of school fees, there will not be enough funds to run schools properly given the fact that 
we get very little funding from the government. Parents know what is going on and they talk to 
each other. If you have exempted too many parents from paying, others find they have to pay too 
much and also the quality of teaching is compromised. They will withdraw their children and 
enrol them in those schools where all parents are able to pay. This has happened in some schools 
(Respondent: SGB Member from former Model C school) 
 
• SGBs in our schools do not have capacity and skills of fundraising. They also do not have those 
contacts with big businesses and companies (Respondent: Principal from rural school). 
 
• You should know that some of our SGB members also come from poor neighbourhoods and are 
not employed. They have to look for piece jobs to survive. When will they have time to fundraise? 
Who will contribute money? Our communities are poor. Some of them cannot afford to pay the 
minimum fee of R 40 per year for their children (Respondent: SGB member from rural school).  
 
The following are some of the comments on school governing bodies: 
• While we appreciate the issue of participation by parents in running of the schools, there have 
been complaints from many principals that SGBs interfere with the functions of school 
management. One colleague of mine told me that some of his SGB members came in almost daily 
to check who is present, how so and so is teaching, whether the place is clean etc. Many teachers 
have raised concerns about such interferences. We need a lot of capacity building and training of 
these SGB members (Respondent: Principal from township school). 
 
• The government has eroded powers of the SGBs. You find that we cannot recruit teachers and 
conduct many other businesses freely without seeking approval from the Department of Education, 
which has a lot of bureaucratic hurdles and inefficiencies (Respondent: SGB member from former 
Model C school). 
 
• Having Student Representative Councils in schools is a very good idea and I have no complaint 
about it. However, having them in the SGB is a problem because there are times we discuss 
confidential matters that are not supposed to be known to learners. I feel that they should not have 
been included in the SGBs (Respondent: Principal from township school). 
 
•  I am not happy that learners are included in SGBs because we are talking and discussing 
learners’ issues all the time and I feel it is a conflict of interest to have them as members in those 
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bodies (Respondent: Principal from former Model C school). 
 
• Due to lack of skills and capacity some principals dominate their SGBs and make all decisions on 
their own. While we appreciate the governments efforts in involving us in running schools, the 
government should not only push all the  responsibilities to us and do very little in turn but it 
should also put development programmes and funding for intensive training of SGBs (Respondent: 
SGB member from rural school). 
 
4.6.5.3 Curriculum 2005 
Consequently respondents discussed Curriculum 2005. The majority of the respondents 
expressed enthusiasm and hope for the vision set out by Curriculum 2005. They 
perceived the new curriculum as a means to produce and attain equity and redress. They 
also believed that the new curriculum reflected the principles of lifelong learning and if 
adequately funded, it would provide opportunities to empower teachers to make 
important educational decisions affecting their respective learners. The most interesting 
aspect is that the benefits of the new curriculum mentioned most frequently by 
respondents was the emphasis on “skills that are important in preparing learners for a 
better future and for better job prospects”.   
 
However, respondents expressed concerns that implementers, particularly teachers, were 
left out of the process during the policy formulation stage. A respondent remarked, 
“Teachers and learners experiences were not drawn directly into the process, and this is 
a source of major problems and setbacks in the implementation process”. 
 
Respondents were mostly able to discuss the conceptual context of the curriculum. Most 
teachers and principals who were respondents from township and rural schools viewed 
the language of the curriculum as being “technical, complicated, confusing and difficult 
to comprehend”. A respondent stated: 
 
• Many of us educators are not clear about the pedagogical language of OBE as it proves to be very 
technical and complex although some of us have received some form of training (Respondent: 
Teacher from rural school).  
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• In my school nothing is being done and it is even more difficult to follow the OBE language for 
teachers who have not been exposed to any training. Educators are not well versed with the 
terminology and technical language used (Respondent: Teacher from township school).  
 
Teachers and principals who were respondents from former Model C schools 
acknowledged the technical nature of the language and the way it confused teachers but 
stated, “we have always practised and implemented OBE in our schools, it is not as if we 
are beginning with its introduction”.  
 
One of the key findings of the Curriculum 2005 Review Committee was that the structure 
of the curriculum was skewed and “many of the conceptual confusions, lack of clarity in 
policy documents and difficulties with implementation of Curriculum 2005 stem from the 
basic structure and design flaws”(CEPD 2002:22). The Committee identified three 
problems related to the complexity of the language: “the use of meaningless jargon and 
vague ambitious language, the unnecessary use of unfamiliar terms to replace familiar 
ones and the lack of common understanding and use of Curriculum 2005 
terminology”(CEPD 2002:22). Other concerns raised by the Committee were those 
related to the structure and design of the curriculum which also included overcrowding of 
the curriculum.  
 
In order to address the problem of design and structure, the Committee recommended that 
a National Curriculum Statement of the four bands (Early Childhood Development 
(ECD); General Education and Training (GET); Further Education and Training (FET); 
and Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) be developed so that it contains four 
key design features instead of eight. The four design features should be Critical 
Outcomes; Learning Area Statements; Learning Outcomes; and Assessment Standards. 
To address the problem of the complexity of the OBE language, the Committee 
recommended that the language used in the new curriculum should be clear and 
accessible. 
 
Many respondent teachers and principals identified other aspects in the curriculum as 
being confusing and difficult to set and follow. These were critical and specific 
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outcomes; assessment; integrated teaching; team planning and preparations. However, 
respondents contended that with training they were able to cope. The majority of 
respondents from township and rural schools cited large classes and overcrowded 
classrooms; inadequate learner support materials; inadequate training; and lack of follow 
up support as major obstacles in the implementation of the new curriculum.  
 
4.6.5.4 Participation in Policy Development: SASA and Curriculum 2005 
Respondents in each group were asked to comment on whether they provided input in 
any of the two policies (SASA and Curriculum 2005) when they were being formulated. 
The majority of respondents in each group acknowledged that they were aware that the 
policies were being formulated. However, many of them, mostly those from township 
and rural schools, acknowledged that they did not provide any input neither did they 
know much about such policies till the implementation phase. The respondents from 
former Model C schools indicated that they provided input in SASA during the 
formulation process. Many of them were members of school governing bodies, principals 
and teachers.  
 
Majority of respondents from township and rural schools were members of SADTU. In 
the discussions many of them acknowledged that SADTU executive members made 
presentations and provided inputs on SASA on their behalf. One respondent stated, “Our 
Union, SADTU, provided input on SASA in zonal and regional meetings and conferences; 
and made presentations in public hearings organised by the Departmental officials and 
the Hunter commission”. However, many of the respondents expressed concern that 
SADTU officials did not sufficiently consult at the school level where the bulk of their 
members were. Some of the respondents stated that their representatives attended 
regional and zonal workshops and conferences without consulting and holding meetings 
with them at the school level to obtain recommendations on their preferred position. The 
following are some of the remarks from respondents: 
• I am aware that my union provided input in SASA and many other policies but I am not exactly 
sure whether they consulted with members in the schools. We did not even receive any documents. 
I myself know that all the schools in our zone were not consulted. The Union did not approach the 
members (Respondent: A teacher from township school).   
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• While we appreciate the fact that SADTU representatives act and speak on behalf of its members, 
we would have liked more inclusivity of members’ views. Their consultations with all members, 
particularly at the school level, have been very limited. At times this was done at regional 
meetings held in urban areas where the majority of us could not attend. Many of us are also not 
able to access the policy documents (Respondent: Teacher from rural school). 
 
• Sometimes I feel there is no use to make submissions because the government and the groups they 
favour would have already decided on what they will take. Sometimes consultations are just used 
as a camouflage. Many times it’s the views of the powerful groups which are favoured because 
they know how to make follow up until the last stage (Respondent: SGB member from township 
school). 
 
Discussions were held with provincial and regional SADTU officials. They 
acknowledged that they made presentations on the SASA legislation at the national level 
on behalf of their members after holding consultations with them. However, it was not 
possible to hold consultation workshops and meetings in all places because of problems 
of funding and other logistical arrangements. The members had the option of attending 
meetings in different areas or making written submissions to their districts and regional 
organisation offices.  
 
As stated above, most respondents from former Model C schools were aware of the 
formulation of the two policies and they acknowledged that they provided inputs in the 
SASA process. Most respondents stated that they had access to the policy documents and 
schools held meetings and discussions where principals, teachers, school governing 
bodies and parents were able to formulate informed responses to the policy documents. 
They accessed funds for their workshops and meetings from sponsors, mainly the 
business community and former learners (alumni). They made submissions to the 
Association of School Principals and to the South African Federation of State Aided 
Schools. Consequently, the former organised workshops for principals where 
submissions were made to the Department of Education and South African Federation of 
State Aided Schools. Schools and school governing bodies sent representatives to South 
African Federation of State Aided Schools to make presentations to the Department of 
Education and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Education.       
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The following are some of the respondents’ statements: 
 
• We realised that it was necessary to mobilise all our stakeholders that is, parents, teachers 
principals, school governing bodies, sponsors etc. to discuss and provide inputs to the policy 
process because although we accept that there is need to redress and bring equity to those who 
were disadvantaged, we also felt that there was a need to ensure that the quality of education 
offered by our schools was not compromised (Respondent: Principal from former Model C 
school). 
 
• Many of the policies were going to be changed to suit the new situation and we needed to provide 
input so that no person will be disadvantaged by the changes. We had to put our own structures 
and secure the documents for discussion to enable us to participate in commissions and 
government hearings (Respondent: School Governing Member from former Model C school). 
 
• The existing structures in former Model C schools provided good examples since they were 
functioning well. There was less dependence on government in terms of funding and many other 
functions and there was a need to retain these structures in order to maintain quality (Respondent: 
School Governing Member from former Model C school). 
 
The issue of non-involvement of teachers in the development of Curriculum 2005 has 
been discussed in earlier sections. The majority of respondents, particularly principals 
and teachers, expressed concern about lack of consultation and involvement in the 
development of the new curriculum, which in turn made implementation very difficult. 
The respondents expressed their frustration in implementing policies that they do not 
know and in which they had not participated in their formulation: 
 
• Maybe if the Department and also the Union had obtained input from grassroots’ level, there 
would have been more ownership on the part of educators including myself (Respondent: Teacher 
from rural school). 
 
• Educators in the field could have given a very realistic picture of conditions of teaching and 
learning on the ground. Unfortunately they were not consulted except through few members of 
their unions and organisations who were not able to reach majority of educators (Respondent: 
Teacher from rural school). 
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• The provincial Department comes with these streams of policies from the national government and 
keeps on pushing them to us to implement some things we really do not know or some things we 
are not party to. Before we internalise one policy another comes and we become very confused 
because we have not been invited to give our views at the time that the policies were being 
formulated (Respondent: Principal from township school).  
 
4.7 Discussions emanating from the Findings 
The above findings show that after the 1994 elections, the government put in place new 
policies to enhance fundamental transformation of the education system to meet the goals 
of equity and redress. It also ensured that the process of developing policies was open to 
all South Africans by putting in place numerous avenues, institutions, bodies etc. to 
facilitate their effective participation. However, the findings reveal that participation has 
not been as inclusive as anticipated. The majority of those who were able to participate 
fully were a small group of stakeholders, mainly from formerly advantaged communities. 
It marginalised or excluded those in the lower levels, mostly those from formerly 
disadvantaged societies. The findings revealed the following challenges that limited 
participation in education policy formulation:  
• Compromises made in the negotiation process in Kempton Park and the changes 
made by the apartheid government in the education sector before the 1994 
elections. The formulation of SASA is among the examples where the new 
government had to enter into negotiations with the Model C school governing 
bodies. This provided more advantage to Model C school governing bodies and 
other affluent groups. 
• The functioning of participatory institutions, bodies, avenues and so forth 
provided more opportunities to certain groups with more influence and ideas to 
participate while those without were left out. 
• Arrangements, functioning and powers of structures particularly at the provincial 
level constrained participation of many groups and stakeholders in the process. 
This is evident in the findings on the arrangements and the way the NCOP, the 
provincial legislatures and the Departments of Education operate or function. 
•  Lack of capacity, commitment, will and understanding of procedures among 
provincial politicians and Departmental officials. This has been highlighted in the 
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findings on the policy formulation in the Eastern Cape province. 
 
The above findings show that groups are able to use interest and ideas to influence the 
policy process. However, whether the groups are part of networks or stand on their own, 
members are bound together not only because of similar interests but also because they 
share the same values and goals. The findings also show that institutional norms and rules 
and arrangements constrain policy change. Actors and groups use ideas to circumvent 
institutions in order to effect changes in the pursuit of their interests. Public officials have 
their own interests and ambitions that they seek through control of the state machinery. 
Since institutions comprise of norms, rules and structures as well as being the formal 
apparatus of government, people from within are able to use those norms and rules to 
effect changes that would enhance and further their own interests. 
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PART III 
 
Policies Developed to Transform the Education Sector 
 
Part II outlined the process of policy development in the education sector. This part 
discusses some of the education policies that have emerged from the process. It identifies 
their limitations and shows how they have been influenced by inputs from different 
groups which participated in the process and the economic environment that existed 
during the policy process. This Part analyses financing, school governance and 
curriculum policies.  
 
4.8 Education Financing 
With the establishment of a democratic government in 1994, it was expected that a 
substantial increase in the amount of funding would be directed towards schooling, 
specifically to previously disadvantaged groups since education was viewed as an 
investment into South Africa’s future (CEPD 2003; Fiske and Ladd 2004). However,  the 
expectations were thwarted because it was argued that the overall level of public 
spending on education in South Africa was higher than that of other developing countries 
in terms of the percentage of total government expenditure and GDP (Financial and 
Fiscal Commission 1998; CEPD 2002; Fiske and Ladd 2004). It was well above the 
average of 40 per cent for most developing countries (Financial and Fiscal Commission 
1998). Given the above factors, the post-apartheid government came up with policies to 
increase the resource base for education and improve public expenditure through 
charging user fees; implementation of the equitable shares formula; and targeting poor 
schools to improve the incidence of education expenditure.  
   
4.8.1 Charging user fees 
As discussed in Part II of this Chapter, among the policies to increase funding for 
education was charging user fees where parents were required to supplement government 
allocation. School governing bodies which consist of elected parents and educators have 
the right to charge fees and enforce payment on parents except those that have been 
 225 
 
 
granted exemptions. Moreover, the governing bodies can also raise additional funds 
besides user fees to supplement school income. Justifications for allowing fees were 
advanced by a number of stakeholders including external consultants (Karlsson et.al. 
2001; Nzimande 2001). It was argued that since the government might not be able to fund 
the former Model C schools at the same level as before, and if no other sources of 
funding were available, it might affect the quality of education adversely. Therefore, 
there was a likelihood that the majority of parents in the middle class might opt to take 
their children to private schools, on the ground that the quality of education in public 
schools was low. This would deny the public schooling system the most influential 
people like business men and women, politicians, professionals, senior public servants 
etc. (Fiske and Ladd 2004; Nzimande 2001; Harber 2001). Moreover, allowing the 
former Model C schools to charge fees would free up additional public funds that would 
be used in addressing backlogs in the schools that served the former disadvantaged 
communities (Fiske and Ladd 2004; Nzimande 2001). One of the outcomes of charging 
school fees was to enable children from middle class families to stay in public schools 
because the latter were able to hire additional teachers and acquire other essentials that 
enhanced the provision of quality education. According to Fiske and Ladd: 
 
On the positive side this policy appears to have successfully induced most middle class families to 
keep their children in the public school system. That is an important achievement in light of South 
Africa’s apartheid history and values implicit in the new democracy. In replacing the fragmented 
education system under apartheid, it was essential for the new government to avoid setting up yet 
another bifurcated system of education. Moreover, permitting the former white schools to charge 
fees headed off the temptation to seek equity by destroying the islands of educational excellence 
that existed under apartheid. South Africa needed all the trained workers and citizens it could 
muster, and it made little sense to undermine the quality of the ‘good’ schools, especially at a time 
when the constituency of those schools was being widened to include all races (Fiske and Ladd 
2004:81). 
 
Although the policy of charging fees has also enabled children of all races to access 
quality education in the former Model C schools, it led to continued socio-economic 
imbalances as it could not free the anticipated adequate public funding to address the 
immense backlogs in formerly disadvantaged schools. Former model C schools which 
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have learners from most affluent communities and families are able to raise substantial 
amount of funding. On the other hand most township and rural schools charge very low 
fees because the majority of parents are unemployed and poor. Discussions held with 
principals and members of school governing bodies in 10 schools included in this study 
revealed that close to 45 per cent of parents and guardians of learners in township and 
rural schools depend on meagre income from the informal sector, casual work and piece 
jobs. Thirty six per cent depend on old age pension and 18% have livestock and also 
engage in subsistence farming. Only 10% are employed in the formal sector. Moreover, 
there are no sustainable income generating activities in the areas where the parents can 
take part and earn income.  
  
On the other hand, discussions with the above respondents showed that the majority of 
parents (98%) of learners in former model C schools that were included in this study are 
involved in the formal sector either as employees or employers running their own 
businesses. Only 2% were said to have no permanent employment. Discussions showed 
that many of the parents with children in township and rural schools cannot afford to pay 
the minimum amount of fees charged by those institutions. The amount of fees charged 
and collected per year and the number of state and SGB funded educators in the 10 
schools included in this study is shown in Table XI. It shows that township and rural 
schools received between 25% and 60% of the expected fee income. However, the 
majority of former model C schools collected 90% and above of the fees charged per 
annum. Only one school received 87% of the fees expected.  
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Table XI: Fees charged and received and number of state and SGB funded educators  
 
School No. of 
learners 
No. of state 
funded 
educators 
No. of 
educators 
funded by 
school 
governing 
body 
Amount of 
fees charged 
by school per 
year* 
Fee 
Income 
(in Rand) 
Fee Income 
received (in 
Rand) 
Township A 982 30 0 80 78560 31432(40%) 
Township B 942 26 0  60 56520 16956(30%) 
Township C 985 31 2 100 98500 59100(60%) 
Rural A 750 20 0 65 48750 22913(47%) 
Rural B 500 15 0 65 32500 8125(25%) 
Rural C 454 10 0 55 24970 12485(50%) 
F. Model C 
(English 
medium) 
722 25 6 3000 2166000 2057700(95%) 
F. Model C 
(Dual medium) 
965 36 8 3600 3474000 3161340(91%) 
F. Model C 
(English 
medium) 
683 22 5 3000 2049000 1782630(87%) 
F. Model C 
(Afrikaans 
medium) 
750 27 6 3150 2362500 2126250(90%) 
 
*Fees exclude boarding expenses. Two of the former Model C schools (English medium) provided 
boarding facilities at a cost of R 11 200 and R 13 000 per annum respectively including tuition. One of the 
township schools provided boarding facilities at a cost of R750 per annum including tuition. 
 
By collecting higher fees former model C schools have been able to employ additional 
teachers and secure adequate teaching and learning materials, equipment and other 
resources which township and rural schools do not possess. Having additional teachers 
funded by SGB means lower teacher: learner ratio in the former model C schools. It also 
allows the latter to offer other subjects and learning areas which are not available in the 
township and rural schools, and also provide extra assistance and tuition to slow learners.  
This has evidently enhanced the quality of learning and education as a whole in the 
former Model C schools (Fiske and Ladd 2004). The user fee policy has resulted in 
continued socio-economic imbalances. The above findings are also confirmed by Fiske 
and Ladd (2004) who compared public and private resources in current public schools 
(primary and secondary) in the Western Cape by classifying them along former 
department categories. They showed how socio-economic imbalances exist with the 
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former Model C schools obtaining more public and private funding. This allowed the 
former Model C schools to employ additional teachers, maintain low teacher: learner 
ratios, and offer better quality education. This is shown below in Tables XII and XIII. 
 
Table XII: Public and Private Resources in Primary Schools, by Former Department, 
Western Cape 2001* 
 DET 
(Black) 
HoR 
(Coloured) 
HoD 
(Indian) 
HoA 
(White) 
Total 
Resources per Learner (Rand) 
Annual fees 
charged 
 
45 
 
99 
 
327 
 
2077 
 
443 
Total public 
funds per learner  
 
 
3002 
 
 
3613 
 
 
4142 
 
 
3857 
 
 
3594 
Teachers and teacher qualifications 
SGB teachers 
(number per 
school) ** 
 
 
0.16 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
1.33 
 
 
3.82 
 
 
0.90 
SGB teachers as 
a percentage of 
state paid 
teachers 
 
 
 
0.60 
 
 
 
2.20 
 
 
 
12.50 
 
 
 
28.50 
 
 
 
6.30 
Learners per 
state paid teacher 
 
 
38.40 
 
 
36.30 
 
 
37.10 
 
 
35.90 
 
 
36.60 
Average 
qualifications*** 
 
13.41 
 
13.10 
 
13.51 
 
14.05 
 
13.30 
Percentage of 
unqualified 
teachers 
 
 
6.50 
 
 
20.90 
 
 
9.40 
 
 
0.80 
 
 
15.00 
 
*Calculated by Fiske and Ladd based on data provided by Western Cape Department of Education. 
**All teachers hired by SGBs divided by the number of schools in the cell. 
 
Source: Fiske and Ladd 2004:75   
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Table XIII: Resources in Secondary Schools, by Former Department, Western Cape, 
2001* 
 DET 
(Black) 
HoR 
(Coloured) 
HoD 
(Indian) 
HoA 
(White) 
Total 
Resources per student (Rand) 
Annual fees 
charged 
 
105 
 
333 
 
283 
 
2701 
 
1126 
Total public 
funds per learner 
 
 
3402 
 
 
3972 
 
 
3803 
 
 
4419 
 
 
4034 
Teacher and teacher qualifications 
SGB teachers 
(number per 
school)** 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
0.94 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
5.96 
 
 
2.60 
SGB teachers as 
a percentage of 
state paid 
teachers 
 
 
 
0.40 
 
 
 
3.00 
 
 
 
2.50 
 
 
 
29.50 
 
 
 
9.40 
Learners per 
state paid teacher 
 
 
33.60 
 
 
33.20 
 
 
35.30 
 
 
32.40 
 
 
33.10 
Average 
qualifications*** 
 
13.83 
 
14.10 
 
14.17 
 
14.48 
 
13.30 
Percentage of 
unqualified 
teachers 
 
 
2.60 
 
 
0.80 
 
 
1.20 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
0.90 
 
*Calculated by Fiske and Ladd based on data provided by Western Cape Department of Education. 
**All teachers hired by SGBs divided by the number of schools in the cell. 
 
Source: Fiske and Ladd 2004:75   
 
 
Both Tables XII and XIII show that school fees will enhance the quality of education if 
they are an addition to the resources provided by the state. Assuming that all fees in 
Tables XII and XIII were paid and there were no exemptions, the amount of funds raised 
through payment of fees in the former DET schools would contribute very little to their 
total revenue. On the other hand, in the former white schools it will significantly 
supplement the financial resources provided by the Department by a high percentage. The 
latter schools would be able to hire additional teachers and this would bring down the 
teacher: learner ratios. Consequently, in both Tables XII and XIII, teachers in the former 
white schools have higher average qualifications than those in the former DET schools 
which have a bigger percentage of unqualified teachers.  Fiske and Ladd observed: 
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Assuming that all fees were collected and that there were no fee waivers, fee revenue for the DET 
(black) schools would account for only one per cent of their total revenues. In contrast, the average 
fee of 2077 per learner in the former white schools would augment total public funding in those 
schools by 54 per cent. The availability of fee revenue permitted the typical black primary school 
to hire less than a fifth of an additional teacher while the typical white school was able to hire 
close to four additional teachers and expanded their teaching force by close to 30 per cent. The 
white schools were somehow advantaged in terms of both the quantity and quality of state funded 
teachers. They had slightly lower learner to teacher ratios, teachers with higher average 
qualifications, and a smaller proportion of underqualified teachers. Similar patterns emerge in 
secondary schools which show that the former white schools had sufficient fee revenue to expand 
their teaching staff by over 29 per cent (Fiske and Ladd 2004:74-75).  
 
It is assumed that the above situation is likely to lead to differences in the quality of 
education provided in different public schools. 
  
4.8.2 The equitable share formula 
The post-apartheid government has attempted to direct greater levels of resources to 
provinces that were historically disadvantaged in order to address the issue of 
jurisdictional inequality and poverty. Equity between provinces in respect of revenue for 
education is calculated on the basis of a formula constructed by the National Treasury. 
The formula reflects several provincial variables. These include the size of the school age 
population; the number of learners enrolled in public ordinary schools; the distribution of 
capital needs in education and hospital facilities; the size of the rural population in each 
province; and the size of the target population for social security grants weighted by a 
poverty index (Department of Education 2001). 
 
The Equitable Shares Formula was phased in over a period of four years in order to 
ensure that those provinces which were projected to receive real cuts in their budgetary 
allocations were given sufficient time to make the necessary adjustments, either to their 
expenditures or to their own revenues. From 1995/96 the education budget showed 
visible signs of a shift in priorities from the advantaged to the disadvantaged provinces. 
KwaZulu Natal, Eastern Cape and Limpopo were given sizeable increases to meet their 
educational obligations at the expense of the more advantaged provinces like Gauteng 
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and Western Cape (University of Witwatersrand Education Policy Unit 1998; Department 
of Education 2001; National Treasury 2003). 
 
Table XIV below shows that there has been substantial increase of expenditure per 
learner since the new government took over. However, despite the increase, the gap 
among provinces per learner expenditure is still wide. The Treasury (2003:54) observed, 
“Despite having the biggest education budget of 10.4 billion rand and notwithstanding 
the highest growth in total spending of 12.4 per cent a year between 1999/2000 and 
2002/2003, KwaZulu Natal still has the lowest per learner expenditure”. The lowest per 
learner expenditure figures were also apparent in the other poorest provinces of Limpopo, 
Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga while the wealthier provinces spend relatively more per 
learner (CEPD 2003; Treasury 2003) (See Table XIV). 
   
Table XIV: Expenditure per learner by Province (in Rand) 
 
 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Eastern Cape 1896 2186 2846 3362 3866 
Free State 2124 2399 3570 3910 4433 
Gauteng 2993 3372 4021 4384 4655 
KwaZulu Natal 1979 2185 2633 3069 3432 
Limpopo 1303 2127 3211 3452 3674 
Mpumalanga 1780 2530 3019 3287 3685 
Northern Cape 3219 3282 4438 4858 5139 
North West 2179 2694 3602 4065 4447 
Western Cape 3552 3212 3987 4391 4721 
Average 2336 2665 3234 3631 3995 
 
Source: National Treasury 2003:54 
 
It has been argued by the National Treasury that the poorer provinces spend a 
proportionately high percentage of their provincial budget on education. Dielties and 
Motimele (2003:10) observed, “In 2002 the Eastern Cape spent 36%, Limpopo 42% and 
KwaZulu Natal 37% of their provincial budgets on education while Western Cape spent 
33% and Gauteng 35% yet the latter two provinces spent more on each learner than the 
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former provinces”. Therefore, despite measures taken to address inequalities between 
provinces through the equitable share formula, inequitable distribution of resources 
across provinces still remains. According to the National Treasury: 
 
While per learner expenditure is an important measure for comprising the nine provinces, it is 
advisable to use it with other indicators that reflect unique circumstance prevailing in individual 
provinces. For instance, some provinces have greater administration or head office expenditure. 
Some spend more on transport and hostel accommodation, while others have higher average 
salaries because they have larger proportions of better qualified educators. Also, the average cost 
of providing education varies across provinces due to the availability or otherwise of infrastructure 
and other factors (National Treasury 2003:54). 
  
Given the above position, the poorer provinces with enormous backlogs will require more 
resources in addition to what has already been redistributed. Due to slow economic 
growth it is unlikely that the education budget will increase soon hence additional 
resources might not be available. 
 
Provincial education expenditure on personnel has been very high over years although 
some improvements have now been apparent. Personnel expenditure consumed 90.9% of 
education spending in 1999/2000 financial year, which improved to 88.6% in 2001/02 
and 86.7% in 2002/03 (see Table XV). 
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Table XV: Provincial education personnel expenditure (in percentage) 
 
 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Eastern Cape 96.3 94.2 91.1 88.6 
Free State 88.7 90.1 88.2 86.6 
Gauteng 86.3 84.9 83.2 81.8 
KwaZulu Natal 92.1 93.2 89.1 88.9 
Limpopo 92.3 92.2 91.8 89.7 
Mpumalanga 92.1 93.0 88.9 83.1 
Northern Cape 85.3 84.1 84.6 81.0 
North West 91.8 92.1 90.9 89.6 
Western Cape 86.4 88.7 85.7 83.8 
Total 90.9 90.9 88.6 86.7 
 
Source: Department of Education 2002:45; National Treasury 2003:57 
 
Personnel expenditure was lowest in wealthier provinces and relatively high in the poor 
provinces of the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, North West and KwaZulu Natal. The share of 
personnel in the four provinces is above the national average of 86.7% notwithstanding 
lower average educator salaries. These provinces have the greatest backlogs in terms of 
infrastructure, facilities and equipment. Higher personnel expenditure has been attributed 
to educators’ salaries hitherto being determined at the national level. This means that 
during that time, provincial Departments of Education had no discretion over 90% of 
their budget. To address the problem, measures have been taken to strengthen provincial 
inputs to the national bargaining process. Having higher personnel expenditure means 
lesser funds for non-personnel expenses (capital expenditure and non-personnel non-
capital expenditure) which are also very crucial for effective learning.  
 
There are considerable differences in non-personnel spending between provinces. The 
differences become apparent when we examine expenditure per learner on non-personnel 
non-capital items (see Table XVI). 
 
 234 
 
 
Table XVI: Per learner budgets for non-capital non-personnel spending (in Rand) 
 
 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
 R million Per 
learner 
R million Per 
learner 
R million Per 
learner 
Eastern 
Cape 
201 94 559 276 424 204 
Free State 75 101 154 218 201 286 
Gauteng 388 270 373 258 571 376 
KwaZulu 
Natal 
182 69 314 118 322 127 
Limpopo 213 116 325 181 302 176 
Mpumalanga 81 90 122 136 215 243 
Northern 
Cape 
111 564 111 571 107 561 
North West 170 189 210 238 220 245 
Western 
Cape 
238 268 358 403 362 398 
Total 1660 143 2526 220 2723 238 
 
Source: Department of Education 2002:46; CEPD 2003:84 
  
Provinces with greatest backlogs (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal, Limpopo and North 
West) spent between R 69 and R 189 per learner in 2000 on water, electricity, school 
security, maintenance and repairs, equipment, stationery, textbooks and other learning 
materials. Although allocations increased in 2001 they were still low in most of the poor 
provinces (Treasury 2003; CEPD 2003). The Northern Cape’s expenditure was very high 
for the three years while Gauteng and the Western Cape also spent relatively high 
amounts per learner during the same period. The three provinces have the best pass rate 
in matriculation examinations. The National Treasury (2003:59) stated that: “there 
appears to be a relationship between inadequate non-personnel non-capital resourcing and 
senior certificate results, indicating the need to reinforce this component of education 
expenditure”. CEPD (2003:83) observed “many schools received as little as R50 per 
learner in non-personnel allocations in poor provinces compared to R400 per learner in 
the wealthier ones. All the schools which received small allocations were poor schools 
which served formerly disadvantaged communities”.  
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With higher personnel expenditure very little amount of funding was devoted to capital 
expenditure. Capital expenditure involves “building schools and extra classrooms in 
overcrowded schools; and replacing dilapidated buildings” (National Treasury 2003:62). 
Although the amount devoted for capital expenditure has increased since 2001/02, the 
funds are not adequate for the needs of poor provinces with large backlogs and 
inadequate infrastructure. Officials from the Directorate of Planning in the Eastern Cape 
Department of Education confirmed in the interviews that they spent 2.4% of the budget 
on capital expenses in 2001/02 compared to 0.9% which was spent in the previous year. 
However, the increase was not adequate to cover the number of school buildings and 
renovations that were planned for the financial year, and some projects had to be 
abandoned. 
 
4.8.3 Targeting poor schools to improve the incidence of education expenditure 
To achieve intra-provincial equity the government has adopted a policy intended to direct 
more funding to poorer schools. In 1999 the Department of Education established Norms 
and Standards of School Funding which stipulate funding procedures to promote equity 
and redress within the context of inadequate government spending and more reliance of 
parental financial contribution for education. The Norms and Standards deals with public 
funding of schools, exemption of parents who are unable to pay school fees and subsidies 
to independent schools (Dielties and Motimele 2003). The Norms and Standards 
emphasises giving the poorest public schools and those in bad physical condition a larger 
resource allocation than the relatively advantaged schools (Karlsson, McPherson and 
Pampallis 2001). Redistribution takes place in two cost categories, namely; 
• capital cost allocation which includes building new classrooms and other 
construction; 
• recurrent cost allocations, that is, immovable capital improvements and repairs, 
recurrent costs easily separated from other costs, other recurrent and minor capital 
equipment and hostel costs. 
 
Building new schools or adding classrooms and learning facilities have to be targeted at 
the neediest section of the population. In the capital cost allocation need is defined in 
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terms of either lack of current schools or overcrowding of existing ones. With recurrent 
cost allocation, provincial Education Departments are required to direct 60% of their non-
personnel and non-capital recurrent expenditure to the poorest 40% of schools in their 
province. In order to implement the policy, provinces are obliged to produce a resource 
targeting list by compiling a list of schools based on their socio-economic levels of 
development and physical resource. As shown in Table XVII, the resource targeting list 
is used to divide schools into five categories based on needs (CEPD 2001). 
 
Table XVII: Resource targeting table based on conditions of schools and poverty of 
communities 
School quintiles 
from poorest to 
least poor 
Expenditure 
allocation 
(percentage of 
the resources)  
Cumulative 
percentage of 
schools 
Cumulative 
percentage of 
non-personnel 
and non-
capital 
recurrent 
expenditure 
Per learner 
expenditure 
indexed to an 
average of 100 
Poorest 20%  35% 20% 35% 175 
Next 20% 25% 40% 60% 125 
Next 30% 20% 60% 80% 100 
Next 20% 15% 80% 95% 75 
Least poor 20% 5% 100% 100% 25 
      
Source: Department of Education 1998e:27  
 
The above Table shows that the poorest 20% of schools will receive 35% of resources, 
while the next poorest 20% will receive 25%. The following two categories will receive 
20% and 15% respectively. The last 20% of schools, which are mainly previously 
advantaged schools, that is, former Model C schools and former House of Delegates 
schools, will receive 5% of the resources. The allocations will be used to meet the costs 
of water and electricity, maintenance of buildings and the purchase of learning materials. 
In addition, all learners will receive a minimum package of learning materials equivalent 
to R100 per learner. In cases where provinces have not received sufficient funding, 
priority will be given to poor schools (Department of Education 1998e; Karlsson, 
McPherson and Pampallis 2001).   
Norms and Standards of School Funding repeat what is contained in SASA, namely, 
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allowing school governing bodies to raise additional funds to supplement state funds 
(Department of Education 1998e). Section 36 of SASA states “a governing body of a 
public school must take all reasonable measures within its means to supplement the 
resources provided by the State in order to improve the quality of education provided by 
the school to all learners at the school” (Republic of South Africa 1996:25). Raising 
additional funds is essential particularly for the least poor schools (many of which are 
formerly advantaged schools) which will receive smaller resource allocations for 
recurrent costs.   
 
The Norms and Standards have made provision for exempting poor parents from paying 
fees. Parents that will be exempted are those whose combined annual gross income is less 
than 10 times the annual fees per learner. If the combined annual gross income of parents 
is less than 30 times but greater than 10 times the annual school fee per learner, those 
parents do not qualify for any exemption. However, the regulations do not provide a 
blanket exemption and parents have to apply to the school governing body for exemption. 
If parents fail to apply and do not pay full school fee, the governing body can take legal 
action to recover the fees. However, they may not exclude the affected learners from 
school. 
  
The government has taken great strides by putting in place this policy to address existing 
inequities between poor and rich public schools (intra-provincial inequities). However, 
the Norms and Standards only deal with expenditure at school level. They do not cover 
the administrative and development expenditure of provincial education despite the fact 
that their budgets are also expected to be consistent with the Norms and Standards 
(Department of Education 1998). While it is essential to regulate educational finance 
holistically, this has not been possible due to complexities associated with the multi-level 
budgeting systems characteristic of fiscal federations. The complexities limit the 
effectiveness of the Norms and Standards in effecting SASA’s objectives of achieving 
equity in school funding (CEPD 2002).   
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The Norms and Standards put a lot of responsibilities on school governing bodies. The 
responsibilities add more workload on school governing bodies and also impose financial 
burden on parents. Bush and Heystek observe: 
 
This approach is justifiable to address historic inequalities but it also increases pressure on the 
governing bodies of the schools in the top two quintiles to replace the lost income through fees or 
other fundraising activities. The outcome is substantial variations in fee levels at different schools, 
making it more difficult to achieve the goals of equity and equality. The richer schools are able to 
protect their privileged position through high fees while the positive discrimination in state 
funding cannot compensate for the substantial differences in fee levels (Bush and Heystek 
2003:130). 
 
The provision on exemption of parents from paying fees has a number of challenges. 
There are no proper monitoring mechanisms at the level of implementation which will 
prevent schools from keeping out some parents by using different means to screen those 
who are unable to pay. The document gives school governing bodies responsibilities to 
decide which parent to exempt and which not to. The document assumes that parents are 
knowledgeable with these aspects and other procedures regarding application for 
exemption. Moreover, the provisions for exemption are based on the assumption that 
there is reliable information available on which school governing bodies can base their 
decisions about exemption. However, information is not always accessible by school 
governing bodies. For example, it is difficult to establish the income of a parent who is 
engaged in the informal sector where earnings are very irregular. There are parents who 
do not earn incomes but have livestock worth thousands of rand.  
 
Even if the required information is available, many school governing bodies do not have 
the capacity to determine parental income and may not be able to engage with the school 
authority through the bureaucratic exemption process. There are also cases where parents 
have to support several learners at different schools. While provision for conditional 
exemption is provided in these cases, less assertive and uninformed parents may suffer 
unfair treatment. The system considers the combined income of parents rather than 
household income. In the African tradition, older siblings are often required to support 
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the younger ones. Hence, household income should be considered instead of parents’ 
combined income. Studies have shown that even if parents who genuinely cannot afford 
have their children’s fees exempted, there is not much that is achieved in terms of equity 
due to the indirect costs involved (Eicher 1984; CEPD 2003). About a quarter of parental 
expenditure on education is not included in fees. Expenses for transport, uniform, school 
bag, lunch, extra-mural activities etc. take much of the income of poor parents. Stationery 
and uniform for a learner going to secondary school for the first time can cost an excess 
of between R1 500 and R2 000 (Sunday Times 9 March 2003). According to CEPD 
(2003:18), “the cost of education doubled from 2% to 4% of household expenditure 
between 1995 and 2000. Indirect costs add as much as 25% to formal school fees”.  
 
The Norms and Standards of School Funding does not redress personnel costs in favour 
of poor schools, like it does for non-personnel costs. Personnel costs still make up the 
bulk of education budgets. The Eastern Cape is one of the provinces most affected with 
close to 90% of its budget going to salaries. Some progress have been made in reducing 
it, but there is still a lot that need to be done to attain the METF target of 80:20 personnel 
to non-personnel costs (Dielties and Motimele 2003). Therefore, the proportion of the 
budget transferred from the least poor to the most poor is small and limited to non-
personnel funds and is unlikely to have any significant impact on reducing inequalities. 
Personnel costs are generally distributed equally with a bias towards wealthier schools, 
which qualify for additional staff based on broader subject choices. More weight is also 
given to mathematics, science and technical subjects. Schools offering these subjects are 
allocated more teachers. Former Model C schools are beneficiaries of these (Vally and 
Tleane 2001; Oldfield 2001). The government has indicated its intention to redistribute 
personnel in favour of poor schools. The measure involves reduction the number of 
funded positions from the former Model C schools, while increasing those of 
disadvantaged schools. However, former Model C schools possess resources that would 
enable them pay teachers to fill gaps left by those positions that the government might 
withdraw from. 
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While the development of resource targeting system is an important step towards 
attaining equity; it has become apparent that given the extensive prevalence of poverty, 
the distinction between the poorest quintiles and the next quintiles does not deal 
adequately with the challenge of inequity (National Treasury 2003). Moreover, in many 
cases, the least poor in one province are much better funded than the poorest in another 
province. Despite the fact that the resource targeting system is supposed to address intra-
provincial inequities the differences in funding between similar quintiles in different 
provinces reflect existing inter-provincial inequities. Discussions are underway to review 
the system. There is also a move to exempt certain categories of learners from paying 
school fees. Among them is giving learners from households that receive welfare grants 
an automatic 100% discount on their fees. Hearings on the changes are currently taking 
place in the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Education (Daily Despatch 29 
October 2004).  
 
The move to review some of the policies can be attributed partly to the pressure exerted 
by different groups and policy networks that have been calling for a review of education 
policies to ensure that they enhance the goals of equity and redress. These include the 
Education Rights Project in collaboration with the University of Witwatersrand Legal 
Studies, the South African Human Rights Commission and other civil society 
movements. Review of some of the education policies could also be an act of policy 
learning by the Department of Education. Among the policies that have been reviewed 
are a number of provisions in the SASA, Curriculum 2005 and so forth.  
 
The above factors show that despite dramatic measures taken by the government to 
redistribute resources, education financing policies have not been able to successfully 
address the existing inequities as expected. The main policy driving the equitable share 
formula, (which distributes block grant from the national treasury to provincial 
governments in favour of poor provinces), has not been able to equalise education 
expenditure across provinces despite the fact that redistribution has been effected 
(Dielties and Motimele 2003).  
  
 241 
 
 
The Department of Education (2003) stated that it has been difficult to persuade 
provinces to spend more on education since there are also high demands from other social 
sectors such as health and welfare. The policy is affected by two aspects. One of the 
problems relates to the powers and functions devolved to provinces which enable them to 
distribute funding according to their own discretion. The responsibility for determining 
the amounts to be allocated annually to provincial education departments rests with 
provincial legislatures and provincial governments. This is a problem that is exacerbated 
by the complex budgeting procedures for the allocation of funds to the provincial 
departments which are consolidated at provincial government level, and again at national 
level by the Department of Finance before they are approved by Parliament. However, 
provincial legislatures have the final say with respect to cross-department allocation at 
provincial level. It means that the national Department of Education has limited power to 
enforce education funding norms. This brings again to light the issue of institutional 
norms, rules and arrangements constraining policy variation and change. 
 
Another aspect which affects education financing is the inadequate amount of resources 
available from savings for redistribution. Since 1994, there has been an increase in the 
share of social services from 10% of GDP and 34% of the budget to 15% of GDP and 
39% of the budget. The components which increased were: education (from 5% to 7% of 
GDP); social security and welfare payments (from 1.6% to 3.2% of GDP); and spending 
on health which remained around 3% (Finance and Fiscal Commission 1998). The 
education budget was 47 per cent of the total budget after 1994, which was a higher 
amount than any other budget within the social sector. However, its share decreased 
during the period between 1995 and 1999. Whereas the social sector budget rose from 
44.1 to 47.7 per cent of the total budget between 1993/94 and 1998/99, the education 
budget remained below 47.4 per cent between 1995/96 and 1998/99 (Nicolau 2001; 
CEPD 2002). According to CEPD (2003:78), “the proportion of provincial budgets 
allocated to education dropped from 40 per cent in 1998/99 to 38 per cent in 2001/2002. 
The latter percentage ranged from just over 34 per cent in the Western Cape to almost 43 
per cent in Limpopo”. 
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Education spending for both national and provincial Departments of Education increased 
only by 14 per cent between 1998/99 and 2000/2001 (CEPD 2003; Fiske and Ladd 2004). 
During the same period prices rose steadily. This is shown by the price deflators at the 
bottom of Table XVIII.  Thus 14 per cent in actual spending would amount to a decline in 
real spending. Moreover, provincial education spending which amounts to over 85 per 
cent of the total education spending also declined in real terms (CEPD 2003). According 
to Fiske and Ladd (2004:80), “only the inflation adjusted spending of provinces on 
ordinary public schools appears to have increased, but even that increase was tiny”. 
Trends in education spending in 1997/98 to 2000/2001 are shown in Table XVIII. 
 
Table XVIII: Aggregate Spending on Education 1997/98 to 2000/2001 (in Percentages) 
 
 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/2001 
Total spending 
National & 
Provincial 
(Index) 
 
44.50 
(1.00) 
 
45.10 
(1.02) 
 
46.70 
(1.05) 
 
50.70 
(1.14) 
Provincial Spending 
Total 
(Index) 
38.50 
(1.00) 
38.70 
(1.01) 
39.80 
(1.04) 
43.30 
(1.12) 
Ordinary public 
schools 
 
28.70 
 
30.60 
 
33.70 
 
36.80 
(Index) (1.00) (1.06) (1.17) (1.28) 
Price deflators 
 
GDP index 
 
1.00 
 
1.06 
 
1.13 
 
1.22 
Government 
services index 
 
1.00 
 
1.09 
 
1.16 
 
1.24 
 
Source: Fiske, E. & Ladd H. (2004:80)  
 
Hence, inadequate financial resources jeopardised the attainment of equity and redress. 
Analysts have identified government’s macroeconomic policy as one of the factors 
contributing to the decrease in budget and increase in inadequate financial resources in 
education (Dielties and Vally 2001; Nicolau 2001; Vally 2001).  In the initial two years, 
the post apartheid government put forward its Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) which was developed prior to the 1994 elections. The RDP entailed 
massive human resource development as one of the key components driving the nation’s 
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economic reconstruction. Under the RDP budgeting for education would be based on 
needs. However, given the scale of injustices and inequities it was soon realised that there 
was a need for more investment than the state could afford. According to Sayed: 
 
The post apartheid dividend of inward growth and external investment was not as huge as 
expected. In fact the post apartheid economic boom was based mainly on speculative trading. 
Productive investment was slow and not significant. In this changed conditions, macroeconomic 
stabilisation and an export led growth strategy were considered key imperatives for change (Sayed 
2001:260).  
 
Therefore, the government committed itself to a macroeconomic policy framework, the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy to provide stability in the 
economy and secure resources for greater distributive justice (Dielties and Vally 2001; 
Nicolau 2001). GEAR is based on an export led strategy with reduced tariff barriers to 
attract foreign investment and stimulate growth. The strategy emphasizes privatisation of 
essential state assets and removal of exchange controls. It is aimed at reducing the 
government’s fiscal deficit and is focused on a projected economic growth of 6% per 
annum.  However, GEAR did not attract the amount of required foreign investment as 
expected and the economy did not grow as anticipated. Emphasis on fiscal discipline and 
concentration on the reduction of fiscal deficit led to reduction in the education budget. 
Therefore the additional funding that was anticipated for educational expenditure was not 
available. Additional funding could only be raised by allowing schools to charge fees; 
redistribution of resources through the Equitable Shares Formula and resource targeting 
of poor schools (intra- provincial equity). Given the apartheid legacy and the enormous 
backlogs, lack of capacity, poor infrastructure and other associated impediments, 
redistribution of resources was not adequate to address equity and redress. The effects of 
GEAR were also identified in some studies. Nicolau observed:       
 
The introduction of GEAR in October 1996 led to a large decrease in the education budget. In 
1997/98, the education budget decreased by 0.88% of the total national budget. The decrease was 
associated with fiscal discipline and notions that the education budget is exceptionally large in 
comparison to international standards. The introduction of MTEF led to a phenomenal 1.42% 
increase in the education budget. This is a budgeted figure based on the MTEF assumption that 
 244 
 
 
real growth is 3% in this year. Unfortunately, real growth was only 0.5%, implying that the actual 
expenditure allocated to education decreased compared to budgeted figure. GEAR resulted in a 
decrease in both the national and education budgets in 1997/98. The decrease in the education 
budget was nearly four times more than the national decrease, which means that the education 
share declined significantly.  These budget decreases can be attributed to fiscal discipline and the 
desire to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3% of GDP (Nicolau 2001:78).  
 
Moreover Fiske and Ladd reiterated: 
 
GEAR kept interest rates high and focused attention on reducing the deficit rather than on 
promoting economic growth. The expected new economic investment, however, did not prove to 
be forthcoming and the result was a significant slowdown in the economy that was far greater than 
would be predicted by the slowdown in the world economy. The combination of fiscal austerity 
and the economic slowdown left little leeway for additional public spending of any type (Fiske 
and Ladd 2004:79).   
 
The above findings show that although the government put in place policies and 
strategies for redistribution of resources that were geared to enhancing equity and redress, 
they encountered setbacks and economic constraints.  
 
  4.8.4 South African Schools Act: School Governance and Democracy 
International organisations and bodies have treated decentralisation and devolution of 
power and control as a means of solving social, economic and political problems. The 
World Bank and IMF have pushed developing countries, particularly Sub-Saharan 
African countries, to adopt decentralisation in their structural adjustment programmes 
(Harber 2001). This is attributed to a belief that the state in developing countries is 
plagued by governance problems – that governance is top heavy, centrist, autocratic and 
incapable of bringing development (Oldfield 2001). In order to bring about effective 
development, promote effective governance, and enhance democracy and participation 
there has been a shift towards minimizing the role of the state and enhancing the power of 
civil society through decentralisation and devolution of powers and responsibilities to 
lower levels and sites (Sayed 2001; Lewis and Motala 2004). Part I of this Chapter 
showed how the post-apartheid government of South Africa devolved power and 
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responsibilities to national, provincial, district, local and school levels. As stated in 
Chapter I this was also one of the agreements reached in the negotiation process. 
Similarly SASA required that responsibilities and power devolve to school governing 
bodies to enhance democracy and increase the participation of communities in decision 
making. However, there are also economic considerations. 
 
School governing bodies were preferred by both the National Party and the ANC led 
government. During the negotiations, the apartheid government decided to decentralise 
power to the school level by giving power to staff and parents to control the running of 
schools, including collection of fees. This move was also intended to provide an 
opportunity for white Model C schools to maintain their privileges (Carrim 2001). In the 
case of the ANC led government the commitment to decentralisation stems from People’s 
Education where the Mass Democratic Movement and NECC advocated the need for 
education to be rooted in the community and allowing for the active participation of 
learners, parents and teachers in the process of education (Wolpe 1990; Sayed 1999). In 
this case an “individual is viewed as self reliant and not hostage to the state and the 
emphasis is on the citizen who works in civil society for the public good and the assertion 
of civic virtue” (Harber 2001:18).  SASA make provisions for school governance and 
democracy. 
 
The purpose of SASA was “to develop an accountable and democratically governed 
school system based on partnership between government, schools and local 
communities” (Harber 2001:18). It establishes school governance, organisation and 
funding. According to SASA,  governing bodies must be composed of the school 
principal and elected representatives of parents, teachers, non-teaching staff and learners 
(in secondary schools). Governing bodies may co-opt non-voting members. Parent 
representatives must make up the majority of voting members. The governing bodies of 
public schools are juristic persons, they have legal capacity to enter into binding 
contracts, to sue and be sued (Department of Education 1996). In order to deal with the 
heterogeneity of the school system, the Act provides different powers and functions for 
the governing bodies in different public schools. A basic set of functions are stipulated 
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for all public school governing bodies (Department of Education 1996). They are 
required to: 
• Develop and adopt a constitution and mission statement for the school; 
• Determine admissions policy of the school, subject to important restrictions; 
• Administer and control the school property, buildings and grounds, and rent 
them out for fund raising purposes; 
• Recommend to the provincial Department of Education the appointment of 
teaching and non-teaching staff; 
• Develop a budget for the school, which could include school fees for approval at 
a meeting of parents. All school governing bodies are expected to supplement 
state funds in order to improve the education they offer, either through school 
fees or other forms of fund raising. 
 
School fees become compulsory once approved by the parent body. All parents, unless 
specifically granted exemption, are obliged to pay approved fees. Such exemptions are 
provided for under the National Norms and Standards for School Funding, which provide 
that parents who are less able to pay to be fully or partially exempted from school fees 
(Department of Education 1998). Children may not be removed from a school or be 
denied access to the school if parents do not or cannot afford to pay fees. However, the 
school may sue the parents for fees owing. An amendment to the Act in 1997 allows all 
public schools to use funds that they have raised to employ teachers in addition to those 
allocated and paid for by the provincial Departments of Education. School governing 
bodies may also apply to their provincial Education Departments to be allocated 
additional functions. These may include, but are not limited to, the right to: 
• Maintain and improve the school’s property, buildings and grounds; 
• Determine extra-curricular activities; 
• Choose the subject options offered at the school, within the parameters of 
provincial curriculum policy; 
• Purchase textbooks and other materials and equipment. 
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While the policy provides communities with powers and responsibilities to govern and 
enhances their democratic right to manage their own schools, a number of observations 
can be made. SASA provides for parents to constitute a majority of members on school 
governing bodies. Conceptually, this undermines the principles of democracy because 
parents are likely to make decisions on every aspect irrespective of the views of other 
constituencies. In other words, the ‘voice’ of the parents is privileged over other ‘voices’ 
and this could be seen as a form of exclusion. McLennan (2000) observes that the weight 
given to parental representation on school governing bodies exacerbates the potential for 
racial conflict at schools, as the majority parents are likely to use the powers given to 
governing bodies to maintain their group identity. Jansen (2000) has also shown how 
parents in certain schools took advantage of being in majority on school governing bodies 
to manipulate aspects like geographical cut off to maintain a particular identity. 
 
Although school governing bodies can apply to provincial Departments of Education to 
perform additional functions, these powers have been given mostly to former white 
schools whose governing bodies usually include skilled professionals. However, it is the 
aim of the government to grant additional powers to all school governing bodies as they 
become willing and able to exercise them (Pampallis 2002). Currently many have 
difficulty in fulfilling their basic functions or qualifying for additional functions due to 
lack of capacity and experience. The differences in the capacities of school governing 
bodies has given more advantages and privileges to former model C schools which have 
been able to perform more functions and responsibilities. It has also excluded school 
governing bodies from some of the public schools that served disadvantaged groups since 
they lack capacity to perform the functions and responsibilities that they are required to 
do. Although provincial Departments of Education have conducted training to build 
capacity of school governing bodies, this has not been adequate due to limited financial 
resources. 
  
The Act treats stakeholders, like parents on the school governing body, as being uniform 
and homogenous. This ignores the fact that conceptually parents are seen, treated and 
classified according to gender, educational qualifications, employment and so forth. The 
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effect of this is to exclude or affect participation of certain groups of parents. The 
problem of equal participation by parents in school governing bodies is evident given the 
fact that some of them are either illiterate and lack capacity, or live far from schools and 
have to incur transportation costs to attend meetings. This denies some parents 
participation while at the same time opening opportunities for others to dominate the 
governing bodies. It also creates different levels of participation in governing bodies as 
many of those from disadvantaged communities lack experience and capacity and require 
extensive training. Equally, it opens the doors for principals and other members of school 
management team, particularly those from schools in the rural areas, to dominate and 
take over responsibilities that are meant to be executed by the school governing bodies. 
The issue of participation will be discussed in detail in the section which examines 
education policy implementation. 
 
School governing bodies are tasked with the responsibility of charging fees and raising 
funds from other activities to supplement school income. This not only overloads 
governing bodies with a lot of responsibilities, but also limits their participation in other 
roles and responsibilities (Delties and Motimele 2003). As discussed Section 4.8.1, user 
fees have led to continued socio-economic imbalances between rich schools and poor 
ones. This is manifested in two policies in education financing (provincial equitable 
funding share formula and Norms and Standards for School Funding). Raising of user 
fees has been a point of contention because it has the potential for exclusion of people on 
race and ability to pay.  Although the policy makes provision for the exemption of 
parents who cannot pay user fees, this creates tension between parents and school 
governing bodies as the responsibility of ensuring equity and redress is shifted from the 
central government to school governing bodies (Carrim and Tshoane 2000; Sayed 2001).   
 
The establishment of structures to enhance governance and democratic participation at 
the school level has not succeeded to address existing inequities as stipulated in the goals 
of SASA. It has led to continued socio-economic imbalances where wealthier schools 
have been able to maintain and retain their privileges. In response, the national 
government has issued legislative amendments between 1998 and 2002 that have affected 
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the discretion and authority of school governing bodies (Lewis and Motala 2004; RSA 
2001). Among the measures taken are: 
• An amendment of Employer Educators Act of 1998 placed limits on the powers 
of school governing bodies to make appointments of teaching and non-teaching 
staff. The Act gives school governing bodies two months to recommend 
appointments. After that the provincial Department Head may make decision 
without input from the school governing body. Moreover, the Head may 
temporarily transfer an educator from a wealthy school to a needy one without 
recommendations from the school governing body (RSA 1999). 
• In 2001, SASA was amended to limit the functions and obligations of school 
governing bodies to only those prescribed by the Act (RSA 2001). Heads of 
Department have been given greater powers to intervene when school 
governing body fails to meet its responsibilities. At the same time their 
responsibility to correct the situation through capacity building has been 
increased. The same Act puts in place mechanisms to ensure responsible 
financial accountability. A school governing body can no longer take a loan or 
overdraft without the approval from the education MEC. Restrictions have also 
been put on the establishment of school trust funds. 
• The discretion of school governing bodies’ to prepare school budgets. 
Provision of budget guidelines by the Department of education was changed to 
budget prescriptions which all school governing bodies are required to follow 
(RSA 2001).      
 
  The above amendments show that the national state is ‘tightening screws’ to control 
decentralised sites to ensure that they promote the goals of equity and redress and 
transformation as a whole (Sayed 2002; Lewis and Motala 2004). They bring to light 
contradictions and conflicts that arise from arrangements of the structures at the different 
levels, the allocation of powers and responsibilities and how they function as discussed in 
Part II of this Chapter.  
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4.8.5 Curriculum 
The initial efforts made toward the transformation of curriculum in South Africa in 1994 
focused on ironing out variations in the curriculum used by the different departments of 
education. This was followed by removing offensive language and content from the 
apartheid era school syllabi followed by the introduction of continuous assessment in 
schools (Jansen 1998; Harley and Wedekind 2004). However, the major curriculum 
change came in 1998 with the introduction of Curriculum 2005. This involved 
reconceptualisation of teaching and learning, moving away from content based 
curriculum to one that is based on the principle of an outcomes based education (OBE) 
and learner centredness (Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand 1997). With 
OBE both the process and content of learning became important. It put emphasis on 
outcomes, which stipulated what a learner had to know and be able to do upon 
completion of a learning process. Learning subjects have been reorganised into eight 
learning areas, that is: communication, literacy and language learning; numeracy and 
mathematics; human and social studies; physical and natural resources; technology 
education; arts and culture; and life orientation. The combination of these learning areas 
is supposed to allow students to acquire an understanding of, and ability to function in, 
larger political, social and economic contexts. 
 
OBE focuses on clearly defined outcomes of the learning process, rather than teacher 
input in terms of the content of the syllabus (Greenstein 1997). The first type of outcomes 
is critical cross-field outcomes that are more general in nature and are generated across 
different learning areas. They include, among others, the identification and solution of 
problems; teamwork; the organisation and analysis of information; effective 
communication; social and environmental responsibility; and understanding of the 
interrelated nature of the world as a set of systems that do not exist in isolation.  The 
second kind of outcomes is specific to each learning area and forms the basis for 
evaluation of progress and effectiveness of learning programmes. Specific outcomes are 
supposed to be evaluated through continuous assessment model is ongoing and formative 
or developmental in nature.  OBE in schools is consistent with the strategy of the 
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National Qualification Framework (NQF), which sets a national system that links all the 
different levels of education to each other (Kraak 1998). 
  
While the introduction of the new curriculum has been hailed as a major progress in 
changing the education system in South Africa, some contradictions and limitations of 
OBE have emerged. Education Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand (1999) outlined 
the main issues that have emerged in the OBE debate as: 
• ideological and philosophical assumptions that underpins OBE, which was 
described as a conservative technology disguised by populist discourse. 
• the implementation context of OBE and the need to establish adequate resourcing 
strategies if OBE is to work. 
• the equity consequences of OBE, with the likelihood that it would succeed only in 
privileged schools and thus further marginalize students in township and under-
resourced schools. 
 
Consequently, Jansen (1999) pointed out that OBE discourse in South Africa drew on a 
range of various groups with different influences and was not coherent in its origin and 
further elaboration. Many of the forces that had a stake in OBE were motivated by the 
need to align education and training with the macroeconomic policy which emphasised a 
supply side approach, economies of scale and the need to develop a highly skilled labour 
force (Greenstein 1997). Sedunary (1996:32) observe: “the rapid ascendance and 
popularity of OBE discourse in South Africa may be attributed to its skilful packaging of 
the radical language of other educational discourses like liberal progressive (ideals about 
comprehensive schooling in Australia) and people’s education in South Africa. Both 
cases share common ground in terms of their hostility to an elite schooling system based 
on divisions between academic and vocational training”. 
 
The new curriculum embraced a number of elements that formed the core of people’s 
education, among them, learner-centred approach, participatory governance, critical 
thinking and democratic nationhood (Jansen 1999; Greenstein 1997; Sedunary 1996). 
Since contribution to the policy process by popular stakeholders and constituencies like 
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those of teachers, parents and learners was very limited, those concepts made OBE more 
palatable and acceptable. According to Hartley and Wedekind (2004), the new 
curriculum has been heavily influenced by the past apartheid curriculum and draws a lot 
from it. They observe: 
 
Potential tension between goals (such as economic development, on the one hand, and equity and 
redress on the other) appear to have been elided by the cumulative contribution of the three design 
features to the transformation agenda. Thus even while focused firmly on the desired future, the 
curriculum inescapably also carried within it a strong dimension of the past: it was the key 
instrument. The past was influential in a different kind of a sense too. If the new curriculum were 
to fulfil its key symbolic function, it would have to be seen to be dichotomous to the ‘old’ 
curriculum in every possible aspect (Hartley and Wedekind 2004:198).  
 
Although critical outcomes show commitment to learner-centred rather than content 
centred learning, they do not encompass skills and abilities that many would consider 
fundamental to a transformed education system in particular, and in South African 
society in general. Critical outcomes have also been criticised for failing to reflect a 
critical awareness of debates about the nature of knowledge (Soudien 1999; Jansen 1998; 
Greenstein 1997). For instance, although the outcomes show the ability to organise and 
critically evaluate information as an objective skill, it makes no reference to the way in 
which the conduct of these activities is often underpinned by ideological and political 
factors. Consequently, the Department has emphasised that learning programmes and the 
education system should enable learners and the education system as a whole to earn a 
living and also to meet the needs of the country’s economy (Department of Education 
1997).   
 
However, many of the education policy documents have given more weight and emphasis 
on the ability of education and training to provide learners with skills to work in a “post-
fordist, internationally competitive economy. Consideration has not been given to 
whether such economic policy is suitable to achieve the goals of transformation in South 
Africa and alternatives which might be more feasible” (Greenstein 1997:11-12). As 
discussed in Chapter III, the new curriculum was heavily influenced by the views of 
business. This is so because the latter preferred a curriculum that would enhance 
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production of skills geared towards improving the economy and meeting the challenges 
of a competitive global market.  
 
Jansen (1998) discusses a number of limitations of OBE and its negative impact upon 
South African schools. The following are among the reasons he advances (Jansen 
1998:323): 
• the language used is complex, confusing and at times contradictory. The jargon laded concepts 
used in the OBE-NQF discourse is too complicated and can only be understood by experts. They 
are too difficult and complicated for teachers to understand and apply them in their classrooms. 
The discourse has been used to exclude teachers and all those not versed in it that is, almost all 
those outside of the narrow circle that has been involved in the curriculum development work. 
• There is a claim that with OBE there would be fundamental changes in the relationship between 
teachers and learners such that teachers would become facilitators in cooperative learning and no 
more authority in the process. However, this might not be achievable given the conditions which 
exist in schools and the fact that no mechanism has been identified for bringing such changes in 
the classrooms.    
• In order for anticipated changes to take place there is need to have highly qualified, theoretically 
sophisticated and creative teachers. Since such teachers do not exist and the fact that there is no 
intervention in the classrooms and schools, there is a danger that OBE might be interpreted and 
applied in a mechanical way. Some teachers would hide behind outcomes while they continue 
with old practices.  
• OBE will entail reorganising teaching, allocating more time to measure learner progress against 
outcomes, administer continuous assessment and maintaining comprehensive records. This is a 
heavy load to the already overburdened teachers with high learner numbers. Moreover majority of 
teachers who are implementers of the new curriculum were not consulted and involved in the 
process of its development.  The new curriculum was imposed on them to implement with very 
inadequate support. 
• In order for OBE to succeed there is a need to introduce a number of factors in schools: train and 
retrain teachers, new forms of assessment, classroom organisation and time for managing the 
process, monitoring and evaluation of implementation, training managers and principals, parent 
support and involvement, new learning resources and opportunities for teacher dialogue and 
exchange. However, Jansen argued that there was neither funding nor political will for such a 
radical change. 
 
Although officials from the Department of Education interviewed by Jansen felt that 
introducing the new curriculum in 1998 might not be feasible, they still prepared for its 
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implementation in that year. Jansen argued that the initiative to implement the new 
curriculum at that time was an act of symbolism for the Department and the ANC to be 
seen as having achieved a major transformation of the curriculum. Govender et.al. 
(1997:13) echoed a similar statement: “There is tremendous pressure on the department 
to deliver a new curriculum by 1998. With the next national elections in 1999 there is a 
perceived political need to have significantly transformed the education system during 
ANC’s first term in office”.  
 
However, Jansen argued: “OBE will further undermine the already weak culture of 
teaching and learning in South African schools by escalating the administrative burden of 
change at the very time that rationalisation further limits the human resources capacity 
for managing such change” (Jansen 1998:330). It is evident from the above that OBE as a 
curriculum to empower learners and equip them with essential skills denied in the past 
era could continue entrenching past inequalities. Greenstein make the following 
statement: 
 
Under conditions in which the quality of teaching, learning and educational performance shows 
considerable variation between provinces, districts and schools and is linked to material resources race 
and residence, the success of any new programme is likely to show similar variation. In other words 
the social and educational context has a crucial impact on the success of policy. Rather than reducing 
disparities between schools and allowing them all to start afresh on equal footing, innovations have 
greater chance of being implemented successfully in well resourced schools with more qualified 
teachers catering to better prepared students. Whatever benefits the new curriculum would bring in its 
wake, they are more likely to be accrued to those who benefit from the existing system as well, and be 
denied to those who suffer from poor quality education at present (Greenstein 1997:8). 
 
Moreover, Hartley and Wedekind (2004:200) viewed Curriculum 2005 as a “political 
instrument, which continued to entrench inequalities between wealthier schools, the 
majority of which are former white only schools and other public schools which serve 
previously disadvantaged communities”. 
  
Curriculum 2005 has been besieged with a lot of conceptual and implementation 
problems. A review was conducted in 2000 where different stakeholders and 
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constituencies were able to provide inputs to the Review Committee. The Committee 
found that while there was an overwhelming support for Curriculum 2005 especially on 
the side of teachers, many of them were confused about its design and implementation. 
“Although C2005 has generated a new debate on teaching and learning, teachers have a 
rather shallow understanding of the principles of the curriculum” (Report of Review 
Committee: Executive Summary 2000). Other factors identified in the report are:  
• the structure and design of the curriculum are skewed with complex language and 
confusing terminology, overcrowded curriculum and weaknesses of the specific 
design features that promote sequence, pace and progression;  
• lack of alignment between curriculum and assessment policy;  
• inadequate training of teachers; poor quality or unavailability of learning support 
materials;  
• insufficient follow up support; and  
• unmanageable and unrealistic time frames. This was also confirmed by 
respondents from the Eastern Cape Department of Education whose inputs are 
presented below. 
 
4.8.5.1 Discussions with respondents from different directorates of the Eastern Cape 
Department of Education  
 According to the Directorate of Curriculum Development, the implementation of 
Curriculum 2005 began in 1997 with training of Grade I teachers. Currently, all teachers 
have been trained and are required to deliver the curriculum. Training of teachers was 
done through a cascade method. Each regional office had a member of staff who was 
responsible for coordinating training in the region. Regional officials were trained at the 
national level. They in turn trained district trainers. District trainers trained teachers. 
Trainers who trained teachers included subject advisors, college lecturers and staff from 
teachers’ centres which have now been dis-established.  
 
All directorates contacted identified the following problems that hindered the effective 
implementation of Curriculum 2005 in the Eastern Cape Province: 
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• Budget constraint. During the 1997/98 financial year, the province experienced 
serious financial problems. The Department was required to train close to 20 000 
teachers in 41 districts, a task which was almost impossible at that time due to 
lack of funds. However, funding improved after 2000 because of a shift in the 
budget. 
 
• Shortage of manpower at all levels. The Curriculum Development Directorate had 
6 staff members who were required to train teachers in all six learning areas. At 
the regional level, the staff was also thinly spread, yet they had to undertake many 
other responsibilities and functions in addition to training educators on 
Curriculum 2005.  
 
• Some districts had no subject advisors and sometimes education development 
officers had to assist in training, despite the fact that they were not qualified to do 
so. Since a cascade model was adopted in training there was a problem of 
ensuring proper content and quality during the implementation of the Curriculum 
in the schools. This was exacerbated by the fact that many teachers were 
unqualified and lacked confidence. Consequently, some teachers resisted changes 
being introduced in their schools.  
 
• Shortage of learner support materials and other resources. Some schools indicated 
that they lacked books and other materials and learners were forced to share 
learning materials for almost the whole year. Some schools offering mathematics, 
science and technology lacked materials for practical lessons. The Department 
relied heavily on material resources provided by donors. Transport was a problem 
experienced in all areas. Subject advisors and other trainers were not able to 
provide follow up support due to lack of transport, funding and human resources.  
 
4.8.5.2 Discussions with Subject Advisors and Other Training Officials 
Interviews conducted with subject advisors and other training officials in the districts 
included in this study (East London, King William’s Town, Alice and Peddie districts) 
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showed that training was conducted over a one-week period, and thereafter, teachers were 
expected to implement OBE in schools. College lecturers and staff from dis-established 
teachers’ centres assisted subject advisors in training. However, the following problems 
were identified by subject advisors: 
• Limited human resources. Less than eight subject advisors in each of the districts 
were expected to conduct training in OBE and other subject areas. EDOs were not 
keen to assist, although they received initial training in OBE.  
• Inadequate transport proved to be a formidable problem in all districts.  
• At the provincial level, unqualified people were sent to the national level for 
training. This posed a problem, as trainers who were not properly trained were 
unable to train teachers. 
• The high pupil-teacher ratio prevented effective implementation of OBE. Many 
schools experienced teacher shortages, despite redeployment.  
• There was lack of clear communication and coordination at district, regional and 
provincial levels. Although at first teachers were enthusiastic about OBE, but 
shortage of materials and lack of follow-up support demoralised and demotivated 
them.  
 
4.8.5.3 Discussions with Teachers and Teacher Organisations 
Discussions were held with teachers from the schools that were included in this study. 
Most of them appreciated the importance of the new curriculum and the need to 
implement change in schools. Although they had received training in OBE, they felt that 
the training was too short. It was not accompanied by regular visits to schools and follow 
up support. As a result, teachers who experienced problems in their schools were not able 
to receive guidance and feedback from trainers. Schools also experienced shortages of 
materials and other resources. In most township and rural schools, learners had to rely 
only on few textbooks including teachers’ books. Large classes also hindered the 
effective implementation of OBE. This experience was identified by teachers in township 
and rural schools. Those in former Model C schools received regular training with 
sponsorship from their teacher organisations and also funding from the private sector. 
They had small classes with adequate learning materials, resource centres and other 
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facilities that enhanced learning. Slow learners were given individual tuition. Most of the 
schools had employed additional teachers who were able to assist such learners. 
 
Discussions were also held with teacher organisations, namely; SADTU, NAPTOSA, and  
Suid-Afrikaanse Onderwysersunie (SAOU). All the three organisations acknowledged 
the importance of implementing the new curriculum in order to build critical thinking 
abilities and develop cognitive skills among the learners. They supported the efforts of 
the Department in providing training to all teachers. However, they made the following 
observations: 
• The Department was not doing enough in training of teachers. There was 
shortage of subject advisors, and as a result, there was no follow-up support in 
schools. Since EDOs were not well equipped in OBE, they were not able to assist 
in training. All teacher organisations were involved in training their members. 
SAOU raised funds and held annual workshops to equip their members with 
required skills. Some SADTU members were well conversant with OBE. They 
collaborated with Departmental officials in training teachers. They also trained 
key teachers who would in turn train others in the schools. 
 
• Both SADTU and NAPTOSA stated that the redeployment of excess teachers 
was a useful exercise, which was supposed to alleviate teacher shortages, 
particularly in the rural areas. However, since the Department based the statistics 
of teachers on 1998 records, some schools which had fewer learners at that time, 
had more learners in 1999. Despite the increase in the number of learners, 
teachers were still redeployed. The Department provided schools with emergency 
grants for employing extra teachers, but not all of them received the funds. Due 
to lack of thorough research, teachers were redeployed to teach subjects in which 
they were not qualified or trained. It was acknowledged by SADTU that many 
teachers who were required to use OBE were not conversant with the content of 
the subjects they were teaching. This was also confirmed by members of some of 
the political parties who felt that priority should have been given to training 
teachers in the subject matter before introducing OBE. 
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The Curriculum Review Committee recommended a reduction in the number of learning 
areas from 8 to 6 while retaining outcomes; scrapping the 66 specific outcomes; and 
simplifying the complex assessment and performance measures (Harber 2001). A 
national curriculum statement for the ECD, GET, FET and ABET bands has been 
formulated and is currently being implemented in some of the classes. However, informal 
discussions with some of the teachers and district officials revealed that training of 
teachers, funding and learning materials remains a problem, particularly in township and 
rural schools. 
 
4.9 Discussions emanating from the Findings   
The above findings show that the education policies developed were intended to 
transform the education sector. However, the findings in Part II identified various factors 
that affected the policy formulation process. Such factors have led to contradictions and 
limitations on the type of education policies developed. Some of the factors and 
constraints identified created opportunities for some communities and groups to maintain 
existing interests. They also resulted in continued socio-economic imbalances. Similar 
conclusions as those reached in Part II of this Chapter can be deduced from the above 
findings. It is evident that the economy and inadequate resources are among other factors 
that constrain policy change.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
EDUCATION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  
 
As indicated in Chapter II, the policy process does not end with the adoption of the policy  
or legislation but continues with implementation. Contestations that emerge in the policy  
formulation and adoption stage continue during the implementation stage where policies  
may be substantially modified, elaborated or even negated, rendering them symbolic  
(Anderson 1990; Parsons 1995; Dye 1992 and Jansen 2001). Public policy is  
implemented by a complex system of administrative agencies that perform most of the  
day-to-day work and therefore are able to affect citizens more directly than any other  
governmental units (Hogwood and Peters 1983; Farazmand 1997). As discussed in  
Chapter II, agencies often have much discretion in carrying out the policies under their  
jurisdiction and therefore do not necessarily or automatically implement what the  
legislature has proposed (Ham and Hill 1985; Hogwood and Peters 1993). This Chapter  
examines the implementation of education policies in the Eastern Cape Province. The  
first part examines the first and second phase of bureaucratic reorganisation and how the  
structures functioned; and the second part looks at the implementation of  the South  
African Schools Act. 
 
PART I 
 
The Establishment and Functioning of Structures and Bureaucratic Reorganisation  
 
This section looks at the establishment of a single Eastern Cape Department of Education 
from different racially segregated apartheid era education structures; and the functioning 
of these structures during the first phase of bureaucratic reorganisation. It also examines  
how the bureaucracy was reorganised and reoriented to enable the province implement  
new policies that would transform the system. 
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5.1 The First Phase of Bureaucratic Reorganisation: 1994-1998 
                                                                      
5.1.1 The Establishment of the Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Education 
Structures 
The Eastern Cape Department of Education was established through the amalgamation of 
six separately administered Departments of Education, which were controlled and 
administered by the former Ciskei and  Transkei, the House of Assembly, House of 
Representatives, House of Delegates, and Department of Education and Training. As 
stated in Chapter IV Section 4.2.1, the establishment of the Department entailed the 
adoption of a flatter organisational structure to promote a more efficient and responsive 
service delivery bureaucracy and changing the way the bureaucracy delivered its services 
(Department of Education 2000e).  
 
A strategic management team (SMT) was put in place to oversee the establishment of the 
Department. Respondents recalled that the SMT was drawn from people in the previous 
administrations, labour and other actors outside the government who had been involved 
in education. The appointment of the SMT in 1994 was over and above the existing 
management. It was a superstructure that operated over and above the different 
departments whilst the latter continued to function. This ensured that delivery of 
education support to the schools remained uninterrupted. The parallel nature of the work 
of the Department and the SMT coupled with the fact that most of the members were 
professional educators, created suspicions from other staff that they were restructuring in 
a way that would pave way for them to take over some of the positions.  According to the 
terms of reference provided by the Department, the SMT was required to: 
• Develop a vision and mission statement for that Department. 
• Recommend educational reforms in order to attain efficiency and effectiveness of 
the new Department. 
• Make recommendations on how the six administrations could be integrated. 
• Make recommendations regarding the structure of the Department for the purpose 
of achieving the goals and objectives formulated in the mission statement. 
• Make inputs towards formulation of policy for the new ministry. 
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• Assist the Department to determine priorities. 
• Make any other recommendations necessary to facilitate the process of 
restructuring, integration and rationalisation. 
• Perform any other task that may be assigned to the team by the MEC. 
Many of the people who served in the SMT were absorbed in the new senior management 
positions in the new provincial department of Education. They were seen as lacking 
management skills and experience, as opposed to those who served in the apartheid 
government who possessed more experience and skills. 
 
 5.1.2 The Establishment of Flatter Organisational Structures 
The establishment of the organisational structure of the Eastern Cape provincial 
Department of Education has to be understood in the context of the broader process of 
public service transformation throughout South Africa. As stated in Part II of Chapter I, 
the Eastern Cape provincial Department of Education was a product of six amalgamated 
former departments of education. Interviews showed that the integration into one uniform 
system of these diverse working environments comprising different personnel structures, 
salary scales, finance and provisioning systems posed major challenges and exposed a 
significant deficiency in the capacity of the provincial Department of Education. Partly 
due to lack of skills and experience, new procedures and practices were poorly 
developed, resulting in a complicated network of systems and procedures that were very 
difficult to manage and control.  
 
The establishment of flatter organisational structures posed a lot of challenge to the 
newly created Department of Education. In 1995, the first organisational structure was 
approved for the Department of Education, followed by a second one in 1997. A third 
structure was established in 1999. The 1995 organisational structure was unrealistic 
because it provided for 75% more people than those employed (Eastern Cape Department 
of Education, Culture and Sport 1997). This was redesigned in 1997 but it was not wholly 
accepted, as there had been no consultation with stakeholders during the initial stages. 
However, towards the end of 1997, it was approved and the Arts, Culture and Heritage 
Division became a separate department. The features of the new structure were (Eastern 
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Cape Department of Education 1999b):  
• A head office structure, six regional offices and forty-one district offices. 
• Four new directorates were created namely, Planning and Management 
Information Systems; Education Provision and Management; Human Resources 
Management; and Financial Management. 
• Education Planning, Research and Information Technology was linked closely 
with policy. 
• The Education Management Information System and Information Technology 
were now catered for in the structure. 
• Education Provisions and Management now grouped together all functions that 
contribute effectively to provisioning and support. 
• Finance and Human Resource functions were separated given the large numbers 
of personnel and finances that the Department managed. 
 
Respondents singled out vacant positions that were not filled as required as one of the 
major weakness of the 1995 organisational structure. The same thing happened with 
another organisational structure that was established in 1997.  Some respondents stated: 
 
• In 1997 there were still posts that were not filled.  At this point the department still did not know 
the number of staff that it had.  The process of a head count had not been completed and 
personnel were not loaded onto the existing organogram but held against a parallel structure.  
The department had released a total of 1187 personnel through the VSP costing in excess of 
R12m.  (Respondent: Human Resources Directorate). 
  
• The same problems that beset the old structure in 1995 now affected the new structure in 1997.  
Absorption led to double parking in the same post. No assessment had been done of existing 
personnel.  As long as staff fulfilled the entry requirements, personnel were absorbed.  No 
assessment of ability or performance was done.  A comprehensive head count had not been done 
in the province.  The education department was unable to declare any supernumeraries and the 
instability of the department continued (Respondent: Curriculum Directorate). 
 
Although the management structure of the department was relatively small, all the posts 
were never filled.  Even when there was loss of personnel through attrition, the posts 
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were not filled.  A former senior member of management cited examples of positions of 
education development officers and subject advisors where only 34% of the former were 
filled and 18% of the latter. Yet both education development officers and subject advisors 
played a crucial role in overseeing policy implementation and in providing support to 
schools in the province. 
 
5.1.2.1 Personnel Positions on the Organisational Structure
The recruitment of personnel for the Department was made through the office of the 
Premier who at that time had an acting Director-General and a legal team. The posts for 
senior positions were advertised in local and national newspapers. Staff that were in the 
existing Departments filled positions that were not managerial and strategic. The 
provincial Service Commission oversaw the appointments by approving organisational 
structure and using proxies in the interviewing panels. The filling of the posts took place 
from the top and went progressively to the lower posts.  As time caught up with the 
process, it became more haphazard with increasingly little regard for procedural 
requirements.  This was followed by mass absorption into the lower levels of the 
structure and, in this way, persons were not recruited but simply absorbed.  In filling the 
organisational structure, they did not match the number of people with available posts. 
 
There was a lot of lateral movement of officers. People received absorption and 
appointment letters at the same time. Posts were being filled in all departments 
simultaneously and potential candidates tended to apply for many posts at the same time.  
This resulted in an officer being appointed to more than one post within a very short 
period of time.  The stability of the department was seriously hampered in this way as 
opportunities arose simultaneously in all departments for the upward mobility of staff.  
Serving officials would apply for posts in a number of departments and often they were 
successful in being appointed to more than one position. Interviews showed that most of 
the above problems occurred because of lack of departmental coordination in filling the 
posts. Due to lack of coordination by the Director-General’s office, departments 
competed among themselves for the best candidates. 
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Chapter Five of the Public Service Act of 1994 provided for the size of the management 
echelon of the provinces in the integration and amalgamation process. The criterion that 
was used to determine the size was based on the size of the population of the province. 
The vastness of the province, lack of infrastructure and the enormous backlogs were not 
considered in the allocation. The implication of this arrangement is that it constrained the 
management ability of the province, as there were fewer people in the management 
echelon to supervise, manage and oversee performance. Many respondents felt that the 
support staff were too many compared to the line functions and that there was 
duplications both within and outside the organisational structure.  In some instances the 
support staff were more than the line staff as the department was forced to hold on some 
staff despite them not having any tasks allocated to them.  
 
5.1.2.2 The Establishment of Regions and Districts 
Another feature in the establishment of the new Eastern Cape Provincial Department of 
Education was the creation of regions and districts and delegation of responsibility and 
authority. The new provincial Department of Education established six regions and forty 
one districts. Although responsibilities were delegated to officials in the regions and 
districts, this was not accompanied by concurrent authority of allocating and directing 
resources necessary to execute the delegated responsibility. Much effort was devoted to 
filling posts at head office while the same priority was not given to the regions and 
districts where delivery was to take place. As directorates, regions and districts were 
established, there was an imbalance of resource allocation among the levels and within 
the directorates. This arose largely due to poorly designed organisational structures and 
dysfunctional management systems that did not reflect departmental priorities. 
Centralisation of functions and resources at the head office masked inefficiencies and 
wasted a lot of time of personnel servicing districts as they had to visit the head office for 
most matters. A respondent remarked:  
 
• The geographic isolation of the Eastern Cape Department of Education district offices; the lack of 
efficient Head Office administrative support and infrastructure; weak administrative management 
capacity; severely restricted resources for non-personal expenses; and an operational breakdown 
involving suppliers; inefficient financial and provisioning controls; and also the prevalence of a 
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‘territorial mentality’ encouraged a dysfunctional centralised hierarchical system of service 
delivery with inattention to functional specifications. All these posed major constraints on the 
functioning of districts (Respondent: Curriculum Directorate). 
 
There was top down decision-making by senior managers and respondents acknowledged 
that the rigidly regulated environment stifled the initiative and creativity of district and 
directorate managers. Although a new organisational structure was designed, the 
authority remained concentrated in the hands of a few managers, with subordinates 
awaiting directives or unable to make decisions independently. Many of the respondents 
expressed the frustration of not being able to act promptly because of having to wait for 
orders from people from higher echelons. The latter took their time because they lacked 
experience as much as accountability. While the organisational structure had clearly 
demarcated areas of responsibility, it failed to provide the necessary authority that would 
allow staff to undertake their responsibilities effectively.   
 
In the discussions held with district officials, respondents cited the problems they faced 
as: lack of consultation by head office; lack of clear lines of communication and direction 
at all levels; having to perform unplanned tasks at very short notice and delays in 
responding to urgent requests by the head office. These problems stemmed from 
limitations in the decentralisation process, whereby people were not given enough 
opportunity to exercise their powers and make decisions on matters under their 
jurisdiction. A number of examples were cited to illustrate this situation. One of them 
was that, some directorates in the head office were communicating directly with 
principals or individual teachers on matters that are supposed to be attended by the EDOs 
or other officers in the district offices. A principal who was a participant in the focus 
group discussions cited the following problem with the Head Office: 
 
• A teacher decided to stay at home for four weeks without sick leave. I informed the district office 
who in turn wrote to the head office and requested for a substitute teacher. Having had no reply 
after a long time I employed a substitute teacher since learners were not been taught and were 
supposed to write matriculation examination. As soon as the substitute teacher started teaching, 
the absent teacher approached a lawyer who informed the Department that his client had been 
sick and that he intended to sue for his client being replaced. The head office responded 
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immediately by asking the district office to write and instruct me to terminate the services of the 
substitute teacher. You can see that they (sic) only responded because of being threatened by a 
lawyer (Respondent: Principal). 
 
Centralised budgeting also made it very difficult for regional and district offices to act on 
their plans. The approval of funds for essential activities was delayed, and at times the 
implementation of some of the activities had to be postponed or abandoned. This affected 
the implementation of many school development programmes. 
 
It was found out that many decisions which participants said they made without referring 
them to a higher authority were mainly routine administrative matters, such as approval 
of the use of government vehicles for official duties, planning activities for their offices 
and schools, approval of educational tours for schools and organisation of meetings for 
school governing bodies. In other activities, districts could only make recommendations 
to the head office. For example, school governing bodies conducted recruitment 
interviews for teachers and other staff with the assistance of district managers and EDOs. 
However, approval and appointments were made by the head office. Also, district 
officials could plan workshops and training for teachers, principals or school governing 
bodies; but they could not be able to conduct any of them without approval of funding 
from the head office. 
 
Decisions on activities that were subject to approval by the head office were 
appointments of teaching and non-teaching staff, funding, extension of curriculum, 
approval of teachers’ leaves, transfers, promotions, suspension and dismissal of staff. The 
major problems cited by participants were that approvals took long, leading to some 
essential activities being held in abeyance. Most districts had to send their officials to the 
head office almost every week to make follow up of some important issues including 
approval of funds for different activities. This proved expensive given the fact that some 
of the districts are far from the head office. Many of them, particularly those in the 
former homelands which were vast and served large numbers of schools, lacked basic 
facilities like telephones and facsimile machines.  
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5.1.3 Organisational Culture 
In examining the establishment of the new Eastern Cape Provincial Department of 
Education, we looked at the way the organisational structures were established as well as 
the organisational culture, namely orientation, attitudes, values, commitment etc. and 
how it affected the process. The culture of the civil service at the time reflected the 
organisational background of the people working within it.  This was not a homogeneous 
group of happy workers but people who were suspicious of each other and did not always 
share a common history or vision for the future. As a respondent stated: 
 
• The civil service that emerged from amalgamation held opposing views of how the department 
was to be run as they had come from opposing sides of the education system. This divided the 
department internally into different groups.  The first group was made of those that came from 
within the civil service and the second one was composed of those that came from outside the 
formal civil service.  Those from the former administration were further divided amongst 
themselves between those that came from the three different regions that made up the province.  
The new entrees into the civil service also had political and organisational differences amongst 
themselves representing their different political organisations and allegiances.  All these groups 
had their own baggage that they brought into the civil service which haunted the attainment of a 
common positive organisational culture (Respondent: Directorate Physical Resources and 
Planning). 
 
Therefore, the organisational cultural milieu was complex, multi faceted and resistant to 
change. As stated in Section 5.1.1, the Department personnel came from three groups, 
that is, officials from the former homeland education authorities; officials from the 
former white education authority and post 1994 political appointees.  
 
The organisational culture was shaped by a command and control management style. 
There were unclear and confusing lines of authority and accountability. The new 
Provincial Department of Education faced problems of authority, accountability and 
responsibility. Administratively, the Department reported and was accountable to the 
Director General of the province while politically it reported to the Provincial Legislature 
through the MEC for Education. At the same time the Provincial Department was also 
accountable to the National Department of Education as the latter sets norms and 
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standards and requires the former to send progress reports on the provincial educational 
programmes. Although this changed after 1997 when political heads of provincial 
Departments of Education were given powers to run their own departments, it brought a 
lot of confusion, and hampered delivery of service. A respondent remarked:   
  
• The relationship between the Department and the Ministry was tense.  This was as a result of the 
confusing lines of authority and accountability.  Administratively the department was accountable 
to the Director General but the MEC had to account to the Provincial Legislature and account for 
what his or her department was doing.  The new recruits into the department continued to be 
political activists whilst employed by the government.  Their political histories, organisational 
accountability and personal networks some times went above and beyond their immediate political 
heads of the department. Officials in the department held political positions in the party structures 
where they would interact and report on government’s performance. This created tensions in the 
departments as administratively lower employed staff were reporting to higher political 
organisations (Respondent: Senior Management Section).  
 
There was lack of service ethic. Employees viewed public service as a job where they 
would gain financially rather than a service to the community. Other factors mentioned 
by respondents as having influenced staff morale, values and aspirations were: 
 
Firstly, regional differentiated access to training and resources. A respondent commented: 
 
• Not all the former civil servants were the same.  There were differences between the ex South 
African Government employees and those that worked in the homelands.  Those that worked for 
the former South African government had higher levels of skills, were better equipped to be able to 
perform their tasks and enjoyed better living and working conditions.  Those that worked in the 
former homelands worked under poor conditions and did not have access to skills and 
opportunities that allowed them to grow as individuals and deliver a good service to the public 
(Respondent: Human Resources Directorate). 
Secondly, there was lack of job security while others had expectations after a long period 
of oppression. Some respondents stated: 
  
• The senior personnel were afraid of losing their jobs. All management positions were advertised 
and some had to apply for what they believed to be their posts. Carrying out their tasks under 
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their previous government positioned them opposite the political leaders now in power.  The 
future was not secure anymore and everything had to be done to ensure a better future even if this 
meant leaving the service (Respondent: Senior management Section). 
 
• The junior personnel had expectations of improved conditions of employment and advancement 
opportunities.  At last higher positions in service were attainable and not the exclusive privilege of 
whites in the former South Africa and political lackeys of homeland leaders in the Bantustan.  
There was an expectation of fairness and equality when promotions were to be considered 
(Respondent: Human Resources Directorate). 
 
Thirdly, living and working conditions were uninspiring. Bhisho lacked the amenities and 
other facilities that were available to employees who moved from big towns, particularly 
Port Elizabeth. Some respondents cited problems of accommodation in Bhisho which 
separate them from their families. 
 
Fourthly, some appointments were made on political grounds and this proved difficult in 
coping with old civil service employees who were seen as conservative or resisting 
change. Some respondents made the following comments: 
 
• Political appointments were only made at the senior and managerial positions.  These political 
appointees being in senior positions had personnel and programme responsibilities which had to 
be performed within existing frameworks.  The rules of the service however were of the old order.  
The staff codes were the old procedures.  A situation arose where the subordinate knew his or her 
way around the bureaucracy better than the superior who had recently joined the service.  In 
many instances they came from different political persuasions and this added to the poor working 
relations (Respondent: Directorate of Physical Resources and Planning). 
 
• The overhaul of the civil service started from the top with newly elected political leadership 
appointing senior managers. The politicians who came into power wanted their own trusted 
comrades heading, leading and filling the departmental structures.  This led to the appointment of 
persons previously outside government who had served their communities in a totally different 
manner.  For the education department this meant drawing on educationists who until now had 
worked in organisations that presented an alternate view to that being put forward by the state at 
that time. These were cadres of the Mass Democratic Movement, exiles and liberation fighters 
who claimed at last to be working openly in uplifting the conditions of the country’s population. 
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Many saw their employment as deployment reflecting the culture that this brought into the service 
(Respondent: Senior Management Section). 
 
• Participatory democracy was the organisational principle that guided their former work 
environments and flat management structures where they were accountable to committees and 
forums made it difficult to work for a boss or supervisor as was required in the service. The 
activist could not fit comfortably into the role of government functionary easily. Although the 
passion for wanting to serve was there, the conditions under which these were to be performed 
were restrictive to the new recruit into government service (Respondent: Further Education and 
Training). 
 
In sum, different cultural orientations, values and beliefs were brought into the Eastern 
Cape Department of Education by former civil servants from ex-Departments and new 
ones from outside the government, many of who were former activists. The combination 
of the above factors tended to encourage a culture of maximising differences rather than 
building unity and encouraging integration (Department of Education 2000d).  
 
Respondents acknowledged that there was conflict, crisis management and fragmentation 
of effort, and lack of teamwork. The issue of performance and functioning of the civil 
servants who served in the apartheid government was raised with some of them and other 
respondents in the provincial Department of Education. Discussions revealed that most of 
the civil servants who served in the apartheid government had more skills in terms 
generic administrative processes. However, they lacked skills in terms of transformation 
and new management styles. The provincial government provided training to all civil 
servants that were absorbed in the province, and this included those that served in the 
apartheid government. Some senior managers in the provincial Department of Education 
acknowledged that some of those who served in the apartheid government were not 
willing to adapt to the new approach and continued to make use of old administrative 
procedures and this affected the pace of the transformation programme.  
 
However, interviews with some of the civil servants who served in the old apartheid 
government showed that they all realised that they had to change the way they functioned 
by going through a new orientation programmes. The problem was that there were delays 
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from the national Department of Education in issuing new regulations. Hence some of the 
old apartheid regulations which had been abandoned were brought back through the back 
door (by those civil servants) and were implemented. They acknowledged that some of 
them were threatened by the new approach and orientation and were not willing or quick 
enough to adapt to the new changes and this affected the transformation agenda of the 
Department of Education.  Hence the functioning of the structures and implementation of 
policies took place within the above context and environment. 
 
5.1.4 The Functioning of Structures and Implementation of Policies 
In the process of amalgamation, the Department was confronted with a lot of pressure to 
balance the requirements of institutional transformation and implementation of education 
policy. It was required to implement policies emanating from both the Department of 
Public Service and Administration and the National Department of Education. This was 
due to the transformation and amalgamation of civil service and the six former 
departments of education taking place simultaneously with transformation. The exercise 
led to policy overload. There was lack of policy prioritisation and senior managers lacked 
necessary understanding of core policies. Some respondents offered the following 
remarks: 
 
• Many policies are not understood and implemented by everyone in the Department due to culture 
of non-reading and also not understanding. Many staff do not bother to read and understand the 
policies and do not input or comment when invited to do so. Due to lack of understanding of policy 
then, staff fail to implement it in the manner in which it was intended. At times I think they do 
things deliberately to set others to failure (Respondent: Senior Management Section). 
 
• Senior managers from the provincial department who participate in policy development at the 
national level are required to run workshops to educate other provincial department staff about 
the new policies. As you are aware the staff is responsible for the implementation of those policies. 
Most of the times workshops run by senior managers are not informative and people do not get a 
clear understanding of the policies. That is one of the main reasons for bad policy implementation 
(Respondent: Curriculum Directorate).   
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 Another respondent expressed his frustration at how they were required to implement at 
once all policies coming from the National Department of Education. Because there was 
no prioritisation of policies, implementation of earlier policies was abandoned as soon as 
new ones were formulated. There would be a shift on implementing new and current 
ones, leaving the previous ones unmonitored. A respondent remarked, “We were not able 
to say anything because we were told by our Heads that we had to be seen transforming 
the system. Hence we had to implement as many new policies as possible to show the 
people that there is change”. 
 
It was acknowledged that policy priorities were being more determined by availability of 
funds from national government and donors than by the commonly agreed strategic 
framework. While this could partly be attributed to lack of skills and experience, the 
responsibility and powers allocated to national and provincial Departments of Education 
also contributed to non-performance. Some respondents observed: 
 
• The elected government having gained power was keen to consolidate the transformation and 
internalise it within the administration. This was done by implementing new policies at a rapid 
rate. The policies emanated from education and public service administration and resulted in 
what policy implementers in the department refer to as policy overload. They were unable to 
prioritise important policies and implement them. The process was driven by deadlines and not by 
strategic means from the department. The department was not entrusted with the responsibility 
and freedoms to prioritise and phase in the new policies (Respondent: Finance). 
 
• The strategic focus of the Department during this period seemed to have been concentration on 
either what the national Ministry was passing down to them (and policy flowed out of Pretoria 
thick and fast) or whatever presented itself as a serious crisis within the province. This placed the 
Department in a poor position, as it was not so much anticipating changes and engaging with 
processes so much as being overwhelmed by urgent needs catching them unawares (Respondent: 
Curriculum Directorate). 
 
Many of the respondents attributed the above problems to lack of clarity in the division of 
responsibilities and powers between the national and provincial Departments of 
Education. Two respondents gave the following comments: 
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• New policies were set at the national level without due consideration to the organisational, 
financial and service delivery implications in the province (Respondent: Finance). 
 
• Provincial officials were actually confused by policies passed to them for implementation. The 
confusion was caused by lack of consistency and coherence in policies and in the structures of 
governance. People should acknowledge that the relationship between national, provincial, 
district and school structures of governance had been disrupted and this had to be dealt with if 
policies were to be implemented (Respondent: Senior Management Section). 
 
An example was cited where the National Department of Education set teacher: learner 
ratios that were required to be implemented immediately. The implementation entailed 
employing close to over 2000 additional teachers without more funding. The provincial 
Department had to overspend and the consequences were devastating. One respondent 
recalled: 
 
• Since no consideration was given to increase in finances, paying additional teachers resulted into 
a budget/financial crash when the budget could not support the increased salary bill. A 
moratorium was then placed on the creation and filling of new posts. This had serious impact on 
the programmes being implemented during that period, as programme budgets were the first to 
face financial cuts. As a result some school building projects had to be stopped halfway before 
completion (Respondent: Finance). 
  
Another example was the administration of the unitary matriculation examination which 
many respondents felt was imposed on the provincial Departments by the National 
Department of Education without consideration of financial resources. This task was 
administratively huge and it turned out to be chaotic. The Eastern Cape was confronted 
with administrative problems such as lack of control and proper monitoring, paper leaks 
and many others where provincial administrators were called to account. Most 
respondents identified Curriculum 2005 and training of members of school governing 
bodies as policies that had to be implemented by the provincial Department without 
consideration of funding. 
 
Frequent change of both the political heads and senior managers destabilised the 
Department and continuity of policy and programme implementation. This was 
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exacerbated by lack of proper coordination and communication between the political 
head and the administration. There were frequent interferences with the work of senior 
managers by political heads. In many cases, the new incumbents abandoned programmes 
that were conceptualised, initiated and implemented by predecessors when they took 
office. 
 
5.1.5 Planning and Provisioning 
In the period between 1994 and 1997, planning proved to be very difficult for the new 
provincial Department of Education. Old and cumbersome procedures inherited from 
different era were in place; political and administrative heads were changed frequently; 
and the Department was open to whoever would fund a planning exercise. 
 
 Planning exercises lacked continuity and had no long-term sustainability. In most cases 
they were governed by funders’ priorities and cycles and without regard to the needs of 
the Department. Hence the Department was at the mercy of donors’ funding priorities as 
it did not have a strategic approach to them. As a result, donors tended to lead rather than 
to follow departmental planning. A respondent stated: 
 
• Funding priorities were determined by donor agencies and for as long as education and the 
Eastern Cape were on their priority list, they assisted with planning (Respondent: Curriculum 
Directorate). 
 
The Department’s dependence on donors and consultants was also evident as it sought 
solutions to some of the problems encountered in planning while at the same time 
continuing with service delivery. Under those circumstances, it sought suggestions and 
was inundated with solutions from NGOs and consultants, while donors provided 
funding. In the first three years following the establishment of the department, there were 
at least three different strategic plans drawn up by three different foreign countries 
represented by their aid agencies.   
 
 There was lack of data and information on important aspects essential for transforming 
the education system in the province. Interviews showed that the Department lacked 
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adequate information on teachers and learners, infrastructure, equipment and other 
facilities in the province. Such information would enable them to do proper budgeting 
and planning so that they would be able to direct resources and expenditure in areas of 
policy priorities in accordance with Departmental and provincial goals. Respondents 
showed how lack of data also affected the provision and location of school buildings: 
 
• The list of schools to be built was submitted to the Public Works Department. As it was not 
verified before actual work of building started, it resulted in problems where more was built than 
necessary and prioritisation was through what traditional chiefs who were the authority in rural 
areas decided was a priority. Lack of coordination also resulted in schools being built where there 
were no access roads or water provision. The RDP programme in its support of emerging 
contractors resulted in building programmes not meeting deadlines and poor workmanship in 
some instances. Tenders were not properly elicited and the capacity of contractors not fully 
verified before contracts were awarded (Respondent: Departmental Directorate of Physical 
Resources and Planning). 
 
The Department had to fund projects established and implemented during the previous 
apartheid regime due to contractual obligations and prior commitments, and this causing 
cash flow problems. Some respondents made the following comments: 
 
• A major focus of planning in the province entailed the refocusing or spending away from areas 
that were resourced to areas that were under-resourced. The newly established department faced 
the problem of projects that were commited by the old government. The department could not get 
out of agreements already in place and in this way budgets for future projects were already 
commited (Respondent: Senior Management). 
 
The payroll included a number of ghost schools and teachers, which meant wasting 
scarce financial resources that could have been used in needy priority areas. Although the 
Department had produced annual plans, they had not been endorsed, supported and 
implemented with commitment from within. As there were frequent changes of top 
leadership, predecessors’ plans were discarded by incoming leaders only to start their 
own planning. Two respondents stated: 
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• The department also faced the problem of the lack of continuity at the level of leadership both 
politically and administratively. The new incumbents did not trust the previous heads choices and 
wished to implement plans that they were familiar with. Strategic plans would then be drawn up 
using different analytical tools and lower level staff began to lose faith in the leadership ability to 
plan and follow things through (Respondent: Senior Management). 
 
• The strategic management team report reflects some of the problems of lack of continuity by 
senior managers and political leaders. This was the first strategic plan of the department and it 
had legitimacy problems from the onset. The SMT was set up by the first MEC of the department 
of education, set up their terms of reference and was part of the processes of developing the 
report. Less than a month before the report was to be tabled in the legislature the MEC was 
changed and the report was tabled by the incoming MEC. The process from there to a planning 
session and implementation never really got around and the subsequent planning sessions 
reverted to discussing deployment and filling of key positions (Respondent: Directorate of General 
Education and Training). 
 
In any organisation, planning requires cooperation and teamwork in order to achieve a 
wider and greater impact that combined effort and focused expenditure can yield. It was 
found that the Department only followed demand. There was no consideration given to 
adopting a systematically integrated approach to planning. An example cited by some 
respondents was classrooms that were built without planning for attendant needs such as 
teachers, books, learner support materials, water, electricity etc. Without coordinated 
planning through links across directorates, policy implementation continued to be 
compromised as each directorate did their plans and activities separately. Respondents 
from the regions and districts explained how they received instructions from directorates 
to perform different tasks at the same time.  
 
The physical dispersion of head office also militated against co-ordinated planning. The 
head office of the department was dispersed in three locations in Bhisho, five in East 
London, six in King William’s Town and one in Zwelitsha. This happened because the 
department of Public Works and Roads could not accommodate the provincial 
Department of Education in one government building to enable it to establish a single 
physical head office. This factor complicated the management of the Department and the 
education functions. A respondent remarked: 
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• The arrangement upset and affected adversely the day-to-day running the department and co-
ordination of services and constrained cooperation between the functional components of the 
Department (Respondent:  Directorate Physical Resources and Planning). 
 
However, currently most of the directorates are housed in the same building complex in 
Zwelitsha, so it is hoped that there will be improvement. 
 
Monitoring is a crucial function in planning. It enables planners to identify bottlenecks 
thus providing management with ways to resolve problems as they rise, it allows 
programmes and projects to be adjusted to enhance delivery, and it provides a better 
understanding of impact of delivery on the ground. Most respondents acknowledged that 
the Department has been functioning without a system for monitoring problems and 
achievements in implementation of its plans and programmes. The Public Finance 
Management Act required the establishment of a performance management system, a 
form of monitoring mechanism. However, this was not yet fully operational within the 
Department. 
  
Donor agencies are a source of funding to enable the provincial Department of Education 
to implement national policies. Respondents expressed fear that these agencies have 
overly influenced departmental planning through their funding of specific development 
priorities. Since 1997 considerable donor funding has been received for infrastructure 
development. Japanese development funds were used to build schools in the eastern 
region of the province. The European Union also built many schools throughout the 
province and had an ongoing development programme. Local corporations or businesses 
have put up school buildings through fundraising programmes initiated by former 
president Nelson Mandela. The Department has been required to provide facilities like 
desks, learning materials etc. However, due to lack of proper coordination there have 
been cases where handing over of such school buildings has had to be postponed because 
the Department had not supplied what was required. Respondents identified other major 
problems in the project: 
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• Since this programme was mainly done on the request of communities, it happened that schools 
were built haphazardly without taking into consideration the Department’s plans. You would 
sometimes find a school built next door to another one simply because the community requested, 
without taking into consideration the real need. At times the department would not have planned 
or put aside funding for different facilities. Therefore funds planned for other activities had to be 
used (respondent: Directorate of Physical Resources and Planning). 
 
Coordination of donor activities and sustaining the programmes and projects when they 
pull out was identified as a major problem of the Department by many of the respondents. 
However, the respondents also identified some positive measures that were being taken 
by the Department to improve planning. The Department established the Education 
Management and Information System (EMIS) in 1997. EMIS data’s comprehensiveness 
and validity was problematic during the initial stages as many school managers were 
reluctant to submit their tenth day and annual returns. The tenth day returns were data 
submitted to the Department on the tenth day after opening showing enrolments for the 
year. Respondents stated that the rate of return only improved in 2000 and all data was 
captured. However, it was discovered that the numbers in the returns were inflated and 
without means of verification, the database was rendered unreliable. An inter-directorate 
EMIS committee was established to explore how the data can be used in future planning, 
an action which was seen by some respondents as a commitment to improve planning in 
the Department. 
 
In order to improve the planning process, in 2000 the Department formulated a Corporate 
Plan (2000 to 2004) with emphasis on multi year planning and identification of policy 
priorities. The Corporate Plan will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 5.1.6 Financial Management 
In the period before 1997, the financial system was decentralised, each provincial 
Department managing its own finances. In education, there was dual responsibility 
whereby strategic managers controlled expenditure while the former heads of old 
departments of education signed cheques. However, the budget was not properly 
consolidated. Lack of clarity on financial management resulted in cash flow problems.  
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Staff received very little training in financial management. Despite the fact that some of 
them had been managers before the change, they were not able to manage the new 
department. According to the Eastern Cape Department of Education: 
 
Staff did not adequately follow financial checking systems, and routinely attached multiple 
commitments to funds. Because separate financial systems were being run, managers did not 
always know how much money their department was spending. Expenditure reports were out 
years after, and only then showed overspending. Without financial information management, 
decision-making was largely a matter of hit and miss. This was compounded by the fact that the 
Eastern Cape Department of Education lacked basic office infrastructure like computers, which 
slowed down the financial reporting process, and saw some components of the Eastern Cape 
Department of Education still using manual systems (Eastern Cape Department of Education 
1999e: 28). 
 
Some respondents echoed the same problems as those identified in the above report: 
 
• Much of the financial management problems could be attributed to having unqualified financial 
managers and personnel who were entrusted to take care of the entire Departmental budget which 
was very big. There was also lack of proper financial information to facilitate management 
decision making. Another factor was the use of manual systems and lack of infrastructure, which 
hampered communication and coordination between regions and head office. Money spent in a 
region would be recorded by hand in a file. Everything took longer to do and cost more money due 
to underdeveloped infrastructure and poor communication systems. For example, calling a 
meeting could not be done by phone or fax because facilities were not available in most regions 
and districts. Therefore, people had to drive for two hours to a place just to set up a meeting 
(Respondent: Senior Management).   
 
• There was a lack of coordination and accountability on financial matters, and there was unequal 
utilisation of resources. Some regional directors overspent, as there was no proper consultation 
between the regions and head office. Lack of capacity and skills in financial management among 
managers was also a contributing factor to the financial problems of the Department 
(Respondent: Finance). 
 
The Department encountered severe administrative difficulties associated with integrating 
personnel data from ex-departments into one common payroll system; redirecting 
resource to priority programmes; addressing accounting irregularities and filing 
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problems. There were many incidences of financial mismanagement, fraud and 
corruption. Some respondents remarked: 
 
• Standing committee reports from 1997 reflected persistent problems within the Department of 
Education, such as certain staff having two PERSAL numbers, in other words collecting two 
salaries and this was being investigated (Respondent: General Education and Training). 
 
• The MEC at the time felt that nobody really benefited from the financial crisis, but there is 
evidence of serious fraud and corruption within the Department of Education. For example in 
1997 about 100 cases were being investigated and the amount of funds misappropriated was over 
R 1 272 000. Cases were being reported to the police and the Legal Section had formulated 
charges against the Deputy Director and Assistant Director of salaries at the time. There were 
also problems with duplicate salary cheques being printed and all were being investigated by the 
police. The bank reconciliation for the period of April to August 1997 was not done mainly 
because there were no officials trained to do that job (Respondent: Finance Directorate).  
 
Consequently, the Department was also confronted with problems of inadequate financial 
resources. It had to service new and old debts from ex-departments and address inherited 
backlogs. Contractors and other service providers were not paid and the Department was 
highly indebted. Before 1997, backlogs and inherited debts were not initially factored in 
when allocation of funds for the provinces was being considered at the national level. A 
respondent stated: 
 
• During the period 1994 to 1997 the provincial Department operated each financial year as if it 
were a clean slate, not carrying debts over into the following year’s budget. By 1998 the 
Department owed millions to different suppliers and service providers. Builders, publishers etc. 
were not paid. The department also picked up old debts from the six previous departments of 
education, for example telephone and electricity bills. Things started to turn around only in 1998 
when the former MEC of Finance took over the financial management of the department and 
started budgeting new money for servicing old debts (Respondent: Finance Directorate).  
 
Discussions were held with representatives of churches which had public schools on their 
properties. According to SASA (1996) the Department is supposed to pay for the use of 
private property and in return, the owner is required to “maintain and improve school 
buildings and the property on which the school stands and the supply of necessary 
 282 
 
 
services” (SASA 1996:14). The majority of the respondents expressed their 
disappointment that the Department did not make payments as stipulated in the Act. 
Often they had to close schools and send learners away because they could not pay for 
electricity or make necessary repairs and maintenance due to delays or non-payment from 
the Department. Respondents from the Eastern Cape Christian Council of South Africa 
(ECCCSA) also echoed similar problems concerning payments for suppliers of materials 
and textbooks to the schools in the province. The ECCCSA undertook mentoring some of 
the schools in the impoverished and disadvantaged areas. They found out that non-
delivery of textbooks and other learning materials was the result of the Department not 
paying debts on time. Suppliers had to use their own resources most of the time and as a 
result often they incurred losses. Because of this, they had to stop delivery of the items to 
schools. 
 
The Department also had to commit funds for running projects, which were initiated by 
ex-departments. This made it difficult to start new projects, as old projects were still 
being serviced (Eastern Cape Department of Education 1998). A respondent stated: 
 
• In the western half of the province schools had transport and electricity for their pupils, while the 
eastern half did not have the same benefits. In 1994 when the government changed and funds were 
scarce, these advantages were not taken away from the western half of the province, as politicians 
felt that they could not undermine these areas. As a result the budget went more to the west of the 
province than the east. This carry over from the past with funds already limited left very little 
room for manoeuvre. The total envelope for each year was not increasing at the same rate as the 
demands on the ground (Respondent: Finance  Directorate).     
 
Another respondent commented: 
 
• Because the Department had to continue to put allocated funds to programmes that were started 
during the apartheid era which favoured already better regions and areas of the province, failed 
inability to redirect expenditure to previously disadvantaged areas was most unfortunate, and 
resulted in little visible change in delivery following the change in government. Changing this 
pattern of expenditure was difficult as the incremental approach to budgeting which was being 
practised then only entrenched past practices (Respondent: Finance Directorate) 
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The problem of inadequate funding was also compounded by the fact that all government 
Departments in the Eastern Cape tended to suffer from a large wage bill. This limited 
availability of funds for addressing running costs and infrastructural needs was very 
crucial in addressing inequities and redressing past imbalances. As shown in Chapter IV, 
the Eastern Cape Department of Education had very high personnel expenditure. This 
was driven by national agreements which led to adjustment of salary structures of 
personnel in the different amalgamated departments to enhance equity since each entity 
paid different salary scales. By 1998/9, the Eastern Cape Department of Education 
personnel expenditure peaked at 92%, in excess of the international norm of 80% 
(Eastern Cape Department of Education 2001). Many respondents acknowledged that this 
led to insufficient funds for non-personnel expenses and numerous embarrassing 
incidents such as schools running out of chalk, electricity and water cuts.    
 
Respondents expressed concern about the budgeting process during the period between 
1994 and 1997 not being inclusive of Departmental staff, teachers and other relevant 
stakeholders. Following the announcement of the budget vote, the Administrative 
Support Services Section would allocate funds to different directorates. It was only after 
1997 that different sections and directorates got more involved in internal budgeting. 
 Due to the crisis that emerged from financial decentralisation in 1997, the financial 
system was centralised under Section 100 of the Constitution and the responsibility for 
Eastern Cape Department of Education’s financial management was placed under the 
MEC of Finance. This means that staff had to report to Treasury on a computerised 
system where stringent measures were put in place. Before payments for services 
incurred by the Department could be effected, payments costing had to be provided and 
budgets had to be checked to ensure that proposed expenditure matched with what was in 
the system. Financial Management Systems had not been extended to all sections of the 
Department, and not all of them could conduct the above exercise. There were no internal 
controls in place and audit systems were lacking. The Treasury performed most of these 
functions due to centralisation, and this delayed the Department from developing some of 
the systems (Eastern Cape Department of Education 1999). 
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In order to have effective implementation and delivery of prioritised planned activities 
and programmes proper budgeting is needed. Before 1997, the Eastern Cape Department 
of Education used incremental budgeting with a 5% increment simply being added on the 
previous year’s budget. After 1997, there were no significant changes although there 
were moves to make the budget geared more towards policy priorities by encouraging 
zero based budgeting. 
 
After 1997, there were more interactions between the executive budget committee headed 
by the MEC of Finance and Departments to discuss their budgets. ECSECC Report 
explains the general trend in Departments thus:  
 
The general trend was that departments would request more funds than needed, knowing that they 
would get less than they asked for. The committee then made recommendations based on 
executive priorities. The prevailing rule-of-thumb over this period was that 85% of the provincial 
budget would go to education, health and welfare as key priorities. The MEC for Finance would 
then table a budget for all the departments, based on the programmes they had submitted. Each 
department then had to direct these funds towards the programmes for which monies had been 
allocated (ECSECC 2001:33). 
 
In 1998 there was an attempt to abandon incremental budgeting. The new budgeting 
approach suggested that the budget had to be aligned with priorities identified for the 
MTEF cycle (Eastern Cape Department of Education 2000c). However, there was no 
evidence of moves to allocate budget in accordance with priority activities and 
programmes as the Department continued to work on yearly budgets. Until 1998, debt 
was not factored into the budget. New systems were introduced from 1998 to repay debt, 
and the expertise brought in from the Department of Finance oriented staff in budgeting 
and financial procedures. Inherited and current departmental debt resulted in the Treasury 
holding back non-personnel allocations that had been committed in the budget speech. 
There were cases where financial reports showed under-spending, when in actual fact 
funds were never disbursed or released (Eastern Cape Department of Education 2000a).  
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5.1.7 Human Resources Management 
After 1994, the new Eastern Cape Department of Education, which resulted from the 
amalgamation process, lacked human resource management plans (ECSECC 2001).  This 
posed a lot of problems, which affected a number of other areas. There were no proper 
job descriptions and work plans were undeveloped. There were insufficient systems for 
monitoring staff performance. Without adequate human resource management structures 
there was no implementation of a performance management system. A respondent gave 
the following comment: 
 
• Staff did not understand the new organogram, and were not clear of their responsibilities due to 
the instability of the department. Due to poor management practices, no work-plans were ever 
drawn up for staff between 1994 and 1997. In addition there was no performance management 
system put in place. Clearly staff had little guidance in the difficult period of 1994 to 1997. It was 
also difficult to address poor performance due to lack of proper human resource management 
system. Attitudes from inherited staff opposed to transformation were difficult to confront 
(Respondent: General Education and Training Directorate).  
 
Another concern raised by respondents was that there was poor career planning and 
incentives. Very few human resource development programmes were implemented and 
where this was done, they were implemented in a very uncoordinated and haphazard 
manner. A respondent gave comment on human resource development: 
 
• What training had occurred was uncoordinated and mostly in response to opportunities 
individuals saw to develop their careers. Training had been provided by Fort Hare Institute of 
Government and was not linked to a set programme within the Department although some sort of 
training needs analysis had been done (Respondent: Directorate of District Development). 
 
• Human resource management was new in the public sector and there was little understanding at 
head office that it meant more than just uncoordinated training. Since the department was always 
responding to crisis, the human resource management section had its focus diverted to whatever 
crisis that requires attention even if it was not related to human resources.  They would receive all 
left overs of work that needed urgent attention. Another aspect is staff who had taken study leave 
and gone for training on their own initiative very often left the department of education to take up 
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other posts soon after completing the training. However, the section became more focused since 
1997 (Respondent: Directorate of Human Resource Management). 
  
Respondents acknowledged that plans were not developed regularly. Erratic work 
planning or lack of it, further undermined effective management and as stated Section 
5.1.2, appointments to positions on the organogram were problematic and often led to 
inefficiencies because people were not qualified to fulfil a range of the functions 
stipulated. Some employees were not loaded on the personnel salary system (PERSAL) 
and this brought a lot of rift and grievances between management and trade unions. 
Another arose from some staff members, mostly those from the former Transkei, who 
had promoted themselves fearing that they would be put in lower positions in the 
amalgamated structure. This brought a lot of acrimony and some of them had to 
reimburse the Department for the excess benefits and remuneration acquired as a result of 
irregular promotions. 
 
Voluntary retirement robbed the province some of the most experienced people. As the 
provincial Department of Education was being restructured, a number of staff were 
required to be retrenched. However, the sunset clause provided that civil servants who 
served in the apartheid government were not to be retired until after five years. Hence the 
Department offered voluntary severance packages for those who wanted to take early 
retirement. Unfortunately those who opted to leave were the more skilled and 
experienced staff that could not easily be replaced. A respondent confirmed: 
 
• The amount that an official would be paid was related to the numbers of years of service that the 
particular official had in the service. Longer serving officials stood to benefit greatly from the 
application of this tool as their pay out was substantial. This resulted in skilled personnel who 
knew that they had marketable skills leaving the department. They were easily absorbed into the 
private sector and went with a golden handshake. Many opted for this rather than face an 
uncertain future in the service (Respondent: Human resources Directorate). 
 
Although there were slight improvements, many of the above problems continued after 
1997. Monitoring and improvement of work was hampered by a lack of essential 
administrative support systems. There was top down decision-making by senior managers 
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and respondents acknowledged that the rigidly regulated environment stifled the initiative 
and creativity of district and directorate managers. Although a new organisational 
structure was designed, the authority remained concentrated in the hands of a few 
managers, with subordinates awaiting directives or unable to make decisions 
independently. Many of the respondents expressed the frustration of not being able to act 
promptly. They had to wait for orders from those in higher echelon who took their time 
because they also lacked experience. While the organisational structure demarcated areas 
of responsibility clearly, it failed to provide the necessary authority that would allow staff 
to undertake their responsibilities effectively. A respondent lamented: 
 
• Lower level managers were not treated as professionals. They were not availed opportunities and 
privileges to take initiatives, apply their creative skills and knowledge and participate in decision 
making. Even a simple letter has to be approved and signed at the top (Respondent: Directorate of 
Human Resources Management). 
 
5.1.7.1 Establishment of Directorate of Human Resources
The Directorate of Human Resources was established after 1997 and was made up of 
three components, namely; Human Resources Development, Human Resources 
Administration, and Labour Relations (Eastern Cape Department of Education 2000f). 
The directorate was responsible for close to 68 000 educators and 8 000 non-educators 
servicing about 2.3 million school learners with a personnel budget of R 6.3 billion in 
1999–2000 (Eastern Cape Department of Education 2000a). Human Resources 
Development was charged with organisational development, all aspects of employee 
welfare and capacity building. Human Resources Administration was responsible for all 
personnel practices that is, recruitment, placement, compensation, performance 
management and general compliance with personnel policies. Labour Relations was 
responsible for industrial relations agreements and concerns. All the three components 
together were responsible for employee productivity and performance. 
 
Managing and integrating personnel from diverse apartheid era departments encountered 
numerous problems and created tension. Most of the respondents said that many 
individuals were not fully prepared to discharge their responsibilities, and in some cases, 
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personnel were wrongly placed without regard to their qualification and experience. The 
following issues regarding staff recruitment and performance emerged from discussions 
and interviews held with departmental officials: 
• All staff from amalgamated departments of education except for those who opted 
for retrenchment packages were absorbed. As indicated in Section 5.1.2, there 
was a large number of excess staff. The Director of Human Resources gave an 
example of the former Ciskei administration staff who were dismissed because 
they participated in a strike in 1992. They were subsequently replaced. However, 
with the establishment of the new provincial Department of Education in 1995, 
dismissed staff and replacements were absorbed leading to “double parking” in 
jobs. A respondent from NEHAWU confirmed that 3 000 of their members had 
been dismissed but almost all of them subsequently were absorbed. The problem 
with many of the people who were absorbed is that they lacked the right 
qualifications, a factor which affected performance adversely. Therefore, the 
Department was stuck with a large number of extra staff that lacked the required 
skills. 
• Bureaucrats who had served in the apartheid government were seen as people 
with at least some generic administrative skills and were therefore expected to 
guide the new political leadership in the running and managing of the provincial 
Department of Education. However, lack of commitment to transformation by 
some of them undermined the implementation of a number of the programmes. 
• Many respondents saw the employment of professional teachers and former ANC 
activists as another handicap in the performance of the Department. They felt that 
these cadres lacked the required experience and were likely to be manipulated by 
those who were against transformation. Moreover, the majority of professional 
teachers that were recruited were members of ruling party. Most of them lacked 
experience, they had not occupied similar positions before, nor had they received 
any training in management and administration of the public sector.    
• Administrators in the former homelands carried out promotions of civil servants 
against regulations in order to put themselves at par with the rest in the former 
South Africa. They claimed that those that would be absorbed in the new 
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Department were likely to lose out. There were also allegations of corruption, 
anarchy and unfair promotions which prompted various enquiries by both national 
and provincial Departments. The focus of the inquiries was the former Transkei 
where most of the illegal and unfair promotions took place. 
 
Therefore, according to ECSECC (2001:16): “the management systems were improperly 
operationalised, run by unprepared staff and disregarded by managers.” While the 
respondents acknowledged that the situation was bad, they felt that it was exacerbated by 
what was happening during that time, that is: 
• Rapid policy changes required the acquisition of a constantly changing number of 
competencies. 
• Departmental functions and processes were frequently restructured and realigned, 
requiring personnel to readjust to new roles and new funding regimes and 
opportunities. 
• Rapidly changing roles, functions and responsibilities meant that definitions were 
not developed in time, thus creating confusion. 
The above factors called for intensive training of staff. However, respondents stated they 
were not satisfied with the progress of training and retraining of staff as it was moving at 
a very slow pace. A respondent remarked: 
 
• There was need for continuous training. Given the rapid staff turnover, personnel were in a 
continuously unsettled state of learning or needing to update their skills (Respondent: Curriculum 
Development Directorate). 
  
Many respondents felt that human resources management problems played a major role 
in the crises that the provincial department faced. The fact that senior management posts 
were not filled led to weak capacity in budget management and control of expenditure. 
The outcome was centralisation of financial systems, which hampered day-to-day 
operations of districts and schools due to distance from the head office. Lack of capacity 
and skills among civil servants was exacerbated by the implementation of voluntary 
retirement plan.  
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The Department used a performance appraisal system after 1997. According to the 
respondents, the system was inadequate because rewards were based on long service only 
and many people felt that this criterion on its own was not adequate. Moreover, it was 
applied in a fragmented and erratic manner and this led to its legitimacy being doubted. A 
new system was developed nationally but there were delay in its implementing in the 
Eastern Cape. A respondent provided the reasons for the delay: 
 
• The new system required an assessment of the staff complement and a declaration from individual 
workers on which to base performance measures. Implementing the system also raised other 
issues such as the format and source of information to be gathered, the system’s contingency on a 
business planning system, the measuring of performance as an indicator of transformation, the 
role of unions, attitudinal issues and uncertainty whether managers were commited to act on the 
outcome of appraisals (Respondent: Human Resources Directorate). 
 
5.1.7.2 Labour Relations Procedures
Stipulated labour relations procedures were agreed upon at national and provincial levels. 
They were within standards of good practice advanced by the Department of Labour. A 
number of factors hampered their implementation (Department of Education, 2000a): 
• Reluctance of managers to take measures against employees who went against 
procedures. 
• Trade Unions put obstacles by not agreeing to participate in any other aspect 
besides representing employees in disciplinary hearings. 
• There were a lot of delays before a disciplinary hearing was effected. 
• Grievance procedures were not integrated into managerial processes to enable 
them to address the cause of employee dissatisfaction. 
• Employees were not willing to initiate grievance hearings because they feared 
victimisation by managers. 
 
5.1.7.3 Other Aspects of Human Resource Management Plans
After 1997, a number of human resource management related plans were put in place 
(Eastern Cape Department of Education 2000c). Among such plans were a 
comprehensive Human Resources Management Plan, which was being implemented 
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within the department. Others were the Employment Equity Plan, the Workplace Skills 
Development Plan, and provincial plans and policies on the recruitment and retirement of 
staff (Redeployment Policy, Succession Strategy, Bursary Policy, HIV/AIDS Strategy, 
and Affirmative Action Strategy) (Eastern Cape Department of Education 2000f). 
Respondents acknowledged that some of the plans did not adhere to other policies. They 
also stated that most of them existed only on paper and that no proper implementation 
had taken place. 
 
The above findings showed that the first phase of bureaucratic reorganisation which also 
entailed amalgamation of apartheid era departments into a single Department was beset 
with problems that affected adversely the successful implementation of policies. Many of 
the problems have been discussed in the findings in Part I of Chapter IV. The Eastern 
Cape Department of Education was the worst hit and most affected by implementation 
problems as identified in the Ncholo Report and other reviews that took place. As in other 
provincial Departments of Education, it necessitated a further restructuring and 
reorganisation of the Department in order to pursue the transformative agenda more 
effectively.          
    
5.2 The Second Phase of Bureaucratic Reorganisation: 1999- 
The Department established the Corporate Plan and District Development Programme 
which adopted elements of public managerialist model in reorganisation. An analysis of 
the Strategic Plan showed that the 1997 organisational structure did not fully serve plans 
and policy objectives. It was decided that changes had to be made to align the structures 
with their organisational goals more effectively and establish strategic priorities. This 
called for the creation of “a single, leaner head office structure to determine policy and 
provide leadership, support and direction to the distinct structures. New functional 
alignments and levels of functional units were proposed: Planning and Management 
Implementation Systems; Education Provision and Management; Human Resource 
Management; and Financial Management” (Eastern Cape Department of Education 
2000d). It was also recommended that 41 districts be merged to form 24 district offices as 
centres of education service delivery (Eastern Cape Department of Education 2000d). 
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This would leave a leaner head office, which would determine policy and provide 
leadership, support and direction to district structures. Districts were given more 
managerial and financial responsibilities and powers and became accountable for policy 
implementation and service delivery.  
 
5.2.1 The Corporate Plan (2000 – 2004) 
Initially the planning process was conceived as a retreat or bosberaad with a plan as the 
output. Such plans were predominantly sets of intentions without defined programmes, 
indicators and timeframes and largely unrelated to available resources. In 1999 the 
Department formed a Strategic Planning Committee under the then Head of Department, 
Mr. Jonathan Godden. The Committee included the British government’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) advisors who were also running a ‘whole school 
development’ project called Imbewu. However, the planning process was disrupted with 
the departure of Mr. Godden. The exercise stopped until 2000 when the then MEC, Mr. 
Stone Sizani, set up a new planning team that finalised the work of the first Strategic 
Committee. A Corporate Plan (2000 – 2004) was produced that marked a fundamental 
shift from annual strategic plans to multi year planning associated with the METF 
budgeting process which identifies policy priorities. Respondents stated: 
 
• The corporate plan identified the inherent weaknesses needed to be addressed in order for us as 
Department to achieve the objectives of an effective and efficient education system. Since all key 
stakeholders accepted it, the development of the plan served to mobilise consensus among 
departmental officials tasked with implementing key priorities of the plan (Respondent: Senior 
Manager from the Department). 
 
• The plan has given the Department a basis for planning and coordination across directorates, and 
served as the basis for organizational reconfiguration and resource allocation. It is also the basis 
upon which programmes can be developed, information and resources mobilized, and suitable 
partners found for support and collaboration (Respondent: Physical Resources and Planning 
Directorate). 
 
The Corporate Plan outlined the core business of the provincial Department of Education 
as being policy implementation and adjustment; research and planning; management of 
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resources and support services; and monitoring and evaluation (Eastern Cape Department 
of Education 2000). It outlined the Department’s strategic objectives as: 
• Provision of meaningful GET and FET systems. 
• Successful interaction through a relevant and integrated curriculum framework. 
• Providing physical resources that benefit the stature of teachers and learners. 
• Professional development of educators to meet the challenges of the new century. 
• Addressing the scourge of HIV/AIDS. 
• Development of self managing districts and institutes. 
• Make governance levels work effectively and efficiently. 
• Eradication of illiteracy and the development of skills for self-employment 
 
The above measures are positive and the challenge lies in following through to ensure 
that the plan is translated into practice. Respondents outlined the main challenges in the 
implementation of the plan as lack of capacity in human resources. In addition, at the 
time of data collection, the required financial and management information systems had 
not been put in place. Both the political and the head of department, the two leaders who 
initiated the corporate plan left the Department before implementation of the plan. 
Moreover, due to persistent problems, the Eastern Cape Department of Education was 
being assisted by an Interim Task Team established by the national Department to 
investigate performance problems as well as advise and guide directorates in their 
functions.  
 
5.2.2 The New District System 
According to the Eastern Cape Department of Education, the establishment of the district 
development programme meant that the education system was being transformed through 
a process of decentralisation. Decentralised district offices are required to drive the 
transformation process by bringing service delivery closer to the school community and 
providing schools with effective, ongoing support (Eastern Cape Department of 
Education 2000d). The exercise is aimed at restructuring the bureaucracy to enhance the 
quality of teaching and learning in schools; to develop capacity of districts and schools; 
to enable them to become self managing; and to bring about effective policy 
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implementation and service delivery. The head office is required to perform the functions 
of strategic planning, financial control, policy, planning and coordination of programmes, 
management and information systems, quality assurance, and performance management 
(ECSECC 2001). The differences between the old and new district systems have been 
summarised in Table XIX. 
 
Table XIX: Differences between Old and New District Systems 
 
Old District System New District System 
Centralised 
Authoritarian; hierarchical 
Bureaucratic culture 
Provider driven 
Monitoring; controlling 
Fragmented service provision 
Decentralised 
Collaborative; more equitable  
Developmental; teams 
Needs driven; schools as clients 
Supporting; developing 
Holistic; school focused 
 
Source: Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Education 2002 
 
The new district system was established with the assistance of a private consultancy firm, 
the Delta Foundation. In December 2000, the MEC of Eastern Cape Department of 
Education requested the Delta Foundation to develop a model for a decentralised Port 
Elizabeth district office because of the consultancy firm’s wide range of practical 
experience in managing innovative models in education. There were also a lot of inputs 
from other organisations and donors like the DIFD funded Imbewu project. In February 
2001, a task team consisting of representatives of the Delta Foundation and the 
Department of Education came up with a series of proposals. These proposals were 
developed on the basis of established national and provincial guidelines and also 
incorporated new concepts. The proposals were not only for Port Elizabeth district but 
also for all the 24 districts in the Eastern Cape Province. In September 2001 the proposals 
were accepted as district office model for the Eastern Cape Department of Education. The 
new district system adopted a bottom up approach or backward mapping model of policy 
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implementation with the goal of an ‘ideal school’ where the district office was required to 
play a supportive role (Eastern Cape Department of Education 2002). In the approach, 
“The ‘ideal school’ determines the function and structures of the new decentralised 
district office model. The vision, ownership and capacity requirements of the ‘ideal 
school’ decide what support and assistance the district office will provide and how it will 
deliver” (Eastern Cape Department of Education 2002:4).  It stood on two legs, that is, 
Corporate Services and Education Support Services (See Figure I). 
 
Figure I: District Office Framework 
 
 
                                                            District Office 
 
 
            Education Support Services                                Corporate Services                      
            - professional dev. & curriculum                                            - finance 
               - school management & development                                    - provisioning   
               - special needs                                                                         - human resources 
               - media resources & development                                          - IT systems 
 
 
       
                
 
             Education Development Centres (EDCs)                               Central Office 
             - staff operate in multi-disciplinary teams                              - staff operate in single district office 
 
 
Source: Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Education 2002. 
 
The Education Support Services is made up of multi-skilled teams that is based in 
Education Development Centres (EDCs) closer to schools. Its core function is to provide 
schools with appropriate professional development and curriculum services, school 
management and governance services, special needs in education services and media 
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resources and development services. The Corporate Services wing is housed in a central 
District Office, and its core function is to provide financial, logistic, administrative and 
management services to schools throughout the district. Districts components are 
arranged in a way that facilitates interaction between EDC teams and schools and the 
sharing of available resources and best practices among schools (see Table XX). 
 
Table XX: New Role for Circuits and School Clusters 
 
Geographical Aspects   Physical Aspects               Purpose 
District 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit 
 
 
 
 
Geographical clusters of 
schools. Additional EDC 
support and resources are 
allocated to clusters of non-
functional schools 
Central District Office 
 
 
 
 
• The district Office provides 
corporate services for the district 
and manages and monitors 
education support services 
 
  
EDC, which services several 
circuits 
• The EDC provides education 
support services in its circuits 
  
  
  
School cluster node • Provides a central base for EDC 
staff to conduct support and 
training and a centre or centres for 
cluster schools and their 
communities to hold meetings, 
workshops and best practice 
sessions and share resources 
computers etc. 
 
Source: Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Education 2002. 
 
5.2.3 Implementation of District Development Plan 
Implementation of the plan began at the end of 2001/beginning of 2002 and it is expected 
to take five years to come to full operation. Interviews showed that 40% of the people 
would migrate from the head office to the District Centres. Regions have been abolished 
and staff has been moved to the districts. Most of the professional staff are already in the 
districts and they will be joined by corporate sector staff. By the beginning of 2002, ten 
districts were fully operational. A district director who is a senior manager heads each 
district, and is responsible for ensuring service delivery and budget control. This means 
that districts will have full access to the Department’s central financial, personnel, and 
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provisioning systems. Districts will also formulate their own plans. Each district has 
established a District Education Forum, which will provide opportunity for stakeholders 
to have a say and participate in distinct planning and service delivery. Among the 
professional staff, 24 subject advisors were approved to be placed in each of the districts. 
College lecturers at post level 3 have also been absorbed as subject advisors. 
 
Given the problems which the Department has faced over the years in delivering the 
curriculum and ensuring teaching and learning in the classroom, the idea of 
decentralising administrative and implementation functions to the district level is 
appealing and very convincing. Moreover the plan is underwritten by good intentions 
such as enhancing the role of school governing bodies in school management, and 
making schools more accountable to the communities in which they are located. 
However, there is need to take into consideration the inherent dangers of decentralisation 
in a province like the Eastern Cape which has been beset by a lot of structural weaknesses 
and major implementation problems. As stated in earlier sections comparative 
international experience shows that decentralisation in a context of gross socio-economic 
and institutional disparity (as is found in the Eastern Cape) may serve to accentuate, 
rather than redress inequities in the system (ECSECC 2001; Lewis and Motala 2004). 
 
There is need for a strong centre to manage the process. The head office will be faced 
with the challenge of providing the necessary control and support functions. It needs to 
focus, in the short term, on building information management and planning capacity and 
developing monitoring and early warning systems. It may be too early to make a fair 
assessment of the operation of the district development plan. However, some of the 
respondents identified a number of limitations, namely: 
• Lack of capacity particularly in education support services. Although there were 
plans to recruit additional subject advisors, education development officers and 
other professional staff, the exercise has not taken place. Currently all districts are 
experiencing shortage of professional staff. It has been difficult to prepare 
educators for delivery of the new curriculum. 
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• The districts are vast with a high number of schools. Districts do not have 
sufficient vehicles to visit schools to provide the necessary support including 
follow up and monitoring teaching and learning and also ensuring that suppliers 
deliver learning materials. 
• Due to lack of adequate funding, some of the programmes have been postponed or 
abandoned. 
• Most respondents from schools included in the study particularly township and 
rural schools emphasised that they rarely receive real support from the districts. 
They saw the responsibility of districts as being that of ensuring that schools 
implement policies from the national level. Many respondents expressed concern 
that district officials do not develop schools’ capacity to implement different 
policies. The major problem is that districts do not have capacity to perform their 
required roles of ensuring policy implementation and providing support to 
schools. Discussions with some of the officials in the new districts showed that 
they are aware of their responsibilities of ensuring policy implementation takes 
place at the school level. They also acknowledged that they are required to 
provide support to schools in the implementation of the policies. However, due to 
lack of adequate skilled human resources, insufficient funding and adequate 
transport most of the roles are not performed as required. Most of the time they 
concentrate on ensuring that schools implement policies. This is likely to 
contradict measures taken by the provincial Department of Education to enhance 
bottom up approach to policy making and creation of an ‘ideal school’ as 
proposed in the New District Development Plan. 
• Often districts have to divert from implementation of their plans to respond to 
emergency/crisis or head office unanticipated programmes.  
 
5.2.4 Establishment of Interim Management Task Team 
Due to failure of some of the Eastern Cape Departments to implement policies and 
deliver services, the national government appointed an Interim Management Task Team 
(IMTT) in November 2002 to revamp provincial government’s administration. One could 
be tempted to state that the national government in collaboration with private consultancy 
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firms had indirectly taken over the running of the provincial government. The 
Department of Education together with Health, Social Development and Roads and 
Public Works were the most affected. The IMTT revealed that the above departments are 
riddled with administration irregularities and corruption and private companies or 
consultants have been running several of them. There is an unacceptably high level of 
vacancies, poor financial management, excessive use of consultants, and managers 
lacking capacity and who fail to maintain discipline and performance levels (Daily 
Dispatch 24 September 2003). The findings of the IMTT confirm what has been 
discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
 
The IMTT enlisted the assistance of two consortia, Pytron and Sinakho, to take care of 
administration of the Departments affected, Education being one of them. Evidently, this 
exercise cost much in terms of financial resources which could be used to improve 
teaching and learning in many poor schools. Already records show that the Eastern Cape 
provincial government spent an estimated R 500 million a year on consultants. Members 
of IMTT raised concern regarding the use of consultants but stated that it was difficult to 
attract skilled people to work in the province. The following are some of their responses: 
 
• Vital skills introduced by private companies would later be utilised by departmental staff 
(Respondent: IMTT Member).  
 
• They will help us reconstruct our back office (administration). In order to have a good front office 
(service delivery) we need a strong back office (Respondent: IMTT Member). 
 
5.2.5 Work done by the IMTT 
The IMTT received criticisms for failing to make a difference in the province (Daily 
Dispatch 24 September 2003). Such criticisms came from political parties and 
parliamentarians from provincial and national levels. However, members of the IMTT 
outlined the following achievements: 
• The IMTT has recorded 1 162 disciplinary cases; 533 of them from Education; 
307 from Health, 210 from Roads and Public Works and 112 from Social 
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Development. Of these about 706 have been conducted and 456 are being 
processed. 
• They established internal controls and addressed backlogs in the appointment of 
senior managers. 
• They established four departmental turnaround plans and six transversal projects 
aimed at improved service, delivery and governance.  
• Fast tracking financial and procurement delivery. 
The IMTT implemented resolution 7 of 2002 where assessment of competencies of all 
managers and employees was done and people redeployed on the new organogram. 
Senior managers have been redeployed to different directorates and other existing 
personnel were asked to assess their own competencies and expertise and indicate their 
preferences regarding posts in the new organogram. The exercise also entailed 
identification of excess staff and was completed in December 2003 where all staff will be 
placed or redeployed in different positions. Employees were given opportunities for 
voluntary retirement. It is early to provide substantial comments on the self assessment 
strategy together with the logistics of redeploying all staff into a new organisational 
structure with additional units and posts. However, the exercise is likely to impact on 
performance of some directorates as skilled and most experience staff may decide to 
move to other positions and directorates. 
 
The IMTT prepared a report following a thorough investigation. The report was never 
made public save for very few aspects like the magnitude of corruption and 
mismanagement; and measures being taken to improve the situation. 
 
5.3 Contracting out and Collaboration with NGOs, Donors and the Private 
Sector 
As stated Section 4.2.2 of Chapter IV, there are a number of NGOs, consultants from the 
private sector and donors who are working in partnership with the Eastern Cape 
Department of Education to implement its programmes. Contracts are given through the 
processes of competitive tendering. The work that is done by the various agencies 
includes more general corporate functions of education departments like management and 
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financial consultancy; and IT systems consultancy. Others include core education 
functions like in-service training of teachers; curriculum and material development; 
capacity building for school management teams and school governing bodies; facilitating 
school improvement and institutional rationalisation processes; evaluation; research etc. 
(Pampallis 2004).  
 
There have also been donor operated projects which are implemented following 
agreements between the National and provincial Departments of Education and the 
donors. Among the largest projects are those funded by the USAID, DFID and Swiss 
AID. The usual practice is that agreement is reached between the donor agency and one 
or more provincial Departments of Education on the specifics of a support programme. 
The agency would then call for proposals where a consortia of service providers from 
within and outside the country would submit bids and a preferred bidder chosen. There 
have been several projects implemented in the provinces, Eastern Cape being among 
them.   
 
Among the projects is the USAID District Development Support Programme which 
provided US $20 million between 1999 and 2002 to improve school and district 
performance in four provincial education departments. It was managed by the Research 
Triangle Institute a non-profit US contract research organisation. It also involved some 
South African organisations. Another one is the DFID Imbewu project in the Eastern 
Cape which aims to improve the quality of primary education. According to Pampallis 
(2004), the first phase of the project which had a budget of 7.5 million pounds was in 
operation from 1997 and it ran for three years. The contract for the second phase which is 
worth 22 million pounds will run for seven years from 2001. It was awarded to a 
multinational consortium of Dutch, British and South African organisations.  
 
As stated in Chapter II, contracting out and outsourcing is associated with managerialist 
practices of the private sector and at time the belief in the superiority of the sector in 
delivering public services (Pampallis 2004). While the practice by the public sector could 
be attributed to the above reason capacity problems and shortage of skills among public 
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service managers; pressures of time and the need for rapid delivery of services account 
for contracting out and outsourcing by the Eastern Cape provincial Department of 
Education. Many of the respondents expressed concern about the fact that the Department 
does not have proper mechanism in place to monitor and coordinate work done by private 
consultants and organisations, NGOs and other agencies. This has implications in terms 
measuring their performance, assessing quality and sustainability of the programmes. 
Respondents acknowledged that some of the programmes ceased to operate after donors 
withdrew. Some officials from the Department attributed this to lack of additional staff 
and time to continue with some of the programmes which are taken as additional 
responsibilities. The fact that donor agencies have to include a variety of organisations 
from other countries in delivering the programmes indicates that these activities are 
taking place in an increasingly globalised market. This means that much of the funding is 
not locked in South Africa but goes back to the donor countries and other developed 
countries.            
 
5.4 Discussions emanating from the findings 
The above findings show that the implementation of education policies in the Eastern 
Cape encountered numerous problems and challenges that provided major obstacles in 
achieving transformation in one of the poorest provinces in the country. Lack of 
coherence and coordination of programmes and activities implemented at different levels 
led to contradictions and conflicts and deviations from goals of the transformation 
agenda. The situation was aggravated by lack of capacity particularly in the senior and 
middle management levels; and among personnel from the two homelands that were 
incorporated in the new province. Lack of adequate financial resources coupled with 
unqualified financial managers led to non-implementation of important curriculum 
delivery programmes. The situation was worsened by the fact that the province had the 
highest number of backlogs in the country. There was no genuine integration and 
commitment to transformation among some of the civil servants. 
 
Different measures were introduced by the national Department of Education to ensure 
proper control and coordination of programmes. This involved identifying crucial areas 
 303 
 
 
and setting priorities, and ensuring that funding is available. Managerial practices from 
the private sector were adopted in the implementation of education policies and 
programmes. Districts were given more decision making powers and were supposed to 
oversee the implementation of policy in schools, while at the same time providing 
necessary support. Head office was charged with policy formulation, coordination and 
monitoring role. Implementation began in 2002 which is a short period to make a proper 
assessment. However, lack of capacity is experienced at all levels. Lack of capacity is 
further evidenced by a heavy reliance and dependence on contracting out and 
involvement of consultants, NGOs and donors. Inadequate funding remains a major 
handicap with frequent incidences of mismanagement and corruption among officials. 
The study revealed problems of control and coordination among different levels and 
structures within the province. Many donors established school development and 
improvement programmes that the Department has failed to sustain. Consequently there 
is lack of proper coordination of the work done by NGOs. The following section 
examines the implementation of a specific policy at the school level. It reveals how street 
level bureaucrats use discretion in policy delivery which in turn affects goals and 
objectives of the policy.  
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PART II 
 
Implementation of the South African Schools Act:  Provision on School Governance 
and Democracy 
 
The South African Schools Act (SASA) provides for school governance and democracy. 
This component of the policy was analysed in Chapter IV Part III.  SASA created a legal 
framework for the establishment and election of school governing bodies (SGBs) which 
are required to enhance participation and democracy in schools (Department of Education 
1996). SGBs are juristic persons and have been granted considerable powers in schools. 
The composition, powers, role and responsibilities of SGBs were discussed in Chapter 
IV. This Part examines the implementation of policies relating to School Governance and 
Democracy within the Eastern Cape Province. It draws reference from the ten schools 
included in this study.   
 
As indicated in Chapter IV, SGBs were established as vehicles for effecting the 
decentralisation of power and enhancing participation in schools. The establishment of 
SGBs was supported by both the ANC and the National Party for different reasons. The 
ANC supported the establishment of SGBs on the ground that they will empower 
marginalised communities from previously disadvantaged areas and schools to take 
responsibility and have a say in running the schools. The National party had handed over 
ownership and management of former white only schools to governing bodies in 1992. 
This move has been attributed partly to financial constraints but also was designed to 
enable its constituencies maintain their privileges (Karlsson, McPherson and Pampallis 
2001; Lewis and Motala 2004). Hence, after the 1994 elections both parties supported the 
establishment of SGBs. 
 
SGBs were established through democratic elections. The exercise involved different role 
players including the provincial Department of Education which supervised the elections. 
Interviews with officials of the provincial Department of Education revealed that in the 
Eastern Cape, elections were supervised by officials from the Directorate of Human 
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Resources Management in the provincial Department of Education. The Department 
produced regulations concerning the conduct of elections and consultations were held 
with different stakeholders to provide input. This was followed by training workshops 
and seminars for education development officers, teacher unions, other district groups 
and stakeholders that were to be involved in the process. The main aim was to inform and 
educate them about the respective roles and responsibilities of SGBs and in addition, train 
them on how to conduct the elections. Teams and groups that were trained in the districts 
were required to cascade information to principals and other players at the school level. 
This was followed by actual implementation of elections. By the end of February 1998, 
all schools in the Eastern Cape had elected and established SGBs. District education 
officials were charged with responsibilities of educating SGB members on their roles and 
responsibilities and providing the necessary follow up and support service to enable them 
function properly. This was essential for many of SGBs in township and rural schools 
which lacked the necessary capacity.        
       
5.5 Representation on the School Governing Bodies 
Information on representation on SGBs was obtained from each of the 10 schools 
included in this study. The results are presented in Table XXI.  
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Table XXI: The Number and Gender of School Governing Bodies 
 
School No. of SGB 
Members 
                    Gender 
  Male Female 
Township A 8 5 (63%) 3 (37%) 
Township B 6 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 
Township C 8 6 (75%) 2 (25%) 
Rural A 7 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 
Rural B 7 3 (43%) 4 (57%) 
Rural C 6 4 (67%) 2 (33%) 
F. Model C 
(English 
medium) 
8 5 (63%) 3 (37%) 
F. Model C 
(Dual medium) 
8 4 (50%) 4 (50%) 
F. Model C 
(English 
medium) 
7 3 (43%) 4 (57%) 
F. Model C 
(Afrikaans 
medium) 
8 5 (63%) 3 (37%) 
 
 
Table XXI shows that in the 10 schools under study, SGBs were male dominated. Men 
formed the majority of SGB members among teachers, learners and parents in most of the 
schools. Where female parents were represented, their roles were subservient to those of 
their male counterparts, the latter occupying executive positions. Lewis and Motala 
observed the same trend in a study of 15 schools in Durban South:  
 
Males were over-represented among parent and learner representatives. In a sample of 15 schools, 
only 20 per cent of learner representatives were female. Among educators males dominated 
regardless whether it was a secondary school, where males tend to make up the majority of 
educators, or a primary school, where there are greater numbers of female educators (Lewis and 
Motala 2004:127).    
 
Informal discussions with selected SGB members and observations made in 4 out of the 
10 schools included in this study confirmed that many SGBs were not representative of 
the population that they served. In the four former Model C schools, African parents were 
not well represented in the structures, even where their children formed the majority of 
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the learner population. Majority of members of SGBs in those schools were white, many 
of them with distinct occupations like lawyers, medical doctors, accountants, business 
people etc. This was also confirmed in a study by Carrim (2000:32) who found that 
African parents are not being elected into SGBs into former Model C schools, including 
ex-Afrikaner and ex-Indian schools. McPherson and Naicker observed in their study on 
SGBs: 
 
Africans and people of other races who are members of school governing bodies would either 
have been co-opted or would be included on less important subcommittees while decision making 
authority is retained by the executive body (Mcpherson and Naicker 2002:9). 
 
In township and rural schools that were included in this study where learners are 
predominantly African, there were also distinct choices of certain groups of people. In the 
township schools, most SGB members were elected from among educated parents who 
were employed in the formal sector, articulate and able to communicate in English. Most 
members of SGBs in rural schools have low levels of literacy and lack skills and 
capacity. The four former Model C schools had elected administrators, bursars and 
secretaries as non-educator representatives on their SGBs. This means cleaners, gardeners 
etc. who hold permanent jobs in those schools were not elected. Of the six public schools 
(township and rural schools), only one had non-educator representative in the SGBs. The 
majority of township and rural schools did not have support staff on their SGBs. All 
secondary schools are required to have learner representatives in the SGBs. However, it 
was observed that the former Model C schools had no learner representatives, instead, 
they continued with prefect system which was abolished. Prefects are selected by 
teachers. Township and rural schools had learner representatives in the SGBs. Their 
participation was limited because in most schools they were not regularly invited to SGB 
meetings. Some of the principals and other SGB members claimed that some of the 
meetings discussed sensitive issues in which the presence of learners was not appropriate. 
In other schools they were invited only when they discussed matters related to learner 
discipline. 
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5.6 Decision Making  
According to Section 18(2)(a) of the SASA, governing bodies are obliged to meet at least 
once per school term. Discussions showed that all schools fulfilled this obligation. 
Respondents acknowledged that annual general meetings were held in their schools. In 
addition SGBs held monthly meetings, which addressed finance and budgeting, fund 
raising, learner discipline, staffing matters, and planning.  Raising funds tended to be a 
priority at township and rural schools while distribution of funds was given more 
attention at former Model C schools. Members of the SGBs were reluctant to show the 
researcher the actual minutes of SGB meetings, citing confidentiality as the reason for not 
doing so.   
 
Respondents discussed how decisions are made in their schools. Although most of them 
acknowledged that decisions are democratically made and every member has an equal 
opportunity of participation in decision making, some respondents, particularly those 
from township and rural schools, claimed that principals use different tactics to impose 
their views on other members. Some of the tactics mentioned by respondents were 
formation of cliques within the schools. Such cliques dominated meetings in a way that 
undermined the ability of the SGBs in their schools to function as independent bodies. 
This was evident in the observations made in the township and rural schools.  
 
Many parent SGB members criticised principals for caucusing with educators and 
learners before SGB meetings to solicit their support. In one group interview, a 
respondent made the following statement: …most often when principals disagreed with 
decisions taken at SGB meetings, they frequently canvassed other members of the school 
community in order to alter such decisions. Some principals contended that there was 
nothing wrong with this practice, on the ground that decisions could be changed with 
changing circumstances. However, SGB members felt that canvassing was unfair and led 
to marginalisation of parents. A respondent contended: …in many cases parents’ voices 
are not heard because school based actors - the principal, together with educators and 
learners - canvassed among themselves beforehand.  
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Some respondents who are SGB members in former Model C schools identified other 
problems regarding participation in decision-making. Some of them argued that 
principals and affluent members of SGBs (mostly professional and those from 
advantaged communities) meet beforehand, canvass and agree on positions to take on 
different aspects on the agenda.  As a result any suggestions made by other members in 
meetings are often either ignored or rejected or referred to smaller committees for more 
information or research.  With such delays the issue is relegated to the bottom of the 
agenda and eventually falls out. Instead of remaining active in the SGBs, many of the 
respondents (particularly those from disadvantaged communities) opt to keep a low 
profile and in some cases, stop attending meetings. Two affected respondents gave the 
following remarks:  
 
• I have stopped attending meetings of SGB. My suggestions are always challenged and thrown out 
and I really feel that I am not a valued member of the governing body (Respondent: former Model 
C school SGB member from disadvantaged communities). 
 
• Whether I am present or not they will take decisions on what they have agreed among themselves. 
I see no need of travelling so far to attend such meetings while I cannot make any difference 
(Respondent:  former Model C school SGB member from disadvantaged communities).       
 
SGB members from former Model C schools and advantaged communities argued that all 
members are given equal chances of participation and all views and opinions are 
considered. However, others agreed that most decisions are dominated by principals, 
chairpersons of the SGB and other influential people like medical doctors, accountants, 
bankers, lawyers, business people etc who are members of SGBs. This aspect was also 
confirmed through observations that were made.   
 
Another issue, which came in the discussions, was the time set for meetings in former 
Model C schools. Some respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the time set for 
attending meetings of either parents or SGBs because it was awkward for parents or 
members who lived far away from the schools. Some of them did not have the means of 
transport to attend meetings which were mostly convened in the evenings and far from 
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their homes. Observations showed that the most active group of SGBs in former Model C 
schools were white parents. They participated more in discussions than those from 
formerly disadvantaged groups, and in many cases decisions made or suggested by them 
during meetings were easily accepted and endorsed by all members. Consequently, in 
township and rural schools, the most active members were principals and some of those 
with better education. The two groups participated most in discussions and made many of 
the decisions which were endorsed by other members. In the rural schools most decisions 
were made by principals and the school management team. Squelch (2000) confirms that 
SGBs often delegate authority back to the principal because of lack of capacity.  Sayed 
and Carrim (1997:34) argue that “SASA circumscribes inclusiveness in ways that it 
marginalizes black working class and rural poor families. While SGBs may represent 
parents, they often fail to do so for parents from the most vulnerable families”.   
 
5.7 Roles and Responsibilities of School Governing Bodies 
There is lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities of SGBs particularly by 
members of township and rural schools. In the discussions, most of the members 
struggled to understand their main roles and responsibilities. Many of the respondents 
from township and rural schools saw their role as “fund raising, ensure that parents pay 
school fees and attend meetings, and teachers attend school”.  This could be partly 
attributed to inadequate education, information and training on the roles and 
responsibilities of SGBs. Most respondents expressed concern that training and education 
by the Department on the roles and responsibilities of SGBs was confusing and the 
training material were too complex to understand. Some of the materials were written in 
English, a language that was not well understood by many parent members from rural 
schools. A Departmental official acknowledged this in the following words: 
     
• Understanding roles and responsibilities particularly by some of those in rural schools has been 
problematic. Many members have low literacy levels. This makes training difficult, as they do not 
cope with the materials presented in training manuals. You find few people dominate 
responsibilities that are supposed to be handled by all SGB members. Hence you find that 
budgetary issues and financial management are usually handled by School Management Teams 
(SMTs). SGBs seem to think their main role in school activities is to carry out fundraising 
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activities. This has therefore affected their involvement in other responsibilities such as 
development of policies for their schools (Respondent: District Official). 
 
The consequence is that most SGBs from former Model C schools understand their roles 
and responsibilities well and are able to take on additional ones, putting their schools 
always ahead in terms of quality, effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
The separation of school governance from management poses challenges for most SGBs 
including those with literate members. As a result there is often tension between the 
principal and members of the SGBs. A number of respondents from township schools 
stated that some of the SGBs tend to see themselves as employers even for educators who 
are employed by the Department and tend to interfere in professional matters. While this 
is an indication of lack of information or knowledge on their respective roles, such action 
could also be explained in a different way.  
 
Some parent SGB members from township and rural schools acknowledged that at times 
they have to make impromptu visits to schools because some educators, and even 
members of school management, are often not at their place of work. They cited 
incidences where members of the community and parents had to teach because educators 
had absconded and principals had failed to either inform the SGB or to take any 
disciplinary measures against the absentees. They felt that they were not interfering but 
exerting their role as SGB members and parents who have interests in their children’s 
education and welfare. This was confirmed by one respondent district manager who 
acknowledged, and showed how he had to solve conflicts of this nature in his district. He 
also acknowledged that most of the time interferences by SGBs arise from ignorance of 
roles and responsibilities of governing bodies. 
 
Consequently, there have been cases where some principals have taken advantage and 
took over SGB responsibilities and made decisions that were supposed to be made by 
members of the SGBs. This was apparent in the three rural schools where many of the 
SGB members had low levels of literacy. Sayed (1999) comments on the complexity of 
 312 
 
 
the roles and responsibilities of SGBs as outlined in SASA and he argues that they are 
best suited for middle class communities. The budgetary tasks and financial management 
skills that require considerable expertise have proved to be most difficult. The roles and 
responsibilities of SGBs seem to be straightforward and clear on paper. However, there is 
need for more clarity particularly for most SGB members from disadvantaged and rural 
areas, where schools had no experience or tradition in governance (Vally 1998).   
    
5.7.1 Additional Responsibilities 
All the four former Model C schools had applied for additional functions and 
responsibilities, which qualify them as Section 21 schools. Schools that qualify to be 
categorised as Section 21 are required to be self managing schools. They manage their 
own funds which are received en bloc from the Department. They procure supplies like 
educational equipment and materials and take charge of responsibilities of maintenance 
and care of physical conditions of the schools. Only two of the six township and rural 
schools had applied for this status. This is attributed to the fact that such functions have 
serious economic and leadership implications, which is lacking in many of those schools. 
This call for the need to build capacity to a level that allows them to prepare adequately 
for these tasks and to exercise their powers to the fullest.  
 
The Department manages funds of those schools that have not attained Section 21 status. 
It pays for procurements and services through requisitions made by those schools. Some 
respondents expressed concern about long delays by the Department in paying for 
services rendered to schools by service providers. Disconnection of essential services like 
water, electricity, telephones etc. due to non-payment was cited by most respondents. 
 
 The Department has also established complicated bureaucratic procedures, which make 
things very difficult for schools when making requisition for procurement and services. 
Most of the respondents gave examples of procedures put in place to engage small 
contractors or builders to do repairs or maintenance in their schools. They have to fill 
long complicated forms. Schools are not able to choose their own preferred service 
providers even within the precincts of the school. The Department has a list of 
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contractors from which schools can choose. Often such service providers have not been 
able to do quality work, let alone completing such work. Moreover, due to non-payment 
or delays in payment, many of them use this as a justification to abandon the work before 
completion. This affects mostly schools in township and rural areas who have not 
attained section 21 status.  
 
5.8 Formulation of School Policies 
The SGBs are charged with formulation of a number of policies at the school level.  
Respondents commented on the policies they formulated in their schools.  
 
5.8.1 Development of School Constitutions 
According to SASA, one of the first major tasks of all SGBs was to develop a 
constitution for their schools. Although all respondents acknowledged that they had 
developed constitutions for their schools, many revealed that they have had to receive a 
special assistance from the Department. The Department supplied schools with 
standardised draft constitutions that were easily adapted to local school circumstances 
and to school networking. However, despite the assertion that the schools had 
constitutions, most of them could not produce one for the researcher’s perusal. The 
degree to which schools adhered to constitutions produced by SGBs could not be 
ascertained.  
 
5.8.2 Formulation of vision and mission statements of schools 
A number of respondents acknowledged that they formulated vision and mission 
statements for their schools. However, the majority of those from township and rural 
schools reported that they did not participate in the exercise. They indicated that the 
formulation of vision and mission statements was done by the district officials in 
consultation with principals and then imposed on the schools.  
 
Respondents from the district offices acknowledged that there were cases where they had 
to collaborate with schools to come up with vision and mission statements because of 
lack of effective participation by most members of SGBs. They expressed dissatisfaction 
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with some members’ participation in meetings and in discharging other SGB obligations 
in schools, especially those in the rural areas. They attribute this to SGB members having 
other commitments, little interest in the activities of the school, and also capacity to 
understand their roles and responsibilities. This situation calls for proper capacity 
building programmes together with support and monitoring of schools especially those 
from disadvantaged areas. 
 
5.8.3 Admissions policy 
It was revealed from the discussions that most schools have some form of admission 
policy based on the one from the Eastern Cape Department of Education. While 
respondents claimed that their admission policies are open, the findings revealed a lot of 
discrepancies in admission of learners in the respective schools surveyed. Informal 
discussions with some respondents in the schools under study showed that the exclusion 
of learners is practised in both former Model C and in township schools. Discussions 
showed that many of the former Model C schools conduct ‘informal interviews’ with 
parents who submit applications for children’ admission. This is a way of determining 
which children to admit because they also find out indirectly the parents’ occupation and 
income. There have been a number of incidences where parents have been informed after 
such interviews that places are full, while others with good positions and better income 
who came after them were given admission. Discussions showed that township schools 
that are perceived by communities to provide better education also give preference to 
well known members of the community, employed parents and those who are not likely 
to request exemption from paying fees.      
 
Language is another factor that affects admission. Research findings showed that in most 
dual medium schools there is preference of English and Afrikaans as medium of 
instruction. However, some schools used language and admission as a way of exclusion. 
Writing about schools that use Afrikaans as medium of instruction in Pretoria, Bush and 
Heysek observed: 
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The governing body has not opted to become dual medium, knowing that there is little demand for 
Afrikaans only schools by black parents. The annual fee of R 4 400 may also be prohibitive for 
many poor parents, although the principal claims that admission to the school is independent of 
ability to pay. Many black parents wish to pay their way if they can afford to do so. The school’s 
marketing is also focused on its local (predominantly white) community. The brochure is sent to 
local schools and churches while there is also advertising in the local free newspaper. A further 
consideration is that this school is located away from the convenient public transport (Bush and 
Heystek 2003:135).  
 
Tikly and Magobane (1997) outline strategies used by some former Model C schools as 
administering English language tests, advertising only in the historically white press and 
interviews with prospective learners. Gilmour argues that certain provisions in some of 
the policies have provided the escape valve for exclusion: 
 
Schools are not obliged to admit every person who applies to enter. The intention here is that 
schools could be permitted to maintain their particular religious, cultural or language character. 
This clearly opened the door for discriminatory practices disguised as cultural freedom (Gilmour 
2001:11).  
 
5.8.4 Language policy 
SGBs have been given the power to develop language policies and put forward concrete 
proposals on promoting multilingualism. However, the implementation of the policies by 
SGBs has varied. English and Afrikaans were still the dominant languages used in 
teaching, and were parents’ preferred choices offered by the curriculum. Studies showed 
that many schools do not have formal written language policies. In many cases the 
formulation of language policies by SGBs took place haphazardly and without proper 
planning, and in other instances, decisions were not made in full SGB meetings (CEPD 
2000, 2001 & 2002). In some schools language policy is limited to the introduction of an 
African language in schools that traditionally offered English or Afrikaans as the medium 
of teaching and learning (CEPD 2000, 2001 & 2002; Motala et. al. 2002). This was 
evident in most of the schools included in this study where members of SGB 
acknowledged that they have not formulated language policies for their schools. 
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The absence of language policies in many schools is attributed to lack of capacity by 
SGB members particularly those from townships and rural schools. This may be due to 
the technical nature of the policy, inadequate training or lack of orientation as to their 
specific roles and responsibilities (Motala et. al. 2002). However, studies showed that 
there are instances where SGBs possess the necessary skills and capacity but failed to 
come up with proper school language policies. This could be attributed to the fact that 
language policies in education have been received with mixed feelings by some of the 
parents particularly those from affluent and advantaged communities. According to Mda: 
 
South Africa’s White (and sometimes Indian and Coloured) parents have frequently articulated 
their concerns about the new language policy as fears of lowered academic standards or of the 
diminution of Western and Afrikaner language and culture (Mda 1997:372).     
  
5.8.5 Code of conduct 
All respondents from Former Model C schools indicated that they participated in 
developing codes of conduct for learners in their schools. Those from rural schools stated 
that learners’ codes of conduct were developed by principals and teachers. 
 
 5.9 Relationship among, and between SGB and Educators 
It was noted in most schools that power struggles either between chairpersons of the SGB 
and principals or between the parent component of SGB and the rest of the educators 
were a problem. This cut across all school types. In some cases the parent component of 
the SGB would be on good terms with the principal and not with educators. Educators 
felt that in such cases parents were influenced by their chairpersons and principals to 
have a negative attitude towards them. On the other hand, principals and chairpersons of 
the SGBs who experienced such situations felt that educators who did not want to be 
reprimanded contributed to this situation. Problems of relationships between different 
members of SGBs could be partly attributed to the fact that departmental officials, 
particularly those at the district level, were not providing the required support to schools. 
Schools are left to implement some of the crucial policies on their own without receiving 
sufficient support and monitoring. This confirms what was stated in Part I of this Chapter 
where districts acknowledged that their role was to ensure policies are implemented and 
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to provide support to schools. However, these roles are not implemented effectively due 
to lack of capacity, inadequate funding and lack of transport. 
  
5.10 Problems of Communication 
Respondents expressed concern about lack of coherence at various levels of governance. 
The flow of information from provincial and district offices down to the schools was a 
major problem. SGB members revealed that they often received notices of workshops 
and meetings from the district offices at the last hour. They also contended that most 
often they do not receive in time policy circulars that they are required to implement. 
Often urgent matters are not attended to by district offices and they do not receive replies 
to correspondences. Many schools cited problems with payments of temporary and 
substitute teachers’ salaries. They gave examples of affected teachers who have been 
working for almost a year without salaries. However, respondents from district offices 
acknowledged the above problems exist and they contended that they experienced similar 
problems of communication with head office. This raises concerns about the new 
decentralised system and whether it is adequate to ensure effective control and 
coordination in implementing the transformational agenda.  
 
5.11 School Finances 
School governing bodies have been given responsibilities of financial management, 
including those of cost recovery in order to generate additional educational resources. All 
public school governing bodies are obliged by SASA to support their schools financially 
as best as they can.  This is evident in Section 36 of SASA which states: 
 
A governing body of a public school must take all reasonable measures within its means to 
supplement the resources supplied by the State in order to improve the quality of education 
provided by the school to all learners at the school (Department of Education 1996: 2A-25). 
 
The rationale for charging user fees was discussed in Chapter IV. All respondents in the 
ten schools acknowledged that their schools charge user fees. However, the amounts 
differed from those charged by former Model C schools which were higher while those 
charged by township and rural schools were relatively lower (See Table XXII).  
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Table XXII: Fees charged and received by schools included in the study 
 
School No. of 
learners 
Amount of 
fees 
charged by 
school per 
year* 
Potential Fee 
Income per 
year (in 
Rand) 
Actual Fee Income 
received per year 
(in Rand) 
Township A 982 80 R 78 560 R 31 432 (40%) 
Township B 942 60 R 56 520 R 16 956 (30%) 
Township C 985 100 R 98 500 R 59 100 (60%) 
Rural A 750 65 R 48 750 R 22 913 (47%) 
Rural B 500 65 R 32 500 R 8 125 (25%) 
Rural C 454 55 R 24 970 R 12 485 (50%) 
F. Model C 
(English 
medium) 
722 3000 R 2 166 000 R 2 057 700 (95%) 
F. Model C 
(Dual 
medium) 
965 3600 R 3 474 000 R 3 161 340 (91%) 
F. Model C 
(English 
medium) 
683 3000 R 2 049 000 R 1 782 630 (87%) 
F. Model C 
(Afrikaans 
medium) 
750 3150 R 2 362 500 R 2 126 250 (90%) 
 
* The amount excludes boarding fees 
 
The amounts given by respondents from former Model C schools ranged from R3 000 to 
R 3 600 per annum, while those from township and rural schools ranged from R55 to 
R100 per annum. Respondents expressed concern about non-payment of fees by parents 
who have not been granted partial or full exemption. Non-payment of school fees was 
more of a problem in township and rural schools. The percentage of learners who paid 
school fees in those schools ranged from 25% to 60%, while those who paid in former 
Model schools ranged from 87% to 98%.  It was evident from the discussions that many 
parents cannot afford to pay school fees. Discussions revealed that in former Model C 
schools only close to 10% of the parents are not able to pay fees. Those in township and 
rural schools acknowledged that close to 58% could not afford to pay fees. Most 
respondents were aware of the policy that learners could not be expelled from schools for 
not paying school fees and that parents could apply for partial or full exemption.    
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However, in the discussions some respondents felt it was not advisable to inform parents 
about their right to apply for partial or full exemption from paying school fees. Principals 
from township and rural schools acknowledged that they do not inform parents because if 
they are aware of the policy many of them may not have to pay fees. They argued that if 
parents are informed no one will pay.  One respondent who is a principal remarked:  
 
• The fact that parents have been told children will not be sent home, many of them have taken 
advantage and even those who can afford are no longer paying school fees. If you tell them about 
partial or full exemption, the policy will be abused and no one will pay and the Department will 
not compensate the school. It is really a struggle in some of our schools to get parents to pay fees 
(Respondent: Principal, Rural School). 
 
Another principal stated: 
 
• In many of our schools we still send children who have not paid school fees home because parents 
are never bothered even if you send hundred letters. If you call meetings they do not show up even 
if their households share the same fence with the school. So if you want to see them send children 
home or retain their reports. We know it is illegal but we do not get assistance from the 
Department to recover fees that are not paid by even some of the parents who can afford. Taking 
them to court will not be possible and it is not worthy it if you consider the amount that is claimed 
from a parent. Moreover, we do not have money to pay lawyers (Respondent: Principal, Township 
School). 
 
Because of not being informed, it was revealed that in many schools only a very small 
percentage of parents has been exempted from paying school fees. Information obtained 
from district offices showed that the percentage of parents with children in township and 
rural schools who have been officially exempted range from 2% to 4% and those in the 
former Model C schools from 10% to 25%.  In some of the township schools, parents 
who were exempted from paying fees had to offer their services free of charge to schools 
despite the fact that this is not provided as a condition in the Norms and Standards for 
School Funding. Services offered included building, repairs and general maintenance of 
school buildings, general cleaning of the school buildings and compounds, school 
gardening and other manual jobs. As stated in Section 5.8.3, the former Model C schools 
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have ways of excluding poor parents regardless of their race. During the discussions it 
was confirmed that in many former Model C schools the economic status of parents is 
‘indirectly investigated’ by principals before a child is accepted for admission in any 
grade. Many schools avoid admitting children of parents who are likely to apply for 
partial or full exemption of school fees. However, they ensure that they take a limited 
number of them. 
    
The majority of respondents expressed concern about exempting parents from paying 
school fees while at the same time not being given additional funding to cover the loss of 
income. Respondents from the Department stated that schools are allocated funds 
according to the Norms and Standards for School Funding of 1998. They acknowledged 
that placing different schools on right quintiles has been a challenge to the Department as 
the latter realised that in many cases it has worked more to the advantage of some better 
off schools while the worst deprived and disadvantaged schools have not benefited as 
anticipated. Departmental officials confirmed that they were preparing better instruments 
that would enable them to assess and place schools on right quintiles. They also indicated 
that more SGBs from schools in township and rural areas would be given additional 
responsibilities and become section 21 schools by 2005. While this might be a good 
move, the capacity of the SGBs to perform those functions need to be considered given 
that there is no support staff and many members and teachers lack skills in financial 
management. 
 
Respondents indicated that, as members of SGBs they had been involved in drawing up 
budgets for their schools. However, some of them stated they were only consulted about a 
budget that was already prepared and were not involved directly in the preparation 
process. According to SASA, the budget is supposed to be prepared by SGB after which 
it is discussed and approved by a meeting of all parents. Some respondents expressed 
concern that budgets were prepared by principals and other members of school 
management team, though at times few selected members of the SGB were included. 
Others stated their budgets were not approved by all parents as their schools did not hold 
meetings for that purpose. 
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Discussions showed that some SGBs in former Model C schools, and some of the 
township schools, were able to cope with financial responsibilities because of teamwork 
and financial skills possessed by some of their members. Schools that included SGB 
members with relevant skills (due to their qualification and position at work) were better 
positioned to assume greater financial responsibility. 
 
5.12 Staff Appointments 
According to SASA, SGBs have been granted rights to recommend appointment of 
teachers to the Department of Education (Department of Education 1996). According to 
discussions former Model C schools made recommendations to the department for the 
appointment of additional staff. However, some of the district officials indicated that 
close to 50% of SGBs in the township and rural schools did not make recommendations 
on hiring additional staff. It should be noted that not all those schools that made 
recommendations for more teachers were successful. This has resulted in large teacher: 
learner ratios and overcrowded classrooms. 
 
Most former Model C schools were able to hire extra teachers who were paid from 
additional funds raised by SGBs and school fees. Respondents acknowledged that this 
practice was not possible in most of township and rural schools due to lack of funds to 
pay for additional educators. One of the township schools had secured the services of two 
volunteer teachers who were drawn in for as little as R 400 per month without benefits. 
Respondents indicated that volunteer teachers were qualified educators who were not 
able to secure full time employment. However, such teachers lacked experience and 
sufficient skills and were required to be mentored. Recommendations for appointing 
teachers are supposed to be made by SGBs. However, in many cases school management 
teams or principals together with some of their teachers made the recommendations. This 
was justified that parents were not always available and that the urgency of the matter did 
not necessitate holding consultations with all SGB members in the process. In other 
schools, principals would hold informal consultations with SGB members after the 
process had taken place.     
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Some principals stated that they excluded SGB members from meetings that made 
recommendations for appointments of staff because they are not available most times due 
to commitment in other businesses. They also felt that recommending staff for 
appointments is a technical and professional exercise which many of the SGB members 
who are illiterate would find difficult to perform. The problem of excluding SGB 
members could also be attributed to lack of clarity with regard to distinction between 
school governance and school management.      
 
Principals dominate in many of SGBs functions. Their dominance is apparent on such 
areas as policy development, drawing up the budget and determination of school fees. 
SGB members and parents do not make decisions on those aspects most of the time. 
Principals in collaboration with School Management Teams, make decisions and then 
approach SGB members or parents for endorsement. This practice seemed to be very 
common in township and rural schools that were included in this study. Lewis and 
Motala (2004:130) observe “devolution of authority by SASA has strengthened the hand 
of the principal. While this may be positive for some spheres of activity, it is not 
sufficient to fulfil SASA’s promise of democratic participation of role players or 
stakeholders”. Instead of strengthening local democracy, it could reinforce the power and 
influence of school management teams.  Centralisation of authority at the school level is 
not experienced in all schools. Bischoff and Sayed (1999) observe that principals in 
former Model C schools have not experienced change in their role of financial 
management. However, those in township and rural schools admitted that they had 
experienced a shift with regard to their role, taking more responsibilities that could have 
been performed by SGBs. 
 
5.13  Capacity Building 
The findings have revealed the need for intensive and serious training for SGB members, 
particularly for those in township and rural schools. The Eastern Cape Department of 
Education has conducted training for SGBs. Most of the training was done at district 
level by education development officers. Due to lack of adequate trainers, training of 
SGBs has also been outsourced to NGOs and other private organisations. The most 
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crucial areas of training have been conflict resolution and financial management. 
However, training has been haphazard and uncoordinated, with no follow up support. It 
has also been too academic and not practical enough to suit the needs of the members. In 
many cases it has been conducted without a proper needs analysis (CEPD 2000, 2001 & 
2002). Equally there has been no proper monitoring and follow up support and mentoring 
by the provincial Department of Education. This was acknowledged in discussions with 
members of the provincial Department who attributed the problems to lack of adequate 
manpower, transport and financial resources. Due to lack of monitoring, SGBs in most 
affluent schools use their own discretion in conducting their affairs, neglecting issues of 
equity, redress and democratic participation as stipulated in the policy. These concerns 
were raised by many respondents from the provincial Department of Education and 
NGOs.  
  
5.14 Discussions emanating from the findings from Part I and II 
The findings show that the government has opted for governmental and sectoral mixes of 
policy delivery system. In the governmental mix, the responsibility for implementation of 
different education programmes and activities has been entrusted to different levels of 
government, that is national, provincial and school levels. The different levels and 
structures have been allocated powers and responsibilities. Furthermore, districts have 
been ‘empowered’ and more responsibilities and decision making powers have been 
granted to those levels to enable them make decisions and implement education policies. 
In the sectoral mix, the provincial Department of Education has outsourced the delivery 
of some of the programmes and activities to consultants and NGOs from within and 
outside the country to enhance quick delivery of services. It has also involved 
communities like school governing bodies to participate in policy delivery at school 
level. This is intended to make services more responsive to community’s needs and 
increase their involvement in the way in which services are delivered.    
 
However, the findings reveal that arrangements of structures including allocation of 
powers and functions have affected the delivery of education policy. There is incoherence 
among the fragile and weak structures at all levels with lack of proper coordination, 
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control, communication and monitoring among them. There is lack of capacity and 
adequate financial resources to implement the education programmes and activities at the 
school level. This in turn, has resulted in lack of proper implementation of the 
transformation agenda and selective delivery of policies. The findings reveal that while 
the first phase of bureaucratic restructuring adopted a ‘top down’ rational policy 
implementation model, there was an implementation deficit for the reasons identified 
above. However, with the second phase of bureaucratic restructuring an attempt was 
made to apply new managerialism and implement ‘bottom up’ model of policy 
implementation. In this model districts were given more powers to plan their own 
programmes and budgets in collaboration with the head office. Consequently schools 
were supposed to decide what support and assistance the district office will provide and 
how it will deliver. The findings show that there were setbacks due to confusion about the 
line of authority and accountability and also lack of capacity. Problems of corruption, 
mismanagement and lack of commitment and will among implementers particularly at 
the head office, were also noted. 
 
The findings also show that street level implementers with their expertise, skills and 
position use their own discretion to interpret policies; and thus deviating from the goals 
set by those policies. This is also related to the issue of policy changing the role of the 
state and decentralisation of its functions. In this process, lower level implementers have 
been empowered with greater latitude to make decisions and be held accountable for 
them. They are able to determine which policies or elements of policies to implement and 
this is likely to advantage some groups while neglecting others. This is evident from the 
findings on implementation of the provision on School Governance of the South African 
Schools Act. We can conclude from the findings that institutional arrangements and 
structures including allocation of powers and functions constrain policy implementation. 
The situation is also aggravated by lack of capacity and commitment and adequate 
financial and other resources.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The post-apartheid government of South Africa has committed itself to achieving 
fundamental transformation of the education system. It has put in place policies and 
measures that would bring about the goals of equity and redress and enhance democracy 
and participation of all groups in the development and decisions making processes. It is 
evident from the findings that the government has taken great strides within this short 
period to implement its transformation agenda in education. While it has to be 
commended for the achievements, this study found that the transformation of the 
education sector has been beset by major challenges and factors that have led to setbacks 
and contradictions in the policies and different strategies put in place. The setbacks have 
also affected the process of formulating and implementing policies. This conclusion 
draws from the findings on the transformation process and policies in the education 
sector. It also shows how the theories and methodology adopted have been used in the 
study. 
 
6.1 The Establishment of a Government of National Unity         
Some of the agreements reached in the negotiated settlement have affected the policies 
adopted to transform the education system. The setbacks which were evident during the 
transition period continued to adversely affect the policies and the goals of achieving 
equity and redress in the education sector. The establishment of a Government of 
National Unity during the transition period meant that decisions were made on the basis 
of compromise, negotiation and consensus. This implied that the post-apartheid 
government would be restricted to act on various aspects of transformation. It also limited 
its latitude and flexibility to manoeuvre social and economic issues and this had 
implications for the transformation of education. However, this does not mean that the 
new government did not have any options or choices for implementing the transformation 
agenda. The national Department of Education had the option of developing strategic 
priorities and identifying specific areas of intervention. However, it opted to produce a 
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range of policy frameworks in all areas without considering the implications of their 
implementation such as financial and human resources, the arrangements of structures 
including their powers and responsibilities, and other crucial factors (Sayed 2001; 
ECSECC 2001). The measures taken by the Department could be attributed to lack of 
experience and capacity on the part of the newly appointed senior management. This was 
exploited by some of the officials that had served in the apartheid government who were 
threatened by the change and were not willing to adapt to the new approach and 
orientation. They continued to conduct business as before and this affected the pace of 
the transformation programme in education.  
  
6.2 Formulation of Education Policies 
Education policy is generated by provincial and national representatives and then 
discussed by HEDCOM after which it is passed to CEM for approval. It is then presented 
to Cabinet for approval as an executive policy programme and thereafter it is either 
implemented or taken through legislative route to be adopted by parliament.  Different 
groups and policy networks influenced the policy process in the education sector. The 
example of the formulation of SASA was provided where the major influence was 
exerted by two policy networks. The first one was composed of the NP, the Freedom 
Front, the Model C based South Africa Federation of State Aided Schools and the 
Afrikaans Press. Relationship of the members is attributed to the fact that they had 
common values, goals and interests. They were in favour of more power being devolved 
to SGBs. This measure would enable retention of existing privileges and positions of 
Model C schools and also enable the above groups to maintain their interests. However, 
they also had individual interests that were pursued through the network.   
 
The second network one consisted of the ANC Study Group, the ANC aligned education 
organisations and intellectuals, Members of Parliament, COSAS and officials from the 
Department of Education who were members of the ANC. All the members pursued 
common goals, values and interests. Members of the groups wanted to see policies that 
would enhance democracy, equity and redress particularly among the disadvantaged 
groups and communities. Consequently, they also wanted to see reorganisation of the 
 327 
 
 
school system to ensure equity and redress. There were also had individual interests that 
were pursued within the network. The first network exerted more influence on the policy 
when it was in the hands of the Department of Education. This is attributed to the fact 
that the Department had to enter into negotiations with Model C SGBs. The need arose 
from the fact that the NP had granted powers to Model C SGBs which required the 
Department of Education to negotiate with those bodies before effecting any changes that 
would affect them. Therefore, formulation of SASA obliged the Department of Education 
to enter into negotiations with governing bodies of Model C schools before any changes 
were made to their powers as required by Section 247 of the Interim Constitution. 
 
Negotiations with the governing bodies of Model C schools gave them advantages as 
they were able to have many aspects and functions of their SGBs included in the new 
Bill. The second network was only able to exert some influence when the Bill was taken 
to the Parliamentary Portfolio on Education and amendments were made to some of the 
provisions. The Bill favoured the first network because financial constraints allowed 
SGBs in all public schools to charge fees. The main issue is that the apartheid 
government used the institutions of the state to make changes in the school system to 
make it difficult for the new government to radically transform the education system. 
Evidently, such measures affected the policy process and policy change.  
 
It is evident from above that the education policy formulation process was open to all 
groups and individuals in South Africa with the establishment of different structures and 
avenues for participation. However, constraints in participation were evident in the 
established structures and avenues. As different legislation is taken through the political 
process in the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Education, it creates the opportunity 
for participation by various stakeholders through public hearings called by the 
Committee. The majority of ordinary people were excluded because the cost of 
participation (transport, time and other resources) became too high. Other avenues and 
strategies have also shut out ordinary people particularly those from formerly 
disadvantaged communities. This means that opportunities were more opened to better 
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resourced NGOs, private and business sector interests, formerly advantaged and most 
affluent groups in the country.  
 
Statutory bodies have been established at various levels to enhance participation by 
different stakeholders and groups. The establishment of such bodies ignores the fact that 
organised civil society has unequal and varied capacity. Their effective participation is 
constrained by inequities in race and gender, and in many cases, statutory bodies have 
been dominated by white, male, most affluent and highly educated representatives. Their 
composition has been heavily weighted towards ministerial appointments which limit 
members from meaningful participation. The findings also showed that in some 
provinces, like the Eastern Cape, the Department of Education has not yet established the 
stipulated statutory bodies; while in others the structures are in place but they are not 
functioning. 
 
The participation of provinces through the NCOP has encountered a number of 
challenges. Section 76 bills which concern provinces are supposed to be discussed in the 
provincial legislature after first reading in the NCOP. Provinces are required to solicit 
inputs from people during this period. However, permanent delegates to the NCOP 
present bills to the provincial legislature late thus making effective consultation 
impossible, and this denies the participation of the majority of people in the province. It 
has also been shown that permanent delegates spend time that they would have used for 
consultation in their provinces by participating in discussions on Section 75 bills which 
are not within the mandate of the provinces. Some of the provinces have failed to adapt 
national legislation to suit the respective provincial environment due to lack of 
knowledge and capacity. Consequently, many of them have developed very few pieces of 
legislation due to lack of capacity. Evidently, these factors have affected participation in 
education policy development.  
 
Members of Parliament are obliged to consult with people through their constituency 
work. In this process, people in the constituencies are availed the opportunity 
opportunities to provide input to some of the policies. Members of Parliament have been 
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allocated constituencies and provided with offices and funding to enable them perform 
their duties in the constituencies. However, in many cases, the participation of ordinary 
people has not been effective because the system of proportional representation allows 
Members of Parliament to be more accountable to their parties than constituencies. 
Therefore they have lesser commitment towards constituencies allocated to them by their 
parties.           
 
Therefore, participation has not been inclusive as anticipated and the majority of those 
who were able to do so effectively were well resourced NGOs, private and business 
sector interests, a small segment of the elite and most affluent groups in the country. It 
marginalised or excluded those in the lower levels most of them from the formerly 
disadvantaged communities. The above challenges can be attributed to:  
• Compromises made in the negotiation process in Kempton Park and the changes 
made by the apartheid government in the education sector before the 1994 
elections. Formulation of SASA is among the examples where the new 
government had to enter into negotiations with the Model C SGBs. This provided 
more advantage to Model C SGBs and other affluent groups. 
• The functioning of participatory institutions, bodies, avenues and so forth 
provided more opportunities to certain groups with more influence and ideas to 
participate, while those without same were left out. 
• Arrangements, functioning and powers of structures particularly at the provincial 
level constrained participation of some groups and stakeholders in the process. 
This is evident in the findings on the arrangements and the way the NCOP, 
provincial legislatures and the Departments of Education operate or function. 
•  Lack of capacity, commitment, will and understanding of procedures among 
provincial politicians and Departmental officials. This has shown in the findings 
on the policy formulation in the Eastern Cape province. 
 
6.3 Economic Policy 
With the establishment of the new government, it was realised that the country was 
already spending a large share of its gross domestic product (GDP) on education which is 
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higher than the international average for developing countries. It was therefore clear that 
any increase in education expenditure would only be financed by economic growth. In 
the initial two years, the post apartheid government put forward its Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) which was developed prior to the 1994 elections. It 
entailed massive human resource development as one of the key components driving the 
nation’s economic reconstruction. Under the RDP budgeting for education would be 
based on needs. However, given the scale of injustices and inequities it was soon realised 
that there was a need for more investment than the state could afford. Therefore, the 
government committed itself to a macroeconomic framework, the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) to provide stability in the economy and resources for 
greater distributive justice.  
 
GEAR is based on an export led strategy with reduced tariff barriers to attract foreign 
investment and stimulate growth. It also emphasizes privatisation of essential state assets 
and removal of exchange controls. It is aimed at reducing the government’s financial 
deficit and is focused on a projected economic growth of 6% per annum. GEAR did not 
attract the amount of required foreign investment as expected and the economic growth 
per annum was at times negligible or very low. Emphasis on fiscal discipline and 
concentration on the reduction of fiscal deficit led to reduction in the education budget. 
Therefore there was no anticipated additional funding for educational expenditure. 
Hence, additional funding to enable redress could only be raised by allowing schools to 
charge fees; redistribution of resources through the Equitable Share Formula and resource 
targeting of poor schools (intra- provincial equity).      
 
The outcome of charging school fees was that children from formerly advantaged 
communities stayed in public schools because they continued to receive quality 
education. At the same time it enhanced inequities on the basis of class since it enabled 
children of all races from middle class families to access quality education in the former 
Model C schools. Fees have also reinforced the advantages enjoyed by the former Model 
C schools without at the same time increasing resources to former state schools which 
served mostly disadvantaged groups.  
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 The post-apartheid government has attempted to direct greater levels of resources to 
provinces that were historically disadvantaged through the Equitable Shares Formula in 
order to address the issue of jurisdictional inequality and poverty. The Equitable Shares 
Formula was phased in over a period of four years so as to ensure that those provinces 
which were projected to receive real cuts in their budgetary allocations were given 
sufficient time to make the necessary adjustments, either to their expenditures or to their 
own revenues. However, despite these measures (which have seen significant allocation 
to poor provinces), inequitable distribution of resources across provinces still remains. 
The poorer provinces, namely the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and KwaZulu Natal, spend the 
least per capita on education while the wealthier provinces like the Western Cape and 
Gauteng spend relatively more per learner. This is despite the fact that the poorer 
provinces spend a proportionately high percentage of their provincial budget on 
education. 
  
To achieve intra-provincial equity the government initiated policy to direct more funding 
to poorer schools. In 1999 the Department established Norms and Standards of School 
Funding which stipulate funding procedures to promote equity and redress within the 
context of inadequate government spending and more reliance on parental financial 
contribution for education. The Norms and Standards provide the poorest public schools 
and those in bad physical condition a larger resource allocation than the relatively 
advantaged schools. The major challenge that was faced was that the Norms and 
Standards of School Funding did redress personnel costs in favour of poor schools as 
compared to non-personnel costs. Therefore, the proportion of the budget transferred 
from the least poor to most poor is small; limited to non-personnel funds and is most 
likely to have very little impact on reducing inequalities. Wealthier schools continue to 
benefit more as personnel costs favour schools that qualify for additional staff based on 
broader subject choices. Consequently more weight is given to mathematics, science and 
technical subjects. Schools offering these subjects most of which are former Model C 
schools, are allocated more teachers. Similarly, there have been challenges with the 
exemption clause because some schools exclude learners whose parents are not able to 
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pay or those that are likely to apply for exemption. Therefore the above findings show 
that inadequate funding and lack of the required economic growth is likely to affect the 
attainment of the goals of equity and redress in education.  
 
6.4 Arrangement of Structures and Allocation of Powers and their effects on 
Policy Implementation 
The transformation of education and education policies were also affected by the 
arrangements of structures including their powers and functioning. This has created 
vertical and horizontal incoherencies, lack of coordination, control, communication and 
proper monitoring. Problems of allocation of powers and the functioning of structures at 
the national and provincial levels have resulted in the provincial Departments of 
Education setting their own priorities and implementing policies selectively. This is 
attributed partly to the national Department of Education’s failure to prioritise 
interventions. Instead, the National Department developed policy frameworks in all areas 
of education that provincial Departments of Education were expected to implement, and 
in many cases, without budgeted funding. The fact that funding was allocated by 
provincial legislatures exacerbated the problem because the National Department had no 
control of the financial resources. The above developments resulted due to lack of 
coordination, control, communication and monitoring and consequently, this derailed the 
transformation of education.  
 
Both provincial and national Departments of Education have attempted to address this 
problem by different measures. There was restructuring and reorganisation of the 
bureaucracy including the introduction of new managerialism which includes giving 
more decision making powers to the districts, introduction of performance management 
systems, controls and monitoring and so forth. Despite the above measures that were 
adopted, the task of ensuring proper coordination, control, communication, monitoring 
still persisted in many provinces, particularly in the Eastern Cape Department of 
Education. 
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Lack of proper implementation is also attributed to lack of capacity, commitment and 
resources. Many of the people who were appointed in the senior management positions 
lacked the necessary skills and experience despite the fact that they enjoyed political 
legitimacy and had commitment to transformation. Officials who served in the apartheid 
government had experience in generic administrative procedures but not in the 
management style and orientation of the new administration. Although many of them 
adapted to the new changes, some of them resisted and continued to use old practices. 
This had a deleterious effect on the pace of transformation in education. This problem 
was exacerbated by the fact that the Province incorporated two homelands of Transkei 
and Ciskei which were very poor and had a lot of backlogs. The two provinces had civil 
services that lacked capacity and motivation; and a history of corruption and 
maladministration. This adversely affected the transformational agenda in education in 
the Eastern Cape Province. 
   
Problems of capacity and mismanagement led to the Treasury taking over the 
responsibilities of managing the finances of the Eastern Cape Provincial Department of 
Education. The consequences were tightly controlled system which curtailed or delayed 
the implementation of various programmes. It was difficult to build capacity in the 
Department of Education now that financial responsibilities were entrusted to the 
Treasury. Provincial Departments of Education have restructured a number of times in 
order to facilitate the effective implementation of policies.  
 
There have also been differences of capacity in policy implementation between and 
among schools. Former Model C schools remain privileged as they have the capacity to 
implement their programmes. SGBs in those schools understand their roles and 
responsibilities and they have capacity and sufficient funding to implement them. They 
also have adequate resources and teachers to deliver the curriculum effectively. Township 
and rural schools have elected SGBs. However, many of them lack the necessary skills. 
Capacity building by the Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Education has not been 
adequately provisioned due to lack of funding. Lack of capacity means that the 
responsibilities and functions of the SGBs are performed by principals. Additional 
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responsibilities affected performance by principals and other members of the school 
management and also opened the doors for undemocratic practices in the governance of 
schools.  
 
Financial constraints remain a problem in the township and rural schools despite 
redistributive measures taken by the Department. Most schools do not have adequate 
learning materials and resources. Others lack sufficient number of teachers and educators. 
The above differences have exacerbated inequities between wealthy and, township and 
rural schools.                 
 
Overall, the findings of the study have shown that various factors have led to setbacks  
and contradictions in the policies that were adopted in education. They have also affected  
formulation and implementation of the policies, hence exerting certain limitations on the  
achievements of the goals of transformation in education. The factors identified in the  
findings are the outcome of the negotiated settlement and subsequent changes made by  
the apartheid government in education before the 1994 elections; constraints and unequal   
participation of different groups in education policy development in various established  
structures and avenues; drawbacks in the implementation of education policies by  
decentralised structures and agents at various levels. This was exacerbated by lack of  
capacity, lack of adequate resources, lack of commitment and will among some of the  
civil servants. The legacy of apartheid and the homeland governments, together with 
existing backlogs added another layer. Consequently, there were challenges in the  
economic policy which led to decrease in funding for education.  
 
6.5 Discussions on Theories and Methodology used in the Study 
6.5.1 Theory 
The study is premised on the fact that transformation/ including policy and the policy 
process, involves an examination of a multiplicity of formal and informal negotiations, 
contestation and struggle between competing groups with different perceptions, 
expectations, interests and ideas. This takes place throughout the process, that is, when 
policy texts are being produced; when they are being discussed and scrutinised in public 
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discussions and hearings; when they are being adopted in the legislature or other bodies; 
and when they are being implemented, monitored and evaluated. During these different 
stages policies are modified, constituted and reconstituted. As a result, they give rise to 
intended and unintended outcomes which are likely to support or contradict the objectives 
of those policies. Hence, in all its stages the policy process is beset with continuous 
debate, contestation and struggle for the success of ideas and interests which are pursued 
by individual actors, groups and policy networks through the institutions. Hence, 
examination and analysis of the process has taken those factors into consideration. 
Consequently, it is evident that the process cannot be explained using one approach. This 
study has been situated in ideas, group and networks and institutional approaches to 
examine the factors that have affected education policies, their formulation and 
implementation and the overall transformation of education in South Africa. It contends 
that policy change and variation result from interaction of ideas and interests within 
patterns of group and policy networks and preset institutions.  
  
The study adopted institutional approach to explain the effect or consequences of 
institutional rules or structures, arrangements and procedures on the adoption and content 
of policies in the education sector in South Africa including the outcome of their 
implementation. This was done by examining changes made by the apartheid government 
through institutional structures during the negotiation process. It also involved the 
examination of institutions that are involved in the education policy process including 
their arrangements, allocation of powers and responsibilities. Among the institutions 
examined were the provincial and national Departments of Education, the national 
Assembly, the NCOP, provincial legislatures and other bodies. It also included analysis 
of the formal policy process and different roles performed by each institution.   
 
The findings showed that the apartheid government being the government of the day used 
institutional norms and rules to effect changes that would enable its constituencies 
maintain existing interests and make difficult for the new government to effect 
subsequent changes. As indicated in Section 6.1, agreements reached in the negotiation 
process in Kempton Park, like the establishment of the Government of National Unity, 
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meant that decisions were made on the basis of compromise, negotiation and consensus. 
The implications were that the post-apartheid government would be restricted to act on 
various aspects of transformation. It also limited its latitude and flexibility to manoeuvre 
social and economic issues and this had implications on the transformation of education. 
Moreover, some of the changes made by the apartheid government entailed negotiations 
with different actors, for example the formulation of SASA obliged the Department of 
Education to negotiate with Model C SGBs. It is evident that negotiations entail 
compromises with one side benefiting more than the other. The findings show that this 
was the case with Model C SGBs which had most of their recommendations included in 
SASA.  
 
The findings also show that arrangements of structures including allocation of powers 
and responsibilities have affected policy formulation and implementation. The study 
revealed that there is lack of proper coordination, control, communication, proper 
monitoring, lack of accountability and other factors which affect efficient policy delivery. 
This has had effect on policy implementation. The arrangements, powers and 
responsibilities have also affected policy formulation particularly at the provincial level. 
Therefore, the main conclusions that can be made from the above findings are: 
institutional norms and rules; and also arrangements of institutional structures including 
allocation of powers and responsibilities, constrain policy variation and change. The 
policy process entails continuous debate, contestation and struggle for the success of 
ideas and interests which are pursued by individual actors, groups and policy networks 
through the institutions. The discussions in Chapter II showed that actors and groups use 
ideas to circumvent institutions in order to effect changes in the pursuit of their interests. 
Public officials have their own interests and ambitions that they seek through the control 
of state machinery. Since institutions consist of norms, rules and structures as well as 
being the formal apparatus of government, people from within are able to use those 
norms and rules to effect changes that would enhance and further their own interests.  
 
The institutional approach was not adequate to analyse how different actors in the 
different institutional structures, for example the executive and other actors, relate and 
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interact informally with groups from outside the government, politicians and other 
members of the executive and bureaucracy, and how such relationships and interactions 
affect the outcome of the policy process in education.  
 
Therefore, this study has also the adopted group and policy network approach and ideas 
to explain the effect of relationships and informal interactions including the use of 
various strategies by different groups and policy networks on decision making and 
content of policies and their implementation. The group and policy network approach has 
also been adopted to examine participation in different bodies, structures and avenues 
established by the government to enhance participation of all the people in policy 
formulation. The findings showed that the education policy process was influenced by 
different groups and policy networks. The example of how two networks were involved 
in the formulation of SASA has been discussed in the study to show how groups and 
networks influence policies. The first network consisted of the NP, the Freedom Front, 
the Model C based South African Federation of State Aided schools, the Afrikaans Press 
and other constituencies made up of mostly white groups. The second one was made up 
of the ANC Study Group, ANC aligned education organisations and intellectuals, ANC 
Members of Parliament, COSAS and officials from the Department of Education who 
were members of the ANC.  
 
The two groups have been identified as policy networks because they were made up of 
actors from interest group representatives, bureaucrats, politicians and other people in 
decision making positions. The findings revealed that each network had a broader 
network interest. At the same time, each group or actor in each network had a specific 
interest which was pursued within the broader network interest. Actors and groups 
participated and cooperated in the network as long as there was a relationship between 
the broader network interest and specific group interests. Each network was made of 
loose, open membership. For example, it was observed in the findings that in the second 
network different members attended discussions depending on whether issues being 
discussed were of interest and concern to them.  
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The findings also showed that the relationship of the actors or different groups in each 
network could be attributed to the fact that they had common values, interests and goals. 
However, what brought them close and linked them together was the broader network 
interest and the fact that they could also pursue their group or individual interests. 
Therefore, the findings support what group and network approach advocate, namely 
networks are formed because of similar interests among the participants. The findings 
revealed that the relationship within members of a network on its own does not enhance 
influence in the policy process but need to be linked with ideas. For example, in SASA 
both networks held workshops and on the basis of the discussions and ideas from the 
actors and groups, they were able to make submissions to the Department of Education 
and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Education. The fact that the Department of 
Education had to negotiate with Model C SGBs in order to fulfil the requirements of 
Section 247 of the Interim Constitution availed opportunities to the governing bodies 
including others in the first group to advance their preferences and maintain existing 
interests. This had implications for policy change, as the bill included most of the aspects 
advanced by Model C SGBs. 
  
On the other hand the second network advanced ideas on amendments and variation of 
the Bill. However, inadequate funding led to agreement on allowing schools to charge 
fees. The decision worked to the advantage of Model C SGBs who were also able to exert 
most influence in the initial stages of the bill. They were also advantaged by the fact that 
the apartheid government changed the school system before 1994 elections ensuring that 
the new government would not be able to implement changes without negotiations with 
those institutions. Although the above  findings are based only on SASA, they support 
what is advanced in group and network approach, namely the relationship that exist 
within a network does not necessarily enhance influence in the policy process but need to 
be linked with ideas advanced by competing networks. It is also evident from the above 
findings that institutional norms and rules and economic policy constrained policy change 
and this benefited the first policy network. This confirms findings from other studies 
which show that institutions and economic environment constrain policy change.   
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The government has put in place structures and avenues to enhance the participation of 
people in the formulation of education policy. They include commissions established by 
the Ministry and Department of Education; political party structures and caucuses; 
established statutory bodies at different levels; public hearing convened by the 
legislature; and parliamentary constituency offices. As the study has shown, despite the 
availability of those structures and avenues for participation, policy formulation in 
education has not been as inclusive as it was anticipated. The findings showed that the 
majority of those who were able to do so effectively and provide most input were 
resourced NGOs, private and business sector interests, a small segment of the elite and  
affluent groups in the country most of whom are from formerly advantaged groups. Many 
of these actors and groups had the necessary resources and information and were able to 
compete with other groups in making presentations in different avenues and structures 
established for participation. It marginalised or excluded other individuals and groups, 
many of them from formerly disadvantaged communities.  
 
Moreover, the arrangements, functioning and powers of the structures particularly at the 
provincial level, inhibited the participation of certain groups and stakeholders particularly 
those from the rural areas and formerly disadvantaged groups. Lack of capacity, 
commitment, will and understanding of procedures among provincial politicians and 
Departmental officials has also limited the effective participation in education policy 
formulation particularly among the formerly disadvantaged communities. It is not 
difficult to deduce from the findings that some of the policies will reflect the interests of 
those who were able to exert most influence. The above discussion on the role of the two 
policy networks in the formulation of  SASA and participation of different actors and 
groups in established structures and bodies in education policy formulation show that 
competing ideas and interests advanced by groups and networks have affect decision 
making and policy. Moreover, it is assumed that some policies will reflect and maintain 
the interests of those individual actors, groups and policy networks that exerted most 
influence. The above discussion also showed that institutional norms and rules, 
inadequate resources and economic environment constrain decision making and policy 
change and implementation. 
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Another aspect that was examined was policy implementation. Delivery of education 
programmes and activities is effected through governmental mix. It is implemented at 
national, provincial and local (district and school). Administrative and financial 
arrangements including powers granted to different levels are stipulated in the 
Constitution of South Africa 1996. The findings revealed that arrangements of structures 
including powers and responsibilities granted to different levels posed a number of 
challenges. They resulted in incoherencies among different levels and structures and 
problems of coordination, control, communication and monitoring. Problems of capacity 
in terms of adequate and skilled human resources and also lack of will and commitment 
among some of the employees were revealed. Inadequate resources and financing of 
programmes and activities resulted in policies not being implemented as planned or 
implemented selectively. These factors  led to skewed implementation of transformation 
programmes in education and have also enabled certain groups to maintain existing 
interests. This brings into the picture the role of street level bureaucrats. It also supports 
criticisms advanced against the ‘top down’ rational model of policy implementation as 
discussed in Chapter II.  
 
Parsons (1995:469) observed, “A public officer has discretion wherever the effective 
limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action and 
inaction. Whether the mode of implementation is top down or bottom up, those on the 
front line of policy delivery have varying bands of discretion over how they choose to 
exercise the rules which they are employed to apply”. The findings confirm the above 
statement by showing that implementers or street level bureaucrats in the provincial and 
lower levels used their discretion to implement education programmes selectively. Such a 
practice provided some of them with opportunities to implement programmes that are 
likely to enhance their interests or leave out those that would disadvantage them.  
 
The findings also show that there have been restructuring and reorganisation of the  
bureaucratic structures to address the challenges. More administrative powers and  
responsibilities were decentralised to districts to enable the head office focus on 
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coordination, monitoring, policy determination, providing leadership, support and  
direction to district structures in policy implementation. The head office became  
responsible for formulation of strategic priorities and districts were given the role of  
policy implementation and provision of school support. They were required to frame their 
activities within the strategic priorities set by the head office. Head office collaborates 
with districts to budget for the programmes and activities. The funds are then allocated to 
head office and districts which are required to implement the programmes and activities 
to meet specified performance targets. 
 
An attempt was made to introduce bottom up model of policy implementation. It also  
included other measures such as introduction of aspects of new managerialism, 
including outsourcing. The granting of powers to districts aimed at ‘empowering’  
employees of government in lower echelons with more power and control over their jobs; 
and also provide them with greater latitude to make decisions and become  
accountable for them. However, problems of lack of capacity in terms of adequate and  
skilled human resources, inadequate financial resources, proper coordination, control and 
monitoring continue to pose major challenges for policy implementation. The  
above findings reveal the government’s attempts to balance centralisation and  
control while at the same time enhancing decentralisation to enable provinces and other  
lower structures implement policies to attain transformation agenda. The findings  
confirm what Metcalfe and Richards saw as the main issue in governmental mix type of  
policy delivery. Here the need for centralisation becomes essential in order to secure 
control of national financial resources while at the same time decentralising in order to 
secure managerial benefits to ensure that education policy and programmes are 
implemented as required and that they meet the stated goals and objectives.  
“Centralisation in order to decentralise, and decentralisation as mode of centralisation  
thus constitutes a key paradox in the allocation of responsibilities in the modern state”  
(Metcalfe and Richards 1992). The above findings also confirm that institutional  
arrangements, including allocation of powers and responsibilities, constrain policy  
implementation. 
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Overall the findings in this study showed that institutions, groups and policy networks 
and ideas affected the policy process. Groups and networks participate in the policy 
process. They come together because they have common values, goals and interests. 
Their relationship emerges as a result of members being close and linked because of 
common interests and their own individual interest which is pursued within the network 
interest. Ideas are important because they are advanced by groups and networks with the 
purpose of competing to influence the policy process in order to enhance their interests. It 
takes place in both policy formulation and implementation. This confirms observations 
by John who stated: 
 
In the policy process there is a continual debate and struggle for the success of ideas and their 
attendant interests. What causes policy variation and change is the way in which certain ideas are 
selected. Ideas emerge either from policy entrepreneurs’ skill at advocacy, or from chance 
conjunctions of people and events or from a favourable environment (John 1999:19).    
 
The findings also reveal that institutional norms and rules and arrangements of structures 
including allocated powers and responsibilities constrain change. However, actors, 
groups and networks are able to use institutional norms and rules and arrangements of 
structures to advance or maintain interests. This is confirmed by Howlett and Ramesh 
(1995) who observe that actors and groups use ideas to circumvent institutions to effect 
changes in the pursuit of their interests. Public officials have their own interests and 
ambitions that they seek through control of state machinery. Since institutions comprise 
of norms, rules and structures as well as being the formal apparatus of government, 
people from within are able to use those norms and rules to effect changes that would 
enhance and further their interests. Consequently, the findings also show that economic 
policy and inadequate funding constrain change. Hence we can conclude that competing 
ideas and interests advanced by groups and networks have impact on decision making 
and policy. Moreover, it is assumed that some policies will reflect and maintain the 
interests of those individual actors, groups and policy networks that exert most influence. 
The above discussion also show that institutional norms and rules, inadequate resources, 
lack of capacity and skilled human resources and economic environment, constrain 
decision making and policy. 
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 6.5.2 Methodology 
The study is premised on the fact that transformation including policy and the policy 
process involves a multiplicity of formal and informal negotiations, contestations and 
struggle between competing groups with different perceptions, expectations and interests. 
This takes place throughout the process. During these different stages policies are 
modified, constituted and reconstituted. As a result, they give rise to intended and 
unintended outcomes which are likely to support or contradict the objectives of those 
policies. Therefore research directed at examining policies need to bring out the goals and 
objectives of policies, the target groups and consequences of such policies, and also 
identify the beneficiary groups or those advantaged by those policies.  
 
The above issues have been addressed in this study by adopting an interpretive qualitative 
methodology. The study has exposed different views and perceptions of reality on the 
transformation in the education sector by all the participants and groups that were 
included in the research. The views and perceptions were constructed by different groups 
and people involved in the study, namely, policy makers and implementers (government 
agents and NGOs, CBOs, FBOs etc.); those from formerly disadvantaged communities 
who are the intended beneficiaries of the transformation process in education; those from 
formerly advantaged communities, most of whom benefited from the former regime; and 
politicians from different parties.  
 
By adopting an interpretive qualitative methodology it was possible to use unstructured 
interviews, focus group discussions and face to face interactions to listen to the views of 
all the above groups and people included in the study. Those that were affected 
differently by the transformation process were able to open up and give their perceptions, 
views, experiences and opinions on how they saw the process as it unfolded. In the case 
of policy formulation, it was possible to find out groups that have been excluded and 
those that have been able to participate in the process. The methodology enabled us to 
conduct an in-depth examination of the process of policy formulation by interacting with 
the above actors, groups, communities and institutions. Through face to face interactions 
and getting the people to voice their perceptions, concerns, opinions and views on the 
 344 
 
 
policy formulation in the education sector, we were able to find out what took place in 
the process.  
 
Valadez and Bamberger (1994:330) observe, “Face to face interactions has (sic) the 
irreplaceable character of nonreflectivity and immediacy that furnishes the fullest 
possibility of truly entering the life, mind and definitions of the other as this other 
conceives it”. It was possible to obtain detailed information on the policy formulation 
process in the education sector and people’s perceptions and views on the structures and 
institutions involved in the process. We were able to scrutinise those structures and 
institutions to find out how they functioned, whose ideas and interests they served; the 
groups and people involved in the process; those that were excluded and the reasons for 
exclusion. 
 
The methodology enabled us to examine and scrutinize some of the education policies 
that have been put in place by analysing the texts and conducting face to face interactions 
with respondents from public schools (township, former Model C and rural schools); 
NGOs, CBOs, FBOs, political parties and government. Each individual and groups gave 
their perceptions, views and opinions on the policies (Education Financing Policies, 
Curriculum 2005, SASA (School Governance)). Through the interactions with the above 
groups and textual analysis of the policies, we were able to find out:  
• The scope of the policies that were identified in the process, that is, what the 
policies assumed they can do; how the issues are framed; existing contradictions 
in the policies and the relationships embedded in them.  
• The pattern of the policies, namely, what they build on or alter in terms of 
relationships, what organisational and institutional changes or developments they 
required.  
• The language used in some of the policies was scrutinised to find out the 
impressions they produce. The issue of language was mostly applicable to 
Curriculum 2005.  
 
The methodology used in the study enabled us to obtain information on the 
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implementation of policies in the education sector in the Eastern Cape. Unstructured 
interviews and face to face interactions were used to obtain views and opinions of people 
on the implementation of policies in the Eastern Cape Province. Policy makers, 
implementers (government agents, political parties, members of legislatures, CBOs, 
NGOs, FBOs, etc.), respondents from township, former Model C and rural schools 
related their experiences on the implementation of education policies in the province. By 
discussing openly and relating their experiences through face to face interactions, we 
were able to acquire information and knowledge on:  
• The establishment of the new provincial Department of Education and the major 
challenges encountered in the amalgamation process.  
• The arrangement of structures and powers allocated to different levels, that is, 
national, provincial, district and school levels and their relationships to the 
implementation process.  
• Agents/groups and institutions involved in the implementation process and the 
level of human, financial and other resources provided for implementation. 
• Major challenges encountered in policy implementation at different levels. 
Face to face interactions through unstructured interviews and observations were made at 
the school level to examine the implementation of SASA (School Governance 
component). Three types of public schools were examined, namely former Model C, 
Township and Rural schools. In doing so we were able to obtain information on the 
establishment of SGBs and the profiles of its members; how SGBs have functioned; their 
understanding and fulfilment of their roles and responsibilities; profiles of school 
governing bodies; and their capacity and training needs. The information that was 
collected from the three different types of public schools enabled us to make informed 
and balanced comparisons between the functions and performance of SGBs among those 
schools.  
. 
While it is evident that the government has made strides in pursuing the transformation 
agenda to ensure social justice, equity and redress in education, the methodology used in 
the study has enabled us to identify the challenges and limitations in respect of the 
process, namely: 
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• It enabled us to examine and expose the effects of education policies on the 
ground. This was evident in the analysis of different policies to show their 
limitations and inherent contradictions in the implementation of school 
governance in the four schools in the Eastern Cape province. 
• It has enabled us to examine and identify how and where policies increase 
inequality and impact unfairly on particular groups. This was observed in 
analysing the policies and in examining their implementation in the Eastern Cape 
Province. 
• It enabled us to scrutinize and examine established structures and institutions 
more critically and how they have constrained or facilitated the process of 
transformation in the education sector. 
Respondents from schools were not only able to provide their views on how policies have 
affected them, but also provided valuable comments on how and what actions could be 
taken to make policy improvements; as well as how they would like the policies and 
programmes to be implemented. They were also able to single out aspects of the policies 
that they identified as having limitations or contradictions.  
 
Although the methodology adopted in the study has enabled us to explore the information 
identified in the above sections, there are also limitations. While people relate their 
stories, perceptions, views and opinions, it is difficult to tell the extent of honesty in 
them. This was the same with observations made. Although the researcher would have 
preferred to take bigger samples for the study, hold more interviews with all the 
respondents and make more observations at the school level, time and resources were 
limited. The problems were addressed by securing alternative sources of information, 
mainly documents and also by going back to respondents to discuss with them the draft 
of the findings in order to obtain more clarification on some of the issues. The use of 
triangulation methods as a way of overcoming the above limitations was discussed in 
Chapter II. Consequently, the amount of data collected is immense and there is a danger 
that a researcher with limited time and deadlines to meet might leave out vital 
information.  As a researcher, I have my own values and convictions which are likely to 
affect the way I look at transformation in the education sector and the policies that have 
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been put in place, including their formulation and implementation. Therefore, this might 
affect the way the data from different respondents is interpreted. However, this was 
addressed by securing alternative sources of information, and also by obtaining more 
clarification on some of the issues in order to ensure that the respondents’ views were 
properly reflected. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
Interview schedule for Members of the National and Provincial Legislatures and 
officials from the National Department of Education 
 
 
1. Please discuss avenues and strategies of participation in policy development at 
national and provincial levels. Are all avenues functioning and known by all 
people? What problems are encountered by the structures in enhancing 
participation? Please discuss. 
 
2. How participation organised and who is responsible?  
 
3. Which groups or people participate most? Please discuss why particular groups 
are most active? 
 
4. Which groups or people are excluded? Please discuss why particular groups or 
people are excluded. 
 
5. In your opinion who benefits most in participation in the policy process? Has this 
affected the type of education policies formulated by the post-apartheid 
government? Please discuss.  
 
6. Please explain what measures could be taken to enhance effective participation in 
policy development by all groups? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
350
 
APPENDIX II 
 
Interview Schedule for Members of School Governing Bodies, Principals, Teachers 
and Learners in Township, Rural and former Model C Schools and Teacher Unions 
 
Formulation of South African Schools Act and Curriculum 2005 
 
1. Please discuss explain whether you are you conversant with the South African 
Schools Act and Curriculum 2005? 
 
  
2. What are the objectives of the two policies? 
 
3. Please give your views about the goals and content of the policies. Please discuss 
the aspects of the two policies you like and those you do not prefer and why? 
Please give reasons. What aspects were left out that you feel should have been 
included in the process? Please discuss.   
 
3. Please discuss whether you or your school provided input during the formulation 
of the two policies? Please discuss whether you participated as a group or an 
individual? 
 
4 If yes, what input did you provide? In what forum or place did you make input? 
How were you informed about the presentations? Who else was there to provide 
input? How was your input treated? Did it make a difference? 
 
5. Please discuss the stage at which you provided input in both policies? 
 
7. Are you satisfied with the methods and avenues used by policy makers to get 
people’s feedback on the two policies and others during the policy formulation 
stage? Please give your comments. What other groups and organisations do you 
think should have been involved in the process but were left out? Why do you 
think they were left out? 
 
8. Please discuss the changes you would you like to see in policy formulation in 
education? 
 
 
Implementation of South African Schools Act: School Governance and Democracy 
 
• What is the composition of members of the school governing body (Please give 
their number, gender and the positions they hold in the school) 
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• Please outline the roles and responsibilities of the SGB?   
 
• What has the SGB accomplished in each function? 
 
• Which functions do you feel the SGB has performed very well? 
 
• In which ways has it done well? 
 
• Why do you think it has performed well? 
 
• Which functions do you feel the SGB has not performed well? 
 
• Why has it not performed well? 
 
• What problems hinder effective performance of the SGB? 
 
• Please discuss whether there have there been any problems in determining the 
powers and functions between the SGB and the principal? 
 
• How many meetings of the SGB were held since it was established? How often 
are meetings of the SGB held? What issues are discussed in these meetings? 
 
• What type of training have members of the SGB received since they were 
elected? Who conducted the training? How many times has it been offered? What 
was the content of the training? Who met the cost of training? Has the training 
enhanced the performance of the SGB? (Please explain). 
 
• What are the major sources of funding for your school?  How much fees do you 
charge and on what criteria were the fees fixed?  Who was involved in fixing the 
fees? How much have collected per annum? What do you do about those who are 
not able to pay fees? Please explain how much funds the school is allocated by the 
Department per annum. Has the amount decreased or increased in the last five 
years?  What was the school able to do with additional funding if there was an 
increase? How did the school cope if there was a cut in funds? What do you 
experience as a result of funding problems?  
 
• Please discuss implementation of Curriculum 2005 in your school? What are the 
major problems is your school facing in implementation of the policy?  
 
 
Interview schedule for NGOs: Participation in formulation of Curriculum 2005 
 
• Please give your views on participation in education policy development before 
and after 1994 elections? 
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• What strategies are in place to enhance participation in policy development? What 
are the major strengths and weaknesses of the structures? 
 
• Please discuss your organization’s participation in development of Curriculum 
2005? What role did it play? At what stage did you participate? In your opinion 
did was everybody given opportunity to participate in the process? Who was 
excluded and why were they excluded? Who played a greater role? Please give 
your views why others were excluded while others were given opportunity to 
participate? Please give your views about Curriculum 2005, its major strengths 
and weaknesses?  
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APPENDIX III 
 
 
 
Interview Schedule for Officials from the Provincial Department of Education and 
Workers’ Union 
 
 
 
 Policy Development: The guiding questions for interviews are:  
• Which policies of transforming the education sector have been developed 
at the provincial level and are currently being implemented?  
• Please explain how the process of policy development in this province 
take place? 
• What part does individual stakeholders including different groups and 
organisations play?  
 
Responsibilities and Power between the National and Provincial Departments of 
Education: The guiding questions for the interview are: 
• Please explain responsibilities and powers of provincial Department of 
Education?  
• What areas which fall under provincial Department does the national 
Ministry of Education have powers over the Department.   
• Please explain areas where problems or conflicts have resulted because of 
powers and responsibilities provided to provincial Departments and 
national Ministry of Education by the Constitution? 
•   What do you feel are the advantages and purposes of co-ordination 
between national and provincial system and within the province itself?  
• Please explain whether decentralisation truly advances the process of 
democratic participation and decision making and what capacity problems 
exist in the province in this regard?  
• Please explain whether you think constitutional separation of powers and 
responsibilities in education has lead to dysfunctionality in the policy 
implementation and monitoring processes in education in the province.  
 
Provincial management Capacity and Management Institutions: The guiding 
questions for the interview are: 
• Please explain whether national Department structures ensure that a single 
coherent education system is maintained? 
• Please discuss the establishment of new provincial Department of 
Education and the challenges encountered in terms of establishing new 
organisational structures and reorganising the bureaucracy?  
• What is the staffing situation at the Headquarters, Regions and Districts?  
• What major problems does the civil service face in performing their 
duties?  
• In view of Ncholo Report what steps have both the national Ministry and 
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provincial Department of Education taken to improve provincial 
management systems and raising the level of provincial performance?  
• Please discuss the measures taken to address problems of integration and  
• What is the situation in terms of infrastructure, facilities and performance 
of people in the regions and districts? What powers have been delegated to 
those levels? What problems do those levels face in performing their 
duties? What monitoring and evaluation mechanisms have been put in 
place to assess performance in the regions and districts? 
• Does the department have a HRD plan? Do staff have clear job 
descriptions? How are individual’s performances monitored and 
managed? What is the role of the department in career pathing and 
training? How are training needs determined? Are all staff on a common 
Persal system? Are grievance and disciplinary procedures effective? 
• What is the relationship between management and the trade unions?  
• Has the Department faced problems of defining roles between political 
and administrative structures or have there been tensions between political 
and administrative structures resulting from problems of interference of 
each others’ responsibilities? How was the problem addressed?  
 
Democratic Participation and Governance Institutions The guiding questions 
for the interview are: 
• Has the province established a National Education and Training Council? 
If it has been established what is its composition? What has it achieved 
since its inception? What problems has it faced? If it does not exist, what 
plans are in place to establish one?  
• Do all schools in the province have active school governing bodies?  
• How do you rate performance of school governing bodies in different 
schools since they were established?  
• What problems has the Department experienced with school governing 
bodies in determining policies in the area of admission, religion practice 
and language to be used in schools and in performing their other 
functions?   
• What is the Department doing to make sure that user fees will not 
perpetuate inequalities?  
• What type of capacity programmes for school governing bodies is the 
Department implementing and what is the progress? 
 
Planning and Planning Implementation 
• To what extent does planning follow policy priorities? 
• Is planning needs driven or supply driven? 
• Does the department have effective systems in place to quantify and 
prioritize needs? 
• What is the research and information gathering capacity of the department? 
• To what extent does planning integrate with the budget process? 
 
 
355
• Are plans being implemented and what mechanisms are in place to 
monitor/modify plans? 
 
Policy and Policy Implementation 
• What were the key policy imperatives at the time, both with respect to 
transverse public service as well as education-specific issues and 
challenges? 
• How were provincial education policy imperatives determined and 
prioritized? 
• To what extend do these priorities integrate with overarching policy 
frameworks of the public service? 
• How well are key policies understood across the establishment 
structure? 
• How effectively are key policies implemented? 
• Are lines of political and operational accountability understood and 
effective? 
• What monitoring and evaluation systems and mechanisms are in place 
to ensure tracking of implementation, feedback, and realignment? 
 
 
Finance 
• Please discuss major problems encountered by the Department in 
allocation of funding, expenditure and managing the funds? 
• What changes have occurred in the budgeting process, with particular 
respect to the MTEF? 
• Have financial systems and packages been standardized across very 
section of the department? 
• What formal channels exist for different sections to input into the 
budget process? 
• What was the total debt carried by the department in the period under 
review? 
• How has the level of debt servicing increased during the period? 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
 
Observation Schedule of School Governing Bodies (SGBs) Meetings 
 
 
What to observe: 
 
1. Meeting procedure to find out:  
 
· times, days and places where meetings are held. This will enable the 
researcher to find out whether distance, times and days when meetings of 
SGBs are held affect attendance by members.  
 
· whether meetings of SGBs have quorum. 
 
· members who are present and those who are absent. Whether there is a 
pattern in schools whereby certain categories of members of SGBs do not 
attend meetings. 
 
The above three aspects will be complemented by examining minutes of previous 
meetings to find out whether there is a pattern of good attendance of meetings by some 
members and while others are often absent. 
 
 
2. Items to be discussed in meetings to find out: 
 
· whether  items on the agenda reflect on activities and functions of SGBs 
as stipulated in the Act; and whether those items are intended to promote 
effective implementation of the policy and proper management of teaching 
and learning in those schools. 
 
 
3. Discussions in the meetings to find out: 
 
· whether they implement decisions taken in previous meetings. This will be 
done by observing how they go through matters arising from minutes of  
previous meetings and the weight they attach to each aspect, and whether 
action has been taken on decisions made.  It is possible to find out 
decisions which have been implemented  as  members report back on 
matters arising from previous meetings. 
 
·  which category of members or individuals  participate most and 
contribute in discussions. 
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· members who make practical and constructive input to discussions. 
 
·  members who make least or no contribution to discussions. 
 
· the type of items on the agenda which are given more weight and are 
discussed at greater length and those which are given lesser weight.  
 
·  language used to conduct meetings and whether members are able to 
understand and communicate properly.     
 
· whether there are members who dominate discussions and their influence 
on decisions taken. 
 
· whether members work together as a team or are divided in cliques which 
oppose each other. This will be revealed by observing how they participate 
in discussions and the way they take decisions in meetings; and also how 
they listen and react to inputs from different members. 
 
Above aspects will be observed by sitting in meetings of SGBs. 
 
 
4. Duration of  meetings: 
· A meeting can take long when there are either too many items to be 
discussed or important matters to deliberate.  However, a meeting can 
prolong if people take much time to provide unnecessary input;  if there is 
in- fighting among members and they delay deliberately to make 
decisions; and if people want to avoid responsibility by making decisions. 
 
5. Sitting arrangements: 
· Sometimes people sit near each other in order to discuss the agenda 
informally before the meeting starts and to adopt a common stand.  They 
might also sit near each other because one member does not understand 
the language used properly. Therefore he/she might rely on the other 
member for assistance in explaining  the discussions. These are some of 
the aspects which will be observed in sitting arrangements during 
meetings of SGBs. 
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